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Abstract
The thesis is an in-depth survey of the law of self-determination from the perspective of the
interaction between nationalism and international law. It argues that, as nationalism (the doctrine
that the nation is the basis for the state) provides the basic legitimacy for the modern state and as
the state is, in turn, the basic unit of international law, one would expect to see nationalist
arguments in that law. International bodies may use the language of nations and peoples to
legitimise their positions, whether this is the drafting of an instrument or a decision by a court.
However, it is also argued that while these bodies may refer to peoples, they remain essentially
elite institutions disconnected from mass politics. Therefore, the peoples they cite may be no
more than an idea of a people, a political idea whose function is to legitimise a particular action
or decision, and whose characteristics may be subjectively shaped to fit that decision.
The interaction between nationalism and international law creates certain tensions in the law
of self-determination. Nationalism requires that self-determination be exercised by all authentic
peoples and that states conform to those peoples. Positive international law is ultimately based
on states and their intent, and seeks to establish a certain degree of clarity and consistency in that
intent. These are two very different standards and there is no stable middle ground between
them. Thus, self-determination can alternatively be criticised for falling short of a right of “all
peoples” and for the lack of clarity and consistency in its obligations.
The thesis also considers the close relationship between national ties and legal principles.
National ties used to identify a nation, such as language, territory, religion, identity etc., can
readily relate to principles, like self-determination, territorial integrity and state sovereignty. The
law of self-determination usually presents these principles in an antagonistic relationship with
each other: self-determination v. territorial integrity etc. However, it is argued that these balances
merely represent the different weight attached to various ties in the definition of a nation: self-
determination highlights subjective ties, territorial integrity emphasises territorial ties etc.
The thesis also looks at the consequences of this interaction, first its historical context, then in
the drafting of instruments, the decisions of courts and legal obligations. It is argued that in the
drafting of instruments, various bodies use a technique of “balancing”, in which self-
determination is balanced by other principles. This allows self-determination to be proclaimed as
a right of “all peoples” (satisfying nationalism), while effectively limiting it to certain situations
(satisfying positive law). However, there are two problems with this approach. First, despite this
formula of words, the balance is still evidently intented to restrict self-determination. This has
lead, in turn, to attempts to establish more sensitive balances. Second, these balances of
principles may encapsulate national ideas and far from establishing legal clarity can simply boil
down to competing interpretations of “people” and “country”.
These problems become more evident in decisions by courts and similar bodies. It is argued
that balancing in this case becomes unsatisfactory because it does not address nationalist
perceptions of legitimacy. If self-determination is to be promoted or contained, it does matter
whether the groups in question are peoples or not. It cannot simply be left to principles. As a
consequence, courts and similar bodies often seem to supplement these balances with nationalist
rhetoric, in which peoples are identified and shaped to support particular principles. Finally, for
these reasons, the law of self-determination is seen as one in which the right can alternatively be
used to support or to challenge existing obligations, but is highly problematic as a source of
obligations in itself.
“Ideas might be used as weapons…  as a weapon, ‘self-
determination’ should be handled with care.”
H. F. E. WHITLAM
AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION DURING THE
DRAFTING OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COVENANTS, 264th MEETING, 1952.
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1Introduction: The Idea of the People
There are few concepts so widely used, but little understood as the right of peoples to self-
determination. The right, by which peoples freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development,1 undoubtedly occupies a key position in some of
the most prominent international instruments. It features in article 1 of the United Nations Charter
1945, among the purposes of the organisation. It is the first right in the twin Human Rights
Covenants 1966, one of seven basic legal principles in the Friendly Relations Declaration, GA
Res. 2625(XXV) 1970 and one of ten in the Helsinki Final Act 1975. It has been variously
described as the basis for friendly relations, peace and development, and a prerequisite for human
rights. It is also hotly contested around the world: from the heights of the Caucasus Mountains to
the Pacific island of New Caledonia, from the indigenous peoples of the Arctic to the deserts of
Western Sahara, and numerous points in between.
At the same time, self-determination is not just contested, but notoriously ambiguous. The
right itself not only remains an open concept, but its subject, the “people” is effectively undefined
and legendarily undefinable. This certainly hasn’t been for a lack of academic interest. Self-
determination commands a vast and rapidly expanding literature. However, too often this
literature tends to skirt around certain issues, most notably the people. This is unfortunate. As
self-determination is a right of peoples, the people not only provides a logical starting point for a
study of the right, but it is, in fact, hard to see how much headway can be made without at least
some explanation for it. Another notable weakness in the literature has been the lack of
comprehensive accounts of the sources of the law of self-determination. This field has been
dominated for some years now by Antonio Cassese’s Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal
Reappraisal. While the commanding position of this book is undoubtedly well deserved, the
dependence of so much of the recent literature on a single secondary source is also clearly a
limitation.
This work is, therefore, intended to have four goals. First, it seeks to give the reader an in-
depth account of the law of self-determination, looking in detail at the sources of the law. Second,
it aims not only to be in-depth but also with depth, digging down to the ideas and historical
context which underlie the law. The reader will be able to find details on how self-determination
was interpreted in, say, article 1(2) of the Human Rights Covenants or in Re. Secession of
Quebec. But, he or she will also find, among other things, the theory behind the American
Declaration of Independence, or Edmund Burke’s criticisms of popular sovereignty or Emmerich
de Vattel’s views on patriotism. Third, this study will take a critical look of the law of self-
determination. It will examine the right, consider its rhetoric and application, and the assumptions
behind it to develop a theory that explains its role in international law. Fourth, despite the fact that
self-determination sometimes almost seems to revel in ambiguity, the intention throughout this
1 This description of the right can be found in article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 6 ILM (1967) at pp. 360,
368; the Colonial Independence Declaration, GA Res. 1514(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684)
at pp. 66-7; the Friendly Relations Declaration, GA Res. 2625(XXV), 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 28,
(A/8028) at pp. 121-4; the Helsinki Final Act, 14 ILM (1975) pp. 1292-1324 at p. 1295; Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, 32 ILM (1993) pp. 1663-87 at p. 1665; Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations, GA Res. 50/6, 50 GAOR (1995) Supplement No. 49, (A/50/49) at p. 13.
2work is to be as clear and accessible as possible.
Having proposed these goals, it is worth outlining the basic approach of this work. Its starting
point is the proposition that the law of self-determination is the product of the interaction between
the doctrines of national self-determination and international law. This hopefully should be fairly
self-evident, and this is important because it has major implications for how the law should be
studied. If the law of self-determination is the product of this interaction, the best method for
analysing it would presumably not only be from the perspective of positive international law (the
law as binding legal obligations), but also from that of self-determination and its close associate
nationalism. (Nationalism here refers not to national prejudice, but to a doctrine which argues that
nations and peoples are the basis for the state and all other forms of legitimate political authority.)
It also means that legal studies of self-determination, in order to examine the law, must necessarily
look outside it, and those that do not may miss an important dimension. They might tell only half
the story. This can be seen in many legal studies on the law of self-determination, and to highlight
this it might be useful to take a quick look at three of the best.
Take, for example, Michla Pomerance’s hard-hitting Self-Determination in Law and Practice,
which delivers a compelling critique of the inconsistencies of the law of self-determination.
Pomerance concludes with the observation: “Even if, as a legal right, ‘self-determination’ cannot
really swim, as a moral right or political desideratum, it will not, and in the opinion of most
people should not, sink”.2 This, though, suggests that whatever self-determination’s problems
with international law, and Pomerance argues that there are many, there is another force which
works to keep it afloat. But, in Pomerance’s work this force (nationalism) remains in the
shadows, hinted at but never explicitly analysed. Moreover, although Pomerance efficiently
catalogues the problems caused by nationalism’s interaction with international law, this interaction
is presented from a purely legalistic, and thus solely negative perspective.
The importance of the nationalist dimension can also be seen in Antonio Cassese’s Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, which has set the standard (and much of the
content) for recent work in the field. Cassese describes his approach as, “positivist – a
commitment to the ‘is’”, in international law, while still taking a wider perspective: discussing the
law’s failings and, “the direction in which the international community’s conception of the right
seems to be moving”.3 In this vein he outlines what he considers to be the flaws in the law of self-
determination. Interestingly, Cassese dismisses the lack of a definition of a people as only one of
the “alleged flaws” in the law.4 However, the concept of the people clearly does play an important
role, and when he turns to what he calls the “real flaws”, Cassese delivers an essentially nationalist
critique. The law is, “blind to the demands of ethnic groups, and national, religious, cultural or
linguistic minorities”, “international law takes a ‘statist view of self-determination’”, it “ultimately
lacks universality”, and is, “frustrated by the existence of other rules that prevent its application in
some specific areas.”5 Arguably, none of these issues actually pose much of a problem for the law
as such. The fact that the law of self-determination ignores the demands of ethnic groups, is not
universally applicable and is viewed in relation to other legal principles may actually make the task
of the international lawyer considerably easier. However, where they do appear to pose a problem
2 M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine of the United Nations (Martinus
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982) at p. 73.
3 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1995) at p. 3.
4 Ibid. pp. 326-7.
5 Ibid. pp. 328-32.
3is in terms of the law’s legitimacy, and that legitimacy is, in turn, shaped by nationalism.
Karen Knop does not neglect nationalism as such in her perceptive study, Diversity and Self-
Determination in International Law. Her analysis of peoples in terms of the interpretation of
identity by legal bodies and international lawyers also, in fact, covers a similar ground to this
study. Nonetheless, nationalism does remain largely in the background. Knop prefers to deal with
issues of identity in relation to colonialism and the participation of women and indigenous
peoples, rather than how it is used by nationalism in international law. The impact of the doctrine
on the interpretation of peoples and self-determination is never really fully explored.
This can be seen, for example, in her examination of the International Court of Justice’s
Western Sahara Advisory Opinion and arguments about whether Mauritania had been a “legal
entity”. Despite noting Mauritania’s claim that, “a category of people or nation existed in
nineteenth-century international law…  appropriate to the Mauritanian entity”,6 and that it
connected this people to nationalist struggles in Italy, Germany and the Balkans,7 Knop never
examines this claim as a nationalist argument. She also does not seem to consider that the Court’s
treatment of the concept of a “legal entity” may have been shaped by national considerations, even
though its decision explicitly referred to, “ties of a racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and
economic nature”.8 These are, of course, ties that are normally used to identify a nation.
Nationalism, therefore, is not simply an optional extra in the legal study of self-determination.
The doctrine plays such an important role in shaping the law of self-determination that its
fingerprints can still be seen even in a purely legal study. It is, of course, better if this role is
acknowledged because then it is possible to produce a much more accurate picture of the law.
Consequently, although this work is a legal study of the law of self-determination, it is also
necessarily a hybrid, which will look at the doctrine of nationalism and its interaction with
international law. This interaction will be looked at in a number of areas, including the drafting of
instruments, adjudication and legal obligations.
Nationalism is itself an enormous field and there are a variety of approaches to it. The one
taken by this work, and which forms its basic theory for the role of the people in international law
is as follows: Nationalism is a doctrine of political and legal legitimacy, which proposes that the
basis for legitimate authority is a nation or a people. However, to do this it must first of all have
an image of that nation or people to provide a blueprint for this authority. This means that a
people, or its image, necessarily assumes the role of a political idea, which is used to legitimise the
existence and actions of political and legal institutions. This idea, the idea of a people is absolutely
central to nationalist politics and provides, in the words of Lord Acton, no less than, “the mould
and measure of the State”.9 Nationalism means that the interpretation of peoples is inherently a
political matter, which determines the legitimacy of political and legal institutions and what they
can do. As the Canadian Supreme Court noted in Re. Secession of Quebec and the International
Court of Justice in Western Sahara, it is the “characterizing”10 or the “consideration”11 of a
population as a “people” that is the key to self-determination in international law. The focus, then,
6 K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2002) at p. 147.
7 Ibid. pp. 147-8.
8 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 63, para. 149.
9 J.E.E. Acton, “Nationality” in J. N. Figgis and R. L. Vere eds., The History of Freedom and Other Essays
(MacMillan and Co., London, 1922) pp. 270-300 at p. 299.
10 Re. Secession of Quebec, 161 DLR (1998) 4th Series, p. 437, para. 123.
11 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 33, para. 59.
4is on the use of peoples as a rhetoric.
Contrary to what might be the preferred self-image of international lawyers, international law
is, in fact, institutionally orientated towards this type of argument. The basic unit of international
law is the sovereign state, and today these are invariably legitimised in national and nationalist
terms.12 Moreover, international organisations not only incorporate these national structures into
their organisation (e.g. the Russian, French, Chinese etc. representative in the UN General
Assembly, Security Council etc.), but also provide forums (most notably the UN General
Assembly) for the expression of nationalist principles. One might expect, then, that nationalist
rhetoric could be used in relations between states and that this may extend into international law.
And nationalism does appear to occupy a central position in international law. This is reflected in
both article 1 of the UN Charter, which makes self-determination the basis for friendly relations
among nations, and the twin Human Rights Covenants, which declare it the first human right. If
the nationalist argument can function in international law, then one would also expect see peoples
being used as political ideas to legitimise various activities, including the drafting of instruments
and the adjudication of disputes.
The idea of the people is, therefore, central to the nationalist argument, but it is more than
simply the lowest common denominator in the study of nationalism and national self-
determination. It is argued here that treating the people or nation as a political idea is the most
productive way of looking at self-determination in international law. Indeed, it may be more
useful than looking at peoples as sociological entities, which the rhetoric of self-determination
suggests, and there are three reasons why this may be the case.
First, the politics of international law displays two particular features which make it likely that
the rhetoric of peoples will be used. Firstly, as we have seen, is that it is structurally orientated
towards the nationalist argument. If one can generally talk of a double-edged process of
“‘politicizing’ law” and “‘legalizing’ politics”,13 then nationalism clearly has a place in this politics.
Secondly, international law is a fundamentally elite affair. Self-determination may introduce the
language of bottom-up mass politics, but international law is essentially a top-down doctrine
created by elites, like states’ representatives and international functionaries, with very few, if any,
mechanisms for direct popular participation. Despite its populist language, the law of self-
determination is focussed on this elite plane and may not even require the direct involvement of
peoples. The International Court of Justice notably described the principle as, “the need to pay
regard to the freely expressed will of peoples”.14 It is evident that “need” falls someway short of
“obligation” and “pay regard” is somewhat less than “respect”. Popular expressions of the will of
the people, like plebiscites may be important for the right’s legitimacy, but elites, national or
international, still have considerable discretion as to whether they use these mechanisms and the
conditions under which they do so.15
However, if peoples actually have little direct involvement in the creation of international law,
the representation of nations and peoples is a standard feature of the political environment in
12 W. Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1990) at p. 1
13 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Finnish
Lawyers’ Publishing Company, Helsinki, 1989) at p. xxiii.
14 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 33, para. 59.
15 Harold Johnson: “[T]here has been no general acceptance of the plebiscite as a regularly acceptable means
for self-determination.” H. S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations (A. W. Sijthoff,
Leyden, 1967) at p. 200.
5which the law is developed. It is common for states’ representatives, the leaders of national
liberation movements and even representatives of international organisations to appeal to nations
and peoples to legitimise their positions. Nonetheless, despite this rhetoric, there is a notable
distance between this level of decision-making and the peoples in question. This distance
separates peoples and nations as political ideas from the actual people themselves.
The distance can be physical. Individuals, perhaps in the International Court of Justice in The
Hague, or the United Nations in New York, may make determinations about the rights of peoples
on the other side of the world. But connected to this, and more importantly, there may be a
mental distance. These individuals may not be intimately familiar with the peoples in question and
be reliant on information presented to them. They have, in other words, an outside perspective. A
striking illustration of this was provided by Judge Petrén in his separate opinion in Western
Sahara:
“[E]ach judge has had to struggle – as far as his knowledge of languages would allow –
through the immense literature existing on the questions of African history to which
reference was made, and has been able to inform his colleagues of the fruits of his reading.
It is nevertheless striking that the Advisory Opinion should be based almost exclusively on
the documents and arguments submitted by interested States, which are accepted or
dismissed in light of an examination of the evidence adduced.”16
As to the standard of this evidence, Judge de Castro complained that:
“[T]he Court had nothing to go on, in my opinion, except vivid and touching descriptions of
desert life – but no concrete facts…  which would fulfil the conditions required of evidence
to be submitted to a court.”17
This standard of evidence, though, did not prevent the court from making a number of
determinations as to the nature and rights of the populations of Western Sahara, Morocco and
Mauritania. A decisive factor in defining the rights of peoples, therefore, may be the perception of
those populations by elite international bodies. It can be noted that ignorance may be as powerful
as knowledge in shaping national rights. To cite a notorious example, Neville Chamberlain’s
description of Czechoslovakia in 1938 as “a far-away country” and a “people of whom we know
nothing”,18 and the policy that this rationalised, certainly had a profound effect on Czech and
Slovak self-determination.
The second reason for focussing on the people as a political idea relates to the rhetoric of
nationalist politics. It may be objected that, while much of the development of the law of self-
determination might take place on an elite level, this may only be a reaction to the success of
nationalist movements representing particular peoples. This may or may not be true. However, the
problem is that nationalist movements invariably claim to represent peoples regardless of their
level of popular support. Correspondingly, to see the success of a nationalist movement as
evidence in itself for sociological peoples may be to accept the rhetoric of self-determination too
16  Judge Petrén, Separate Opinion, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 113.
17  Judge de Castro, Separate Opinion, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 172.
18 Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut,
1965) at p. 366.
6uncritically on its own terms.19 Nationalist movements may succeed for a variety of reasons and in
the right circumstances may not need mass support much less whether those masses form a
sociological people (whatever that is).
In this regard it can be noted that some writers have found considerable differences between
the peoples accorded rights in international law and their sociological composition. This criticism
has been levelled, above all, at the colonial “people”. For example, Anna Michalska has argued
that:
“One cannot ignore that colonial states were often artificially created: they were composed
of different national, ethnic and religious groups (which sometimes remained markedly
different)... Can such an exercise of the right to self-determination of colonial and
dependent peoples fully satisfy peoples?”20
A similar point was made by Karen Knop:
“Rather than as corresponding to a sociological fact, we might justify the colonial
categories of ‘peoples’ as a normative designation. Whether or not a trust territory or non-
self-governing territory had some identity apart from the purely administrative, its
population was normatively joined together as a ‘people’ by virtue of suffering the
collective injury of colonialism.”21
However, the colonial “people” was not simply created in the minds of lawyers. It was the
product of the success of nationalist movements in colonial territories which usually acceded to
independence as one unit. Even if one accepts that colonial peoples were not sociological peoples
(whatever those are), one is still faced with the fact that they represent probably the most
successful application of self-determination in international law. Similar objections may be made
to other legal peoples. The peoples of many, perhaps most, of the world’s states may have
dubious sociological credentials. If self-determination in Eastern Europe is looked from a purely
sociological perspective, it may be hard to explain why an apparently sociological nation,
Romania and Moldova failed to reunite, or why Latvia and Estonia’s very large Russian minorities
acquiesced in, and in some cases supported Baltic independence. In fact, surprisingly little of the
law of self-determination corresponds exactly with sociological peoples, and yet the right has been
successfully invoked again and again. One conclusion from this might be that the law of self-
determination is artificial or contrived: that it is not really national self-determination. This may or
may not be true, but unfortunately it does not take us very far in understanding self-determination
in international law, which is, after all, the goal of this study. From this perspective, we might
conclude that there is, in fact, only a limited mileage in an approach simply based on a sociological
concept of peoples: whatever that is.
This leads to the third point. Treating a people or a nation as a sociological entity quickly runs
into the dead end that there is no agreed definition of what such an entity is. Charles Tilly has
19 See J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Second Edition), (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994) at
pp. 405-6.
20 A. Michalska, “Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination in International Law” in W. Twining ed., Issues of
Self-Determination (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1991) pp. 71-90 at p. 82.
21 Knop op. cit. no. 6 at pp. 56-7.
7called the nation, “one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon.”22 Eric
Hobsbawm compared attempts to quantify them to mapping floating clouds.23 And Hugh Seton-
Watson found himself, “driven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of a nation can be
devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists.”24 The one point on which experts generally
seem to agree is the lack of any agreement on a definition of a nation or a people.
This is not for a lack of imagination. There are formidable barriers to any definition of a people
or a nation. Peoples are groups which are typically composed of millions of individuals, and these
individuals may associate with each other a multitude of ways. A national identity may be only
one of several identities: social, occupational, religious, political, regional, gender etc., and their
value, content and consequences may vary according with the circumstances in which people find
themselves.25 The extreme example is a civil war in which people are prepared to kill each other,
but are still considered one nation.
Moreover, a national identity itself is not fixed. Various ties, like language, religion, politics,
history or race, can be used to identify a nation, but different people within the same nation may
have their own views on which of these are important in defining it. Is the essence of a nation in
its culture or in its institutions and values? Is it traditional or modern, religious or secular, uni- or
multicultural? Each position would emphasise different ties and people may have very different
perspectives on what it means to be part of a nation. The importance of these ties may also vary
situationally. Language, for example, might not seem important to a person surrounded by people
of the same speech, but put that person together with individuals speaking a different tongue and
it may suddenly become much more relevant. On top of all this, individuals may have more than
one national or ethnic identity: hyphenated Americans, Swedish Finns, Swiss Germans etc. The
concepts of peoples and nations are extremely complex and do not lend themselves to easy
formulation.
Nonetheless, in spite of this lack of a definition, self-determination still seems to play an
important role in international law. More to the point, perhaps it performs this role because there
is no definition. Perhaps if there were such a definition, maybe its role would be very different.
The lack of an agreed scientific definition for a people is not simply an academic failure, for
intellectuals to ponder. It is also a spectacular opportunity. If a nation or a people is the basis for
the state, as self-determination implies, if self-determination is the basis for friendly relations
between nations, as the UN Charter asserts, and if, as is frequently claimed, it is the prerequisite
for human rights: if it is so important: would such a vacuum stand unfilled? It seems unlikely. The
lack of a definition provides the room for peoples to be used as political ideas. One might even
say without contradiction that a defining feature of the people and its role in international law is
that it is undefined. If it is claimed that a group is a people there is no agreed standard against
22 C. Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in C. Tilly ed., The Formation of National
States in Western Europe (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975) pp. 3-83 at p. 6.
23 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1990) at p. 6.
24 H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism
(Methuen, London, 1977) at p. 5.
25 H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background (MacMillan, New York, 1951) at
p. 11; B. Azkin, State and Nation (Hutchinson University Library, London, 1964) at pp. 53-4; E. Hobsbawm,
“Language, Culture and National Identity” 63 Social Research (1996) pp. 1065-1080 at p. 1067; D. Miller, On
Nationality (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) at pp. 46, 120.
8which that claim can be measured. It is purely a matter of perception.26 The lack of a definition of
a people may be a problem for lawyers, but it can lubricate the politics of nationalism. Oscar
Schachter, for example, has complained that:
“[P]rinciples of self-determination do not provide a regulative norm to determine which
‘people’ are entitled to self-determination... It leaves the UN door open for any self-defined
‘nation’ to claim sovereign rights based on the universal right of self-determination.”27
This may frustrating for Schachter and other lawyers trying to identify legal norms, but how is it a
disadvantage for nationalists?
An example of this is provided by the UN draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. This drafting process, which is still ongoing, brings in not only the representatives of
states, but also of indigenous peoples. The latter derive their legitimacy directly from representing
a group and, in the drafting process, have sought to maximise their rights in two consistent ways.
First, they have rejected any objective definition of an indigenous “people”, demanding, that these
populations define themselves. Second, they have insisted that the right of self-determination
should have no express limitations. This would seem to underline that objective definitions only
seem to limit the possibilities of what can be achieved with self-determination.
To sum up, this work is intended as an in-depth study of the law of self-determination centred
on the people. As this law is the product of the interaction between nationalism or the right of
self-determination and international law, it is argued that a hybrid approach, combining both a
nationalist and a legal perspective, will be most productive. As a study of nationalist politics in
international law, the focus will be away from peoples as sociological entities towards their role as
political ideas. This, of course, does not mean that ideas of peoples should be divorced from the
social, cultural, political or economic roots of self-determination. However, at the same time, this
political rhetoric, especially in the context of international law, may be somewhat removed from
the peoples in question and this makes the approach particularly productive. In legal practice on
self-determination nationalist politics and international law have become so interconnected that it
is hard to see where one ends and the other begins. Nationalist considerations, it will be shown,
can shape the drafting of instruments, the decisions of judicial bodies and international legal
obligations. The right of self-determination allows, perhaps even requires nationalists and
international lawyers to step into each other’s shoes. This work will see how they do so.
The study is divided into five chapters. Each one will look at a different aspect of the law of
self-determination from the perspective of the interaction between nationalism and international
law. The first chapter, “Nationalism and the Right of Self-Determination” is intended to explore
26 Rogers Brubaker: “Nationhood is not an unambiguous social fact; it is a contestable – and often contested –
political claim.” R. Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism” in M. Moore ed., National
Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) pp. 233-65 at p. 238; Asbjørn Eide:
“The concept of ‘nation’ is not descriptive: It contains a subjectively felt aspiration or an assertion with far-
reaching political significance”. A. Eide, “In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession” in C. Tomuschat
ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 139-76 at p. 142; K. R. Minogue,
Nationalism, (Basic Books, New York, 1967) at p. 154; T. Makkonen, Identity, Difference and Otherness: The
Concepts of ‘People’, ‘Indigenous People’ and ‘Minority’ in International Law (Erik Castrén Institute of
International Law and Human Rights, Helsinki, 2000) at p. 78.
27 O. Schachter, “Sovereignty – Then and Now” in R. St. John MacDonald ed., Essays in Honour of Wang
Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) pp. 671-88 at p. 684.
9some of the basic concepts necessary for any investigation of the law of self-determination,
including the doctrines of nationalism and self-determination, and the relationship between the
national ties used to identify peoples and legal principles. The second chapter, “The Historical
Development of Self-Determination” will look at the historical basis for the interaction between
nationalism and international law, charting the evolution of national self-determination from the
medieval period to the end of the First World War. In particular, it will consider the role of the
modern state in this development and the relationship between three products of this institution:
the doctrines of nationalism, liberalism and international law. The third chapter, “Self-
Determination and International Instruments: A Question of Balance” will consider the drafting of
international instruments on self-determination and the tensions in that process. The fourth
chapter, “Self-Determination and Courts: Tipping the Balance” will investigate how courts and
other international bodies respond to cases involving self-determination. The fifth chapter, “The
Law of Self-Determination: A Contradiction in Terms?” examines the ambivalent attitude of
nationalism in the creation of legal obligations and asks how well the law of self-determination
can actually be understood in legal terms.
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1
Nationalism and the Right of Self-Determination
Introduction
This chapter might be called the conceptual one. Its basic aim is to outline a number of
concepts which are essential for a study of self-determination in international law. First there will
be a brief explanation of the terms “people”, “nation”, “country” and “minority”. This will be
followed by an examination of the doctrines of nationalism and national self-determination and
their impact on international law. Finally, the chapter will consider the hand in glove relationship
between the national ties used to identify a nation and many legal principles. Together this will
provide the reader with both the vocabulary and the underlying philosophy behind the interaction
between nationalism and international law.
1. A Few Basic Terms: “People”, “Nation”, “Country” and “Minority”
“People”: The focus of this work is on the people as a political idea, which forms the basis for
and legitimises states and other political institutions and the relations between them. It is not
necessary for this theory to provide a concrete definition of a people, and there will be no
attempt to do so. The chapter, though, will examine the various national ties used to identify
peoples.
“Nation”: In general this work will use the terms “people” and “nation” synonymously and
not seek to draw a distinction between them. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the
right of self-determination and also other rights have been accorded to both peoples and nations.1
1 E.g. “[T]he right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all
fundamental human rights.” GA Res. 637(VII), 7 GAOR (1952) Supplement No. 20, (A/2361) p. 26; “The right of
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources”. GA Res. 1803(XVII), 17 GAOR (1962)
Supplement No. 17, (A/5217) p. 15; “All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of
peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any form of foreign pressure”. GA Res. 2131(XX), 20 GAOR
(1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) p. 12. Saudi Arabia: “[T]he right of nations to self-determination” 5 GAOR
(1950) 3rd Cmttee., 309th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.309) para. 54; France: “[I]t was clear from its very name that ‘the right
of nations to self-determination’ was not even a collective human right, but a right of nations as such.” Ibid. para.
62; USSR: “[T]he right of peoples and nations to national self-determination” 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 359th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.359) para. 8; Byelorussian SSR: “[S]uch rights as that of peoples and nations to self-
determination”. Ibid. para. 21; Ecuador: “[T]he right of peoples and nations to self-determination proclaimed in
Articles 1 and 73 of the Charter”. Ibid. 366th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.366) para. 52; US: “… [T]he principle of the self-
determination of peoples and nations stated in the Charter”. Ibid. 367th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.367) para. 46; Afghanistan:
“The question of a distinction between a people and a nation might be raised. With regard to self-determination the
terms were identical.” Ibid. 396th mtg., (A/C.3/396) para. 58; Syria: “With regard to the word ‘people’…  in its
context the word clearly meant the multiplicity of human beings constituting a nation”. Ibid. 397th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.397) para. 5; UK: “‘Peoples’ might be equated with nations as in the Charter of the United Nations”. 7
GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 24; Netherlands: “The concept of ‘nation’ gave rise to
some difficulties. The subject of internal self-determination was the nation already constituted, the State, whereas
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Second, legal studies have been unable to make a clear distinction between the two.2 The main
difference appears to be that “nation” can be a broader concept, which can refer not only to
groups of people, but also to political institutions. While “nation” has been used synonymously
with “state”, a distinction may be drawn between a “people” and a “state”. It is possible to talk of
the “people of the state”, but not the “people” as the “state”.3 Third, as self-determination is a
doctrine about the perception of legitimacy, the colloquial use of the term may be as important as
its legal usage. In the normal usage, again, “people” and “nation” have been used
synonymously.4
“Country”: Connected to a nation or a people is the term “country”. “Country” like “nation”
or “people” may refer to a national entity. However, the most notable distinction is that
“country” seems to place more emphasis on the territorial aspects of nationality. Thus, while it
may or may not be possible to talk of the world-wide Jewish diaspora as a “nation” or a
“people”, it would be harder to call them a “country”. A “Jewish country” would seem to refer to
the state of Israel.
“Minority”: A legal line may not have been drawn between a people and a nation, but there
certainly have been attempts to draw one between a people and a minority. The line is that, while
“peoples” have a right to self-determination, persons belonging to minorities do not, but have
other, minority rights.5 There is again no generally accepted definition of a minority, although
the subject of external self-determination was the nation which wished to constitute itself as such or was in the
process of doing so.” Ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 7; El Salvador: “[P]rinciple of self-determination of
peoples and nations.” Ibid. 450th mtg., (A/C.3/SR. 450) para. 50; Norway: “[T]he right of all nations freely to
determine their own political, economic, social and cultural status”. 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 569th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.596) para. 3; Columbia: “[T]he right of peoples to self-determination must belong to nations”. 10 GAOR
(1955) 3rd Cmttee., 639th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.639) para. 35; China (ROC): “[I]t could not be denied that the right of
self-determination belonged to peoples and nations”. Ibid. 642nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.642), para. 5; Denmark: “[T]he
right of peoples and nations to freely choose their own form of government.” Ibid. 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para.
2; Venezuala: “[T]he right of self-determination…  or in other words, freedom for all peoples and nations to manage
their affairs in all respects without the intervention of another people or nation.” Ibid. 646th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.646)
para. 42; Lebanon: “[A]ll peoples and all nations should have the right of self-determination.” Ibid. 649th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.649) para. 29.
2   See Cristescu: “‘Nations’ – entities to which the Charter refers at several points – are also holders of equal
rights and the right of self-determination. Although they are not expressly mentioned in the formulation of this
principle in the International Covenants on Human Rights, they are implied, being covered by the term ‘peoples’.”
A. Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination (E/CN.4/Sub.2/404) vol. I, p. 143, para. 280.
3 “…  ‘nations’ is used in the sense of all political entities, states and non-states, whereas ‘peoples’ refers to
groups of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or nations”. Doc. WD 381, CO/156, UNCIO, vol.
XVIII at p. 658.
4 “nation … a large community of people of mainly common descent, language, history etc., usually inhabiting a
particular territory and under one government.” “people … the persons composing a community, tribe, race or
nation”. The Oxford Paperback Dictionary (H. Liebeck and E. Pollard eds.), (Fourth Edition), (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1994).
5 Cristescu: “A people should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, whose existence and
rights are recognized in article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”op. cit. no. 2 vol. I at
p. 142, para. 279; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23 (50): “Article 27 of the Covenant [on Civil
and Political Rights] provides that, in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. The Committee observes
that this article establishes and recognizes a right which is conferred on individuals belonging to minority groups
and which is different from, and additional to, all other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone else,
they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant. In some communications submitted to the Committee under
the Optional Protocol, the right protected under article 27 has been confused with the right of peoples to self-
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there are some authoritative ones, such as those proposed by Francesco Capotorti6 and Jules
Deschênes.7 This work is not intended as a general examination of the concept of a “minority”
and for its purposes a minority can be considered to have three features. First, it is a collection of
individuals defined by the possession of certain national or ethnic characteristics. Second, they
exist in the context of a political institution. Usually this is a state, but it could also be a colony, a
federal unit, an autonomous region or any other political unit in which they form a numerical
minority. Third, despite the possession of these national or ethnic characteristics, they are not
generally considered to be “peoples” with a right to self-determination.
These characteristics are, of course, based on arbitrary and indeterminate values. A minority
is defined in relation to something else: the majority population of a state or other political unit.
It is defined negatively by not being a people. And its positive features are hard to define. What
are national or ethnic characteristics? These might include language, culture, race or religion, but
not all religious minorities, for example, are considered to be national or ethnic groups. Some
are, but many are not. These flaws are, however, important for this rough definition because they
reflect the characteristic tensions between the concepts of “peoples” and “minorities” in
international law.
2. Nationalism
a. The Basic Doctrine
Some clarification of the term nationalism is also needed. Nationalism here is not used to
refer to xenophobia, jingoism or national prejudice. A nationalist may, of course, display some
or all these inclinations, but another may not and they are in no way integral to the doctrine.8
Indeed, in some circumstances that they may work against it.9 Nationalism is not even
determination proclaimed in article 1 of the Covenant…  The Covenant draws a distinction between the right to self-
determination and rights protected under article 27. The former is expressed to be a right belonging to peoples and is
dealt with in a separate part (part I) of the Covenant.” 49 GAOR (1994) Supplement No. 40, (A/49/40) p. 107, paras.
1, 2 and 3.1; P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) at pp.
13-4; R. Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development and Human Rights (United Nations University
Press, Tokyo, 1990) at p. 9; N. Lerner, “The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law” in C. Brölmann, R.
Lefeber and M. Zieck eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 77-
101 at pp. 92-3. But see J. Crawford, “The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions” in J. Crawford ed., The Rights of
Peoples (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 159-175 at pp. 171-2.
6 Capotorti: “A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position,
whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving
their culture, traditions, religion or language.” F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (United Nations, New York, 1991) p. 96, para. 568.
7 Deschênes: “A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in
that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the
population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to
survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.” J. Deschênes, Proposal
Concerning a Definition of the Term “Minority”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, (1985) p. 30, para. 181.
8 H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (MacMillan, New York, 1951) at pp.
5-6; A. D. Smith, “Nationalism” 21:3 Current Sociology (1973) pp. 5-185 at p. 111-2.
9 For example, in countries where nationalism has been a foreign import a general adversion to foreign ideas
would impede the spread of the doctrine. See J. Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism” in E. Kamenka ed.,
Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea (Edward Arnold, London, 1973) pp. 23-36 at p. 33.
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necessarily opposed to cosmopolitanism.10 It merely demands that a cosmopolitan order should
have a national basis. If that sounds like a contradiction in terms, consider the United Nations,
the leading example of a world organisation, which presents itself as the product of the genius of
the world’s peoples, reflects national differences in its organisation and proclaims as one of its
purposes the self-determination of peoples.
A final clarification can be made between nationalism and patriotism, the latter being defined
as a sense of affection or loyalty to a person’s state or country.11 The two are often used
synonymously, or nationalism is presented as the dark side of patriotism: a patriot loves a
country, a nationalist does the same but also hates others.12 The main difference is that, while a
patriot may be loyal to either a nation or a state, a nationalist distinguishes the roles of the former
and the latter. Patriots may act, to use a British expression, “for Queen and country”, but a
nationalist draws a distinction between the country and the Queen (or president, government,
state or any other political institution). The latter is only legitimate to the extent that it represents
the former. Nonetheless, nationalism and patriotism do often support and merge into each other,
and historically patriotism has in many cases laid the foundations for the subsequent
development of nationalism.13
Nationalism is a political doctrine is a fairly recent one, which emerged in Europe in the late
eighteenth century.14 It is also an extremely successful one, which plays a major role in defining
how the world is seen today. It is a mark of that success that many people who might not call
themselves nationalists can, nonetheless, readily relate to its values.15 The basic assumptions of
10 Sun Yat-sen: “We, the wronged races, must first recover our position of national freedom and equality before
we are fit to discuss cosmopolitanism…  We must understand that cosmopolitanism grows out of nationalism; if we
want to extend cosmopolitanism we must first establish strongly our own nationalism. If nationalism cannot become
strong, cosmopolitanism certainly cannot prosper.” Sun Y-s, “The Principle of Nationalism” in E. Kedourie ed.,
Nationalism in Asia and Africa (Frank Cass, London, 1970) pp. 304-17 at p. 311; Thomas Masaryk: “History further
shows that the strengthening of national feeling does not prevent the growth of internationalism and
internationalization…  True nationalism is not opposed to internationalism, but we abhor those nationalist jingoes
who in the name of nationalism oppress other nations, and we reject that form of internationalism and
cosmopolitanism, which in fact recognizes only one – its own nation – and oppresses the others. True
internationalism is not oppression, but neither is it a-nationalism nor anti-nationalism.” T. G. Masaryk, The Problem
of Small Nations in the European Crisis (Lecture given on 19 October 1915), (The Althone Press, London, 1966) at
p. 27;
11   W. Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond” 16 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1993)
pp. 373-89 at p. 374; A. D. Smith, “The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval or Modern?” 17 Ethnic
and Racial Studies (1994) pp. 375-99 at p. 380; Plamenatz op. cit. no. 9 at p. 24.
12 E.g. former German President Johannes Rau: “I never want to be a nationalist but rather a patriot. A patriot is
someone who loves his fatherland. A nationalist is someone who condemns the fatherland of others.” Toby Helm,
“President in Row over German Patriotism”Daily Telegraph (Tuesday, 20 March, 2001).
13 M. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social
Composition of Patriotic Groups Among Smaller European Nations (B. Fowkes trans.), (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1985) at pp. 132, 178.
14 Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at pp. 3, 6, 10-11; C. J. H. Hayes, The Historic Evolution of Modern Nationalism
(MacMillan, New York, 1931) at p. 6; E. Kamenka, “Political Nationalism – The Evolution of an Idea” in E.
Kamenka ed., Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea (Edward Arnold, London, 1973) pp. 3-20 at pp. 3-
4, 7-10, 17; J. A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982) at
p. 4; A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism
(Routledge, London, 1998) at pp. 1, 17, 97; K. R. Minogue, Nationalism (Basic Books, New York, 1967) at pp. 20,
33; H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism
(Methuen, London, 1977) at p. 6.
15 J. Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism” in Gopal Balakrishnan ed., Mapping the Nation (Verso, New York,
1996) pp. 146-74 at p. 171; L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Harvard University Press,
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nationalism, as Ernest Gellner noted, “are so much part of the air we breathe that they are taken
for granted quite uncritically.”16 To put it quite simply, if you believe that in principle peoples
and nations should have a right to self-determination, you have probably absorbed at least some
nationalist ideas. The reason for this success is nationalism’s simplicity. Benedict Anderson
complained of the “philosophical poverty” of the doctrine: that, “unlike most other isms,
nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers”.17 One might counter that a number of
important political philosophers have incorporated elements of nationalism into their theories,
but this poverty is, in fact, its strength. With, no more than a couple of basic premises, it is
highly flexible and can be adopted, and has been adopted, by politicians of every shade of the
political spectrum.18
The basic principles of political nationalism19 can not only be seen in nationalist works but
also in international instruments and legal commentaries. There are two core beliefs: first, that
the world is divided into nations or peoples,20 and, second, that the nation or people is the basis
for the state.21 Correspondingly, the nation obtains freedom by the establishment of its own state,
and the only legitimate form of statehood is the nation-state. Other important elements are that
individuals can only obtain freedom and self-realisation through their nation,22 and that they owe
Cambridge: Mass, 1992) at p. 3.
16 E. Gellner, Thought and Change (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964), at p. 150.
17 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (Revised Edition), (Verso, London, 1991), at p. 5.
18 E. Kedourie, Nationalism (Hutchinson, London, 1960), at pp. 89-91; D. Miller, On Nationality (Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1995) at pp. 4, 187-8.
19 See J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Second Edition), (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994), at
p. 2; Smith loc. cit. no. 8 at p. 10; A. J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with
Nationalism in the USSR (Columbia University Press, New York, 1990) at p. 53; Gellner op. cit. no. 16 at p. 150;
Kedourie op. cit. no. 18 at p. 73; J. Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1990) at p. 2; H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1958) at
pp. 230-1; Q. Wright, “Recognition and Self-Determination” 48 Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law (1954) pp. 23-37 at p. 23; F. Tesón, “Ethnicity, Human Rights, and Self-Determination” in D.
Wippman ed., International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998) pp. 86-111 at pp. 86-
7; A. Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession” 101 Ethics (1991) pp. 322-42 at p. 328.
20 Johann Gottfried von Herder (influential cultural nationalist): “Nature had distributed its gifts differently
according to climate and culture. How could they be compared to one another? Rather we should rejoice, like Sultan
Suleiman, that there are such varied flowers and peoples on the gay meadow of this earth, that such different
blossoms can bloom on both sides of the Alps, and that such varied fruits can ripen. Let us rejoice that Time, the
great mother of all things, throws now these and now other gifts from her horn of plenty and slowly builds up
mankind in all its different component parts.” Quoted in Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at p. 434.
Charter of the United Nations: “We the Peoples of the United Nations… ” Preamble.
21 Adam Mickiewicz (Polish national poet): “For a universal war for the freedom of nations, We beseech Thee,
oh Lord. For national arms and eagles, We beseech Thee, oh Lord. For a happy death on the field of battle, We
beseech Thee, oh Lord. For a grave for our bones on our own earth, We beseech Thee, oh Lord. For the
independence, integrity and freedom of our country, We beseech Thee, oh Lord.” A. Mickiewicz, “Litany of the
Pilgrim” in A. Mickiewicz, Selected Poetry and Prose (S. Helsztynski ed.), (Polonia Publishing House, Warsaw,
1955) at pp. 115-6.
GA Res. 1514(XV): “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development… Immediate steps
shall be taken in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories…  to transfer all powers to the peoples of those
territories…  in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom (emphasis added).” GA Res.
1514(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) at p. 67.
22 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (German nationalist and pioneer of national self-determination): “Only in so far as each
one of these nations, left to itself, develops and takes shape in accordance with its own peculiarities, and in so far as
each individual in each of these nations also develops and takes shape in accordance with this common peculiarity
as well as with his own particular peculiarity, is the phenomenon of divinity reflected in the way it should be… ” J.
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to it certain duties, above all loyalty.23 Finally, and especially important for international law,
peaceful and friendly relations between states, and progress and development can only be
achieved by free nations.24
Nationalism is ultimately a doctrine about statehood: whether it is legitimate and what form it
should take. Its basic prescription for the non-national state is still statehood, but in a different
form. Non-national states should be broken up or merged, as appropriate, until they form nation-
states, which coincide with peoples. Nationalism, however, is not exclusively concerned with
statehood and may also involve other political institutions. Nationalists within a state may for
tactical or practical reasons press for autonomy rather than full independence.25 On the other
hand, nationalists seeking the unification of several states may establish an international
organisation, both as an expression of the common bond between those states and as a forum for
further political integration.
b. The Idea of the People and the Nationalist Argument
Nationalism, then, is a political doctrine and it proposes a political argument about how states
and other institutions should be structured. In this argument the people assumes the role of a
political idea which provides a blueprint for action. However, what does this argument look like
and why is it made?
Although there are numerous variations, the nationalist argument is ultimately fairly simple:
identify a nation, identify with it and make demands in its name. The people in this argument has
two basic features. First, it is usually presented as a homogeneous group with similar experiences
and aspirations. Second, it is fundamentally subjective and its features may be shaped to support
a particular position. In both cases, the idea of the people is an interpretation rather than a
G. Fichte, “Addresses to the German Nation” in H. S. Reiss ed., The Political Thought of the German Romantics
1793-1815 (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1955) pp. 102-118 at p. 108.
GA Res. 637(VII): “[T]he right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full
enjoyment of all fundamental human rights”. GA Res. 637(VII), 7 GAOR (1952) Supplement No. 20, (A/2361) at p.
26.
23 Adamantios Koraes (early Greek nationalist and language reformer): “Gaining honour from the Greek name, it
is in turn your duty to bring it honour, by calling forth once again in the midst of degraded Greece, its ancient
exaltation and splendor.” A. Koraes, “Report on the Present State of Civilization in Greece” in E. Kedourie ed.,
Nationalism in Asia and Africa (Frank Cass, London, 1970) pp. 153-87 at p. 171.
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: “The individual shall also have the duty:…  2. To serve his
national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service…  4. To preserve and strengthen
social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened; 5. To preserve and strengthen the national
independence and territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defense in accordance with the law…  7.
To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society…  8.
To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African
unity.” Article 29, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 ILM (1982) pp. 58-68 at p. 63.
24   Guiseppe Mazzini (key Italian nationalist): “The Countries of the People will rise…  Between these Countries
there will be harmony and brotherhood.” J. Mazzini, “The Duties of Man” in T. Jones ed., The Duties of Man and
Other Essays (J. M. Dent and Sons, London, 1912) pp. 7-122 at p. 52.
Human Rights Committee: “History has proved that the realization of and respect for the right of self-
determination of peoples contributes to the establishment of friendly relations and co-operation between States and
to strengthening international peace and understanding.” General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984)
Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 143, para. 8.
25 H. Meadwell, “Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism” 12 Ethnic and Racial Studies
(1989), pp. 309-28 at pp. 319-24; Smith loc. cit. no. 8 at p. 19.
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reflection of the population in question.
A case in point is the 1808-9 Addresses to the German Nation by German nationalist and
pioneer of national self-determination Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Fichte argued that:
“We are a conquered nation; whether we want to be despised and despised rightly, whether
we want to lose all honour in addition to all our other losses: all that will still depend on
ourselves. The war with arms is decided; now a new war of principles, of morals and of
character begins, and this is a war that we want.”26
This speech contained all the elements of the nationalist argument. Fichte identified a German
nation, identified with it and proposed a course of action in its name. But what was the German
nation that Fichte was addressing? His battle cry, delivered as a series of lectures at the
University of Berlin, fell largely on deaf ears: for the basic reason that the nation in his addresses
existed mostly in his mind.27 The Germany of the time was deeply divided. Politically, it was
fragmented into different states with their own histories, laws and traditions. It was split along
religious lines between Protestants and Catholics and the different states’ churches reinforced
separate identities. Socially, there was a wide gap between the political elite, which embraced
French culture, and had no interest in German unification, and the voiceless and apathetic
peasantry. The nationalist vision which Fichte promoted was basically the preoccupation of a
small and marginalised group of educated men wedged between antagonistic rulers and the
indifferent masses.28
A more contemporary example is provided by a letter sent by Yugoslavia to the UN Secretary
General in 1993:
“The proclamation of new states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been
welcomed by the international community as a kind of achievement in the exercise of the
democratic right of nations to self-determination, whereas the Serb nation’s invocation of
the same right aimed at resolving its own political and legal status has been met with open
opposition and the strongest condemnation. Thus, Serbs became a people who were denied
the right to self-determination and continuation of life in their own state. They were
accused of ‘aggression’ and ‘occupation’ of territories in which they had lived for centuries
as the majority population. The world public welcomed the demolition of the Berlin Wall
and the unification of the German people. Therefore, it is absurd that the same public
supports the erection of another wall which divides an European people – Serbs.”29
It can be seen again in the rather loaded question posed by the Serbian government to the
“Badinter” Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia:
“Does the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent
26 Fichte op. cit. no. 22 at p. 110.
27 Minogue op. cit. no. 14 at p. 64.
28 M. Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (Edward Arnold, London, 1988) at pp. 6, 16-54,
73; H. Kohn, The Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815 (D. van Nostrand,
Princeton, 1967) at pp. 148-51; C. J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (MacMillan, New York, 1960) at p. 38.
29 Letter Dated 11 June 1993 from the Chargé d’ affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/48/207 – S/25936, 14 June 1993, at p. 2.
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peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination?”30
Both again show the elements of the nationalist argument. Serbia/Yugoslavia identified a
people, the Serb people, located in the republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and having
identified it as such demanded its unification into one state, or rhetorically questioned whether
this people had a right to self-determination. But again, what was the Serb “people” in the former
Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina? While there were differences, and
sometimes tensions, between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in those republics, there were also
important differences between the people in the towns and the countryside.31
In Croatia most of the Serb population lived in urban centres where they were generally
integrated into Croatian society. Intermarriage was common and these people were dubbed Hrbi,
a conflation of the words for Serb and Croat.32 Urban Serbs showed little sympathy for Serb
nationalism. The Serb nationalist party, the Serb Democratic Party, or SDS made little
impression in these areas, and they generally proved unreceptive to propaganda either from these
nationalists or from those in Belgrade.33 The area around the town of Knin, which became the
breakaway republic of Krajina, was a different story. There, the peasants in this isolated and
impoverished region, known for its fierce gun culture, proved receptive to the incitements of
local politicians.34 Nonetheless, they constituted only about 15% of the Serb population in
Croatia.35 Moreover, rather than engaging in “self-determination”, they were following a policy
which was directed from the outside by authorities in Belgrade.
Bosnia-Herzegovina also revealed similar differences. This republic was generally less
developed and more rural than Croatia,36 and had three large national groups: the Muslims, Serbs
and Croats. However, Bosnia also had its own identity. Of all the Yugoslav republics, it had the
longest history as an independent state.37 A medieval Bosnian state existed between 1180 and
1463.38 The three peoples of this republic, alongside their Muslim, Croat and Serb identities, also
had a Bosnian identity, although this was generally weakest among the Serbs.39 In elections the
population largely divided along ethnic lines, with the nationalist SDS gaining most of the Serb
vote. However, the SDS stood only on a vague platform of national rights and the elections did
not necessarily signify popular support for partition or Serb independence.40
Again in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a big divide between the people in the towns and the
country.41 In towns, especially the capital Sarajevo, 30% of marriages were mixed42 and most
people had relatives with different national backgrounds.43 In Sarajevo 10.7% of Sarajevans,
30 Opinion No. 2, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, 31 ILM (1992) at p. 1498.
31 C. Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (Hurst and Co., London, 1995)
at p. 63.
32 M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (Penguin Books, London, 1992) at p. 3.
33 Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at pp. 125-7, 148-9.
34 Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at pp. 3, 6-7, 11.
35 Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at pp. 134-5.
36 Ibid. p. 182.
37 Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at p. 143.
38 N. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (MacMillan, London, 1994) at pp. 13-26.
39 Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at p. 142; V. Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise (S. P. Ramet trans.),
(Routledge, London, 1999) at p. 196.
40 Malcolm op. cit no. 38 at p. 222.
41 Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at p. 181; Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at p. 155.
42 Malcolm op. cit. no. 38 at p. 222.
43 Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at p. 192.
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typically children from mixed marriages, identified themselves as “Yugoslav”, the highest rate in
the whole of Yugoslavia.44 In the siege of Sarajevo, Serbs fought alongside Croats and Muslims
in defence of their homes against the invasion from the countryside.45 In the independence
referendum of 1992 thousands of urban Serbs voted in favour of Bosnian independence. Indeed,
the SDS rather than allowing the exercise of the, “democratic right of nations to self-
determination”, set up roadblocks to prevent people from voting.46
A similar point can also be made about the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croats in the
towns and in central and northern Bosnia generally had a strong Bosnian identity and supported a
united, independent Bosnia. On the other hand, the peasants in the harsh, barren land of western
Herzegovina were strongly nationalist and resisted inclusion into a Bosnian state. The western
Herzegovinans, though, were again a clear minority, about a third, of the Croat population in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.47
The point is that the people in the nationalist argument is essentially a subjective and political
one, and its presentation as a homogeneous group ignores the complexity that is inherent in large
bodies like nations. There will always be a difference between a people and its presentation by
nationalists. In some cases this difference can be enormous, so much so that some nationalists
have compared the two and had their faith shaken. For example, in the nineteenth century it was
fashionable to believe that the Slavs were one people. However, for Czech Pan-Slav nationalist
Karel Havlí?ek this idea was exposed when he actually travelled in other Slav lands:
“I learned to know Poland and I did not like it. With a feeling of hostility and pride I left
the Sarmatian country, and in the worst cold I arrived in Moscow, being warmed mostly by
the Slav feeling in my heart. The freezing temperature in Russia and other Russian aspects
extinguished the last spark of Pan-Slav love in me. So I returned to Prague as a simple
Czech, even with some secret sour feeling against the name Slav which a sufficient
knowledge of Russia and Poland has made suspect to me. Above all, I express the
conviction that the Slavs, that means the Russians, the Poles, the Czechs, the Illyrians, etc.,
are not one nation.”48
However, there are ways to bridge these gaps, in particular, it can be argued that a people is
already a unified entity, but has just not yet been “awakened”.49 An excellent example of this is
provided by UN Special Rapporteur Aureliu Cristescu: “We live in an age of the awakening of
national awareness, of the manifestation of the personality of nations which for centuries were
not subjects but objects of international law.”50 This is the nationalist version of the history of
self-determination: one in which peoples are presented as pre-existing givens which are
somehow sleeping, but when roused rise and demand their rights. It certainly should not be taken
at face value. The history of self-determination: from the French Revolution, to Italian
44 Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at pp. 142, 160; Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at p. 182.
45 Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at p. 192.
46 Malcolm op. cit. no. 38 at p. 231.
47 I. Goldstein, Croatia: A History (N. Jovanovi? trans.), (Hurst & Co., London, 1990) at pp. 239-40; Bennett op.
cit. no. 31 at p. 199; Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at p. 155.
48 Quoted in H. Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana,
1953) at p. 27.
49 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983), at p. 48; Smith op. cit. no. 14 at p. 146;
Breuilly op. cit. no. 19 at p. 405.
50 Cristescu op. cit. no. 2 vol. I at p. 146, para. 283.
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unification, the Versailles Peace Conference, the post-war decolonisation process, the collapse of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia reveals many peoples whose national identity may be mixed or
weak, divided or even non-existent. A more accurate picture is a history of nationalist
movements who have legitimised their claims to power by ideas of peoples which, to varying
degrees, may or may not correspond with the identity and aspirations of the peoples in question.
So far we have seen the nationalist argument as a positive set of demands, but the same
argument can also work the other way round. If there is no nation, or if those who claim to
represent it do not, then their demands will not be legitimate. This nationalist counter-argument
was summed up by Mr. Virally, the French delegate in the drafting of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, GA Res. 2625(XXV): “there was always a risk that a few isolated and
unrepresentative individuals might profess to speak on behalf of a people for reasons of a
personal nature or even in order to defend the interests of foreign states, and not the true interests
of that people.”51
A good example of this counter-argument in application is provided by Sir Hugh Clifford, the
British governor of Nigeria in 1920. In a speech to the Nigerian Council, he considered the West
African National Conference, a nationalist movement composed of educated, westernised
Africans, and with the paternalistic sneer of a colonial administrator, declared:
“I will leave Honourable Members to imagine what these gentlemen’s experiences would
be if, instead of travelling peacefully to Liverpool in a British ship [they] could be
deposited, unsustained by [British]…  protection, among…  the…  cannibals of the Mama
Hills,…  the determinedly unsocial Mumuyes of the Muri Province, or the equally naked
warriors of the inner Ibo country, and there left to explain their claims to be recognized as
the accredited representatives of these, their ‘fellow nationals.’”52
Another example, this time in a legal context, is provided by Australian pleadings in the East
Timor (Portugal v. Australia) case. This case concerned the former Portuguese non-self-
governing territory of East Timor, which was invaded by Indonesia in December 1975. In 1989
Australia concluded a treaty with Indonesia on the division and exploitation of the occupied
territory’s oil resources, and this formed the basis for the Portuguese action against Australia in
the International Court of Justice. One of the arguments which Australia made in court was to
attack Portugal’s right to bring the case by drawing a distinction between the Portuguese
government and the East Timorese people. In a section of its counter memorial entitled,
“Portugal’s rights are not identified with those of the people of East Timor”, it claimed that:
“Portugal can point to no basis on which its position can be identified with that of the
people of East Timor. Its alleged sovereignty has not been accepted by the East Timorese
people. Indeed, it was very shortly after Portugal’s withdrawal that Portugal’s sovereignty
was repudiated by political groups in East Timor.”53
And later on in its rejoinder:
51 France, A/AC.125/SR.106 (1969), p. 65.
52 Quoted in J. S. Coleman, Nigeria: The Background to Nationalism (University of California Press, Berkeley,
1958) at p. 193.
53 Counter Memorial of the Government of Australia, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), part II, chapter 2,
section II, p. 111, para. 242. www.icj-cij.org (03/06/04).
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“What Portugal must show is that international law allows a State, whose only basis for
acting is its description by the United Nations as administering Power, to bring an action
before the Court on behalf of a separate and distinct entity such as a people amounting to a
self-determination unit against a third State…  It asserts that States have a right to bring a
dispute before the Court on behalf of the people of a separate and distinct territory ‘dont ils
ont l’administration’ [‘of whom they are the administration’]…  The people of East Timor
and the United Nations have rejected such a role for Portugal.”54
Thus, the counter-argument can be used in both a legal and a political context to undermine the
legitimacy of the rights of an organisation or institution by separating them from the people
which they claim to represent.
Both the nationalist argument and counter-argument can be conveniently seen in GA Res.
3210(XXIX), inviting the PLO to participate as an observer at UN General Assembly and the
Israeli reaction to it. GA Res. 3210(XXIX) based its invitation on the existence of a Palestinian
people and its representation by the PLO:
“The General Assembly,
Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in
plenary meetings.”55
On the other hand, Israel pointedly drew a distinction between the organisation and the
Palestinian population:
“The so-called Palestine Liberation Organization did not emerge from within the
Palestinian community. It was the first summit meeting of Arab Governments held at
Cairo in January 1964 that decided to establish an organization under the cover of which
terror warfare would be pursued and intensified against Israel…  There was no pretence at
the time of its establishment that the PLO was in any way representative of the
Palestinians. There is no room for such pretence today. The organization has never been
anything other than a mere instrument of those who have been conducting a campaign of
savage atrocities, aimed explicitly at the destruction of Israel. It represents only itself,
namely, the approximately 10,000 murderers trained and paid for the slaughter of
innocent human beings. To equate them with the Palestinian community is to do a grave
injustice to the latter.”56
Nationalism here is presented as a series of arguments and counter-arguments based on ideas
of peoples. This might make it seem somewhat detached. It can be noted that Thomas More’s
fantasy people, the Utopians were also a homogeneous mass, “identical in language, customs,
institutions and laws.”57 However, the idea of a people in nationalism is not a “Utopia”, a “no
54 Rejoinder of the Government of Australia, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), part I, chapter 2, section II, pp.
66-7, paras. 145-6. www.icj.cij.org (03/06/04).
55 GA Res. 3210(XXIX), 29 GAOR (1974) Supplement No. 31, (A/9631) at p. 3.
56 Israel, 29 GAOR (1974) Plenary Meetings, 2267th mtg., (A/PV.2267), paras. 92-3.
57 T. More, Utopia (G. M. Logan and R. M. Adams eds.), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975) bk. II,
at p. 43.
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place”. Nationalism is ultimately very much grounded in the practical politics of the real world,58
and it is these ideas, however detatched they may sometimes seem,59 that drive it.
The textbook example is Pakistan. This was an idea which related to Muslims in the former
colony of British India. These populations, distributed as they were across a subcontinent varied
enormously: differing in language, customs, social and economic circumstances, physical
appearance and even practice of Islam. Nonetheless, although they formed majorities in large
areas of the colony, they were a minority in India as a whole. In this position, Muslim politicians
reacted in different ways to the prospect of Hindu power and domination. For Choudhary
Rahmat Ali the answer lay in a separate state. In 1933 he formally named this state “Pakistan”,
or “Land of the Pure”, which also worked as an acronym for the territories it was to include:
P(unjab), A(fghania), K(ashmir), I(ran), S(ind), (T)urkharistan, A(fghanistan) and
(Baluchista)N.60 Other Muslims did not immediately accept this idea. The Muslim League did
not adopt a Pakistan policy until l940 and even then it was subject to different interpretations.61
Nevertheless, in 1947 Pakistan became an independent state, making the transition from a
political idea to a sovereign institution in a mere fourteen years.62 This is a particularly striking
example, but every nationalism performs this same role, building ideas of peoples which form
the basis for political action.
The rhetoric of nationalism, then, consists of various arguments and counter-arguments based
on peoples as political ideas, which are presented as single, homogeneous groups. This
presentation is, in part, due to the fact that, as nationalism proposes that the people is the basis
for legitimate political authority, it needs a clear blueprint for that authority. However, it also
derives from the nature of the nation. Nations are both incredibly complex and anonymous:
people simply do not know the vast majority of their fellow nationals:63 and given this there is an
inherent tendency to simplify these groups: to see a nation as a nation not as millions of
individuals.
This simplification of things is a recurrent theme in nationalism and is expressed, in
particular, in the idea of national government as a natural state of affairs.64 As Irish playwright
George Bernard Shaw put it: “All demonstrations of the virtues of a foreign government, though
often conclusive, are as useless as demonstrations of the superiority of artificial teeth, glass eyes,
silver windpipes, and patent wooden legs to the natural products.”65 Nationalism proposes that
there is a natural political order based on nations against which states can be judged. However,
considering that all states are the product of human endeavour: created by people and maintained
by people: to what extent could any state really be described as natural? Moreover, this argument
curiously only seems to apply to states as institutions. One would not expect a bank to be a
58 Smith op. cit. no. 14 at pp. 110-1.
59 “Nationalism…  appears to be a love for an abstraction of the nation, and that abstraction may have none but
the most tenuous connection with the concrete national life. Clemenceau loving France and rather disliking
Frenchmen expresses this paradox of nationalism.” Minogue op. cit. no. 14 at p. 23.
60 E. Kedourie ed., Nationalism in Asia and Africa (Frank Cass, London, 1970) at p. 30 and C. Rahmat Ali, “The
Idea of Pakistan” in ibid. pp. 245-9; International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan: A Legal
Study by the Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, 1972) at p. 8.
61 Breuilly op. cit. no. 19 at p. 208.
62 R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge: Mass., 1960) at p. 92.
63 E. Gellner, Culture, Identity and Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987) at p. 6; A. D. Smith,
The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) at p. 171.
64 See Smith loc. cit. no. 8 at p. 10.
65 G. B. Shaw, John Bull’s Other Island (Archibald Constable and Co., London, 1909) at p. xxxv.
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natural system of banking to put money there, or for hospitals to need an organic cohesion
between doctors to treat patients. The fact is that there is no inherent distinction between natural
and artificial states. It is a judgment which is intended to reflect on their legitimacy.
Connected with this idea of a natural political order is the perception of progress.66 Although
some nationalist movements have been deliberately regressive,67 in general nationalism relies on
the perception that it represents “the tide of history” (to cite one phrase used in debates on self-
determination). The most derogatory term in the nationalist lexicon, after all, and one which is
specifically used to discredit nationalists, is “tribalism”:68 a label which envisages a movement
as being primitive and unenlightened: a step backwards.
The theme running through this rhetoric of homogeneous nations, natural government and a
march of progress is simplicity. Nationalism likes to make things simple. It seeks to hide
complex political realities behind nations and peoples. The politics by which nationalist goals are
achieved: the various personalities and organisations, the different interests and motivations, the
particular and conditional circumstances, the opportunities that are exploited: all these are
reduced to nations achieving this or that according to a natural scheme of things. The break up of
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, for example, which as we will see involved the interplay of a
variety of factors, can simply be reduced to the claim that those states were multinational,
artificial and thus doomed.
The nationalist argument is one in which nations and peoples are used to legitimise certain
political goals. And on this basic level one can easily single out individuals who have used it for
nothing more than political power or social advancement. These might include M. Ender69 and
Moise Kapenda Tshombe,70 who lead secessionist movements from Austria and Congo (Zaïre),
respectively, only later to become those countries’ leaders. There is also no necessary
contradiction between Slobodan Milošovi? leading Serbia into a series of overtly nationalist wars
in the former Yugoslavia and his wife telling EC envoy David Owen: “I gather you accuse my
husband of being a nationalist…  He’s not a nationalist. If he was, I’d never have married him.”71
Nonetheless, this does not really explain why national self-determination is a right for which,
as John Humphrey put it, “poets have sung and for which patriots have been ready to lay down
their lives.”72 The people may be used in nationalism as a political idea, but the idea obviously
66 See Kedourie op. cit. no. 60 at p. 93.
67 Hughes op. cit. no. 28 at p. 145.
68 Breuilly op. cit. no. 19 at p. 258; Smith loc. cit. no. 8 at pp. 42-3. For use of the term by international lawyers
see T. M. Franck, “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession” in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck
eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993), pp. 3-27 at pp. 3-4, 12-3, 15;
R. Higgins, “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments” in ibid. pp. 29-35 at pp. 29, 35; A.
Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) at pp.
4, 339-41; R. A. Miller, “Self-Determination and the Demise of Democracy?” 41 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (2003) pp. 601-48 at pp. 607,610, 635, 646; K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at p. 95. A similar criticism of “retrogressive”
nationalism can also be seen in A. Eide, “In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession” in C. Tomuschat ed.,
Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 139-76 at p. 140.
69 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War with a Collection of Official Documents (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1933) vol. 1 at p. 515; – “The Question of the Vorarlberg” 463
The Quarterly Review (1920) pp. 443-50.
70 A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (Frank Cass, London, 1991) at p.
66, 78.
71 Quoted in B. Johnson, “Getting to Know the Tyrant”The Spectator (7 July 2001).
72 J. P. Humphrey, “Political and Related Rights” in T. Meron ed., Human Rights in International Law: Legal
and Policy Issues (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) vol. I, pp. 171-203 at p. 193.
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also has deeper significance, relating to such fundamental issues as a person’s identity, place in
society and indeed place in the universe. Humans do have a strong tendency to associate in
groups,73 and, although nationality is not inevitable, it is extremely important for how people
define themselves.74 Different theories have highlighted that nationalism has often emerged at
times of change and upheaval when people have needed a sense of purpose and identity in a
confusing world.75 Indeed, it may have many elements of a secular religion with its own hymns,
icons, martyrs and shrines.76
Likewise nationalism and the right of self-determination in international law cannot simply be
understood in terms of the acquisition of statehood. Independence has a value in itself. It means
freedom and dignity. The drafting of UN instruments on decolonisation, in particular, the
Colonial Independence Declaration, GA Res. 1514(XV), of 1960, are full of painful references to
the basic indignity of foreign rule: “Indonesia was a nation of coolies and a coolie among the
nations”;77 “Africa…  became a laughing-stock for other nations”;78 “men are born free and
people are all equal and should be treated as such”;79 and turning these sentiments into a right:
“The right of peoples to self-determination is based, above all, on respect for human dignity,
which must come before all other considerations.”80 The nationalist demand for self-government
may not simply be one for better government. Philippine President Manuel Quezon once
proclaimed: “I prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos than a government run like heaven
by Americans!”81 And this attitude,82 has certainly informed the drafting of instruments on self-
determination.
c. Nationalism and International Law: Two Standards of Legitimacy
Nationalism’s attitude to the state is quite ironic. The doctrine is actually built around and
obsessed with states and the form that they should take. However, this is concealed by an
outward ambivalence towards the state as an institution. States are only legitimate to the extent
that they represent nations and peoples. If they do not then they are disposable and should be
disposed of in favour of national states.
International law’s approach to the state in somewhat different. States provide the basic unit
of international law, and its two principal sources, conventions and custom, depend on the
intentions and practice of sovereign states.83 Many of the forums of international law, especially
73 D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985) at pp. 144-5.
74 Greenfeld op. cit. no. 15 at p. 20.
75 Kedourie op. cit. no. 60 at pp. 23-8; Gellner op. cit. no. 49 at p. 38.
76 Hayes op. cit. no. 28 at pp. 164-8; A. D. Smith, “The Diffusion of Nationalism: Some Historical and
Sociological Perspectives” 29 British Journal of Sociology (1978) pp. 234-48 at p. 238; B. C. Shafer, Faces of
Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972) at p. 319; Anderson op.
cit. no. 17 at pp. 11-2; Hughes op. cit. no. 28 at pp. 3, 17; Smith op. cit. no. 63 at p. 175; Arendt op. cit. no. 19 at pp.
233-5, 242.
77 Indonesia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 936th mtg., (A/PV.936) para. 40.
78 Congo (Brazzaville) 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 938th mtg., (A/PV.938) para. 59.
79 Morocco, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 28.
80 Mali, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 931st mtg., (A/PV.931) para. 47.
81 Quoted in R. P. de Guzman and M. A. Reforma eds., Government and Politics of the Philippines (Oxford
University Press, Singapore, 1988) at p. 117.
82 See Emerson op. cit. no. 62 at p. 43; Horowitz op. cit. no. 73 at p. 131.
83 R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (Ninth Edition), (Longman, London, 1992) vol. I at
p. 24.
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the International Court of Justice, are open only to states.84 Moreover, positive international law
has its own standards of legitimacy, based on institutions and procedures. The legal status, for
example, of a treaty, as laid out in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, depends on the
conclusion of the instrument by representatives with full powers, that the parties have expressed
consent to be bound, and so on. Similarly, the status of a rule of customary law depends on the
practice of states accompanied by evidence for their opinio juris (legal intent).85 Underlying
these procedures are basic requirements of clarity and consistency, so that the intention of the
relevant parties can be understood.
International law and nationalism are, therefore, two very different doctrines: one
fundamentally state-based and state-orientated, the other based on nations and peoples and
ambivalent about the existence of states. However, both are fundamentally connected by the
state, which provides their nexus. States are central to international law and nationalism is
central to the legitimacy of states.
Nonetheless, if nationalism has become, via the state, important for the legitimacy of
international law, the law of self-determination is also the product of states. If the perennial
problem is that, “the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people”,86 it is
states who appear to have that power in international law. The effect of this is to divide
nationalists in two: into those who control a state and those who do not. And this clearly effects
the content of the law of self-determination. As one might expect, states’ populations regularly
feature among the groups considered to be legally entitled to the right.87 For nationalists without
a state, access to the law depends on sponsorship from states. States have often sponsored the
rights of non-state nationalists, such as those in colonial territories or in Palestine. Motives for
sponsorship may be shared experiences and aspirations, such as those between colonies and
African and Asian states, or a national affinity, such as that between Palestinians and Arab states,
or it may be for tactical reasons, to foster alliances and weaken enemies. Nonetheless, access to
international law depends on states and they are unlikely to extend sponsorship if it is against
their interests to do so.88
From the nationalist perspective the idea that the content of the right of self-determination
should be decided by states, the very objects it is aimed against, is perverse. This impression is
particularly important because self-determination is a fundamentally nationalist argument. It is
an argument about legitimacy, but its own legitimacy depends on being seen to be the genuine
expression of authentic peoples. If those elements are lacking there is little point in even raising
it.
The law of self-determination is, therefore, subject to two different standards of legitimacy:
those of nationalism and those of positive international law. On one hand, its nationalist
84 Article 34(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice.
85 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/
Netherlands) (Judgment) ICJ Reports (1969) p. 44, para. 77.
86 I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1956) at p. 56.
87 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) at pp. 100-1;
Cristescu op. cit. no. 2 vol. I at pp. 146-8; Cassese op. cit. no. 68 at p. 59; R. N. Kiwanuka, “The Meaning of
‘People’ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 82 American Journal of International Law (1988)
pp. 80-101 at pp. 95-101; A. Michalska, “Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination in International Law” in W.
Twining ed., Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1991) at p. 77; M. Bedjaoui,
Dissenting Opinion, Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 83 ILR at p.
49.
88 See R. Falk, “The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)” in J. Crawford ed., The Rights of
Peoples (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 17-37 at p. 34.
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legitimacy depends on all authentic peoples being able to exercise the right without any arbitrary
restrictions. On the other, its legal legitimacy requires that the “peoples” who enjoy the right can
be divided into clear, well-defined categories to which the right can be consistently applied.
These are quite clearly different standards and there is no secure middle ground between them.
As a result, the law of self-determination can, on the one hand, be criticised for falling short of a
right enjoyed by all groups who might be identified as peoples.89 On the other, it can also be
89 Rupert Emerson: “What emerges beyond dispute is that all peoples do not have the right of self-determination:
they have never had it, and they never will have it.” R. Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of
Decolonization (Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No.
9, 1964) at p. 64; James Crawford: “The logical structure of the argument – whether it is for Kosovo or for Quebec –
is very simple: ‘we are a people’. How can one deny that the people of Kosovo or Quebec are people? The term
springs to the lips. And ‘all peoples have the right of self-determination’…  An ethnic group, a group with a
historical continuity and a consciousness, a group evidently entitled to respect, asserts: ‘we are a people’. It seems to
be so. And all peoples have the right of self-determination. The conclusion is obvious. But what is to be done with
it?” J. Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future” in P. Alston
ed., Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 7-67 at p. 39; Christian Tomuschat: “According to
Article 1 of the two International Covenants on human rights, not every people, but only a people, has a right to self-
determination. If every group that qualifies as a people in the ethnic sense were to be considered a people under that
provision, the present legal position would be marked by a blatant inconsistency.” C. Tomuschat, “Self-
Determination in a Post-Colonial World” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 1-20 at 15-6; Will Kymlicka: “According to the United Nations’ Charter, ‘all peoples
have the right to self-determination’. However, the UN has not defined ‘peoples’, and has generally applied the
principle of self-determination only to overseas colonies, not internal national minorities, even when the latter were
subject to the same sort of colonization and conquest as the former. This limitation on self-determination to overseas
colonies (known as the ‘salt-water thesis’) is widely seen as arbitrary”. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A
Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) at p. 27; Martti Koskenniemi: “The
‘domestication of national self-determination’ by limiting it to decolonization has always seemed somehow
arbitrary. The original notion, after all, as concocted by the philosophes of the Enlightenment and their Jacobin
followers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was meant for universal consumption. The political
nationalism which emerged from those theories…  made no distinction between nations under colonial or other kinds
of foreign rule.” M. Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice” 43
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) pp. 241-69 at p. 242; Michla Pomerance: “UN documents…
speak of ‘all peoples’. But clearly, they do not and cannot mean all peoples. The formula is simple in wording but
chimerical in fact…  Little wonder, then, that all the valiant attempts to define ‘colonial’ and ‘alien’ so as to rule out
‘secession’…  have landed in hopeless tautological bogs.” M. Pomerance, “Self-Determination Today: The
Metamorphosis of an Ideal” 19 Israel Law Review (1984), pp. 310-39 at p. 320; Yehuda Blum: “… regretfully, it has
to be concluded that self-determination in practice is apparently not a principle of universal application…  it is
difficult to refrain from noting that what stands out here is the utter insincerity with which the principle of self-
determination has been manipulated by the international community to suit changing political needs.” Y. Z. Blum,
“Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination” 10 Israel Law Review (1975), pp. 509-14 at pp. 512-
4; J. A. Armstrong, “Contemporary Ethnicity: The Moral Dimension in Comparative Perspective” 52 Review of
Politics (1990) pp. 163-88 at pp. 171-2; G. Alfredsson, “The Right of Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples”
in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 41-54 at pp. 46-7;
C. Eagleton, “Excesses of Self-Determination” 31 Foreign Affairs (1953), pp. 592-604 at p. 597; B. Kingsbury,
“Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law” 25 Cornell Journal of International Law (1992) pp. 481-513 at
p. 488; G. Binder, “The Case for Self-Determination” 29 Stanford Journal of International Law (1993) pp. 223-70
at p. 246; M. Eisner, “A Procedural Model for the Resolution of Secessionist Disputes“ 33 Harvard International
Law Journal (1992) pp. 407-25 at p. 415; D. Makinson, “The Rights of Peoples: Point of View of a Logician” in J.
Crawford ed., The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 69-92 at pp. 74-5; G. J. Simpson, “The
Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age” in R. McCorquodale ed., Self-
Determination in International Law (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 2000) pp. 585-616 at p. 589; E. Kamenka, “Human
Rights, Peoples’ Rights” in J. Crawford ed., The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 127-39 at p.
135; D. Wippman, “Introduction: Ethnic Claims and International Law” in D. Wippman ed., International Law and
Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998) pp. 1-21 at p. 10-1; S. P. Sindha, “Is Self-Determination
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criticised for the absence of clear criteria for identifying the subjects and scope of the right and
the incoherent practice in its application.90 Both criticisms can also be made simultaneously and
can be summed up in one word: inconsistency.
Such tensions undermine any attempt to produce a coherent and credible legal definition of a
people. Consider, for example, the widely cited definition by Aureliu Cristescu:
“(i) The term ‘people’ denotes a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own
characteristics;
(ii) It implies a relationship with a territory, even if the people in question has been
wrongfully expelled from it and artificially replaced by another population;
(iii) A people should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, whose
existence and rights are recognized in article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Passé” 12 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1973) pp. 260-73 at p. 270; W. Connor, “Self-Determination:
The New Phase” 20 World Politics (1967-8) pp. 30-53 at p. 44; R. T. de George, “The Myth of the Right of
Collective Self-Determination” in W. Twining ed., Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen University Press,
Aberdeen, 1991) pp. 1-7 at p. 2; S. Tierney, “In a State of Flux: Self-Determination and the Collapse of Yugoslavia”
6 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights (1999) pp. 197-233 at p. 203; P. Alston, “Peoples’ Rights:
Their Rise and Fall” in P. Alston ed. Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 259-93 at pp.
272-3.
90 See Thomas Franck: “… [T]he principle of self-determination began its descent into incoherence – in the sense
of inconsistency of application – almost from the moment of its greatest apparent ascendance…  As a rule of state
conduct, it began to lose its power to obligate when it became a checkerboard of incoherent practice.” T. M. Franck,
“Legitimacy in the International System” 82 American Journal of International Law (1988) pp. 705-59 at pp. 746-8;
R. Y. Jennings: “It must be emphasized, however, that this again, though it [self-determination] has legal overtones,
is essentially a political principle which may be useful to guide political decisions. It is not capable of sufficiently
exact definition in relation to particular situations to amount to a legal doctrine; and it is therefore inexact to speak
of a ‘right’ of self-determination if by that is meant a legal right.” R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in
International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1963) at p. 78; J. H. W. Verzijl: “The ‘right of self-
determination’ has…  always been the sport of national or international politics and has never been recognized as a
genuine positive right of ‘peoples’ of universal and impartial application, and it never will, nor can be so recognized
in the future. It would indeed in its general implementation prove a constant source of disruption and subversion,
and the international legal order of established States will never be prepared to acknowledge with sincerity its
universal existence as a matter of law or right. ‘Peoples’ may fight for it and win or lose; they may succeed in
persuading their own State to grant it by peaceful argument, or fail, completely or in part, to do so. But it is one of
those realities of international life which do not lend themselves to to rigid regulation by law, that is, by a mandatory
rule impartially applying and applied to all identical cases and susceptible of a juristic definition. And for the sake of
the law itself it is better that it should remain so, for, worse than leaving the issue at the mercy of the unceasing
political game would be to create a rule of law which would from the outset be inevitably infected by an
ineradicable taint of international hypocrisy, and therefore unworthy of the appellation of a rule of law.” J. H. W.
Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1968) vol. I, at pp. 324-5; Michla
Pomerance: “It may well be doubted, however, whether any of these definitions [‘colonial peoples’, ‘peoples under
colonial and alien domination’] can provide objective criteria by which to circumscribe significantly, or even in any
manner at all, the universe of eligible claimants to the ‘right of self-determination’” M. Pomerance, Self-
Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982)
at p. 14; Antonio Cassese: “… [T]he wording…  [By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United  Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every
State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.] … is so sweeping and
indefinite that…  it does not offer any concrete indication as to what is really meant by self-determination.” A.
Cassese, “Political Self-Determination - Old Concepts and New Developments” in A. Cassese ed., UN
Law/Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979) pp.
137-65 at pp. 143-4; M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (George Allen and Unwin, London,
1982) at pp. 254-5; Crawford op. cit. no. 89 at p. 20.
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Political Rights.”91
From a legal perspective, element (i) is extremely vague and the inclusion of territory in
element (ii), except perhaps for the Gypsies, does not add much. They could refer to any number
of populations: the inhabitants of states, colonies, federal units, autonomies, geographical regions
or ethnic and tribal groups: and provide little assistance in separating competing claims. Only
element (iii) contains any clear criteria, making a distinction between a people and a minority.
However, this distinction has attracted considerable criticism because it has been seen as
arbitrary, artificial and an attempt to deny populations their inalienable rights.92
The word legitimacy is used a lot here and it is worth clarifying what is meant by it.
Legitimacy has been defined in various ways, but for the purposes of this work it will be
assumed to have four characteristics. First, the legitimacy of a rule or institution presumes the
existence of certain normative standards.93 These give legitimacy its content and provide the
criteria against which rules or institutions can be judged to be legitimate or illegitimate. Both
nationalism and legal positivism contain these standards. Political nationalism is certainly a
diverse doctrine, but at its core is the belief that a nation or a people provides the basis for
legitimate political authority. Legal positivism, on the other hand, looks for legitimacy in the
institutions and procedures involved in the establishment of rules and principles.
 Second, these standards are held or internalised by individuals effecting their perception of
those rules or institutions.94 This subjective content may pose a problem as actors may not
explain their motives and legitimacy may be only one of a number of factors that effect their
behaviour.95 Information on the reasons behind particular decisions in international bodies
varies. The drafting of many instruments may often be accompanied by considerable discussion
of the various provisions. On the other hand, the reasons behind court decisions may typically
have to be inferred from the text or from the individual opinions of judges.
Nonetheless, third, although these standards are subjectively held, they also exist within a
context. That context may be the influence of the views of other individuals, what Max Weber
has called “convention”.96 We have already seen that legal commentators have criticised
international law for failing to reach nationalist or positive legal standards of legitimacy.
(Interestingly lawyers seem more ready to criticise the law for deviating from nationalist
standards than from legal ones). States in the drafting of instruments or judges in courts have
also been ready to criticise drafts or judgments which deviate from nationalist or legal standards.
91 Cristescu op. cit. no. 2 vol. 1 at pp. 141-2, para. 279.
92 I. Brownlie, “The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law” in J. Crawford ed., The Rights of Peoples
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 1-16 at p. 16; F. Ermacora, “The Protection of Minorities before the United
Nations” 182 Receuil des Cours (1983) IV, pp. 255-370 at pp. 326-7; A. Whelan, “Self-Determination and
Decolonization: Foundations for the Future” 3:4 Irish Studies in International Affairs (1992), pp. 25-52 at p. 47;
Kiwanuka loc. cit. no. 87 at pp. 87-8, 92-4.
93 See D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (MacMillan, London, 1991) at pp. 9-11; O. C. Okafor, “The
Concept of Legitimate Governance in the Contemporary International Legal System” 44 Netherlands International
Law Review (1997) pp. 33-60 at pp. 39-40.
94 See I. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics” 53 International Organization (1999) pp.
379-408 at p. 387-8; T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1990) at p. 24.
95 A. Hyde, “The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law”Wisconsin Law Review (1983) pp. 379-426
at pp. 389-92, 398.
96 M. Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (M. Rheinstein ed.), (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge: Mass., 1954) at p. 5.
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Moreover, these standards may also be visibly codified in documents and decisions. Aside from
its legal implications, the position of self-determination in article 1 of the UN Charter, as one of
the purposes of the organisation is an important statement on international standards of
legitimacy. The same can be said about article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants.
More broadly, there might be an institutional context. There may well be an inherent
reciprocity between doctrines which legitimise particular institutions and the institutions
themselves.97 Nationalism and international law grew in the institutional context of the modern
state and neither perhaps would have much meaning without it. More specifically in the law of
self-determination, nationalism and legal positivism are concerned with the creation and status of
international legal rules and obligations. Here the standards of legal positivism and nationalism
are very different. Legal positivism is concerned with the legal legitimacy of obligations, in other
words, whether they are legally binding. Nationalism involves their political legitimacy and
whether they should be followed regardless of whether they are legally legitimate.
Fourth, these standards effect the behaviour of individual actors. This is more than simply the
question of whether particular rules are complied with, but also how actions are justified,
explained and accepted.98 Even if an actor does not comply with a particular standard, how that
non-compliance is justified, the excuses that are made, may also point to standards of legitimacy.
In the law of self-determination the issue of compliance is, in any case, particularly tricky
because peoples are undefined and it is possible in many cases to argue totally opposite positions
in terms of self-determination. However, if both sides use the rhetoric of peoples to support,
explain and justify their position they are influenced by nationalist perceptions of legitimacy.
Thus, regardless of the particular position, one might see, for example, actors building up and
shaping specific ideas of peoples to support their actions or decisions.
3. National Self-Determination
a. Rhetoric and Application
The doctrine that peoples had a right to self-determination came to international prominence
at the end of the First World War. An early legal analysis by the Commission of Rapporteurs in
the Åland Islands dispute in 1921 described it as, “a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed
by a vague and general formula which has given rise to the most varied interpretations and
differences of opinion.”99 And that remains largely accurate today.
An authoritative legal statement of the right may be seen, for example, in article 1(1) of the
Human Rights Covenants.100 This provides that all peoples have the right of self-determination,
and by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.101 However, the concept of self-determination does
97 Beetham op. cit. no. 93 at pp. 14-5, 104.
98 Hurd loc. cit. no. 94 at p. 391.
99 Commission of Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Doc. B7 [C] 21/68/106 (16
April 1921) at p. 27.
100 An almost identical formula was used in the Colonial Independence Declaration, GA Res. 1514(XV), 15
GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) at p. 67; and the Vienna Declaration, 32 ILM (1993) at p. 1665.
Similar formulas were used in the Friendly Relations Declaration, GA Res. 2625(XXV), 25 GAOR (1970)
Supplement No. 28, (A/8028) at p. 123; and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, 14 ILM (1975) at p. 1295.
101 Article 1(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and article 1(1), International
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not lend itself well to legal formulation. Like nationalism, it is not intended to be shaped by
international law, but to shape it. Again like nationalism its strength lies in its flexibility, which
is based on the doctrine containing only a few basic elements which are capable of various
interpretations.
Ironically, the language of what is basically a practical political doctrine about how states
should be structured derives from elaborate theories of metaphysical speculation, in particular,
the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant pioneered a theory of self-determination in
which he repudiated the imposition of external morality on the individual. People, he argued,
should not to be guided by other people’s standards, but rather act according to a process of self-
determination in which they followed a universal law which they found inside them. Only by
choosing of their own free will to follow this inner law could individuals follow the path of
virtue.102
This was a theory of individual self-determination. However, it was given a new twist by one
Kant’s students and self-proclaimed successor Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Fichte
argued that the universe of the past, the present and the future was the product of a universal
consciousness called the Ego. This consciousness was all embracing and nothing existed outside
it. Freedom for the individual was to be achieved by self-realisation, which involved complete
absorption into this universal consciousness. This theory may seem otherworldly, but for Fichte
it could also have political consequences. States were the institutions which facilitated this self-
realisation and this lead him to the paradoxical argument that individuals could only be free
when their lives were closely regulated by the state. As Fichte’s philosophy took on an
increasingly nationalist character, these individuals were also seen to be bound together by
“inner frontiers” created by language, which united them together as an indivisible whole. Thus,
individuals could only achieve self-realisation in a state which corresponded to the frontiers of
their people or volk. Individual self-determination had become national self-determination.103
As the birth of an explosive political doctrine, however, this was less of a bang than a
whimper. Fichte’s philosophy is notoriously difficult and inaccessible to the reader and his
nationalism was also obscurely intellectual. Indeed, his most famous nationalist work, Addresses
to the German Nation even managed to pass Napoleon’s censors because it was considered
essentially academic.104 His immediate followers were also a marginalised group of intellectuals
completely isolated from any realistic prospect of power.105
It is ironic that nationalism, which as been accused of lacking intellectual depth, should find
one of its principal expressions in such intricate philosophical concepts. In fact, self-
determination, as outlined in the UN Charter and the Human Rights Covenants, is in many ways
somewhat removed from that of Kant or Fichte. The right of self-determination in its present
form came to international prominence at the end of the First World War. However, the new
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 ILM (1967) at pp. 360, 368.
102 Kedourie op. cit. no. 18 at pp. 22-31; R. Randle, “From National Self-Determination to National Self-
Development” 30 Journal of the History of Ideas (1970), pp. 49-68 at pp. 51-3; C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1975) at pp. 31-3; A. J. Toynbee, “Self-Determination” 484 The Quarterly Review
(1925), pp. 317-38 at p. 318; E. M. Morgan, “The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination” 20 New York
University Journal of International Law and Politics (1987-8), pp. 355-403 at pp. 357-8; de George op. cit. no. 89 at
p. 4.
103 Kedourie op. cit. no. 18 at pp. 34-47, 64-70; W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (Thornton
Butterworth Limited, London, 1929), at p. 203; Randle loc. cit. no. 102 at pp. 54-7; Taylor op. cit. no. 102 at pp. 36-
7, 39-40, H. Kohn, “The Paradox of Fichte’s Nationalism” 10 Journal of the History of Ideas (1949) pp. 319-43.
104 Hughes op. cit. no. 28 at pp. 25-6.
105 Minogue op. cit. no. 14 at pp. 62-9.
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rhetoric of the time already seemed bound up with established ideas of political authority such as
popular sovereignty and the nationality principle. American President Woodrow Wilson, who is
usually credited with doing most to popularise the doctrine, seemed to consider it nothing more
than the Anglo-American principle of government with the consent of the governed.106
Commentators at the time complained that for a right to self-government, which is what it
effectively was, a right to self-determination sounded unnatural.107 Since then it has been
appealed to across the globe and the political spectrum: by fascists, communists and liberals; by
governments, liberation movements and indigenous tribes. The fact that it has been appealed to
in such a variety of situations suggests that whatever its metaphysical language, the right of self-
determination is not burdened with a great deal of ideological baggage.
However, if self-determination is essentially a practical political right to self-government,
why wrap it up in such a rhetoric? If international instruments are looking for clarity, why not
simply refer to a right to self-government and leave out the metaphysics? In fact, the
combination of a practical right and the metaphysical language provides a particularly effective
formula, and to understand why one has to look at the political landscape in which self-
determination operates.
b. Self-Determination as a Process
The right of self-determination in international law relates primarily to two political doctrines.
The first is nationalism and the second is liberalism. Liberalism may be defined here as a
doctrine, which began to take shape around the time of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It proposes that the basis for legitimate political authority ultimately rests
with individuals. Its starting point is the freedom and equality of the individual, and that the
purpose of political institutions is to protect those freedoms. A liberal state is characterized by
constitutionalism and the rule of law, as the best means of guaranteeing the protection of
individual rights, as well as its representative nature. The authority of government is seen to
derive from the people, who are the group of individuals composing the state.108
Liberalism and nationalism are not unrelated. The two may, in fact, cover considerable
common ground. A liberal society of autonomous individuals might need a sense of identity and
cohesion in order to function.109 A liberal may be concerned that a state with a population
without national sentiment or a common language may not be able to develop effective
representative government or protect individual rights.110  Similarly the belief that power derives
106 See M. Pomerance, “The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception”
70 American Journal of International Law (1976) pp. 1-27 at p. 2; Cassese op. cit. no. 68 at p. 19.
107 G. Murray, “Self-Determination of Nationalities” 1 Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs
(1922) pp. 6-13 at p. 8.
108 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples  (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Mass., 1999) at p. 14; J. S. Schapiro,
Liberalism: Its Meaning and History (D. van Nostrand, Princeton, 1958) at p. 9-13; A. E. Buchanan, “Assessing the
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” 99 Ethics  (1989) pp. 852-82 at p. 854; Kymlicka op. cit. no. 89 at p. 34; J.
Tomasi, “Individual Rights and Community Virtues” 101 Ethics (1991) pp. 521-36 at p. 535; V. Van Dyke, “The
Individual, The State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory” 29 World Politics (1977) pp. 343-369 at pp.
343, 347; M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982) at 1-2;
Miller op. cit. no. 18 at p. 193.
109 Koskennniemi loc. cit. no. 89 at p. 258.
110 See J. S. Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government” in Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative
Government (J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1954) pp. 171-393 at pp. 360-1; T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles
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from the people may pit the liberal against non-national rule.
The language of the two may also be very close. There is a deceptive similarity between
saying that government derives from the people (i.e. a state has a democratic basis) and that it
derives from a people (i.e. a state should correspond with a nation). Both can easily be wrapped
in the language of self-determination. Nonetheless, there are also ways of distinguishing the two,
most notably in the supposed twofold division of self-determination into “internal” and
“external” aspects.111 Internal self-determination is generally seen to correspond to individual
liberties and representative government (liberal government), while external self-determination
is seen as a right of peoples to their own state (national government).
Both nationalism and liberalism use the rhetoric of the people. Nationalism, in particular,
presents (or disguises) political activities as the actions of collective bodies called peoples and
this can be very effectively complemented by self-determination. The right proposes that a
“self”, a people or a nation, is engaged in a process of determination. In keeping with
nationalism it assumes that the nation or people is the basic unit for political action and the
primary object with which individuals identify. What it is to be determined is conveniently for
nationalists a matter for the nation or people. Moreover, the right of peoples to freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, as
provided in article 1(1) of the Covenants, covers, and provides cover for, an enormous range of
activities. This, then, is the crucial distinction between a right to self-determination and a right to
self-government. A right to self-government points to a goal, but a right to self-determination
of Political Obligation  (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1917) at pp. 126, 130-1.
111 On internal and external self-determination see Cassese, op. cit. no. 68; D. Rai?, Statehood and the Law of
Self-Determination (Kluwer, The Hague, 2002) pp. 226-307; Alfredsson op. cit. no. 89 at p. 50; A. Rosas, “Internal
Self-Determination” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993)
pp. 41-54 at pp. 79-86; P. Thornberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some
Remarks on Federalism” in ibid. pp. 101-38; J. Salmon, “Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination:
Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle?” in ibid. pp. 253-82; Pomerance op. cit. no. 90 at pp. 37-42; R.
McCorquodale, “Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach” 43 International and Compatative Law Quarterly
(1994) pp. 857-85 at pp. 863-5; J. Klabbers and R. Lefeber, “Africa: Lost between Self-Determination and Uti
Possidetis” in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 37-76 at pp. 42-3; U. O. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (Archon
Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1972) at p. 1; Michalska op. cit. no. 87 at pp. 83-5; Knop op. cit. no. 68 at 51, 80; K.
Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the
Right to Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000) at pp. 281, 299-301; H. Quane, “A Right to Self-
Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?” 13 Leiden Journal of International Law  (2000) pp. 219-27 at p. 219;
Tierney loc. cit. no. 89 at p. 198; Miller loc. cit. no. 68 at pp. 612-25; S. Trifunovska, “One Theme in Two
Variations – Self-Determination for Minorities and Indigenous Peoples” 5 International Journal of Minority and
Group Rights (1997) pp. 175-97 at p. 182; Alston op. cit no. 89 at pp. 262, 270; H. Hannum, “Self-Determination in
the Post-Colonial Era” in D. Clark and R. Williamson eds., Self-Determination: International Perspectives (St.
Martin’s Press, New York, 1996) pp. 12-44 at p. 14; M. Nowak, “The Right of Self-Determination and Protection of
Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe in Light of the Case-Law of the Human Rights Committee” 1
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (1993) pp. 7-16 at p. 10; F. L. Kirgis Jr., “The Degrees of Self-
Determination in the United Nations Era” 88 American Journal of International Law (1994) pp. 304-10 at pp. 305,
307; A. Kiss, “The Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination” 7 Human Rights Law Journal (1986) pp. 165-75 at pp.
170-2; P. H. Kooijmans, “Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination” 43 Netherlands International Law
Review (1996) pp. 211-17 at pp. 212-5; M. Moore, “Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics
of Secession” in M. Moore ed., National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998)
pp. 1-13 at p. 10; F. Przetacznik, “The Basic Collective Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a
Prerequisite for Peace: Its Philosophical Background and Practical Application” 69 Revue de Droit International
(1991) pp. 259-317 at p. 264.
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highlights a process.112 This process provides a rhetoric to legitimise various political and legal
activities.
c. Towards Freedom
A process, though, is obviously directed towards some end. On one level, self-determination
is a practical political right and its practical end is the achievement of particular political,
economic, social or cultural goals. On another level, however, the rhetoric of self-determination
is also intended to legitimise this politics and the achievement of these goals. The obtaining of a
particular status, therefore, has a deeper significance. The language of self-determination
suggests that its end is some form of self-realisation for a people and this self-realisation is
usually expressed by the idea of freedom.
Freedom itself is an abstract idea. “No word”, Montesquieu noted, “has received more
different significations and has struck minds in so many ways as has liberty.”113 Having such a
noble but ambiguous goal ensures that self-determination will not only be, “a principle of justice
and liberty”, as the Rapporteurs considered, but also, “vague and general”, and give rise to, “the
most varied interpretations and differences of opinion”. Freedom itself may be defined
situationally by the absence of a particular constraint, or ideologically by a particular goal.
Nationalism, of course, holds that freedom is obtained in a nation-state. The formula in article
1(1) of the Covenants and repeated in other instruments that peoples “freely” determine their
political status and “freely” pursue their economic, social and cultural development suggests that
at least one element in this freedom is the absence of constraint. This is supported by the Human
Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 12 (21) on article 1 that interference in the
internal affairs of states adversely affects the exercise of the right to self-determination.114 On the
other hand, though, there is a strong ideological element in the freedom associated with self-
determination. The Colonial Independence Declaration, GA Res. 1514(XV), for example, freely
112 On self-determination as a process see M. A. Shukri, The Concept of Self-Determination in the United
Nations (Al Jadidah Press, Damascus, 1965) at pp. 151-67; B. Kingsbury, “Self-Determination and ‘Indigenous
Peoples’” 86 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1992) pp. 383-94 at p. 391; P. Allott, “Self-
Determination – Absolute Right or Social Poetry” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 177- 210 at p. 204; E.-I. A. Daes, “The Spirit and Letter of the Right of
Indigenous Peoples: Reflections on the Making of the United Nations Draft Declaration” in P. Aikio and M.
Scheinin eds., Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Åbo Akademi University,
Turku, 2000) pp. 67-83 at p. 79; S. J. Anaya, “Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary
International Law” in ibid. pp. 3-18 at pp. 9-10; R. S. Bhalla, “The Right of Self-Determination in International
Law” in W. Twining ed., Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1991) pp. 91-101 at p.
93; E. Rivera-Ramos, “Self-Determination and Decolonisation in the Society of the Modern Colonial Welfare State”
in ibid. pp. 115-132 at p. 115; Y. Tamir, “The Right to National Self-Determination” 58 Social Research (1991) pp.
565-90 at p. 582; H. S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations (A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden,
1967) at p. 200; S. R. Ratner, “Ethnic Conflict and Territorial Claims: Where Do We Draw a Line?” in D. Wippman
ed., International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998) pp. 112-27 at p. 114; Morgan
loc. cit. no. 102 at pp. 360-1; G. Nettheim, “‘Peoples’ and ‘Populations’ – Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of
Peoples” in J. Crawford ed., The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 107-126 at p. 119; Hannum
op. cit. no. 111 at p. 37.
113 C. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of The Laws (A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller and H. S. Stone trans. and eds.),
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989) bk. 11, ch. 2 at p. 154.
114 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 143, para. 6.
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equates “independence and freedom”115 and the Friendly Relations Declaration, GA Res.
2625(XXV), refers to, “self-determination and freedom and independence”.116
The nature of the self-determination process, therefore, is defined by the various statuses
which are associated with the freedom of a people. If freedom is a united, independent nation-
state, then self-determination may involve the process by which that state is achieved and
maintained. If a people is not self-governing, self-determination may be a short process
involving the attainment of independence.117 Alternatively if a state should not only be
independent, but also possess fully developed institutions of self-government, self-determination
may be a longer process based on political development.118 If a united, independent nation-state
already exists, self-determination may take the form of the protection of its unity.119 However, if
115 GA Res. 1514(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) at p. 67.
116 GA Res. 2625(XXV), 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 28, (A/8028) at p. 124.
117 Honduras: “The people of Honduras exercised the right to self-determination in the nineteenth century by
means of a process which lead to its independence from Spain and to statehood.” CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.40, (1990)
p. 3. Ukraine: “Relying on article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and basing its actions
on its domestic legislation in accordance with internationally recognized procedures, the people of Ukraine gave
effect in 1991 to their right to self-determination. The independent statehood of Ukraine is recognized by the world
community. Ukraine has become a member of the international community with full rights.” CCPR/C/95/Add.2,
(1994) p. 6. Kenya: “The object of exercising the right of self-determination was full sovereignty and independence.
All must strive to ensure that as a result of the exercise of that right, the people exercising it could, so far as was
practicable, choose to live under a form of government that was truly sovereign and independent.” A/AC.125/SR.69,
(1967) p. 23.
118 US: “The United States, for its part, had supported the application of that principle [of equal rights and self-
determination] to peoples of dependent territories and has sought to encourage exercise of the right of self-
determination as an initial step towards independence and self-government…  Article 73 bound those Members
responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories to bring about a full measure of self-
government for the peoples of those Territories, while Article 76 set forth, as part of the basic objective of the
Trusteeship System, the obligation ‘to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of Trust Territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned’. That reference to the ‘freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’ stated the heart of the
principle of self-determination.” A/AC.125/SR.92, (1968) pp. 128-9. Australia: “… [I]n laying down both the
objectives and the methods to be followed by administering States, the Charter had said nothing as to the time within
which the objectives were to be attained in a particular territory. That was plainly to be determined according to the
stage of development and the particular circumstances of the Territory and to be worked out by agreement between
the United Nations and the administering State. The Charter gave no authority to the General Assembly to bind
unilaterally either an administering State or the people of a dependent territory to any particular date by which the
act of self-determination was to be made and completed.” A/AC.125/SR.70, (1967), p. 8. Denmark: “… [T]he right
of self-determination should apply to Non-Self-Governing Territories as well as to other territories when a sufficient
level of economic, social, cultural and, at the same time, political, maturity has been reached.” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd
Cmttee., 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 1.
119 Azerbaijan: “… [R]ealization of the right of self-determination must not be used as a pretext for infringement
of the territorial integrity, national unity or ethnic harmony of independent States. In its view, the right of peoples to
self-determination should be given its original, true significance; that would not erode, but on the contrary
strengthen the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States whose governments reflect the
interests of all members of their populations without distinction.” CCPR/C/AZE/99/2, (2000), p. 10. Iran: “The right
should never be used to attack the legitimate sovereignty of independent nations over their traditional territories; the
ultimate goal of self-determination being freedom, justice and peace, it should never be used by a dissident minority
to undermine the political stability of an independent and democratic country or in any way to further aggression,
sedition or subversion.” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 645th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.645) para. 30. Yugoslavia: “… [A]ll
peoples had the inalienable right to self-determination and complete freedom…  the ultimate purpose of the principle
was to ensure the exercise of full sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory.” A/AC.125/SR.69, (1967)
p. 5.
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a nation-state is not fully united, but has part of its national territory separated from it by another
state or by a colony, self-determination might take the form of irridentist claims against those
states or colonies.120
If freedom is the freedom of a nation’s political system from outside interference, self-
determination is a continuous process satisfied by the absence of the offending foreign actions,
presence or interference.121 If it is the liberal vision of the enjoyment of representative
government and political freedom for individuals, self-determination is again a continuous
process this time based on the practice of the nation’s political and legal institutions.122 Finally, if
120 Argentina: “For Argentina the restoration to a State of territories belonging to it that have been wrongfully
occupied means no more than the enjoyment by a people of that State of the rights conferred on it by the principle of
self-determination. Therefore Argentina will continue to oppose claims involving use of a mandatory standard of
international law, such as self-determination, to the detriment of the territorial integrity of sovereign States, as
occurs with part of the Argentine territory which has been occupied by the United Kingdom for over 150 years. We
refer to the case of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.” (CCPR/C/45/Add.2), 37-9
HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 128. Armenia: “… [T]he right to self-determination is not vested in the State but in the
nation or people. Hence it is not by chance that the question of self-determination generally arises when a people or
nation finds itself in a position of dependence or other forms of exploitation are practiced in its respect and,
consequently, when its status as a subject in law is not recognized by the dominant State. Nagorny-Karabakh, which,
like Nakhichevan, had formed an integral part of the Armenian State for thousands of years, was incorporated in the
former Soviet Union in 1920 and, by an arbitrary decision of an unconstitutional and unauthorized party organ…
was transferred to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan…  As a result, the right of peoples to self-determination was
flouted and the will of 95 per cent of the population of Nagorny-Karabakh and the population of Armenia was not
taken into consideration.” CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.36, (1990) p. 3. Morocco: “The right to self-determination has
been exercised throughout the recent history of the Kingdom by various acts that give expression to the freely
expressed choice of Moroccans. The following may be instanced purely by way of illustration: … The advent of
independence in 1956 and the progressive recovery of Moroccan territories remaining under foreign domination”.
CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.13, (1990) p. 4.
121 El Salvador: “El Salvador has been one of the keenest defenders of the right of peoples to self-determination
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. On numerous occasions…  El Salvador has reiterated its attachment
to this fundamental principle of international law and has condemned any outside interference in the internal affairs
of countries, a situation of which the Republic has been and still is a victim.” (CCPR/C/14/Add.7) 29-30 YHRC
(1987) II, p. 69. Iraq: “Iraq has been the victim of a series of flagrant violations of the principles of international law
and, in particular, of its right to self-determination and national sovereignty. These violations have been committed
by the Iranian authorities which began their aggression by bombarding Iraqi cities on 4 September 1980 and openly
announced their intention of occupying Iraq and changing its system of government. This flagrant violation of the
right to self-determination constitutes aggression in the full sense of the term as understood in international law.”
(CCPR/C/37/Add.3) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 33. Nigeria: “The principle of self-determination of peoples entailed
the right of States freely to choose their own political, economic and legal systems; the right to continue their
development and to conduct their foreign policies without foreign intervention or intimidation; and the right freely
to dispose of their natural wealth and resources.” A/AC.125/SR/70, (1967), p. 22.
122 Iceland: “The nation’s right of self-determination is secured by free and direct election of the President of the
Republic, members of the Althing and local authorities at intervals of four years.” CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.14,
(1990), p. 16. Federal Republic of Germany: “The exercise of self-determination requires a democratic process, and
this democratic process is inseparably linked with the unrestricted exercise of human rights. The political will of the
people can only find free expression where human rights are respected. Observance of the following human rights is
of primary importance in this context: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and creed; The right to freedom
of expression, which includes the right to seek, receive and disseminate ideas by all means of communication,
without regard for frontiers; The right to peacefully exercise the freedom of assembly and association; The right to
participate in cultural life; The right of liberty and safety of the individual; The right of freedom of movement in
one’s own country, and the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return there.”
(CCPR/C/52/Add.3) 37-9 HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 163. Guyana: “The Constitution guarantees the right to form
political parties and the freedom of action of those parties, a right which is considered to be one of the strongest
indicators of the right to self-determination.” CESCR, E/1990/5/Ad.27, (1990) p. 6.
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it is freedom to control a national economy, self-determination is the right to regulate a nation’s
industry, trade and investment.123
The concept of freedom, however, creates some problems for the doctrine. If freedom means
the absence of constraint and the freedom of a people (and the national movement which
represents it) to act as it chooses, there is no guarantee that this freedom will not be used to the
detriment of others. What is to prevent the right of national self-determination becoming a selfish
determination of national rights? The charge has been levelled that self-determination creates
narrow and exclusionary societies.124 The solution to this problem appears to be that a distinction
is made between the “exercise” and the “abuse” of the right.125 This fits in well with the original
Kantian concept of self-determination in which the essential element of free will was the
possibility to choose to follow the path of good. As Kant said: “Only freedom in relation to the
internal lawgiving of reason is really an ability; the possibility of deviating from it is an
inability.”126 The assumption surrounding self-determination in international law is that the
“exercise” of the right will work to the general benefit of international society, underpinning
friendly relations, development and human rights. However, if it does not it can be written off as
“abuse”.127 This, of course, means that the right of self-determination is not actually completely
self-determined, but can be held up to external standards.
123   Peru: “[T]he United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in its resolution 46 (III), had endorsed
the principle that every country had the sovereign right freely to dispose of its natural resources and that any
external pressure brought to bear on the exercise of that right was a violation of the principles of self-determination
of peoples and non-intervention”. 27 GAOR (1972) 6th Cmttee., 1349th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1349) para. 47. Bolivia:
“The right of political self-determination, that is sovereignty, had been a fiction throughout Bolivia’s history as an
independent country, because political power had always been subordinate to the economic power wielded by large
mining concerns.” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.651) para. 17. Poland: “His delegation
attached the greatest importance to the sovereignty of peoples over their natural resources, believing that it was often
a necessary condition for securing full self-determination and equal rights.” A/AC.125/SR.93, (1968) p. 142.
124   T. Dragadze, “Self-Determination and the Politics of Exclusion” 19 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1996) pp.
341-51 at p. 342; Eagleton loc. cit. no. 89 at p. 599.
125   US: “The principle of self-determination must not be abused by irridentists or other secessionists who would
redraw settled boundaries between independent State. He pointed out that between the two wars in Europe there had
been cases where aggressors had used the common bonds of language and culture with groups in neighbouring
States to justify their expansionist aims and give a semblance of rationality to policies of annexation based on
unbridled nationalism.“ A/AC.125/SR.92, (1968) p. 132. Turkey: “[T]he Third Committee should make sure that the
article in question [on self-determination] would further the ends for which it had been conceived and could not in
any way be perverted for the benefit of selfish interests incompatible with purposes and principles set forth in the
United Nations Charter. Unless accompanied by adequate safeguards, political and juridical concepts might lead to
serious abuses, as evidenced by Hitler’s expansionism, the purpose of which had been to subject peoples in the name
of self-determination.” 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 649th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.649) para. 2. France: “The Special
Committee must…  exercise extreme caution in order to prevent any abuse or distortion of the principle and must
ensure that its formulation did not, through, clumsiness or carelessness, result in furthering a deterioration of
friendly relations among States and that it did not produce effects that were contrary to the real will of peoples.”
A/AC.125/SR.106, (1969), p. 65.
126 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans. and ed.), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1996) at pp. 18-9.
127 Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit, for example, have argued that: “The right is conditional on being exercise
for the right reasons, i.e. to secure conditions necessary for the prosperity and self-respect of the group. This is a
major protection against abuse. Katanga cannot claim a right to self-determination as a way of securing its exclusive
control over uranium mines within its territory. This condition does not negate the nature of the right. The group is
still entrusted with the right to decide, and its decision is binding even if wrong, even if the case for self-government
does not obtain, provided the reasons that motivate the group’s decision are of the right kind.” J. Raz and A.
Margalit, “National Self-Determination” in J. Raz ed., Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994)
pp. 110-30 at p. 128.
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Moreover, the distinction between “exercise” and “abuse” is a subjective one. The alleged
benefits of self-determination represent nationalist articles of faith concerning the advantages of
the nation-state and are somewhat more questionable as statements of fact.128 As S. James Anaya
has noted, the, “self-determination rhetoric is more often heard in association with turmoil and
destruction than with peace and prosperity.”129 Indeed, the label of “abuse” is usually attached to
secessionist movements, which suggests that the real criteria are states’ interests. For example, it
was argued in the Human Rights Committee that: “the abuse of that right could fundamentally
jeopardize international peace and security”. This was because such “abuse” gave, “States the
impression that their territorial integrity was threatened”.130 This is not, of course, to deny that
secession may be destabilising. In any case, a distinction like “exercise” and “abuse” is probably
necessary in a doctrine whose strength lies in its flexibility and which is appealed to across the
political spectrum by the liberal and illiberal, democratic and totalitarian alike. With such
divergent political applications, there needs to be some mechanism to separate those uses of the
right which are seen as admirable from those considered abhorrent.
d. The Will of the People
A third key element in the self-determination process is the will of the people. This again
reveals the interplay between the practical political goals of the right and its metaphysical
language. The concept of national self-determination proposes that a “self”, in this case a nation
or a people, actually determines something. This language suggests that the will of a nation or a
people is self-evident and is simply there to be acted upon. This again complements nationalism.
Nationalist movements always claim to represent a nation and self-determination adds a
democratic-sounding and dynamic aspect to nationalist politics. Self-determination also makes a
number of nationalist assumptions. It assumes that the relevant unit for political action is a nation
or a people, that individuals primarily identify with the nation, and that the will of the people will
be based on national rather than individual concerns.
However, looked in practical terms, the will of the people in self-determination is not self-
evident and is not actually treated as such in nationalist politics. The determination of the wishes
of any people requires an institutional framework: polling stations, election monitors, electoral
commissions to set rules, courts to settle disputes etc. The circumstances of the vote: the election
rules, who is entitled to vote, timing, party organisation and funding, access to the media, the
attitude of the media, the question asked on the ballot, the economic situation, the personalities
of politicians, the fortunes of the parties: all these may effect the result. It would be a very
confident nationalist who trusted in the self-evident will of the people took none of these factors
into account. In fact, the determination of the will of the people is a highly political process and
is treated as such.
These factors can produce remarkable swings in the expressed will of a people. In
undeveloped agricultural societies it might, of course, be expected that national issues may only
have a limited effect on the vote. For example, the 1956 plebiscite in the trust territory of British
Togoland revealed a pattern where neighbouring wards would vote almost unanimously in
128 Wang G., “Nationalism in Asia” in E. Kamenka ed., Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea
(Edward Arnold, London, 1973) pp. 83-98 at p. 96; T. D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) at p. 9.
129 Anaya op. cit. no. 112 at p. 3.
130 Mr. Mavrommatis, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.503, para. 32.
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opposite directions simply due to local issues or the influence of village leaders.131
However, even in industrial societies the vote may dramatically swing for various non-
national reasons. A good example is the Ukraine. On 1 December 1991 the people of the Ukraine
voted overwhelmingly for independence by 90% on an 84% turnout.132 This represented a final
blow to the Soviet Union and opened the way for negotiations on the formation of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Such a large vote would appear to be an
unambiguous expression of the will of the people for independence. However, what had, in fact,
previously stood out in the attitude of the Ukrainian people was its general apathy to nationalism.
In elections in March 1990 the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Rukh won only 24% of seats in
parliament and this was considered to be an accurate reflection of its strength.133 It also fitted
with the character of the population. Rukh did well in western Ukraine, which until the Second
World War had been part of Poland and retained a strong Ukrainian identity, but elsewhere,
except in Kiev, it struggled to make an impression. A number of factors, though, may explain
why this non-nationalist population swung behind independence, at least for the December 1991
vote. Undoubtedly the decisive factor was the adoption of Ukrainian nationalism by local
communist authorities. In the campaign the population was presented with the political elite and
the media forming a united front in favour of independence, while opposition was disorganised
and ineffective. Moreover, the population accepted the (incorrect) claim by the authorities that
independence would leave them better off. In this way a population which contained a large
number of Russians and Russified Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly for independence.134
Non-national motives can again be seen in the Baltic Republics. In Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia nationalists clearly did have mass support. This was demonstrated early on when two
million people in August 1989 joined hands in a human chain stretching 370 miles from Vilnius
to Tallinn to demand independence.135 In elections in spring 1990 nationalist parties took power
in all three republics, and this was followed by declarations of de jure independence.136
However, despite mass support and their appeal to self-determination, these movements were
reluctant to hold referenda due to the risks involved. Estonia and especially Latvia had large,
prominently Russian, national minorities. Ethnic Estonians formed 61.5% and Latvians only
50.7% of their respective republics.137 A vote held a real danger that it might not produce a clear
majority for independence, which, of course, would seriously damage the legitimacy of the
movements. In fact, the republics resisted holding referendums for a year and then only did so in
March 1991 under pressure from Mikhail Gorbachev, who organised his own referendum to
131 J. S. Coleman, “Togoland” 509 International Conciliation (1956) pp. 1-91 at p. 74.
132   Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Presidential Elections and Independence Referendums
in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union and Successor States: A Compendium of Results 1991-1992 (Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, 1992), at p. 101.
133 A. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1997) at p. 67.
134 Ibid. pp. 127-8; P. J. S. Duncan, “Ukraine and the Ukrainians” in G. Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in
the Post-Soviet States (Longman, London, 1996) pp. 188-209 at pp. 197-9.
135 A. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1993) at p. 219.
136 Ibid. pp. 233, 242-3; R. Pullat, “The Restoration of Independence of Estonia 1991” 2 Finnish Yearbook of
International Law (1991) pp. 512-32 at p. 516.
137 R. Kionka and R. Vetik, “Estonia and the Estonians” in G. Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in the Post-
Soviet States (Longman, London, 1996) pp. 129-46 at p. 136; G. Smith, “Latvia and the Latvians” in ibid. pp. 147-
69 at p. 154.
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support a restructured Soviet Union, (endorsed by 73% on a 75.3% turnout),138 which the
republics boycotted. The referenda held in both Estonia and Latvia, however, produced large
majorities for independence: 78.6% and 73.7%, respectively, on turnouts of over 80%.139 These
majorities, though, could only have been obtained because a significant percentage of the
Russian minority did not vote according to nationality, but supported independence, mainly for
economic motives or because of personal ties to the republics.140
The same considerations can be seen in the referendum held in the autonomous republic of
Tatarstan in Russia in March 1992, but this poll reveals another factor, the question asked on the
ballot. Like the Ukraine Tatar nationalists were politically marginalised and nationalism was
promoted by a communist elite. Indeed, Tatar leader, Mintimer Shaymieyev was a hard-liner
who publicly endorsed the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev. In August 1990 the Tatar
authorities issued a declaration of state sovereignty based on the right to self-determination.141
However, it was not until a year and a half later, in February 1992, that they announced their
intention to put it to a vote. This was fiercely resisted by Moscow, which referred the matter to
the (First) Russian Constitutional Court in the Tatarstan case. What concerned the Russian
authorities was that the sovereignty declaration and referendum question made no reference to
Tatarstan as part of Russia, and the Court held that this formula was unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, the referendum took place on 21 March 1992. Despite the fact that ethnic Tatars
constituted only 49% of the republic and ethnic Russians 43%, sovereignty was endorsed by
61.4% on an 81.7% turnout. This mobilisation again crossed national lines and was achieved by
emphasis on economic benefits, control of the media, concern by local Russians for good ethnic
relations with the Tatars, and also because the referendum question left the term “sovereignty”
open. It could allow for independence, satisfying Tatar nationalists, but it could also mean
autonomy so as not to alienate ethnic Russians.142
These three cases represent the use of a referendum to legitimise political decisions based on
self-determination after they have been made, in some cases a considerable time after they have
been made. An alternative strategy can be seen in the Slovenian referendum on 23 December
1990: the use of a referendum as political insurance.143 In this case voters endorsed the
declaration of “an independent and sovereign state” by 94.6% on a 93.5% turnout, but only after
six months if the ongoing negotiations with the other republics failed.144 These negotiations, at
least on the Slovenian side centred on the reorganisation of Yugoslavia as a confederation, and
the general expectation in Slovenia at the time was that this could be achieved.145 The
138 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe op. cit. no. 132 at p. 35.
139 Ibid. p. 12.
140 Kionka and Vetik op. cit. no. 137 at p. 140; Smith op. cit. no. 137 at p. 162; J. McGarry, “‘Orphans of
Secession’: National Pluralism in Secessionist Regions and Post-Secession States” in M. Moore ed., National Self-
Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) pp. 214-32 at p. 219.
141 “The Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic…  ensuring the inherent rights of
Tatars, of the whole population of the Republic to self-determination…  PROCLAIMS Tatar state sovereignty and
reforms the Autonomous Republic into the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic (Tatar SSR) – The Republic of
Tatarstan.” Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, at www.kcn.ru (visited 12/02/03).
142 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe op. cit. no. 132 at pp. 157-63; M. Bennigsen Broxup,
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(Sage, London, 1997) at p. 242.
143 Glenny op. cit. no. 32 at p. 86.
144 Keesing’s (December 1990), p. 37924.
145 P. Vodopivec, “Slovenes and Yugoslavia, 1918-1991” 6 Eastern European Politics and Societies (1992) pp.
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referendum was, therefore, used a political chip to bolster the hand of the Slovenian government
in its negotiations with the other Yugoslav republics. It was only after the continued failure of
these negotiations that Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991.
The referendum as a political process and the dynamics of that politics can again be seen in
the UN’s attempt to hold a referendum in Moroccan occupied Western Sahara, a process which
has been going on for more than 12 years and, by its own estimates, cost the organisation over
$½ billion.146 Superficially, the sticking point in this referendum has been the identification of
voters and disagreement between Morocco and the POLISARIO liberation movement as to who
is entitled to vote. But, underlying all this is the nature of the referendum as a political process,
and as UN reports repeatedly complain, this means that it is structured towards a “winner-take-
all”147 solution:
“The process thus became a zero-sum game, which each side felt it absolutely had to win
since, owing to the nature of the agreement…  the referendum would produce one winner
and one looser and the stakes were therefore extremely high.”148
In this regard it is telling that the UN Secretary-General’s former envoy James Baker III notably
pointed out that the process of self-determination could, in fact, be achieved by other political
methods:
“It could be achieved through war or revolution; it could be achieved through elections, but
this required good will; or it could be achieved through agreement, as had been done by
parties to other disputes.”149
A referendum, therefore, may be useful for conferring legitimacy on the rhetoric of self-
determination, but it may also be tangential to it. Moreover, it remains a political tool, and when,
how and if one is held is a political decision. It should also be borne in mind that nationalist
movements always claim to represent a people regardless of their level of popular support and
may make various assertions as to its wishes. A good example is Judge Ammoun in his separate
opinion in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion in which he argued that:
“Nothing could show more clearly the will for emancipation than the [national liberation]
struggle undertaken in common, with the risks and the sacrifices it entails. That struggle is
more decisive than a referendum, being absolutely sincere and authentic.”150
However, the background to the judge’s comments were the national liberation wars then
being carried out in southern Africa. Although these struggles were presented as being conducted
by a “people”, they were typically divided between rival organisations often based on ethnic or
tribal loyalties. In Namibia there was SWAPO (mainly Ovambo) and SWANU (Herero and
Journal of Peace Research (1994) pp. 175-87 at p. 176.
146 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation concerning Western Sahara, 19 February 2002, S/2002/178,
p. 8, para. 51.
147 Ibid. p. 5, para. 30.
148 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation concerning Western Sahara, 20 June 2001, S/2001/613, p. 8,
para. 47.
149 S/2002/178, p. 6, para. 33.
150 Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 100.
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Mbandu). In Angola there was the MPLA (mestiços), FNLA (Bakongo) and UNITA (a splinter
of the FNLA). In Mozambique there was FRELIMO (mostly Makonde and Nyanja), which itself
splintered into an alphabet soup of other groups, UDENAMO, MANU, COREMO etc.151 Could
it really be argued that the military victory of one of these movements was a more decisive
expression of the will of the people than a referendum?
Other assertions can be seen in international instruments. The Colonial Independence
Declaration, GA Res. 1514(XV) of 1960, for example, contained, in principle 2, a provision on
the right of peoples to self-determination. However, this provision was preceded, in the
preamble, with the Declaration’s own determination of the wishes of peoples:
“Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the
decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence…
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its
forms and manifestations”.152
These assertions supported the basic orientation of the Declaration, which virtually equated the
right to self-determination with a right to independence. This orientation can also be seen in
another General Assembly resolution passed around the same time, GA Res. 1541(XV). This
resolution outlined three methods by which non-self-governing territories could obtain self-
government: integration, free association and independence.153 It also provided that if self-
government was achieved by integration or free association with a state it should be
accompanied by a referendum. This was not, however, the case if self-government was attained
by independence. The evident assumption was that independence automatically represented the
wishes of the people.
e. Self-Determination and International Law
By putting together the three elements of process, freedom and the will of the people, and
taking into account the distinction between its rhetoric and political application, self-
determination may summed up as:
A doctrine concerning the legitimacy of political institutions, which asserts a process by
which nations and peoples based on their free will attain, maintain and enhance their self-
realisation and freedom by the organisation and practice of those institutions.
It must be added straight away that this is not a legal definition. Self-determination undoubtedly
relates to international law, it attempts to dictate the form it should take, but it is fundamentally
not a legal concept and fits into a legal framework as comfortably as a person into a straight-
jacket. An indication of just how uncomfortably it sits with international law can be seen in the
reaction in the Human Rights Committee to the suggestion by Peru that its legislation was an
151 R. Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule (Oxford
University Press, London, 1972). See also H. A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National
Liberation Movements (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) at p. 145.
152 GA Res. 1514(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) at p. 66.
153 GA Res. 1541(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) at pp. 29-30.
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expression of the right.154 One of the Committee’s members, Mr. Buergenthal responded that
such an interpretation would allow Peru to legislate international law into oblivion:
“The argument…  that national law adopted pursuant to a country’s constitution by its
legislature must be deemed to be an exercise of the right of self-determination had no basis
in international law and, if valid, would do away with international law altogether.”155
The implications of this for international law are far reaching. Self-determination, like
nationalism, provides a basis for the legitimacy of international law, but this “higher law”,156 as
it has been called, remains profoundly ambivalent about the law itself. The standard by which it
judges the law is the rights of peoples and nations and from this perspective it performs a dual
role. On one hand, it can support and lend extra legitimacy to the law. If international law
supports national freedom, for example by the principle of non-intervention, then, it is also an
expression of self-determination. On the other hand, if international law restricts national
freedom, self-determination challenges the law and its basic validity.157 In this process self-
determination can be compared to the application of an all-purpose legal solvent. Apply as
directed and an offending piece of international law should just melt away: an unwanted tie of
sovereignty, a disliked treaty and some have even argued uncomfortable human rights
obligations.158 In this double-sided relationship with self-determination, international law is
riding the proverbial tiger. Self-determination may support international legal rules, but it is
profoundly ambivalent in doing so, and if those obligations should ever cause it to bear its teeth,
then with a flick of the tail and a lurch of the back they may be gone: at least in theory.
4. National Ties and Legal Principles
The law of self-determination is, therefore, the product of the interaction between nationalism
and international law, but how exactly does this interaction take place? This depends on two
concepts essential, respectively, for nationalism and international law: national ties and legal
principles. It is the relationship between these two which effectively defines the law of self-
determination.
National ties, or ties which identify a nation (e.g. language, religion, race, history, territory,
politics and identity), are fundamental to the politics of self-determination. Self-determination
154 Peru, CCPR/C/SR.1547, (1997) paras. 22-3.
155 Mr. Buergenthal, CCPR/C/SR.1548, (1997) para. 59.
156 Emerson op. cit. no. 89 at p. 1; Pomerance op. cit. no. 90 at p. 13.
157 See more generally on the supporting and challenging roles of self-determination Koskenniemi loc. cit. no. 89
at pp. 248-9.
158 Iraq: “[T]he Special Rapporteur [on the situation of human rights in Iraq] had failed to take account of the
circumstances in Iraq following a destructive war and the imposition of economic sanctions. His reports were
incompatible with his mandate and had also failed to respect the people’s right to self-determination and to choose
their political system freely.” CCPR/C/SR.1627, (1997) para. 13. Zaire: “There seemed to be a problem of
interpretation of the Covenant, article 1 of which clearly stated that all peoples had the right of self-determination
and freely determined their political status. Members [of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]
had every right to discuss questions concerning free education, the extent and safeguarding of equality for women,
agricultural programmes etc., but there was no reason to comment on the political organization of the country. It was
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assumes that the basis for legitimate political authority is a nation or a people and, in doing so,
the nation or people is used as a model for that authority. Correspondingly, how peoples are
defined, which national ties are used, also defines this politics.
International law, in turn, is composed of legal principles and how those principles fit together
determines the shape of the law. This has been especially the case in the law of self-
determination, which has invariably been defined as a series of balances between different legal
principles: self-determination v. territorial integrity, self-determination v. state sovereignty, self-
determination v. inviolability of frontiers etc.
Thus, the interpretation of national ties shapes self-determination, and the reading of legal
principles works to define international law. The law of self-determination is, in turn, is moulded
by both. However, national ties and legal principles are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary,
it is argued that legal principles are quite capable of encompassing national ties. For example,
subjective ties have a clear affinity to self-determination, territorial ties to territorial integrity,
political ties to state sovereignty. Indeed, different national ties can relate to all the legal
principles involved in the law of self-determination. As a result, the use of principles may be no
more than an extension of the use of national ties in nationalism.
The question of national ties is itself complicated. There are, at least, four levels to the
identification of nations. First, there is the functional role of ties in uniting or dividing a people.
This is the role that national ties are usually presented as performing, but, in fact, it cannot be
looked at in isolation from a second factor, the symbolic use of ties. A variety of ties may act to
unite or divide a people, but that does not necessarily mean that they are national ties. A state
may unite people under a common government and political life, but those people might not see
themselves as a nation. Linguistic ties obviously effect the ability of people to communicate with
each other, but different nations may speak the same language or mutually intelligible ones and
linguistic differences do not always become national ones. Religion may give people common
values and institutions, but in most cases religion is not the principal basis for nationhood.
Culture and traditions may be shared by a nation, but they may equally be local or regional, or
held in common by a group of nations.159 Moreover, there are other ties, which can clearly unite
or divide people, like class, regional or tribal loyalties, which are not normally considered
national.160 A crucial factor, then, is not simply that ties unite and divide people, but that they are
seen as “national”.161 There is a common tendency to divide national ties into subjective ties
159 On the supranational bond of culture see S. P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” 72:3 Foreign Affairs
(1993) pp. 22-49.
160 Indeed these non-national loyalties may be stronger than national ones. E.g. Some German speaking
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before they were Austrians”. J. W. Cole and E. R. Wolf, The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine
Valley (Academic Press, New York, 1974) at p. 56. Refugees in Copenhagen from the 1848 Dano-German dispute
over Schleswig protested that they would have preferred unity under Germany than a division of the duchy. S.
Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites with a Collection of Official Documents (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, New York, 1920) at p. 149.
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(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge: Mass., 1953) AT PP. 146-7; Armstrong op. cit. no. 14 at pp. 4-
5, 7-9; Miller op. cit. no. 18 at p. 22; O. S. Kamanu, “Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U.
Dilemma” 12 Journal of Modern African Studies (1974) pp. 355-376 at pp. 357-8. More generally see F. Barth,
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(how people identify themselves) and objective ties (based on certain “objective” features). But,
in fact, this division is not as neat as it might appear. Objective ties may functionally act to unite
or divide people, but a crucial factor in their role as national ties is how they are subjectively
interpreted.
A third dimension is provided by nationalism and national self-determination. As a nation or a
people is the basic source of political legitimacy, so how one is identified is a political issue.
Works on the right of self-determination of a particular population usually include a definition
which establishes it as a people and thus legitimises its exercise of self-determination.162 How
peoples are defined, which ties are used and which are not, also defines what self-determination
means. Even within the same nation people may have different ideas of nationality and select
different ties to legitimise different political goals.163
A good example is Ernest Renan’s famous description in his 1882 work Qu’est-ce qu’une
nation of the nation as, “a plebiscite of every day”.164 This widely quoted interpretation evidently
highlighted the subjective elements in nationality. But, it also tied in with the politics of the day.
In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 France had lost to Germany the provinces of Alsace and
Lorraine, which were German in speech but French in sentiment. Renan’s emphasis on the
subjective aspects of nationality evidently supported the recovery of these territories by
France.165 However, this was not the only possible solution. Another Frenchman, the racial
nationalist Maurice Barrès, himself a native of Lorraine, pursued the same goal with an opposite
approach, rejecting the voluntary aspects of the nation in favour of race and territory. The
provinces should be returned to France, not because of the wishes of the people, but because the
nation’s ancestors were buried there.166
There may, of course, be limitations to this. The interpretation of nations and their national
ties may be situational, but other ties may shape that situation. “National consciousness will be
more effective”, Karl Deutsch noted, “the more it is based on the existing separateness and
cohesion of a country or a people.”167 There is an obvious logic to this. Nationalism may work
better if it runs with the grain of society, and incorporates established identities and loyalties,
162 See e.g. R. McCorquodale, Tibet: The Position in International Law (Hansjörg Mayer, London, 1993) at pp.
28-9; G. Seidel, “A New Dimension of the Right of Self-Determination in Kosovo?” in C. Tomuschat ed., Kosovo
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Tappe, “Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet Union:
Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims” 34 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1995-6) pp. 255-95
at pp. 290, 295; C. Brandt Ahrens, “Chechnya and the Right of Self-Determination” 42 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (2004) pp. 575-615 at pp. 593-4, 600, 613.
163 On the different weight attached to ties see N. Berman, “Nationalism Legal and Linguistic: The Teachings of
European Jurisprudence” 24 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1992), pp. 1515-78,
esp. pp. 1571-2; L. K. Medina, “Defining Difference, Forging Unity: The Co-construction of Race, Ethnicity and
Nation in Belize“ 20 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1997) pp. 757-80; D. Conversi, “Language or Race?: The Choice of
Core Values in the Development of Catalan and Basque Nationalisms” 13 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1990), pp. 50-
70; C. V. Mavratsas, “The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995:
Politics, Social Memory and Identity” 20 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1997), pp. 717-37; M. Gallagher, “How Many
Nations are there in Ireland?” 18 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1995) pp. 715-39; Hughes op. cit. no. 28 at pp. 3-4, 7-9,
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than if it runs against it. Nationalists may, therefore, not have a completely free hand in their
interpretation of a nation.168
The law of self-determination adds a fourth dimension. Legal principles may encompass
national ties and correspondingly national ties may be used to legitimise those principles. Four
principles might, in particular, have a close relationship with national ties: (1) the right of
peoples to self-determination, (2) the territorial integrity of states or countries, (3) state
sovereignty, and (4) the inviolability of frontiers and the related principle of uti possidetis, which
upholds political boundaries on independence. Often these principles are presented in an
antagonistic relationship with each other, most usually with self-determination: self-
determination v. territorial integrity, self-determination v. state sovereignty etc. However, it is
argued that what appears to be a clash of principles may, in fact, merely reflect the different
ranking of national ties in the interpretation of nations.
a. Subjective Ties
Subjective ties, or how peoples identify themselves most obviously connect with the principle
of the self-determination of peoples. They connect rather less well with principles like territorial
integrity, the preservation of frontiers and the concept of a “country”. Thus, a balance between
self-determination and these principles, or between the concepts of “people” and “country” may
a well hinge on the question of whether the identity and views of a population should be taken
into account or not. In other words, such a balance might a represent a weighing of how
important subjective ties are in the interpretation of a nation.
A great deal has been said already about the identity and the wishes of a people and little
remains to be covered here. One of the problems with national sentiment is that it may be one of
a number of possible identities and loyalties. The determination of the wishes of a people may
also be influenced by a variety of political factors. The assumption of self-determination is that
of all the identities and loyalties that a person may have, their national identity is the most
important, but this need not necessarily be the case.
As said earlier also, there is no specific rule in the principle of self-determination which
requires an objective assessment of the wishes of the people. Nonetheless, subjective ties are
important for the legitimacy of the right for two reasons. First, the language of self-determination
itself suggests some sort of popular, democratic process. A right which did not appear to have
popular support might also lack legitimacy. Second, nations are usually thought of as
communities. If a group had no communal spirit and behaved as if it had none, then its
nationhood and consequently any claims to self-determination might be called into question.
Thus, while as a legal matter subjective ties may not be essential for the principle of self-
determination, as a political matter, they may be important for its legitimacy.
b. Politics and Government
Of all the national ties, political ties seem to have had the most influence in defining self-
determination in international law. Whether in the decolonisation process, Eastern Europe,
states’ peoples, or secessions like Eritrea, the peoples who have exercised self-determination
168 Smith op. cit. no. 14 at p. 45.
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have usually equated to political units.169 Political ties also seem to relate most readily to the four
legal principles. This is not particularly surprising. International law is a fundamentally state-
based doctrine and, therefore, its principles connect most easily with national political ties. It has
even been argued that: “Most of the proclaimed peoples’ rights are in fact that rights of states in
disguise.”170 National political ties may be reflected most obviously in the principles of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity and, as states are also territorial units, the inviolability of
frontiers and uti possidetis. However, they are also prominent in the principle of self-
determination and there are two reasons, in particular, why this should be the case.
First, political ties are undoubtedly one of the most important ties in nationality. Many of the
institutions of the state and other similar bodies have played a major role in developing national
consciousness, including parliaments, legal systems, the administration, schools and the army.171
Nations and nationality are often divided into two types: political (or civic) and ethnic (or
cultural). In political nations peoples are defined by political and legal ties: a common political
life, shared institutions, values and traditions and nationals are defined by citizenship. In ethnic
nations, on the other hand, nationality is defined by the possession of certain linguistic, racial or
religious features.172 The distinction between these two forms of nationality should not be
overemphasised.173 Consciously political nations, such as America, Britain or France have
developed from a linguistic and cultural core. Equally the development of ethnic nations may
also be shaped by political ties, and, if those nations form a nation-state or a national autonomy,
they also necessarily have a political component.
Second, regardless of these two concepts of nationality, self-determination is a political
argument, which operates in an environment defined by states and other similar institutions.174
Nationalism may downplay the role of institutional ties in its development. Flemish nationalist F.
A. Snellaert’s claim that, “[t]here is a unit folk and a unit state; the latter is the work of man, the
former is the work of God”,175 reflects this orthodoxy. Nonetheless, nationalism is very much the
work of man, and, as it is based on the organisation of political institutions, one might also
169 R. Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations
(Oxford University Press, London, 1963) at p. 105; S. J. Anaya, “The Capacity of International Law to Advance
Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims” 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991), pp. 403-11 at p. 407; J. Donnelly, “Third
Generation Rights” in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 119-50 at pp. 132-3; R. C. A. White, “Self-Determination: Time for a Re-
Assessment?” 28 Netherlands International Law Review (1981) pp. 147-80 at p. 150; Sindha loc. cit. no. 89 at p.
270; G. Alfredsson, “Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination” in D. Clark and R.
Williamson eds., Self-Determination: International Perspectives (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996) pp. 58-84 at
pp. 59-60; Kingsbury loc. cit. no. 112 at pp. 383-4.
170 M. Galenkamp, Individualism versus Collectivism: The Concept of Collective Rights (RFS, Rotterdam, 1993)
at p. 47.
171 E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (Stanford University
Press, Stanford, 1976) at p. 486; Seton-Watson op. cit. no. 14 at pp. 8-9; Breuilly op. cit. no. 19 at pp. 20-1, 84-6.
172 A. D. Smith, “Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight of Minorities” 7:2/3 Journal of Refugee Studies (1994) pp.
186-98 at p. 188; Greenfeld op. cit. no. 15 at p. 11; Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at p. 329; Smith op. cit. no. 63 at pp. 134-8;
Emerson op. cit. no. 62 at p. 110; Kymlicka op. cit. no. 89 at p. 24; A. Eide, “The National Society, Peoples and
Ethno-Nations: Semantic Confusions and Legal Consequences” 64 Nordic Journal of International Law (1995) pp.
353-67 at pp. 353-5; A. N?stase, Protecting Minorities in the Future Europe – Between Political Interest and
International Law (Monitorul Oficial, Bucharest, 2002) at pp. 19-28.
173 R. Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism” in M. Moore ed., National Self-
Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) pp. 233-265 at pp. 257-8.
174 See Breuilly op. cit. no. 19 at pp. 1-2.
175 Quoted in S. B. Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium: A Study in Nationalism (Richard R.
Smith, New York, 1930) at p. 79.
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expect to see some reciprocity in its relationship with them. In particular, as self-determination is
a rhetoric for determining the status of political institutions, the people who might be best placed
to use it are those within these institutions. Politicians may be in a strong position to use the
language of peoples’ rights to defend or increase their power, especially if their institutions have
a national basis. As a result, a right of self-determination may follow these institutions whatever
the supposed characteristics of the people invoked. This can also be reflected in legal principles.
The role of political institutions can be seen most obviously in the self-determination of
colonial peoples. The nationalist movements, which emerged in the former colonies were usually
lead by a western educated elite which developed within the institutions of the colonial state.176
These movements struggled within the context of the political and institutional basis of these
colonies177 to gain control of the state using the rhetoric of self-determination. As a consequence
the “people” in that right was identified with the whole population of a colony. The succession of
the colony to independence as one unit was then protected by the principles of territorial
integrity, sovereignty and, especially in Africa, uti possidetis. The principles of self-
determination, and territorial integrity, uti possidetis and sovereignty were, therefore, essentially
complementary and acted to both legitimise and stabilise, respectively, the succession of
colonies to statehood within their existing frontiers. This is reflected, for example, in article
III(3) of the OAU Charter 1963, which affirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states,178 and the OAU’s Cairo Resolution 1964, which pledged to uphold existing
borders at the time of independence.179 The preservation of borders was also reaffirmed in article
4(b) of the Constitutive Act of the OAU’s successor, the African Union in 1999.180
These may be seen to be examples of political nations. A contrast has sometimes been made
this “decolonisation” model of self-determination and the “ethnic” model which seemed to
prevail in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, even this form of self-
determination, despite appearing to be based on ethnically-defined peoples, was similar in its
balance of principles and the role of political institutions to decolonisation. Political structures
played a major role in defining secessionism in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia and irridentism in Germany. The organisation of these states made self-
determination a logical response to the political and economic changes that followed the collapse
of communism. The Soviet Union,181 Yugoslavia182 and Czechoslovakia183 were all consciously
176 Emerson op. cit. no. 62 at pp. 11-21, 44-57; J. S. Coleman, “Nationalism in Tropical Africa” 48 American
Political Science Review (1954) pp. 404-26; Minogue op. cit. no. 14 at pp. 81-8. R. Emerson, “The Fate of Human
Rights in the Third World” 27 World Politics (1974-5) pp. 201-226 at pp. 207-8.
177 See R. Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of
Collaboration” in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe eds., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (Longman, London, 1972) pp.
117-42.
178 Article III, Charter of the Organisation of African Unity 1963: “3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence”. Quoted in I. Brownlie ed., Basic
Documents on African Affairs (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971) pp. 2-16 at p. 3.
179 OAU Resolution on Border Disputes, Cairo Meeting 17-21 July 1994: “The Assembly of Heads of State and
Government at its First Ordinary Session, held in Cairo, U.A.R., from 17 to 21 July 1964; Considering that the
border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor for dissension; Conscious of the existence of extra-African
manoeuvres aiming at dividing the African States; Considering further that the borders of African States, on the day
of their independence, constitute a tangible reality…  1. Solemnly reaffirms the strict respect by all Member States of
the Organization for the principles laid down in Article III, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity; 2. Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their
achievement of national independence.” Quoted in ibid. pp. 360-1.
180 African Union, Constitutive Act 1999, www.africa-union.org (visited 28/08/03).
181 See e.g. the Soviet report to the Human Rights Committee: “The voluntary character of the Union of Soviet
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multinational federations which legitimised themselves by the right of self-determination.
Similarly, West Germany based its relationship with the East on the principle.184 As self-
determination was so clearly marked out as a course of political action, it was hardly surprising
that politicians should follow it.
In their constitutions the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were all conceived of
as multinational federations based on a union of sovereign republics and the self-determination
of their constituent nations.185 The Soviet federation was composed of 15 Union Republics
(SSRs),186 which represented its large, peripheral nations. These were considered as sovereign
states,187 with a right to secede,188 and many of the trappings of statehood such as flags,
Socialist Republics is legally enshrined in the Constitution of the USSR, article 70 of which states: The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multinational State formed on the principle of socialist federation
as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics.
The Constitution of the USSR guarantees not only the voluntary character of the association of the Republics but
also their sovereign rights. Each Union Republic has its own constitution, which takes account of its specific
features, and its own legislation (Constitution of the USSR, article 76). Each Union Republic retains the right freely
to secede from the USSR (article 72).” (CCPR/C/1/Add.22) 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) II, p. 179.
182 See e.g. the Yugoslav report to the Human Rights Committee: “Proceeding from the fact that Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a multinational State, the Constitution of the SFRY, section 1 of the Basic
Principles, states that[:] The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination,
including the right to secession…  have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal
republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded upon a socialist federal community of working
people – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. (CCPR/C/1/Add.23) 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) II, p. 158.
183 See e.g. the Czechoslovak report to the Human Rights Committee: “The right to self-determination of
peoples…  implemented in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by Constitutional Act No. 143/1968, C. of L.,
concerning the Czechoslovak Federation, proceeding from the full recognition of the inalienability of this right,
respect for the sovereignty of every nation and its right to freely determine the manner and form of its national life
as a nation and a State. This Constitutional Act has affirmed the federal State bond of the Czech and Slovak nations,
agreed to by their competent representatives in the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council as a
State order which appropriately expresses the right of these nations to self-determination and equality as well as to
the protection of their national sovereignty.” (CCPR/C/1/Add.12) 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) II, p. 81.
184 See e.g. the West German report to the Human Rights Committee: “The Federal Republic of Germany
regards the peoples’ right to self-determination as an integral part of the international order of law and peace. In the
national sphere, this right has been embodied in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany which states:
‘the entire German people is called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany’”.
(CCPR/C/28/Add.6) 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) II, p. 262.
185 “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of
socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet
Republics.” Article 70, Constitution of the USSR 1977 in H. Hannum ed., Documents on Autonomy and Minority
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) at p. 745; “The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of
every nation to self-determination…  have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal
republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of working people –
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. Basic Principles, Constitution of Yugoslavia 1974, The Constitution
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Dopisna Delevska Univerza, Belgrade, 1974) at p. 53; “The
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is founded on the voluntary bond of the equal, national states of the Czech and
Slovak nations, based on the right of each of them to self-determination.” Article 1(2), Constitutional Law on the
Czechoslovak Federation 1968 in W. B. Simons ed., The Constitutions of the Communist World (Sijthoff and
Noordhoff, Alphen Aan Den Rijn, 1980) pp. 582-624 at pp. 582-3.
186 Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Lithuanian SSR,
Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Georgian SSR, Armenian SSR, Azerbaijani SSR, Kazakh SSR,
Turkmen SSR, Uzbek SSR, Tadjik SSR, Kyrgyz SSR.
187 Article 76, op. cit. no. 185 at p. 747.
188 Article 72, ibid. p. 745.
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parliaments, educational and scientific institutions and ministries.189 The Ukrainian and
Byelorussian SSRs even had seats at the UN.190 Smaller or more centrally located nations were
represented in 20 Autonomous Republics (ASSRs), 16 of which were in Russia. These were not
sovereign, but had their own constitutions and institutions.191 Below them was the autonomous
oblast (region) and the autonomous okrug (district).192 Yugoslavia was a federation of six
nations and six sovereign republics,193 and these coincided with each other, with the sole
exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where no single nation dominated, although Muslims were the
largest group. There were also two autonomies within Serbia, Voijvodina and Kosovo, which
corresponded to two nationalities, Hungarians and Albanians.194 These “nationalities” unlike
“nations” were not supposed to a have a right of self-determination, although the distinction
became confused and the 1974 Constitution referred to “nations and nationalities having equal
rights.”195 Czechoslovakia was a federation of two nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, and their
respective republics, which had their own governments, prime ministers and legislatures.196
Much of this federalism was, of course, superficial. The structure of the Soviet state was
summed up in the slogan “national in form and socialist in content”.197 This meant that despite
its paper federalism, the USSR was run as a unitary state under the communist party, with
decision-making and economic planning made centrally even on minor issues. It was also an
essentially Russian state, even though Russians formed only a bare majority (50.8%) of the
population.198 The centre and security in the republics were dominated by Russians, and,
although a native normally held of the position of First Secretary in the republics, his deputy was
usually Russian.199 Yugoslavia was different in that its federal structure was intended to limit the
power of its dominant nation, Serbia, which formed about a third of the population. The creation
of the two autonomies and the republic of Macedonia out of what had previously been southern
189 G. Smith, “The Soviet State and Nationalities Policy” in G. Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in the Post-
Soviet States (Longman, London, 1996) pp. 2-22 at p. 18; A. Kagedan, “Territorial Units as Nationality Policy” in
H. R. Huttenbach ed., Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR (Mansell, London, 1990) pp.
163-76 at p. 165.
190 J. N. Hazard, “Managing Nationalism: State, Law and the National Question in the USSR” in A. J. Motyl ed.,
The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (Columbia University Press, New York, 1992) pp.
96-140 at p. 113.
191 Article 82, op. cit. no. 185 at p. 748.
192 Z. Gitelman, “Nationality and Ethnicity in Russia and the Post-Soviet Republics” in S. White, A. Pravda and
Z. Gitelman eds., Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (MacMillan, London, 1994) pp. 237-65 at p.
240.
193 Nations: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims. Republics: Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
194 V. Vujacic and V. Zaslavsky, “Causes of the Disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia” 88 Telos (1991)
pp. 120-40 at p. 124; S. P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 (Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, 1992) at p. 20.
195 Articles 1, 3 and 245, Constitution of Yugoslavia 1974.
196 L. Cutler and H. Schwartz, “Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?” 58 University of
Chicago Law Review (1991) pp. 511-53 at pp. 519, 526-7.
197 R. J. Hill, “Ideology and the Making of a Nationalities Policy” in A. J. Motyl ed., The Post-Soviet Nations:
Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (Columbia University Press, New York, 1992) pp. 50-78 at p. 59.
198 S. White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) at pp. 143-4.
199 M. Rywkin, “Searching for Soviet Nationalities Policy” in H. R. Huttenbach ed., Soviet Nationality Policies:
Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR (Mansell, London, 1990) pp. 62-72 at pp. 64-5; W. Connor, “Soviet Policies
Toward the Non-Russian Peoples in Theoretic and Historic Perspective: What Gorbachev Inherited” in A. J. Motyl
ed., The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (Columbia University Press, New York,
1992) pp. 240-71 at p. 253.
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Serbia were all intended to reduce Serb power. Nonetheless, like the USSR, it functioned as a
centralised state based on the “Trinity” of the Communist party, the police and the army. In
Czechoslovakia too the various national institutions were seen merely as rubber stamps for
decisions of the communist party. Nevertheless, all these states created institutions based on
nationality and established rights, such as sovereignty and self-determination, which politicians
in these institutions could appeal to in order to increase their powers.
Thus, despite these differences between what were presented as multinational federations and
their reality as highly centralised states, national institutions were, in fact, able to build up
considerable authority. Central control in a country the size of the Soviet Union required an
enormous amount of information from the regions, so much that the centre was unable to process
it. This effectively devolved power to the local bureaucratic elites, who provided this
information, and the dependency of the centre allowed them to build up their power still
further.200 In the Brezhnev era (1964-82) republican elites were able to build up considerable
systems of patronage,201 and one even can talk of local “mafias”, especially in Central Asia.202
In Yugoslavia apparatchiks in the republics were also able to establish considerable
independence from the centre,203 and their potential to challenge it had already been
demonstrated in the late 1960s. In 1966 in an effort to restructure the dysfunctional Yugoslav
economy, Josip Broz Tito had thrown his support behind reformist republican leaders,
particularly in Slovenia and Croatia, to bypass the conservative federal bureaucracy. However,
this devolution of power only encouraged demands for more and this was expressed by
republican elites in terms of national rights. In Croatia the communist leadership even allowed
the formation of nationalist movements leading to student unrest in 1971. Tito responded with a
crackdown and a purge of the Croat leadership.204 Nonetheless, power still haemoraged to the
republics205 and Tito presided over a system which not only institutionalised nationalism, but one
where a weakened centre depended increasingly on his personal authority.206 On his death in
1970 central authority fell to the republics in the form of an eight member collective presidency
composed of a representative from each of the six republics and the two autonomies. Of the three
pillars of Yugoslavia, the police were brought under the control of the republics, while the
communist party was torn by infighting.207 The only remaining strong federal institution was the
Yugoslav People’s Army, the JNA.208
In Czechoslovakia the communist elite was swept from power in the Velvet Revolution of
1989. However, the National Councils, or legislatures of the two republics became the forums
for separate Czech and Slovak party formation which worked to divide Czechoslovak political
200 Motyl op. cit. no. 19 at pp. 64-5; R. E. Ericson, “Soviet Economic Structure and the National Question” in A.
J. Motyl ed., The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (Columbia University Press, New
York, 1992) pp. 240-71 at p. 253.
201 J. Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (Fontana Press, London, 1994) at p. 105.
202 Gitelman op. cit. no. 192 at p. 254.
203 Meier op. cit. no. 39 at pp. 2-3.
204 Golstein op. cit. no. 47 at pp. 179-83; Vujacic and Zaslavsky loc. cit. no. 194 at pp. 128-9; V. P. Gagnon Jr.,
“Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia” in M. Brown et al. eds., Nationalism and
Ethnic Conflict (MIT Press, Cambridge: Mass., 1997) pp. 132-68 at pp. 144-5.
205 Ramet op. cit. no. 194 at p. 118; Bennett op. cit. no. 31 at p. 74.
206 C. H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1973) at pp.
113-8.
207 Meier op. cit. no. 39 at pp. 3-4, 10-1; Goldstein op. cit. no. 47 at pp. 187-9.
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life along national lines.209
In the Soviet Union the basis for confrontation between the republics and the centre were
Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms.210 These were aimed at restructuring the ailing Soviet
economy and this brought him into conflict with the bloated bureaucracy. Gorbachev took a two-
pronged approach: replacing First Secretaries in the republics with people more open to
reform,211 and allowing greater freedom to bring public opinion to bear against official
corruption and incompetence.212 However, a more open political climate also allowed the
expression of national aspirations. Previously expressions of (non-Russian) nationalism had been
ruthlessly crushed, but after 1988 nationalist movements could form without being completely
suppressed.213 Greater openness also exposed past injustices, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pacts, which challenged the whole legitimacy of Soviet rule in the Baltic Republics. Gorbachev
believed that he could mobilise the people against the recalcitrant republican elites, but what the
autocratic leader did not appreciate was that political freedom allowed people to follow their
own agendas, and nationalism allowed the elites to mobilise against him.
In some republics nationalist opposition movements quickly assumed a mass character.
Nationalists took power in the Baltic Republics in spring 1990 and in Georgia between October
1990 and January 1992.214 A mass movement also developed in Armenia over the conflict in the
Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. However, in other republics,
especially the key republic of the Ukraine, nationalist opposition had a more limited impact.
Instead, communist elites adopted nationalism, expressed as rights to self-determination and
sovereignty, to co-opt the opposition and increase their power.215 This was reflected in various
declarations of sovereignty. In April 1991 Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics agreed
the Novo-Ogarevo, or “Nine-Plus-One” Agreement, which committed them to negotiations on a
New Union Treaty. On 24 July these negotiations resulted in an agreement to restructure the
Soviet Union as looser federation of sovereign republics.216
The cue for the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the hardline coup of 19 August 1991,
which was staged to prevent this new treaty from being signed. Its failure, however, radically
changed the relationship between the republics and the centre.217 The Baltic Republics used the
collapse of the centre to finally cut their ties to the USSR. Other republics also made declarations
of independence. These did not necessarily mark the end of the Soviet Union, but were responses
to a weakened centre and also attempts by local communists to shield themselves from events in
Moscow.218 Some of these declarations were followed by referenda, although these were
considered mere formalities to bolster the republic’s position in negotiations. In some Central
Asian republics populations which a few months before had voted by over 90% for Gorbachev’s
209 A. Innes, “The Breakup of Czechoslovakia: The Impact of Party Development on the Separation of the State”
11 East European Politics and Societies (1997) pp. 393-435 at pp. 394, 407.
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211 White op. cit. no. 198 at p. 21.
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Soviet Union now voted by an equally large margin for independence.219
The key referendum was, however, the one in Ukraine on 1 December 1991 in which a
largely nationally apathetic population voted by 90% for independence. After this vote, the
leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia, as original signatories to the Union Treaty which
created the Soviet Union in 1922, declared its dissolution in Minsk on 8 December 1991.220 In its
place they established the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS). The basic principles of
the new organisation, spelled out in its 1993 Charter, included self-determination, the
sovereignty of member states, the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity.221 The
apparent compatibility between the principles reflected the fact that the CIS was the product of
nominally sovereign union republics, in most cases governed by a communist elite, asserting
their independence. The principles of self-determination and sovereignty, and the inviolability of
frontiers and then territorial integrity functioned, respectively, to legitimise and stabilise this
succession of established political units.
In Yugoslavia instead of a conflict between the republics and the centre, nationalism was used
in a power struggle between the republics. The first faction to play the nationalist card were, in
fact, conservatives within the Serbian communist party, lead by Slobodan Milošovi?. Milošovi?
used the issue of Serb rights in the predominantly Albanian autonomy of Kosovo to secure his
position as undisputed party leader in 1987. In January 1989 his supporters staged a coup in
Montenegro,222 followed in March by the abrogation of the autonomy of Kosovo and
Voijvodina.223 In June Milošovi?, in front of a million Serbs celebrating the 600th anniversary of
the Battle of Kosovo Polje, issued a stark challenge to other republics. He claimed that the Serbs
were again engaged in battles and quarrels, and added ominously that, while they were not armed
battles, yet, this could not be ruled out.224 Milošovi?’s adopted platform was based on a
document called the “Memorandum” orginally drawn up by Serbian academics in 1986. This
was a blueprint for Serb hegemony in Yugoslavia, which could be achieved in one of two ways:
either a recentralised, Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or a greater Serbia carved out of the other
republics.225 With control of two republics and two autonomies, and thus four out of the eight
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seats in the collective presidency,226 Milošovi? had gone a long way towards the first option.
Milošovi?’s attempt to create a centralised Serb-controlled Yugoslavia met with resistance,
however, from the leaders of the other republics, in particular, from Slovenia. National
communists in Slovenia responded that they would only live in a Yugoslavia which guaranteed
their sovereignty and self-determination. They called for an “asymmetric federation” in which
the republics could establish more flexible and looser relations with each other, and to that end
declared their legislative sovereignty in September 1989.227 Serbia responded by calling for an
economic boycott of Slovenia. In January 1990 Slovene delegates walked out of the congress of
the Yugoslav communist party, causing its collapse. The only pillar of Yugoslavia now left
standing was the army.
Tensions between the republics significantly changed when free elections in April 1990
brought nationalist parties to power in both Slovenia and Croatia. The conflict was now not
between different stripes of communists, but nationalists in Slovenia and Croatia and
communists in Serbia and Montenegro.228 Slovenia and Croatia pressed for Yugoslavia to be
restructured as a confederation, while Milošovi? threatened that if this happened Serbia’s borders
with the other republics would be an “open question”.229 This was not an idle threat. Serbian
authorities began a massive propaganda campaign to create unrest among Croatia’s large Serb
minority.230 Caught between the two sides were Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia by
geography and its mixed Muslim, Serb and Croat population stood in the line of fire in any
conflict between Serbia and Croatia and opposed any changes to the federation. Macedonia also
supported the federation, but would not remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia if Slovenia and
Croatia left.231 In December 1990 Slovenia took out political insurance against the failure of
negotiations by securing support for independence in a referendum.
However, deadlock continued into 1991, with Milošovi? apparently emboldened in his
hardline approach by international support for the integrity of Yugoslavia.232 Matters came to a
head in May when Serbia and Montenegro refused to accept Stipe Mesi?, a Croat, as the next
head of the rotating presidency.233 Slovenia, which was wealthy, compact, homogeneous and
peripheral, was always the best placed of the republics to secede and now pushed for
independence. It was followed by Croatia, which on 19 May held a referendum in which 93.2%
supported independence on an 83.6% turnout.234 This republic, however, shaped like curve
around Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, and with a large Serb minority, was less readily
detachable. Nonetheless, on 25 June both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence
based on the right of self-determination.235 This pushed Macedonia reluctantly towards
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separation with a referendum on independence (95% support on 75% turnout)236 and declaration
of sovereignty in September and a muted declaration of independence, by way of a new
constitution, on 20 November.237
Bosnia-Herzegovina had since elections in November 1990 been run by a government of
national unity involving parties from its Muslim, Serb and Croat communities.238 However, this
middle ground collapsed once Slovenia and Croatia had left the federation. Bosnia had to choose
whether to declare independence, to stay in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or to accept partition
between Serbia and Croatia. All these options were unacceptable to one community and would
lead to conflict.239 On 14 October its parliament voted for legislative sovereignty prompting a
walkout by Serb nationalists. On 20 December, in response to EC guidelines on recognition, the
country applied for recognition as an independent state.
This was self-determination as the politics of the succession of established political units to
independence. It was also the framework of international recognition policy. The EC Declaration
on Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe of December 1991,
proclaimed the principle of self-determination, but within the inviolability of existing
frontiers.240 This was developed by the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on
Yugoslavia, the so-called Badinter Commission, which extended uti possidetis to the dissolution
of Yugoslavia.241 Self-determination took place within the borders of the republics, protected by
uti possidetis. The principles of self-determination and inviolability of frontiers/uti possidetis
were again used to legitimise and stabilise, respectively, the succession of political units.
In the case of Czechoslovakia the political crisis focussed on the system of representation and
the framing of a new constitution. The federal legislature in Czechoslovakia was divided into
two houses: the Chamber of the People, elected in nation-wide elections; and the Chamber of
Nations, divided equally between Czech and Slovak members. This dual arrangement was
intended to compensate for the 2:1 ratio in the size of the Czech and Slovak populations. Czechs
would naturally dominate the Chamber of the People, while Slovaks would be equally
represented in the Chamber of Nations. Minor legislation required a simple majority in both
houses. Important legislation needed a qualified majority in the Chamber of Nations, i.e. a
majority of both Czech and Slovak members. Constitutional amendments had to be supported by
three-fifths of the Chamber of the People and three-fifths of both the Czechs and Slovaks in the
Chamber of Nations. This meant that a relatively small number of members of the Chamber of
Nations (31 out of 150 on constitutional matters) could block legislation.242
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Constitution and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
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The problem with the system was that it institutionalised politics along lines of nationality, yet
could only work with a high degree of consensus. It encouraged nationalism, but was particularly
vulnerable to gridlock. None of this mattered when it was first set up. The legislature was just a
rubber stamp for the communist party. However, with the emergence of separate Czech and
Slovak parties in the Velvet Revolution, subsequent attempts to draft a post-communist
constitution became paralysed by the disproportionate power of Slovak members to block
legislation. This paralysis at the federal level allowed the National Councils in the two republics
to attempt to increase their own powers at the expense of the federal government.243
The major political difference between Czechs and Slovaks in post-communist
Czechoslovakia was the economy. Slovakia was originally poorer and less industrialised than the
Czech lands. To some extent it remained so, but the gap had been significantly reduced under the
communist regime with investment in industry. However, this meant that Slovakia was left with
large, inefficient industries, which were hit disproportionately hard by economic modernisation.
In June 1992, for example, Slovak unemployment stood at 11.3% compared with 2.7% for
Czechs.244 While the Czechs favoured rapid economic reform, Slovaks found it more painful and
wanted to move more cautiously.
These perspectives were reflected in the programmes of Czech and Slovak parties. In
Slovakia the largest party was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) lead by
Vladimír Me?iar on a platform of gradual economic reform and a looser Czechoslovakia. The
HZDS proposed a declaration of Slovak sovereignty followed by negotiations on a
confederation.245 This suited prospective HZDS voters, of whom only 19% favoured
independence, as well as Slovaks in general of whom only 9% had voted for separatist parties in
previous elections.246 The largest group in Czech Republic, a coalition of the Civic Democratic
Party (ODS), lead by Václav Klaus, and the Christian Democratic Party, on the other hand, was
focussed on rapid economic reform and favoured a centralised political structure which would do
least to impede this. However, after elections in June 1992 the coalition was faced with the
HZDS on a platform of decentralisation and slower reform.247 For Klaus and the ODS,
Czechoslovakia itself had became an institutional obstacle to economic reform.
Klaus and Me?iar began negotiations on a future constitution for Czechoslovakia, but instead
agreed on its dissolution. This was essentially an elite agreement. Separation at the time was
supported by only 16% of the population.248 Klaus and Me?iar also did not even have an absolute
majority in their respective republics.249 Nonetheless, the dissolution was described by
Czechoslovakia as “one of the forms” of the implementation of self-determination,250 and Slovak
independence was legitimised as an exercise of the right and the culmination of the historic
Slovak Federal Republic” 13 Michegan Journal of International Law (1991-2) pp. 172-217 at p. 208, 212-3; K.
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development of the Slovak nation.251 On 1 January 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia
became independent states within their existing frontiers which had been confirmed by a treaty
in October 1992.252 Self-determination and sovereignty, and the inviolability of frontiers again
provided principles by which politicians in established political units could legitimise and
stabilise, respectively, the accession of the republics to statehood.
This model of the succession of political units was challenged by secessionists in many
former Soviet republics and, in particular in Yugoslavia. However, many of these challenges
were also based on political units. With the break up of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s weakness
provided an opportunity for elites in Russia’s autonomous republics and oblasts to also increase
their power with rights of self-determination and sovereignty.253 Even though only four of
Russia’s ASSRs actually contained a majority of their eponymous nation,254 this national
character was vital to the legitimacy of their claims. When the region of Sverdlovsk declared
itself an autonomous Urals Republic in July 1993, its governor was simply dismissed.255 In
March 1992 the autonomous republics with the exception of Tatarstan and Chechnya signed the
Federal Treaty. (Tatarstan signed later in 1994).256 This conceded a variety of rights, including
control of natural resources and a right to secede, not granted to non-national regions.257 The
1993 Constitution recognised 21 autonomous republics, which represented an upgrade for five of
them. However, some rights, in particular secession, were limited, with self-determination in
article 5(3) balanced with the integrity and inviolability of the federation in article 4(3).
The Checheno-Ingush ASSR also initially followed this pattern, with the communist elite
declaring the republic’s sovereignty in November 1990.258 However, Chechnya stands out
among the autonomous republics as in this case the communist elite was replaced by nationalists
who declared independence on 1 November 1991.259 Various reasons can be advanced for the
apparent stridency of Chechen self-determination. The Chechens were one of the least integrated
of Russia’s ethnic groups (unlike the Tatars) and carried the memory of their mass deportation
under Stalin, (although they were not unique in this respect). However, despite these features, it
is not clear whether the majority of Chechens, whatever their feelings about Russia, actually
wanted a war with Moscow. No vote was ever held on Chechen independence and the
subsequent conflict may in large part be attributable to the failure the Russian and Chechen
governments and, in particular, Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Dzhokhar Dudayev to negotiate a
solution.260
Secessionist challenges in other republics also reflect the role of political structures. In August
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1990 the assembly in the Abkhaz ASSR in Georgia declared the region a separate Soviet
socialist republic,261 even though ethnic Abkhaz formed only 17.3% of its population.262 The
secession of the Russophone Trans-Dniestr region from Moldova reflected a division in the
ruling communist elite between the left and right banks of the Dniestr River, and indeed, was not
inspired by Russian nationalism but international socialism.263 The conflict over the Armenian
populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan did have a mass character and was a
focus for wider ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azeris. Nonetheless, the Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was also a compact political unit with local institutions controlled
by an Armenian elite.264 This meant that local grievances over the economy and discrimination
within Azerbaijan could easily be focussed by this elite into a political programme for
unification with Armenia.265 Another factor in these secessions was Russian intervention. The
Russian 14th Army played a decisive role in the Trans-Dniestr secession.266 Russian forces also
appeared to be actively involved in Abkhazia, forcing Georgia into the CIS and a more
dependent relationship with Moscow.267 Russia is also the main arms supplier to both Armenia
and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict creating considerable political leverage over
the two.268
This was equally true of Serb secessions in Croatia and Bosnia. Croatia certainly behaved
dangerously when it seceded with Slovenia, without attempting to accommodate its Serb
minority. Indeed, many of its policies worked to alienate this group.269 Nonetheless, a crucial
factor for the Croatian and Bosnian Serb secessions was the active intervention of Serbia in
support of the secessionists. Much of the ethnic cleansing that took place was carried out by
paramilitary criminal gangs, initially funded by the Serbian interior ministry.270 And most of the
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fighting in what was presented as an ethnic conflict was, in fact, conducted by regular forces of
the JNA.271
Political structures, therefore, played an important role in defining secessionism in the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. They also played a major role in shaping irridentism in
Germany. A key element in the reunification of Germany in October 1990 was the West German
constitution which not only provided a roadmap for unification but also forced the pace. The
West German constitutional document, the Basic Law of 1949 provided in its preamble that:
“The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and
freedom of Germany.” It also outlined two methods by which this could be achieved. Article 23
provided that the Basic Law would apply to “other parts of Germany after their accession” to
West Germany. Another route was contained in article 146, which stated that the Basic Law
would loose its validity once a constitution adopted by the German people in free self-
determination entered into effect. There were, then, two models for reunification. East German
lands could join the Federal Republic under the Basic Law, or the people of the two states could
agree to create a single state with a new common constitution. However, perhaps the most
significant provision was article 116, which granted citizenship to all citizens of the 1937
German Reich, their spouses and descendants.272
This became significant in the summer of 1989 when reformists in neighbouring Hungary to
begin dismantling the Iron Curtain and opened its borders with Austria. The result was an exodus
of East Germans and by September 50,000 had arrived in the West. On 9 October 100,000
people gathered in Leipzig in the first of a series of mass demonstrations chanting “Wir Sind das
Volk!” (We are the People!), a demand for democracy. A month later, on the night of 9-10
November the most potent symbol of the Cold War division of Europe, the Berlin Wall was
breached. In December the entire East German Politburo and Central Committee resigned and in
January a government of national responsibility was formed.273 However, in addition to these
political changes 2,000 people were leaving for the West every day, undermining the viability of
the East German state.274
East German opposition groups, such as New Forum, showed little interest in reunification,
as, initially, did the East German population.275 These movements had struggled against the
communist regime and wanted to resolve the East’s political, economic and social problems
themselves. However, what drove reunification on to the agenda was this continued stream of
people, which put an unbearable burden on the West and threatened the East with economic
collapse.276 In November 1989 West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl raised the goal of
reunification: not immediately but eventually through a progressive process. On 22 November
the chant in Leipzig changed subtly but significantly to the nationalist “Wir Sind ein Volk!” (We
are one People!). East Germans began to see that reunification could be a quick and easy route to
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the benefits of the West.277 In this respect Germany can be compared with the other Cold War
divided nation, Romania, which was split between Romania and the Moldavian SSR. When
Moldavia (Moldova) obtained independence in the collapse of the USSR it was widely expected
that unification would soon follow. However, momentum behind this faded when it became clear
to Moldovans that it would involve significant economic costs.278
Kohl responded to this situation with a proposal for reunification to take place quickly by the
five East German Länder joining the West under article 23 of the Basic Law not through a new
constitution, and for the exchange of East German Marks for Deutschmarks at a 1:1 rate. This
gave East Germans greater buying power and expanded the market for West German goods. This
fast and apparently painless track to reunification proved extremely popular and Kohl was
rewarded with a resounding victory for his CDU party in elections in the East in March 1990.279
Reunification took place on 3 October by the accession of East German Länder to the Federal
Republic on the basis of article 23 of the Basic Law, a process described by Kohl as conforming
with the right to self-determination.280 This short-term policy, however, held longer-term costs.
The 1:1 exchange rate, in particular, made East German industry uncompetitive and caused its
economic collapse, which, in turn, became a burden on the West.
Within Germany the abstract principle of self-determination provided the basis for
constitutional articles on reunification. Externally, it provided a basis for non-intervention in the
reunification process by outside powers. But, it also related to other principles, in particular, the
inviolability of frontiers. These principles were explicitly connected in the so-called “Four-Plus-
Two” Agreement of September 1990 between the two Germanies and the United States, Britain,
France and the USSR, which as occupying powers retained certain rights in the two states.281
This instrument, on one hand, welcomed German reunification based on the exercise of self-
determination,282 and, on the other, affirmed Germany’s external borders as those of the GDR
and FRG.283 It also provided that: “The United Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever
against other states and shall not assert any in the future.”284 Thus, the two principles of self-
determination and the inviolability of frontiers applied to political structures, legitimised and
stabilised, respectively, the reunification process.
The right of self-determination in international law is undoubtedly primarily attached to
political units. This may be, in part, because many peoples are defined by political nationality.
But, even if they are not, political ties do effect the context in which the right is exercised. Self-
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determination is a doctrine about the legitimacy of political institutions and regardless of its
rhetoric about peoples it appears that the tail often wags the dog. Politicians in political
institutions may be well placed to use this right to increase their own power. Consequently self-
determination may reflect those institutions regardless of whether its peoples are defined in
ethnic or political terms.
c. Language
Language is widely considered to be one of the most important national ties, but its
relationship with legal principles has been less straightforward than political ties. Language has
been a major element in defining peoples for self-determination. In the Versailles Conference,
after the First World War in 1919, when borders between the new nation-states were being
drawn by nationality, that nationality was invariably decided by the language spoken.285
However, this use of language has not been characteristic of the subsequent development of the
law of self-determination. Thus, in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, while language was the primary
identifying feature of a large number of peoples: Slovenes, Macedonians, Latvians, Estonians,
Ukrainians, Belorussians, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Tadjiks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Turkmen and
Slovaks: the units that actually exercised self-determination were defined along political lines.
Language has not only been used to define a “people” for the principle of self-determination.
It has also been used to identify a “country” for the principle of the territorial integrity of a
country, as outlined in principle 6 of the Colonial Independence Declaration, GA Res.
1514(XV).286 Language has been used to identify a country on this basis, for example, by
Mauritania in its claims over Western Sahara in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion.287
Language clearly does play an important functional role in uniting and dividing people.
However, it does not appear to irrevocably shape human behaviour,288 nor does it inevitably
translate into national ties. Different nations may share the same language, such as English,
French or Spanish, and a single nation can speak different ones, like Scotland or Ireland.289
Many national languages are also extremely close: Czech and Slovak, Serb and Croat, Danish
and Norwegian, Lithuanian and Latvian, Bulgarian and Macedonian. Whatever the differences
between the Krajina Serbs and Croats, language was not one of them. The Serbs in Knin spoke
the Croatian variant of Serbo-Croat and used, like the Croats, the Latin alphabet.290 A crucial
factor, therefore, may not simply be the functional role of language, but the value placed on it.291
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The difference between a dialect and a language may not be so much linguistic as political. A
language may identify a nation with a right to self-determination, while a dialect may not.
Languages may also be manipulated and changed according to nationalist ideas.292 These
reforms may reflect more an idea of a people than the characteristics of the population
themselves. A programme in the 1930s to purge Turkish of “foreign” Arab and Persian words
(the equivalent of stripping English of all its Latin and Greek based words) only produced total
confusion. (A retreat was organised under the “Sun-language” theory that Turkish was the origin
of all languages and the words were therefore not foreign after all).293 An attempt to create an
indigenous language for Norway, Nynorsk, instead of literary Danish (Riksmål), actually resulted
in two. Nynorsk failed to replace Riksmål, and remained the minority language, with Riksmål
being simply known as Norwegian (Norsk).294
Romanian has been twisted several times according to national or political motives. In the
eighteenth century, scholars switched the alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin and stripped the
language of Slavic words to reflect the theory that Romanians, a Latin people, were descended
from the Romans.295 However, when the Soviet Union annexed Moldavia from Romania in
1944, the alphabet in the republic was switched back to Cyrillic and Slavic words added to
promote the idea of a separate Moldavian nation. When the USSR broke up, though, the
Moldavians asserted their independence from Moscow by switching their alphabet back to Latin,
although the idea of a separate language remained.296
This is not to diminish the significance of linguistic divisions. For states or political nations
encompassing different linguistic groups language may create significant barriers to political
society.297 Moreover, these are divisions which can be readily presented in national terms.
Different strategies may be used by these states, each with their benefits and costs. One language
may be selected as the sole official language. This may have the advantage of making the state
accessible to a large part of the population, perhaps a large majority, but the cost may be the
exclusion of other groups both in practical and symbolic terms. A result may be ethnic
conflict.298 On the other hand, two or more languages may be official languages either on a
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national or regional level. This may make the state more inclusive, but at increased
administrative and educational costs. Additional language learning may be both time-consuming
and expensive. Alternatively, a neutral language may be used, such as the colonial language in
former colonies.299 Although not indigenous, this language has the advantage of not elevating
one group above another. However, again it may be difficult to learn and create a cultural barrier
between the governing elite and the mass of the population.300 This may be reduced if a pidgin
can be used, such as Swahili in Tanzania or Bahasa in Indonesia, which has an affinity with the
majority of local languages.301
d. Religion
Religion again may be used to identify both a “people” for the principle of self-determination
and a “country”302 for the principle of territorial integrity. Religious ties have in the past been
used to define borders in the UN partition plan for Palestine303 and, together with elections, in
the partition of British India.304 Some peoples, like the Israeli, Pakistani and Bosniac peoples,
have been primarily identified by religion, and religious ties have been particularly prominent in
many others, such as the Irish, Croat and Serb peoples.
There are some obvious parallels between religious communities and nations. Both are groups
which may have shared identities, customs, values, loyalties and aspirations. Religion may also
assist the development of nations in a number of ways. Missionaries in Africa and Asia and
Christian scholars in Europe have been instrumental in codifying the first written texts of many
national languages.305 Religious institutions, in particular state churches, have provided a
framework for socialising a population into a nation,306 and can also provide an infrastructure for
nationalism. Religious figures can, on one hand, be close to a population in a position of
authority and respect and, on the other, be part of an organisational structure designed to transmit
ideas to large numbers of people.307 Even supranational institutions, like the Catholic Church,
have engaged with nationalism when nationalists have been struggling against Protestants, as in
Ireland, or Orthodox, as in Poland and Lithuania.308
However, there are also important differences. Islam or Christendom may span the globe, but
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nations are seen as specific divisions of mankind.309 Nationalism may also be seen to divide
religious communities, as in the case of Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.310
Alternatively, religious divisions may split a nation and weaken a nationalist movement, for
example, in the Flemish movement in Belgium.311 Indeed, only a small number of religious
communities have, in fact, directly become national ones.
There is also a subtle but fundamental difference between a religious community and a
national one. If religion plays a defining role in nationality, it also takes on the role of a group
marker like language or race. The crucial factor in a nationalised religious identity is the identity
itself not necessarily the belief behind it. As contradictory as it may sound, a national-religious
identity can be just as much secular as religious. Indeed, in Yugoslavia, the drive to establish a
Muslim nation was lead by communists and secular Muslims and opposed by Islamic
revivalists.312 Many of the early Zionists were also socialists.313 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who is
regarded as the father figure of the Indian Muslim nation, envisaged Pakistan as a secular
Muslim state.314 Moreover, the identity of the religion itself may also be interpreted in this
secular nationalist way. For example, in Arab nationalism and Zionism, the significance of
Mohammed and Moses, respectively, changed from prophets of God to expressions of an Arab
or Jewish national genius.315 This is not to say that members of a religious nation will necessarily
be secular, but they need not be religious either and there is a tension, for example, in states like
Israel and Pakistan as to what their national identity means.
e. Territory and Geography
Territorial ties play a particularly important role in the interaction of legal principles. A
common geography obviously connects to principles like the inviolability of frontiers and uti
possidetis. It is a key component in the concept of a “country”, which together with the “state” is
considered to be the basis for territorial integrity. It is a necessary element in statehood and state
sovereignty. As Harold Johnson noted: “All questions of sovereignty are sooner or later
territorial.”316 It is also extremely important for self-determination. The legal right of peoples to
self-determination has normally been attached to defined territorial units: colonies, sovereign
states or federal states.317 Moreover, in international law this territorial aspect is reinforced by
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self-determination being balanced with the principles like territorial integrity, sovereignty and
the inviolability of frontiers. The balance between self-determination and these principles,
however, is more than just a balance of principles: it reflects the interpretation of nations.
The role of territory in nationality is underlined in the story of the idea of “Mother India”, as
recounted by Jawaharlal Nehru:
“Sometimes as I reached a gathering, a great roar of welcome would greet me: Bharat
Mata ki Jai – ‘Victory to Mother India.’ I would ask them unexpectedly what they meant
by that cry, who was this Bharat Mata, Mother India, whose victory they wanted? My
question would amuse them and surprise them, and then, not knowing exactly what to
answer, they would look at each other and at me. I persisted in my questioning. At last a
vigorous Jat, wedded to the soil for immemorial generations, would say that it was the
dharti, the good earth of India, that they meant. What soil? Their particular village patch,
or all the patches in the district or the province, or the whole of India? And so question and
answer went on, till they would ask me impatiently to tell them all about it. I would
endeavour to do so and explain that India was all this that they had thought, but it was
much more. The mountains and the rivers of India, and the forests and the broad fields,
which gave us food, were all dear to us, but what counted ultimately were the people of
India, people like them and me, who were spread over this vast land. Bharat Mata, Mother
India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant victory to these
people. You are parts of this Bharat Mata, I told them, you are in a manner yourselves
Bharat Mata, and as this idea slowly soaked into their brains, their eyes would light up as
if they had made a great discovery.”318
Nehru may or may not have successfully imprinted his own ideas of India on to the villagers as
he claimed, but the tale highlights that nations are usually conceived of as having two elements:
population and territory.
Territory plays an important functional role in defining nations. It obviously provides a
population with their physical location and resources, and shapes their lifestyle, customs and
culture. But, it also plays a major symbolic role. Moreover, of the two elements in a nation,
territory is the unthinking part: it does not express its own wish to be part of a nation. National
territory is territory to which people have ascribed a national role.319 In the age of dynastic
politics and empire-building a territory might have been derided as, “a little patch of ground That
hath in it no profit but the name”,320 but in the nationalist era the name provides all the necessary
value. A nation’s territory is undoubtedly one of its important symbols.321 Austria’s Prince
Metternich once famously dismissed the Italian peninsular as a “geographical expression”.322
But, for Italian nationalists the boot of Italy had an altogether different significance, in the words
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of Guiseppe Mazzini:
“God…  divided Humanity into distinct groups upon the face of our globe, and thus planted
the seeds of nations. Bad governments have disfigured the design of God, which you may
see clearly marked out, as far, at least, as regards Europe, by the courses of great rivers, by
the lines of lofty mountains, and by other geographical conditions; they have disfigured it
by conquest, by greed, by jealousy of the just sovereignty of others…  But the divine design
will infallibly be fulfilled. Natural divisions, the innate spontaneous tendencies of the
peoples will replace the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by bad governments…
To you who have been born in Italy, God has allotted, as if favouring you specially, the
best-defined country in Europe…  God has stretched round you sublime and indisputable
boundaries; on one side the highest mountains of Europe, the Alps; on the other the sea, the
immeasurable sea.”323
The significance attached to geographical features has also shaped the application of self-
determination in international law. Many nations, such as Japan or the Philippines, cover
different islands, but in General Assembly resolution 1541(XV) it was geographical separation
by sea, the “salt-water test”, which was effectively used to define non-self-governing peoples.324
On the other hand, in the Åland Islands dispute the Commission of Rapporteurs considered that
the crucial factor in defining a nation was not a stretch of sea in itself, but the number of islets
and rocks that it contained.325
Territory may also be connected with other ties, such as history and descent. Robert Redslob
remarked that: “[t]he history of a people is simultaneously the history of its soil”,326 and there
may be visible reminders of this in battlefields, monuments and ruins.327 Similarly, the soil may
be the resting-place for a nation’s ancestors and provides a crucial link between past and
present.328 In the Zimbabwean independence struggle, for example, nationalists used ancestral
spirits tied to the land to mobilise peasant support.329 The role of territory in symbolising the
identity of a nation is graphically illustrated an a tale by Czechoslovakia’s first president Thomas
Masaryk about his time in Serbia:
“During the last war against the Turks I happened to be in Serbia, and a Serbian officer
told me his experience on the battlefield. When at the head of his regiment of peasant
soldiers he reached the plain of Kosovo, the famous ‘Field of the Blackbirds’, a deathlike
silence seized the whole detachment; men and officers, without any command, uncovered
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their heads, crossed themselves, and each of them tried to tread softly, so as not to disturb
the eternal sleep of their heroic ancestors. (Here my friend, quite lost in the remembrance
of that great experience unconsciously imitated their gait, and his voice fell to a whisper as
he recalled the silence of his soldiers.) Many of the weather-beaten faces were bedewed
with unconscious tears, as was my friend’s face as he spoke.”330
Kosovo, of course, also shows the problem in the significance attached to a national territory. In
the ethnic cleansing conducted by Serb authorities in 1999 the territory of Kosovo was seen as
more valuable than the people who lived on it.
Territory, then, plays an important role in nationhood and this has significant implications for
the shape of the law of self-determination. The law of self-determination is usually characterised
by a series of balances between the self-determination of peoples, and territorially based
principles like territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers. However, this may be more
than just a balance of principles. How the principles are weighed  may reflect the relative
importance of the elements of population and territory in the definition of a nation.
f. History
In 1998 Armenia submitted a report to the Human Rights Committee, in which it outlined the
historical background to the conflict over the disputed Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh
in Azerbaijan:
“Nagorny-Karabakh, which like Nakhichevan, had formed an integral part of the Armenian
state for thousands of years, was incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1920 and, by an
arbitrary decision of an unconstitutional and unauthorized party organ, the Caucasian
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated 5
July 1921, was transferred to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan…  As a result, the right of
peoples to self-determination was flouted and the will of 95 per cent of the population of
Nagorny-Karabakh and of the population of Soviet Armenia was not taken into
consideration.”331
This provoked Azerbaijan to write a letter to the Secretariat of the Commission on Human Rights
in which it rejected the historical basis of Armenian claims:
“If we look back to ancient times, historical facts confirmed by the research of Strabon and
Plutarch unequivocally testify the existence at those times of the Albanian state on the
territory which included present-day Nagorno-Karabakh region, the population of which
was the precursor of the modern Azerbaijani nation.
Independent Azerbaijani Khanate that was created later and covered the territory of the
present-day Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, during the days of
feudal division on the threshold of XIXth century became the arena of strategic rivalry
between Russian and Persian Empires. Under this circumstances, in accordance with the
Agreement of 1805 the Karabakh Khanate was transferred to the Russian Empire. Gulistan
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and Turkmenchay peace treaties of 1813 and 1828, that ended the Russian-Iranian wars
fixed Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh Khanate, as a part of Russia.
During this period the mass migration of Armenians started from the Middle East to
Transcaucasia including, inter alia, the territory of the present-day Armenia and the region
of Azerbaijan which is known today as Nagorno-Karabakh. It is a matter of historical fact
that only in 1828-9, 130,000 Armenians from Middle East were resettled in Transcaucasia;
later another 600,000 were also resettled. Thus, taking into account that the settlement of
Armenians in Transcaucasia began only in the first part of the XIXth century, Nagorno-
Karabakh region and any other part of the Azerbaijani territory could not be ‘… an integral
part of the Armenian State for thousands of years… ’”332
These statements by Armenia and Azerbaijan contain very different interpretations of
Nagorno-Karabakh and national ties. One highlights the characteristics and will of the
population, the other emphasises territory. However, the common thread running through both is
their use of historical ties to add legitimacy to national ideas. It was not enough to emphasise
territory or the characteristics of the population, those ties also had to have historical depth.
Whether Azerbaijani possession dated from ancient times or 1920, or whether Armenian
occupation had been for thousands of years or from the nineteenth century was important for the
legitimacy of those claims.
Historical ties, then, play an important role in adding depth and legitimacy to national
ideas.333 They also add weight to legal principles. For the principle of self-determination
historical ties have been considered particularly significant for establishing a relationship
between a population and a territory. The argument has often been made that populations which
lack a historic connection to a territory, “settlers” do not have a right to self-determination.334
Equally, historical ties may bolster territorial integrity. It has been claimed that, in a balance
between self-determination and territorial integrity, the latter may prevail to allow the recovery
of the territory by a state regardless of the wishes of the population if that state has a historic
connection to it. These are, of course, legal arguments. The position of historical claims in
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international law, as will be seen further on, is not entirely clear.335 Indeed, considering that
many nations have been shaped by migrations, this raises the question of how long a population
must live in a territory to have a connection to it?
Aside from legitimacy, historical ties undoubtedly perform an important functional role in the
creation of nations. The consolidation of states, the development of languages and their
literature, the emergence of customs and traditions may be the product of a string of events and
processes. However, these may not necessarily be the historical ties that are highlighted by
nationalists. As history is important for political legitimacy, historical facts may be selected or
discarded, not according their original importance, but whether they fit a particular idea of a
people.
Even new nations need a sense of history. Many African states, although undoubtedly the
creations of European colonialism, have, nonetheless, appealed to an earlier heritage, however
spurious. The former British colony of Nyasaland renamed itself “Mala?i” on independence in
1964, after the Maravi people, who founded a seventeenth century empire in the south of the
country, and who are considered the ancestors of many of its tribes. (There is no present Maravi
tribe).336 The Maravian Empire did, at least, encompass part of the modern Mala?ian state (as
well as bits of Zambia and Mozambique). The former British colony of the Gold Coast, however,
changed its name to “Ghana” after a great medieval empire, despite the fact that historical Ghana
had never formed part of its territory, lying 350 miles to the north-east.337 The name, though, was
intended to establish, “a glorious past for the Gold Coast, which would provide a symbol around
which nationalists could draw inspiration.”338 Continuing in this tradition, the west African state
of Dahomey in 1975 became “Benin” after a powerful fifteenth-eighteenth century kingdom,
which lay 200 miles east of its borders in present day Nigeria.339 History in nationalism,
therefore, performs a distinct role. Traditions may be manipulated or invented, and historical
figures may be ascribed different motives from those they originally had. Sometimes the creation
of a national history has even been helped by blatant forgery.340
This symbolic role of historical ties may obscure their functional role in the development of a
nation. Slovakia, for example, claimed before the Human Rights Committee that Slovak
independence was the accomplishment of, “the 1,000-year efforts of the Slovak nation”.341 And
over a thousand years before an event did take place, which profoundly effected the future
development of the Slovak people. By the ninth century a powerful state known as the Moravian
Empire had emerged in the region around the watersheds of the Vah and Moravia rivers, an area
which includes the Slovak capital, Bratislava. The people of the empire were local Slavs, and
335 Judge Petrén, Separate Opinion, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 110; Musgrave
op. cit. no. 128 at p. 255.
336 E. Alpers, “The Mutupa and Malawi Political Systems to the Time of the Ngoni Invasions” in T. O. Ranger
ed., Aspects of Central African History (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968) pp. 1-28 at pp. 17-24; A. J.
Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe (Fourth Edition), (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1985) at pp. 48-9.
337 Smith op. cit. no. 63 at p. 147.
338 D. E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1955) at p. 22.
339 A. I. Asiwaju and R. Law, “From the Volta to the Niger, c. 1600-1800” in J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder ed.,
History of West Africa (Longman, Harlow, UK, 1985) vol. 1, pp. 412-64 at pp. 416-22.
340 H. Trevor-Roper, “The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland” in E. Hobsbawm and T.
Ranger eds. The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) pp. 15-41 at pp. 17-8;
Miller op. cit. no. 18 at p. 33.
341 Slovakia, CCPR/C/81/Add.9, (1996) p. 4.
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Slovak nationalists viewed them as their ancestors and the empire as the original Slovak state.342
However, ironically, it was not the creation of this empire that was crucial for the emergence of a
Slovak people, but its destruction.
By the tenth century the empire had been overrun by Hungarians and their kingdom was
established in 905 AD. It was this division of the Slovaks in Hungary from the Czechs, who
lived in neighbouring Bohemia and Moravia, that lead to the development of separate Czech and
Slovak identities. Czech nationalism in the nineteenth century grew out of the Kingdom of
Bohemia and an existing sense of Bohemian patriotism. However, it made slower progress to the
east in Moravia, which was a separate political unit in the Hapsburg Empire,343 and for Slovaks
in Hungary, with completely different political circumstances, it made less impression still.
Ethnic Hungarian, or Magyar nationalists in the nineteenth century were often decidedly
hostile to other ethnic groups, which, depending on how they were counted, formed either a large
minority or the majority of the kingdom. On separate occasions the Hungarian government had
pursued a policy of Magyarisation against these groups. In the words of radical nationalist Louis
Koussuth, “a Slovak nation has never existed even in a dream.”344 Slovaks spoke a language
close to the Moravian dialect of Czech.345 But, Slovak nationalists faced with this political
climate believed their best prospect to avoid assimilation was to develop a language as close to
the people as possible. A written language already existed in biblical Czech, but even in
Bohemia this was seen as archaic. These people were, if anything, sympathetic to the Czechs, but
their different political circumstances demanded that they develop separate languages and
identities.346 Slovaks may look back to the Moravian Empire as the predecessor of their state, but
if that state had survived one might today talk of “Moravians” rather than separate Czech and
Slovak peoples.347
Returning to the original example of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagoro-Karabakh, it can be
noted that many of the historical ties used by both sides to support their claims were somewhat
spurious. Azeri claims to be the successor to the ancient Caucasian Albanian state (no relation to
Albania in the Balkans) were somewhat undercut by the fact that Caucasian Albanians adopted
the script and eventually the language of the Armenians.348 The Azerbaijani nation was, in fact,
an essentially twentieth century phenomenon. It was only around the time of the First World War
that the idea of the Azeris as a Turkic Azerbaijani nation, rather than simply Tatars or Caucasian
Muslims, really developed.349 The Azerbaijan SSR also played an important role in the
consolidation of an Azerbaijani people, which may explain the particular significance of
territorial integrity in the Azeri concept of nationhood.350 However, the Azeris are correct in their
assertion that the large Armenian population in Nagoro-Karabakh only dated from immigration
342 H. Kohn, “Romanticism and Realism among the Czechs and Slovaks” 14 Review of Politics (1952) pp. 25-46
at pp. 26, 35-6; Seton-Watson op. cit. no. 14 at p. 169.
343 Kohn loc. cit. no. 342 at p. 25; Hroch op. cit. no. 13 at pp. 44, 60.
344 R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1965) at
pp. 260-1.
345 Kohn loc. cit. no. 342 at p. 25.
346 Seton-Watson op. cit. no. 344 at p. 261.
347 S. H. Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European History (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953) at pp.
239-41.
348 Goldenberg op. cit. no. 265 at p. 16; C. J. Walker, “The Armenian Presence in Mountainous Karabakh” in J.
F. R. Wright, S. Goldenberg and R. Schofield eds., Transcaucasian Boundaries (UCL Press, London, 1960) pp. 89-
112 at pp. 91-2.
349 Goldenberg op. cit. no. 265 at pp. 11, 30.
350 Ibid., at p. 41; Dragadze op. cit. no. 268 at p. 282.
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in the nineteenth century. In the 1820s Muslims formed a large majority, perhaps more than
90%, of the population of the region.351
There is also a difference between the use of history to bolster the legitimacy of political
claims and the historical basis of that politics. As the two statements were intended for the
former, they neglected a historical event which is crucial for understanding the present conflict
because it involved the actions of a third party: Turkey. In 1915 the Young Turk regime, in what
was the first act of genocide inspired by a nationalist ideology (Pan-Turanism), and which lead
to the coining of the phrase “crimes against humanity”,352 killed over a million Armenians.353
The Azeris are a people closely related to the Turks and Armenians do not tend to draw a
distinction between them. Nagorno-Karabakh was not the only Armenian irridentia outside the
Armenian SSR. Georgia had an Armenian population over twice the size, forming 8% of its
population.354 However, the possession of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan was especially
galling for the Armenians because it symbolised that the “Turks” (as the Azeris were seen) were
“getting away” with the genocide.355
In conclusion, Ernest Renan once wrote that: “Forgetting, and, I would even say, historical
error are an essential factor in the creation of a nation”.356 Historical ties are undoubtedly
important in defining peoples and nations, but this very importance means that their significance
may change from their original context. National self-determination itself is not a particularly old
doctrine and the use of historical ties in the right, it should be noted, is to use them in the context
of post-eighteenth century politics.
g. Race and Descent
The ideas of race and descent play a number of roles in nationality and have also informed the
principle of self-determination. First, like history, ideas of a shared descent add depth to national
ideas and may also provide a connection to a glorious past. Descent, for example, has allowed
Greek nationalists to claim the heritage of the Hellanic city-states, Romanians to connect
themselves to Rome and the legions of the Emperor Trajan,357 and the Welsh to dream of ancient
Celtic warriors.358 Such claims, though, should not be overplayed. The idea of a Greek ancestry,
in particular, overlooked the role of a number of peoples, Macedonians, Romans, Teutons,
Goths, Albanians and Slavs, in forming the modern Greek nation.359
351 Goldenberg op. cit. no. 265 at p. 158.
352 E. Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity” 23 British Yearbook of International Law (1946) pp. 178-226 at p.
181.
353 R. Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and Holocaust (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992); H. Fein, “Genocide: A Sociological Perspective” 38:1 Current Sociology (1990),
pp. 1-126 at pp. 69-75.
354 Joffé op. cit. no. 262 at pp. 15, 27; Goldenberg op. cit. no. 265 at p. 101; E. M. Herzig, “Armenia and the
Armenians” in G. Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (Longman, London, 1996) pp.
248-68 at p. 263.
355 Herzig op. cit. no. 354 at p. 255; Walker op. cit. no. 348 at p. 105.
356 Renan op. cit. no. 164 at p. 50.
357 Seton-Watson op. cit. no. 14 at p. 175.
358 P. Morgan, “From Death to a View: The Hunt for the Welsh Past in the Romantic Period” in E. Hobsbawm
and T. Ranger eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) pp. 43-100 at pp.
67-9.
359 J. Campbell and P. Sherrard, Modern Greece (Ernest Benn, London, 1968) at p. 21; W. Connor,
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994) at pp. 215-6.
71
In fact, nations as large human groups have over time inevitably tended to assimilate other
groups and individuals.360 The assimilated are generally lost from view and this obviously helps
racial theories. Their legacy, though, may remain in a name: the names of individuals or in some
cases the name of a nation. The Bulgarians and Croats are thought of as Slavic peoples. But, the
original Bulgarians were a Turkic people who conquered the Slav population in Bulgaria and
then totally assimilated with them,361 while name Croat (Hrvat) has Iranian origins.362 Likewise,
the French are thought of as a Latin people, although their name comes from the Germanic
Franks.363
A second feature of ties of race and descent, though, is most significant for international law
and that is their fundamentally exclusionary nature. Of all national ties, ties of race and descent
are the most exclusive. A person can learn another language or perhaps change religion, but they
cannot change their descent. It has even been argued in the drafting of the UN draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that to use race in the definition of a people was to violate
the principle of non-discrimination.364 This has been particularly significant in defining colonial
self-determination. As outlined earlier, anticolonial nationalism in Asia and Africa was typically
lead by western educated native elites. These elites were the product of the colonial system and
to various degrees received a western education and filled a variety of positions in colonial
society. However, at the same time, they were also excluded by the ingrained racism of the
colonial regime.365
This racial discrimination had two effects on the development of nationality and nationalism.
First, race became in opposition a defining feature in national identity.366 Black nationalists, not
just in Africa but also in Europe and the Americas, developed a variety of doctrines around a
Black identity: from the Pan-African idea of a single African/Black people367 to theories like
Leopold Senghor’s Negritude368 or those of Edward Blyden, which celebrated a Black genius.369
Second, race became a defining feature in the right of self-determination in international law. In
colonial self-determination “peoples” were usually defined politically and territorially as the
population of a colony. However, they undoubtedly also had a racial element, as essentially non-
white populations. Accordingly, self-determination was effectively interpreted as freedom from
360 C. A. MacCartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, London, 1934) at pp.
9-10.
361 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1958) at p. 9; Connor op.
cit. no. 359 at p. 216.
362 Malcolm op. cit. no. 38 at p. 7.
363 J. Krej?i and V. Velímsky, Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe (Croom Helm, London, 1981) at p. 155.
364 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22, p. 22, para. 111.
365 See J. Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government (Longmans, London, 1960) at p. 79.
366 E. K. Francis, “The Ethnic Factor in Nation-Building” 46 Social Forces (1968) pp. 338-46 at p. 345.
367 See Judge Ammoun’s Separate Opinion in Namibia, Chapter 4, p. 256-62.
368 Léopold Senghor: “Negritude is the whole of the values of civilization – cultural, economic, social, political –
which characterize the black peoples, more exactly, the Negro-African world. It is essentially instinctive reason,
which pervades all these values. It is reason of impressions, reason that is ‘seized’. It is expressed by the emotions
through the abandonment of self and complete identification with the object; through the myth of the archetype of
the collective soul, and the myth primordial accorded to the cosmos. In other terms, the sense of communion, the
gift of imagination, the gift of rhythm – these are traits of Negritude, that we find like an indelible seal on all the
works and activities of the black man.” Quoted in Irving Leonard Markovitz, Léopold Sédar Senghor and the
Politics of Negritude (Heinemann, London, 1969) at p. 41.
369 See J. M. Lyon, “The Herder Syndrome: A Comparative Study of Cultural Nationalism” 17 Ethnic and Racial
Studies (1994) pp. 224-37 at pp. 227-8, 230-1, 234.
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white arbitrary rule370 and was closely connected with the elimination of racial discrimination.371
Thus, in the Colonial Independence Declaration, GA Res. 1514(XV), and especially in the
Friendly Relations Declaration, GA Res. 2625(XXV), the satisfaction of self-determination was
defined as the absence of distinctions of “race, creed and colour”. It also meant that self-
determination in decolonisation was not restricted to colonial territories, but extended to peoples
under other “racist régimes”. These categories will be examined in more detail later on, but they
underline the importance of race in the law of self-determination.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has looked at the doctrines of nationalism and self-determination and their
relationship with international law. The law of self-determination is the product of the interaction
of these doctrines, but this also puts it in an unfortunate position. Self-determination and
international law, although sharing a nexus in the state, are fundamentally different in their
approach, one focussed on the people, the other on the state. Between them they provide two
standards of legitimacy which any position in the law of self-determination can never completely
fulfil. Nonetheless, as the nation-state is rooted at the foundations of international law, self-
determination necessarily occupies a central position in the legitimacy of that law. From this
position, the doctrine, which is itself profoundly ambivalent about international law, can be
appealed to either to support or to challenge legal rules.
The basis for the interaction between nationalism and international law is the relationship
between national ties and legal principles. National ties and legal principles enjoy a close
connection and the four legal principles examined here, self-determination, territorial integrity,
state sovereignty and the preservation of frontiers, are quite capable of encapsulating different
national ties. Correspondingly different configurations of legal principles and the weight
attached to each principle may reflect different interpretations of nations and national ties. In
addition these principles may shaped by the institutional context in which the right of self-
determination is exercised. Self-determination is essentially a rhetoric for the achievement of
certain political goals. In this regard legal principles may support the political structures which
form the basis for nationalist politics.
This chapter has outlined the basic framework in which nationalism/national self-
determination and international law interact. The following chapters will examine details of this
interaction: how it shapes the drafting of instruments, the behaviour of courts and tribunals and
the concept of legal obligations. However, the next chapter will first look at the historical context
370 Michael Eisner: “While the theory of international law evolved to forbid all colonial subjugation,
international law in practice focused only on Western imperialism in the Third World. The development of the
‘pigmentational sovereignty test’, which emphasizes the racial differences between ‘Europeans’ and the Third
World in assessing whether or not a colonial relationship exists, reflects this focus. Accordingly, alien means white,
and subjugation involves white hegemony over people of color.” Eisner loc. cit. no. 89 at p. 410; Higgins op. cit. no.
169 at p. 106; Pomerance op. cit. no. 90 at p. 16; Emerson loc. cit. no. 176 at p. 204; A. A. Mazrui, “Consent,
Colonialism and Sovereignty” 11 Political Studies (1963) pp. 36-55 at pp. 48-9.
371 See, for example, the preamble, the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: “Considering that the United Nations has condemned colonialism and all the practices of
segregation and discrimination associated therewith, in whatever form and wherever they exist, and that the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960 (General
Assembly Resolution 1514(XV)) has affirmed and solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing them to a speedy
and unconditional end… ” 5 ILM (1966) pp. 350-68 at p. 352.
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in which this interaction developed.
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2
The Historical Development of Self-Determination
“In the old European system, the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by
governments nor asserted by the people. The interest of the reigning families, not those of
nations regulated the frontiers…  and a princess, in the words of Fénelon, carried a
monarchy in her wedding portion.”
LORD ACTON, 1862.1
“The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is
an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.”
THE COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION,
GA RES. 1514(XV), 1960.2
Outline
These two comments, made just over a century apart, point to a radical change in the
perception of political authority. “The principle of the right of a people to self-determination”,
the International Commission of Jurists noted, “seems self-evident”.3 But, the fact that it seems
natural now does not mean that it has always been so. Rather what is self-evident today has
actually been the product of a long historical process. This chapter will chart that process. It will
begin with the formation of nation-states in western Europe in the late middle ages and conclude
at the point where self-determination gained international currency at the end of the First World
War.
The aim of this chapter, then, is about challenging perceptions. It seeks to peel back and
scrutinise what initially appears self-evident. In this regard, it will connect two doctrines which
superficially seem polar opposites: nationalism and international law. The two have, in fact, far
more in common than one might think. Both, in different ways, are doctrines defined by the
modern state and arguably represent necessary responses to the emergence of that type of
organisation. Indeed, the histories of nationalism and international law are often so closely
connected that they can be incorporated into a single narrative. This narrative consists of the rise
of the modern state, and the relationship between three doctrines which seek to make sense of
that institution. These are international law, nationalism and liberalism, and the interaction
1 J. E. E. Acton, “Nationality” in The History of Freedom and Other Essays (J. N. Figgis and L. R. Vere eds.),
(Macmillan & Co., London, 1922) pp. 270-300 at p. 273.
2 GA Res. 1514(XV), 15 GAOR (1960), Supplement No. 16 (A/4684) at pp. 66-7.
3 International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan: A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, 1972) at p. 65.
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between the three has defined the context in which self-determination has developed.
1. The Foundations for National Self-Determination
The end of the First World War, then known as the Great War, in 1918 released new hopes
and aspirations. The old empires of Europe had crumbled and nation-states were emerging from
their ruins. In a phrase for the times peoples had a right to “self-determination”. The idea held
the promise that henceforth peoples could live under the government of their choice.
A necessary element, though, in letting the people decide is to first find out who they are. To
that end, ethnographers were dispatched to the far corners of Europe to determine the nationality
of the people there. In some of the more far-flung of those corners they met peasants in small,
isolated villages living a way of life little different from that of the previous centuries. Now the
outside world intruded into theirs and brought strange men asking strange questions. When they
were asked about their nationality, the peasants replied, perhaps with a look of bemusement or
with a shrug of the shoulders, “we belong here”, or we are “from hereabouts”.4 In the towns
people were generally more helpful, but if they identified themselves with a nation, was that
answer any more instinctive than that of the peasants?5
The right of peoples to self-determination is a political argument and one based on a very
particular idea. It presumes that nations and peoples constitute a single homogeneous unit, the
“self”, which forms the basis for political authority. This is, in fact, a very specific vision, and
although self-determination presents it as a natural one, it actually relies on a number of
conditions. Nationalism first emerged in the eighteenth century, with some elements appearing in
the seventeenth, and it arrived at that time because the necessary conditions for the argument
were then in place.
Throughout history there have been groups which have distinguished their own culture from
that of others. The ancient Greeks, for example, made a clear distinction between their own
civilisation and the “barbarians” around them.6 Indeed, the word nation (natio), itself, dates from
Roman times, and referred to people united by birth, although in Roman and even medieval
usage it was applied to people from the same town or area.7 Self-determination, though, is more
than simple ethnocentrism. The right, in fact, would have been meaningless to the ancient
Greeks. These populations were undoubtedly patriotic, but their political life was centred on their
respective city-states not on their culture or a Greek people. Indeed, they would have found the
very idea of Greek nationhood incomprehensible and insulting. They believed that they were a
unique civilisation, not one nation among others, alongside the barbarians.
A similar distinction between a country and barbarian outsiders was made in medieval Italy.
4 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War with a Collection of Official Documents (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Washington, 1933) vol. 1 at p. 300; M. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in
Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among Smaller European Nations
(B. Fowkes trans.), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) at p. 184.
5 Boyd Shafer: “Nations and national feeling appear to be shaped not by nature but by nurture, by everything
human and peculiar to times and places.” B. C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972) at p. 328.
6 A. D. Smith, “Chosen People: Why Ethnic Groups Survive” 13 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1992) pp. 436-56 at
p. 444; W. Preiser, “History of the Law of Nations Ancient Times to 1648” in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1995) vol. II, pp. 722-49 at pp. 724-5.
7 G. Zernatto, “Nation: The History of a Word” 6 Review of Politics (1944) pp. 351-66 at pp. 351-5; Shafer op.
cit. no. 5 at p. 13.
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Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) in The Prince famously called for a leader to drive the
barbarians out of Italy,8 but, this also did not mean that he necessarily saw Italy as a nation in the
modern sense.9 Even in the nineteenth century, after the first abortive attempt at unification in
1848, the historian Luigi Blanch commented on the Italian identity: “the patriotism of the Italians
is like that of the ancient Greeks, and is the love of a single town, not of a country; it is a feeling
of a tribe, not of a nation. Only by foreign conquest have they ever been united. Leave them to
themselves and they split into fragments.”10 Although the right of self-determination presents
itself as natural, it is the product of particular political, economic, social and cultural
circumstances.
The first of these relates to the state. Self-determination proposes that a nation or a people is
the basis for legitimate political authority. But, the other side of this is that it presumes the
existence of political units, which can accommodate a national political life. However, where the
story of self-determination begins, which is in early medieval western Europe, this was not how
states, at least large ones, could be described. The feudal state, rather than a forum for national
politics, was typically a loose collection of provinces with different laws and traditions, united
only by the fairly distant authority of a monarch. In such states self-determination was largely
meaningless. There was no centralised national power, rather it was diffused through different
levels of the feudal structure. It was only when states developed institutions to exercise national
authority, i.e. on a uniform basis throughout their territory, that the rhetoric of self-determination
could acquire relevance. This was the context of the modern state.
Second, self-determination assumes that individuals are organised into nations and peoples,
and that these groups are the primary focus for their identity and the principal basis for political
action. However, for most of human history, life for most people centred on the locality.11 As
John Armstrong, who made a case for Nations Before Nationalism, noted: “Generally…  a lower
class (especially in sedentary agricultural societies) cannot constitute a group as persistently
conscious of its identity as an ethnic collectivity”. This was, though, “a matter of degree rather
than absolute.”12 Peasants in agricultural societies may have had an awareness of a wider
national community, but for them it was likely to be something distant and abstract compared to
local loyalties.13 And there were good reasons for this. Physical mobility was low and for most
people their world rarely stretched far beyond their immediate surroundings. The locality was
something readily tangible: the place of their family, friends and neighbours; the land that gave
them sustenance and formed the background against which they lived their lives.14 This intimate
homeland was very different from the large, anonymous homeland of the nation.15
8 N. Machiavelli, The Prince (G. Bull trans.) (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1980) ch. XXVI at p. 134. See
also E. P. Noether, The Seeds of Italian Nationalism 1700-1815 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1951) at p.
20; H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (MacMillan, New York, 1951) at pp.
128-9.
9 G. Bull, “Introduction” in Machiavelli op. cit. no. 8 at p. 11.
10 Quoted in D. Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History (University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1959) at p. 5.
11 W. Connor, “When is a Nation?” 13 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1990) pp. 92-103.
12 J. A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982) at pp. 6-
7.
13 J. Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (Fontana Press, London, 1994) at p. 14; J. W. Cole and E. R. Wolf, The
Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley (Academic Press, New York, 1974) at p. 54; E. Weber,
Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1976) at p. 486; Shafer op. cit. no. 5 at pp. 47-8.
14 Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at p. 8.
15 C. J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (MacMillan, New York, 1960) at p. 9.
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The shift in identities from the local to the national may be seen in various words expressing
the concept of a homeland. A good example is the Bengali word desh. Desh has a meaning
equivalent to “home” or “place of origin”, both in a geographical and social and cultural sense.
Traditionally, it was applied to a village or district. However, by the beginning of the twentieth
century it was increasingly attached to Bengal province or India, and, in 1971 was incorporated
into the name of a state: Bangla Desh.16 Similarly the French word pays (country, land, region)
was originally used by most Frenchmen simply to refer to their locality and not to describe
France.17 The factors which helped people develop these wider identities, improved transport and
communications, mass literacy, increased trade etc., belong more to the modern era.
Third, self-determination proposes that the basis for political authority is a single
homogeneous people. This does not mean that the rhetoric of self-determination cannot be used
by elites, but those elites must justify their authority on the basis of a people. This emphasis on
power being held by the whole people, rather than a privileged section of it, is a specific
repudiation of aristocratic privileges. However, in the medieval period and for a long time
afterwards these privileges defined political life. Even in the nineteenth century British statesman
Benjamin Disraeli wrote of two nations: “between whom there is no intercourse and no
sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were…
inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by different
food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws”.18 He was
talking about rich and poor.
This idea of two nations, though, was quite an accurate reflection of the political and social
situation even at that time. In many European countries for centuries the ruling and lower classes
had been literally two nations. Ethnic Swedes ruled over Finns in Finland, Magyars (ethnic
Hungarians) over Slavs and Romanians in Hungary, Germans over different Slav peoples in
various lands and French-speakers over Germans in the German states. Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V (r. 1519-56) even claimed that he only ever spoke German to his horse.19 In a literal
example of these divisions Transylvannia in 1437 was divided in to a union of three nations:
Magyars, Saxons, and Székels (Magyar speakers of Avarian descent). But, this only related to
the identity of the ruling classes. Romanians were excluded from this union because they were
only the common people.20 National self-determination assumed relevance once this social
stratification started to erode. Indeed, it was the part of the population least tied to feudal
divisions and with the greatest social and economic mobility that took the lead in using the
language of nations and peoples to gain political power.
In fact, the effect of “two nations” on self-determination can be seen in Poland around
Disraeli’s time. The country at the time was divided between Prussia, Russia and Austria. In
1846 nationalists in Austrian Poland, who were drawn mainly from the land-owning class,
planned a national uprising to shake off foreign domination and restore their country’s
16 L. A. Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1974) at
p. 11.
17 Weber op. cit. no. 13 at p. 46.
18 B. Disraeli, Sybil; or the Two Nations (Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1877) at p. 76.
19 M. Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (Edward Arnold, London, 1988) at p. 20.
20 S. Fischer-Galati, “The Origins of Modern Rumanian Nationalism” 12 Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas
(1964) pp. 48-54 at pp. 48-9; R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians: From Romans Times to the
Completion of Unity (Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1934) at pp. 101-3; R. A. Kann, The Multinational
Empire: Nationalism and Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 (Columbia University Press, New York,
1950) vol. I, at pp. 306-7; Zernatto loc. cit. no. 7 at pp. 362-3.
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independence. However, their revolt was pre-empted and they were massacred: not by the
Austrians, but by peasants, by definition the Polish people themselves, who considered the
tyranny of their landlords for more serious than anything exercised by Austria.21 This is the
substance behind the nationalist counter-argument that if there is effectively no people or those
who claim to represent it do not, self-determination cannot function.
Fourth, the basic assertion of self-determination that a people or a nation is the basis for
political authority is also essentially a secular one. Even though, as has been seen, nations can
encompass religious ties and nationalism can ally itself with religious institutions, self-
determination finds the basis for authority in peoples not in faith. However, in medieval Europe
monarchs claimed their powers from God, the so-called divine right of kings. Self-determination,
therefore, depended on the development of a rational, secular approach to political authority.22
This took place with the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which
rooted power not in the divine, but in natural laws, which could apply to nations and peoples. It
may be, as Alfred Cobban put it, that, eighteenth century nationalism replaced the, “Divine right
of Kings”, with the, “Divine right of the People”,23 but it did shift the basis of authority from the
otherworldly to this world.
Thus, while self-determination presents itself as a natural political argument, it, in fact,
depends on particular circumstances. It needed national political institutions, a broadening of
identities, social and economic mobility and a secular approach to politics. It was only when
those conditions were in place that the rhetoric of national self-determination could become
relevant.
2. The Nation-State and Internal and External Sovereignty
The Peace of Westphalia 1648, which recognised a system of independent states, is usually
seen as a watershed in the development of international law. However, it was also representative
of a far wider process. The sovereign states of western Europe at the time of Westphalia were the
product of major changes over the preceding centuries. These were changes that laid the
foundations for the doctrines of liberalism, nationalism, international law and the right of self-
determination.
The medieval European state, unlike the modern nation-state, was not a consolidated political
unit. Politics and culture in medieval Europe was profoundly split.24 Life for most people was
centred on the locality. This was good for small, localised states, like the Italian city-states,
which could evoke a strong sense of patriotism in their inhabitants, but large kingdoms were
often a loose patchwork of regions, with different laws, cultures and traditions.25 The authority of
a king was limited by the power of the nobles and so remote from many of his subjects that they
21 Kann op. cit. no. 20 vol. I at p. 228. Similar tensions were also evident in the 1863 uprising in Russian Poland.
See also R. F. Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856-1865 (Athlone Press, London, 1963) at pp.
208, 216-8, 221, 226, 236-43.
22 Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at p. 3
23 A. Cobban, The Nation-State and National Self-Determination (Collins, London, 1969) at p. 40.
24 H. Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1994) at pp. 12, 70; Hayes op. cit. no. 15 at p. 29.
25 J. R. Strayer, “The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe” in K. W. Deutsch and W. J. Foltz
eds., Nation-Building (Atherton Press, New York, 1963) pp. 17-26 at p. 18.
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could pass from one kingdom to another without much sense of loss.26 Not only were the powers
of kings limited, and their states politically and culturally fragmented, but above them was the
Pope and a Latin lingua franca.27 In 800 A.D. Pope Leo III crowned the Frankish king,
Charlemagne as Emperor, successor to the Caesars, establishing idea of the dual universal
authority of Pope and Emperor.28
However, in the centuries prior to Westphalia a parallel process was taking place. Monarchs
in European kingdoms were consolidating their powers. By taking control of justice and taxation
and expanding the administration, they redirected political life away from feudal structures
towards a centralised state.29 And people were drawn into this life, most obviously a growing
body of officials and lawyers, but also ordinary people whose rights and obligations were
transferred from the local to what is tellingly known as the “national” level.30 The erosion of
feudal divisions and the growth of towns, in turn, created new social and economic opportunities
for an emerging middle class.31 As for the monarchs themselves, this nation-building was not
guided by a sense of national destiny, but the simple need to their power and increase their
incomes,32 and, far from being a natural process, it was achieved in the face of concerted and
sometimes violent opposition.33 The kingdoms were also developing their own cultural
identities,34 with English becoming the language of the English parliament in 136235 and French
becoming the sole official language of France in 1539.36 These vernacular languages gained
prestige at the expense of Latin as mediums of culture and knowledge.37
The consolidation of authority at the national level was not only taking place internally. The
emergence of these states as European powers challenged the pretensions of the Pope and
Emperor to universal authority. Thus, the Catholic kings of Spain and Portugal in the treaties of
Tordesillas and Saragossa in 1494 and 1529 explicitly excluded the Pope’s dispensation in their
division of the new world.38 The challenge to papal and imperial authority in those countries also
26 J. R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1970) at
p. 11.
27 Hayes op. cit. no. 15 at p. 31; C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford University
Press, London, 1934) at pp. 35-6.
28 A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (MacMillan, New York, 1947) at p. 23; Spruyt op. cit.
no. 24 at pp. 43-4, 52-3, 78.
29 C. Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in C. Tilly ed., The Formation of National
States in Western Europe (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975) pp. 3-83 at pp. 22, 36-8; Shafer op. cit. no. 5
at pp. 29-55; J. Breuilly, “The State and Nationalism” in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson eds., Understanding
Nationalism (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001) pp. 32-52 at p. 35; T. M. Franck, “Clan and Superclan: Loyalty,
Identity and Community in Law and Practice” 90 American Journal of International Law (1996) pp. 359-83 at pp.
360, 371.
30 Tilly op. cit. no. 29 at pp. 36-8.
31 Macartney op. cit. no. 27 at p. 38.
32 Shafer op. cit. no. 5 at p. 29; H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and
the Politics of Nationalism (Methuen, London, 1977) at p. 11.
33 Tilly op. cit. no. 29 at pp. 21-5.
34 S. Zubaida, “Nations: Old and New: Comments on Anthony D. Smith’s ‘The Myth of the “Modern Nation”
and the Myths of Nations’” 12 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1989) pp. 327-39 at pp. 330-1, 336; A. Kemiläinen, “The
Idea of Nationalism” 9 Scandinavian Journal of History (1984) pp. 31-64 at p. 39.
35 Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at p. 155.
36 Seton-Watson op. cit. no. 32 at p. 48.
37 R. R. Palmer, “The National Idea in France Before the Revolution” 1 Journal of the History of Ideas (1940)
pp. 95-111 at pp. 97-8; Shafer op. cit. no. 5 at p. 41; L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge: Mass., 1992) at p. 20.
38 Nussbaum op. cit. no. 28 at p. 53.
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came from juridical thinkers, like Jean Bodin (1530-96) in France.39 Bodin’s theory of
sovereignty (written tellingly in French)40 expressed the consolidation of power in the hands of
the absolute monarchs, both internally within their kingdoms and externally against other
powers. Sovereignty was, on the one hand, “the most high, absolute and perpetuall power over
the citizens and subjects in a Commonweale”,41 and on the other, there was “nothing upon
earth…  greater or higher, next unto God, than the majestie of kings and soveraigne princes”.42
These internal and external aspects of sovereignty laid the political foundations for liberalism,
nationalism and international law. For liberalism, the internally sovereign monarchy and the
breaking of feudalism and growth of a middle class, meant that politics could be redirected from
collective, hierarchical feudal ties towards individualism and equality.43 The centralisation of
power and growth of a bureaucracy created the possibility of a direct relationship between king
and subjects governed by law. Once this had been established, there was then possible to curb
the power of the absolute monarchy with the rule of law, constitutionalism and representative
government. For international law, the external aspect of sovereignty created the potential for a
new system of law, which had the independent, sovereign state as its basic unit. For nationalism,
like liberalism, internal sovereignty, the breaking of feudalism and the growth of the middle
classes allowed people to think in national rather than traditional social terms. Without the
obstacles of feudalism, political power could be seen to be between a government and a nation.
External sovereignty meant that states or nations were seen as distinct self-governing units.
Finally, the development of all three doctrines was boosted by the Reformation.44 The
religious conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries allowed state-building monarchs to increase their independence,45 while
Protestantism’s use of the vernacular gave a new dignity to national cultures at the expense of
Latin.46 The conflict also impressed liberalism with the values of religious tolerance and freedom
of conscience and expression.47 The culmination of this religious struggle was the Thirty Years
War (1618-48), and its outcome, the Peace of Westphalia 1648, gave recognition to a long
developing system of sovereign states.48 This was not only a victory for Protestantism, but also
the political and cultural power of the nation-state. Indeed, it was a Catholic kingdom, France
which emerged as the dominant European power, and French which began to replace Latin as an
international lingua franca.49 “The Nation”, as Thomas Alfred Walker put it, “stood forth the
39 Ibid. pp. 55-9.
40 Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at p. 132.
41 J. Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonwealth (K. D. McRae ed.), (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962)
bk. I, ch. VIII, at p. 84.
42 Ibid. bk. I, ch. X, at p. 153.
43 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995)
at p. 34.
44 S. Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on
Variations within Europe” in C. Tilly ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1975) pp. 562-600 at p. 581.
45 Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at pp. 157-8.
46 Ibid. pp. 132-3, 143; Hayes op. cit. no. 15 at p. 32.
47 W. A. Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism” 105 Ethics (1995) pp. 516-34 at pp. 525-6; J. Rawls, Political
Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) at pp. xxiv-xxviii (1993); Kymlicka op. cit. no. 43 at p.
155.
48 L. Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia” 42 American Journal of International Law  (1948) pp. 20-41 at pp. 28-
31.
49 Nussbaum op. cit. no. 28 at pp. 86-7.
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ripened product of the work of centuries”.50
There is no better illustration of these three interconnected aspects of the emerging nation-
state than the work of the lawyer, politician, diplomat and “father of international law” Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645). Grotius’ 1625 work De Jure Belli ac Pacis underlined the emergence of a
system of sovereign states. The “human race” had become synonymous with “many nations
[states]”.51 Sovereignty, the attribute of a state,52 meant that it was a power “whose actions are
not subject to the legal control of another.”53 And it was this “great society of states”54 which
was to be the main focus for international law. However, in his earlier years as an aspiring
national politician, Grotius had also been actively involved in the development of a Dutch
national identity. In particular, he helped in efforts to establish the idea of the Dutch nation as the
successor to an ancient Batavian people, who lived on the frontiers of the Roman Empire, and
justify the 1609 War of Independence from Spain as a national revolt.55 He was also influenced
by liberal ideas, especially religious tolerance, and his definition of a state was clearly a liberal
one: “a complete association of free men, joined together for the enjoyment of rights and for
their common interest.”56 (This, though, must be weighed against many concessions to
absolutism, such as allowing a people to be enslaved to a ruler57 and denying a general right of
rebellion58 or that the desire for liberty was a just cause for war).59
Thus, by the seventeenth century western Europe had developed the model of the territorially
delimited, sovereign nation-state. This was a model that would later be exported to the rest of the
world through European colonialism, and it was so effective that even those countries which
escaped direct colonial rule still adopted it.60 Nationalism, international law and liberalism
developed different aspects of this model and were similarly exported as part of a package of
European ideas. Thus, in countries like China and Japan, nineteenth century national reform
movements, which sought to restructure those states along European lines, learned their
international law alongside their nationalism.61
50 T. A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1899) vol. I, at p.
158.
51 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (F. W. Kelsey trans.), (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington, 1925) vol. II, prolegomena, p. 17, para. 23.
52 Ibid. vol. II, bk. I., ch. III, §. VII.3.
53 Ibid. vol. II, bk. I, ch. III, §. VII.1.
54 Ibid.  vol. II, prolegomena, p. 15, para. 17.
55 S. Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (Alfred A.
Knopf, New York, 1988) at pp. 64, 67-8, 72-83; C. G. Roelofsen, “Grotius and the International Politics of the
Seventeenth Century” in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts eds., Hugo Grotius and International Relations
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) pp. 95-131 at pp. 100-2; H. Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of
International Relations” in ibid. at p. 86.
56 Grotius op. cit. no. 51 vol. II, bk. I, ch. I at §. XIV.
57 Ibid. vol. II, bk. I, ch. III, §. VIII.1.
58 Ibid. vol. II, bk. I, ch. IV, §. II.1.
59 Ibid. vol. II, bk. II, ch. XXII, §. XI.
60 Strayer op. cit. no. 26 at p. 12; R. Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts Development, and Human
Rights (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1990) at p. 19.
61 J. Schrecker, “The Reform Movement, Nationalism, and China’s Foreign Policy” 29 Journal of Asian Studies
(1969) pp. 43-53 at p. 45; W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1972) at p.
311.
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3. Government with the Consent of the Governed
Liberalism, nationalism and international law were not only connected at their foundations,
but also developed together. As the delegates assembled in Westphalia in 1648, they could also
look to political changes then taking place in Britain. In England, the changes of the past few
centuries, the consolidation of the state with a focus on parliament and the growth of the middle
classes, laid the foundations for revolution. The English Civil War of 1642, between Parliament
and King Charles I (r. 1625-49), was largely a religious affair conducted between members of a
political elite.62 However, at least among that elite, the revolution revealed an intense awareness
of a national community and ideas of a national destiny which resembled those of later secular
nationalism.63 It also saw a major reassessment of the nature of political authority, witnessed
most dramatically with the execution of the king.64 Charles I may have said on the scaffold that a
subject and a sovereign are clean different things, but new political theories found the basis for
government in the consent of the people.65
In a second English revolution, the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, James II (r. 1685-8), who
ruled by the divine right of kings, was deposed and replaced by Parliament, which, while again
representing an elite, legitimised itself as representative of the nation.66 The revolution’s
philosopher was John Locke (1632-1704). His theory of government with the consent of the
governed in his Two Treatises of Government, published within months of the revolution,
became the standard interpretation of those events.67
62 C. Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) at p. 2.
63 H. Kohn, “The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism” 1 Journal of the History of Ideas (1940) pp. 69-
94 at pp. 79-80. John Milton: “Lords and Commons of England, consider what Nation it is wherof ye are, and
wherof ye are the governours: a Nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit, acute to
invent, suttle and sinewy to discours, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can sour
to.” J. Milton, “Areopagitica” in Complete Prose Works of John Milton (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959)
pp. 485-570 at p. 551.
64 E. Kamenka, “Human Rights, Peoples’ Rights” in J. Crawford ed., The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1988) pp. 127-139 at p. 129.
65 John Milton: “It being thus manifest that the power of Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only
derivative, transferr’d and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in whom
the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak’n from them, without a violation of thir natural birthright”.
J. Milton, “The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates” in Complete Prose Works of John Milton (Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1962) pp. 189-258 at p. 202.
Henry Parker: “I conceive it is now sufficiently cleared, that all rule is but fiduciarie, and that this and that Prince
is more or lesse absolute, as he is more of lesse trusted, and that all trust differ not in nature or intent, but in degree
only and extent: and therefore since it is unnaturall for any Nation to give away its owne propertie in it selfe
absolutely, and to subject it selfe to a condition of servilitie below men, because this is contrarie to the supreme of
all Lawes, wee must not think that it can stand with the intent of any trust, that necessarie defence should be barred,
and naturall preservation denyed to any people; no man will deny, but that the People may use meanes of defence,
where Princes are more conditionate, and have a sovereigntie more limited, and yet these being only lesse trusted
than absolute Monarchs, and no trust being without an intent of preservation, it is no more intended that the Pople
shall be remedilesly oppressed in a Monarchy, than in a Republique.” H. Parker, “Observations upon Some of his
Majesties late Answers and Expresses” in W. Haller ed., Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution 1638-1647
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1933) vol. II, pp. 167-213 at p. 186.
66 Macartney op. cit. no. 27 at pp. 45-6; D. Lewis Jones, A Parliamentary History of the Glorious Revolution
(Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1988) pp. 41-6; H. Kohn, Prophets and Peoples (MacMillan, New York,
1947) at pp. 12, 25.
67 G. N. Clark, The Later Stuarts 1660-1714 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934) at p. 142. John Locke: “These…  I
hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in
the consent of the people…  and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural
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Locke presented an archetypal liberal theory of government, based on individual freedoms,
the rule of law and the wishes of the people. Government was a trust instituted for the benefit of
the governed and founded in their consent. 68 Its object was the protection of the people’s lives,
liberties and estates.69 If a government exercised power beyond its right (by definition
“tyranny”),70 or infringed on the rights of the governed,71 then this trust was forfeited.72 Power
returned to the hands of the governed, who could establish a new government in whatever form
suited them best.73
Although the basis for government ultimately rested with individuals, Locke explicitly
grounded his theory in “the body of the nation”.74 A sense of nationhood effectively underpinned
his system of representative government and the rule of law. However, this role of the nation
supporting liberal government was significantly different from later theories of nationalism and
national self-determination. The people in Locke’s theory was not collective body with corporate
rights. Power did revert to society as a whole if the trust of government was forfeited,75 but the
people were not conceived of as sovereign with the right to change and abolish institutions as
they saw fit. Indeed, although government with the consent of the governed implied that this
consent might be withdrawn, Locke believed that the removal of governments was exceptional
and should not be undertaken lightly. His theory was essentially conservative. “Great mistakes in
the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty”, could be
tolerated by a people. Only, “a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the
same way”, might lead to the dissolution of government.76
Nonetheless, government with the consent of the governed meant that the people was a
standard of legitimacy against which governments could be measured and found wanting. The
1776 Declaration of Independence by the American Continental Congress appealed to this
doctrine to explain and legitimise the independence of thirteen American colonies from Britain,
proclaiming that:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter it or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall
rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin.” J.
Locke, Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Apparatus Criticus (P. Laslett
ed.), (Second Edition), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967) at Preface. However, it appears likely that
most of the Two Treatises was written before 1688 and was in fact originally a call for a revolution than its later use
as justification of one. Laslett in ibid. pp. 47, 65; M. Cranston, “John Locke and Government by Consent” in D.
Thomson ed., Political Ideas (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969) pp. 67-80 at pp. 74-5.
68 Locke op. cit. no. 67 bk. 2, Ch. VIII, Ch. XI at §s. 104, 134.
69 Ibid. bk. 2, Ch. VII at §. 94.
70 Ibid. bk. 2, Ch. XVIII at §. 199.
71 Ibid. bk. 2, Ch. XI at  §s. 138-42
72 Ibid. bk. 2, Ch. XIII, §. 149, Ch. XIX at §. 221-2.
73 Ibid. bk. 2, Ch. XIII, §. 149, Ch. XIX at §. 243
74 “The king and the body of the nation” Ibid. Preface.
75 Laslett op. cit. no. 67 at p. 119.
76 Locke op. cit. no. 67 bk. 2, Ch. XIX at §. 225.
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seem most likely to effect their safety and Happiness...”77
Like Locke’s defence of the Glorious Revolution, its theory of revolt was essentially
conservative:
“Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed
for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind
are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under
absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to
provide new Guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of
these colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former
Systems of Government.”78
The Declaration continued that the colonies’ experience under the British King, George III,
was, “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment
of an absolute Tyranny over these States.” It then listed at length the acts which marked the king
as a “Tyrant…  unfit to be the ruler of a free People”.
The “people”, like the English revolutions, was used as a basis for political legitimacy.
Although many inhabitants of the colonies were indifferent, and a significant minority hostile, to
the actions of Congress, the people were presented as a homogeneous group with identical
experiences.79 However, despite these references to the people, the Declaration was an appeal for
liberal rather than national government. Unlike later applications of the people, it did not argue
that the colonies should be independent simply because they were a people, nor that nations were
sovereign and the basis for states. The Declaration explicitly referred to “our British brethren”80
and stressed the Colonists’ loyalty to the British crown, which it asserted had not been
reciprocated. Like the previous revolutions, the American Revolution was essentially fought to
preserve existing liberties rather than innovate new ones.81 The elevation of the nation to the
basis for the state would come with the French Revolution.
4. Liberalism, National Patriotism and the Law of Nations
The eighteenth century saw an enormous development in liberal and nationalist thinking. The
nation was contemplated in the theories of key liberals like Thomas Paine82 and David Hume.83
77 Quoted in M. Beloff ed., The Debate on the American Revolution 1761-1783, (Nicholas Kaye, London, 1949)
pp. 271-6 at p. 272
78 Ibid. p. 272.
79 C. Becker, The Declaration of Independence (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951) at p. 6.
80 On the identity of the colonists see E. Countryman, The American Revolution (Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth, 1985) at p. 109; J. Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government (Longmans, London, 1960);
Greenfeld op. cit. no. 37 at pp. 410-3.
81 J. P. Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution  (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1989) at p. 4.
82 “[T]he plain truth is, that it is wholly owing to the constitution of the people, and not to the constitution of the
government, that the crown is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey.” T. Paine, “Common Sense” in T. Paine,
The Complete Works of Thomas Paine (Freethought Press, New York, 1954) vol. II, pp. 1-66 at p. 7; “Every
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Liberalism is a profoundly law-based philosophy and these considerations were also explored in
legal works. French philosophe Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755) in The Spirit of the Laws
developed both the internal and external aspects of sovereignty with the “political” or “civil
right”, within the state, and the “right of nations”, an elementary international law, outside it.84
Montesquieu’s notion of the “political right” was shaped by ideas of liberty and a general
preference for democracy. However, this liberty was also closely connected with national
patriotism. The foundation for popular government was what Montesquieu called “virtue”: “love
of the laws and the homeland.”85 Moreover, the laws of each state were animated by “the spirit
of laws”, which in large part derived from the country’s national character.86 Legislators were,
“to follow the spirit of the nation”, as much as possible within their system of government, “for
we do nothing better than what we do freely and by following our natural genius.”87
A similar blending of liberalism, national patriotism and an emerging international law can
also be seen in the 1758 Le droit des gens by Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel (1714-67). Vattel
developed the internal aspects of sovereignty with many of the elements of liberalism.
Sovereignty was established, “for the common good of all citizens”, and, even if it passed into
the hands of certain people, Vattel argued that it was, “absurd to think that it could change its
nature”, in doing so.88 The nation only has a duty to obey a monarch who acted within his
authority (though Vattel did concede that in an absolute monarchy this could be very wide
indeed). If he exceeded his authority, they had no obligation to follow him and the nation had the
right to resist a tyrannical king.89 Integral to this constitutional order, as well as the relations
between states, which were based on sovereign equality and non-intervention, was national
identity. Vattel praised, “love of our country – a virtue so excellent and so necessary in a state”,90
and his descriptions of England91 and Switzerland92 clearly spoke of the rise of national societies.
government that does not act on the principle of a Republic, or in other words, that does not make res-publica its
whole and sole object, is not a good government…  It is not necessarily connected with any particular form, but it
most naturally associates with the representative form, as being best calculated to secure the end for which a nation
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87 Ibid. bk. 19, ch. 5, p. 310.
88 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns (J. Chitty trans.), (T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., Philadelphia, 1863) bk. I, ch. IV, §. 39.
89 Ibid. bk. I, ch. IV, §. 51.
90 Ibid. bk. I, Ch. XIX, §. 211.
91 “That illustrious nation distinguishes itself in a glorius manner by its application to every thing that can render
the state more flourishing. An admirable constitution there places every citizen in a situation that enables him to
contribute to this great end, and everywhere diffuses that spirit of genuine patriotism which zealously exerts itself
for the public welfare. We there see private citizens form considerable enterprises, in order to promote the glory and
welfare of the nation. And while a bad prince would find his hands tied up, a wise and moderate king finds the most
powerful aids to give success to his glorious designs. The nobles and the representatives of the people form a link of
confidence between the monarch and the nation, and concurring with him in every thing that tends to promote the
public welfare, partly ease him of the burden of government, give stability to his power, and procure him an
obedience the more perfect, as it is voluntary. Every citizen sees that the strength of the state is really the advantage
of all, and not that of a single person. Happy constitution!” Ibid. bk. I, ch. II, §. 24.
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He believed that a nation “ought to know itself”,93 that its government and laws should reflect its
character,94 and that both rulers and citizens should labour for its glory.95 Externally, states were
not only free, independent and equal,96 but also had their own will, a moral personality,97 and a
majesty derived from the representation of a nation.98 Thus, Vattel produced a theory of the
internal and external relations of of states with much of the colour of liberalism and national
patriotism.
However, although liberalism and nationalism could be complementary, there was also a
tension between them and this can be seen, in particular, in the work of the Swiss philosopher
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78). Rousseau also developed a theory of popular self-
government, but unlike Locke, his people was a collective sovereign entity, with a general will,99
and the right to erect, change or abolish institutions as desired.100 Rousseau even advocated that
the people should be asked if they wanted to do this in each public meeting.101
Rousseau also recognised that this people needed a common identity and loyalty to function.
His model was taken from the patriotic city-states of ancient Greece and his own native
Geneva.102 Thus, in Considerations on the Government of Poland he argued for an education
system to imprint children with a strong national identity.103 This became most developed in his
Social Contract with a proposal for a “civil religion” to instil people with a sense of patriotism.
However, if patriotism underpinned popular sovereignty, it could also seriously infringe on those
individual liberties that Rousseau saw as the founding purpose for society. Organizations which
promoted separate interests among the people could be banned.104 People who refused to adopt
the civil religion could be banished for being “antisocial”, and those who did accept it but them
acted against it could be put to death.105 The central theme in the Social Contract was how to
92 “The example of the Swiss is very capable of showing how advantageous glory may prove to a nation. The
high reputation they have acquired for their valour, and which they still gloriously support, has preserved them in
peace for above two centuries, and rendered all the powers of Europe desirous of their assistance.” Ibid. bk. I, ch.
XV, §. 190.
93 Ibid. bk. I, ch. I, §. 25; bk. I, ch. IV, §. 44.
94 “Nations cannot be well-governed without such regulations as are suitable to their respective characters; and in
order to this, their characters ought to be known.” Ibid. bk. I, ch. I, §. 25; bk. I, ch. II, §. 13; bk. I, ch. IV, §. 44.
95 Ibid. bk. I, ch. XV, §s. 186-91.
96 Ibid. preliminaries, pp. 1v-vi, §. 4-5, xii-xiii, §s. 18-21.
97 Ibid. bk. I, ch. IV, §. 40; T. Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1884) vol. I at p. 6.
98 Vattel op. cit. no. 88 bk. II, ch. III at §. 35
99 J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (M. Cranston trans.), (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1980) bk. II, ch.
1-4, bk. II, ch. 6, at p. 83, bk. IV, ch. 1, at pp. 150-1. See D. Thomson, “Rousseau and the General Will” in D.
Thomson ed., Political Ideas (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969) pp. 95-106 at pp. 98-9; A Cobban, Rousseau
and the Modern State (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964) at p. 77
100 Rousseau “[T]his act of association creates an artificial and collective body composed of as many members as
there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its common ego, its life and its
will…  Those who are associated in it take collectively the name people, and call themselves individually citizens, in
so far as they share in sovereign power, and subjects, in so far as they put themselves under the laws of the state.”
Rousseau op. cit. no. 99 bk. I, ch. 6, at pp. 61-2.
101 Ibid. bk. III, ch. 18, p. 148.
102 Thomson op. cit. no. 99 at p. 98; Cobban op. cit. no. 99 at p. 40; Kohn op. cit. no. 8 at pp. 242, 249.
103 J. J. Rousseau, Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa Réformation Projettée (London,
1782) ch. IV, pp. 30-1.
104 Rousseau op. cit. no. 99 bk. II, ch. 3, pp. 73-4.
105 “There is thus a profession of faith which is purely civil and of which it is the sovereign’s function to
determine the articles, not strictly as religious dogmas, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is
impossible to be either a good citizen or a loyal subject. Without being able to oblige anyone to believe these
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reconcile individual liberty with social obligations, and it famously opened with the paradox:
“Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.”106 But, Rousseau also highlighted the
tension that could exist between liberalism and national patriotism as the sovereign people was
elevated to the basis of government.
5. The French Revolution
a. The Revolution
In 1787-8 a power struggle erupted between the King of France, Louis XVI (r. 1774-92) and
the nobility over their privileges. In August 1788 the king summoned the Estates General:
composed of the nobility, clergy and the Third Estate (the middle classes): which had last
convened in 1614, to assemble in May 1789. They met at a time of instability, with grain in short
supply and a general breakdown in order throughout the country. The Estates General created a
forum by which each estate could press for its rights and the Third Estate supported its demands
by presenting them as those of the nation (defined as the body of people in a territory represented
by a legislature).107 Abbé Sieyès (1748-1836), a prominent spokesman for the Third Estate,
argued that: “The Third Estate includes everything that belongs to the nation; and everything that
is not of the Third Estate cannot consider itself as being of the nation. What is the Third Estate?
Everything.”108
A triangular power struggle subsequently developed between the king, the nobility and the
Third Estate.109 On 17 June the Third Estate called itself a National Assembly and appealed to
Louis XVI for the “natural alliance of Throne and People” against the aristocracy.110 However,
on 23 June the king sided with the nobles and annulled the Third Estate’s decision to call itself a
National Assembly. This was followed by a revolution in Paris, in which royal authority
crumbled and the Third Estate assumed power. On 26 August 1789 political authority was
transformed with the adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which
laid out the rights of individuals and a liberal basis for the French state. This liberal order was
underpinned by a national one. Power came from the citizens, and this included the innovative
introduction of universal manhood suffrage, but the revolutionaries, or Jacobins also vigorously
sought to unite the people with a common identity.
Individual rights and national patriotism went hand in hand, as expressed in the slogan
“liberty, equality, fraternity”. In that vein the Declaration, in articles I and II, outlined the basic
principles of liberal government: “Men are born, and always continue, free, and equal in respect
articles, the sovereign can banish from the state anyone who does not believe them; banish him not for impiety but
as an antisocial being, as one unable sincerely to love law and justice, or to sacrifice, if need be, his life to his duty.
If anyone, after having publicly acknowledged these same dogmas, behaves as if he did not believe in them, then let
him be put to death, for he has committed the greatest crime, that of lying before the law.” Ibid. bk. IV, ch. 8 at p.
186.
106 Ibid. bk. I, ch. 1 at p. 49.
107 B. C. Shafer, “Bourgeois Nationalism in the Pamphlets on the Eve of the French Revolution” 10 Journal of
Modern History (1938) pp. 31-50 at p. 35; H. Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience,
1789-1815 (D. van Nostrand, Princeton, 1967) at p. 21; K. R. Minogue, Nationalism (Basic Books, New York,
1967) at p. 48.
108 Quoted in Kohn op. cit. no. 107 at p. 21.
109 A. Cobban, A History of Modern France (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1982) vol. 1 at pp. 131-40, 156
110 Ibid. vol. 1, p. 144.
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of their rights.” “The end of all political associations, is, the preservation of the natural and
inprescriptible rights of man”. Article III, in turn, proclaimed the basic principle of political
nationalism: “The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any INDIVIDUAL,
or ANY BODY OF MEN, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it.”111
Thomas Paine, in his 1791 commentary, called the three articles, “the basis of Liberty, as well
individual as national”.112 Nationalism and liberalism were integral and interconnected elements
of the revolutionary order.
As the sovereign nation was the basis of all legitimate political authority, institutions became
only an expression of its will. Under dynastic absolutism Louis XVI had reigned as “King of
France and Navarre”, now he became, “King of the French”.113 The basis for his crown was the
nation and representatives of the nation could (and later would) strip him of it.114 This was an
important innovation on government with the consent of the governed. The sovereign people
could erect or dismantle institutions and rewrite laws literally at will. In the words of Abbé
Sieyès:
“The Nation exists before all things and is the origin of all. Its will is always legal, it is
the law itself…  Nations on earth must be conceived as individuals outside the social
bond, or as is said, in the state of nature. The exercise of their will is free and independent
of all civil forms. Existing only in the natural order, their will, to have its full effect, only
needs to possess the natural characteristics of a will. In whatever manner a nation wills, it
suffices that it does will; all forms are valid and its will is always the supreme law.”115
However, if the people assumed a fundamental political and legal role, it also did so as a
political idea and this idea did not necessarily have to match the people who actually lived in
France. As Liah Greenfeld noted:
“The People worshipped, however, was not the same as the people actually existing; it
was some other – quite imaginary – twenty-four million Frenchmen. And since both the
term ‘people’ in its new, lofty meaning and ‘nation’ referred to an abstraction, rather than
an empirical reality, the glorification of the People did not necessarily imply a belief in
the equal dignity of all those who composed it, the masses and elite alike.”116
This new concept of the “people”, though, had profound implications for international law.
On the basis of the principle of equality, the National Constituent Assembly abolished feudal
privileges throughout France. However, in Alsace the rights of German Princes had been
guaranteed by the Treaty of Westphalia and the solemn promises of Louis XIV. The princes
claimed that if the French government abolished those rights, it would be in breach of its treaty
commitments. If their rights were to be changed, they argued, a new treaty would have to be
negotiated. The Assembly referred the matter to a special committee. On 31 October 1790 its
rapporteur, Philippe Antoine Merlin de Douai, concluded that under the traditional law the
111 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens quoted in Paine op. cit. no. 82 at pp. 94-5.
112 Ibid. p. 98
113 Cobban op. cit. no. 109 vol. 1 at p. 164.
114 S. Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1989) at p. 442;
Cobban op. cit. no. 23 at p. 40.
115 Quoted in Cobban op. cit. no. 109 vol. 1 at p. 165.
116 Greenfeld op. cit. no. 37 at p. 169. See also Weber op. cit. no. 13 at p. 112.
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princes would indeed have a valid claim. However, this law was only the product of the errors of
kings and the ministers. The French nation had declared itself sovereign and the will of the
people was the basis for the union with Alsace not a treaty. Moreover, as the will of the people
(expressed by the Assembly) was that the princes should not be compensated, they should
receive nothing.117
This principle of the sovereign people allowed France to acquire new territories, not by
treaties, but by expressions of popular will. Plebiscites were held in the Papal enclaves of
Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, in July 1791,118 and in the Sardinian territories of Savoy and
Nice in September 1792119 and January 1793.120 Each recorded positive votes for union with
France. In those territories the people generally welcomed the new régime. It was a different
story, however, in Belgium where people proved stubbornly attached to their existing laws and
traditions. The will of the people there for union in spring 1793 was obtained by systematic
repression.121
By this time the character of the revolution was changing dramatically. The revolution was
being resisted on a number of fronts. In April 1792 the Legislative Assembly had declared war
on Austria. This was a revolutionary war to bring the light of the revolution to the rest of the
world and a year later France would be fighting most of Europe.122 However, within France the
idea of the people was also creating conflict. A single people demanded a single political system
and to this end provinces and regional liberties were abolished.123 But, people in the regions,
especially those that had been recently incorporated into France, proved stubbornly attached to
their traditional rights, and in many places this resistance erupted into violence.124
In other ways France was deviating from its original revolutionary idea. As the National
Assembly expressed the will of the nation, its sovereignty was unlimited, without restrictions
from either French or international law. Indeed, such restrictions were considered unnecessary
because it was believed that a nation was incapable of exercising tyranny over itself.125 However,
by the time of the Belgian vote the National Convention, the successor to the National Assembly,
had broken into deadly rival factions and the terror was beginning. Confronted with internal and
external enemies, the Jacobin idea of the French people narrowed to only the virtuous patriot.126
It had become a dangerous ideal. Abbé Sieyès, who at the start of the Revolution had been one of
its greatest spokesmen, was fortunate enough to later reflect back on what he had achieved: “J’ai
vécu (I survived).”127 But, Sieyès’ constitutional experiments would still provide yet another
example of how national glory could sweep aside individual liberty. After the terror, he proposed
117 E. Kedourie, Nationalism (Hutchinson, London, 1960) at pp. 16-7; Kohn op. cit. no. 107 at p. 48.
118 S. Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites with a Collection of Official Documents (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, New York, 1920) at pp. 33-40.
119 Ibid. pp. 41-3.
120 Ibid. pp. 43-5.
121 Ibid. pp. 45-51.
122 C. J. H. Hayes, The Historic Evolution of Modern Nationalism (MacMillan, New York, 1931) at p. 80;
Cobban op. cit. no. 109 vol. 1 at p. 213.
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a new constitution in 1799. This time, instead of an unlimited legislature, there would be a
powerful executive, and the man who would fill that role was Napoleon Bonaparte.128
b. Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution
The French Revolution proclaimed that the nation was the basis for legitimate political
authority. This nationalist argument, however, created the possibility for a counter-argument and
one was most notably raised by Irish-born British parliamentarian Edmund Burke. Burke’s
perspective on nationalism was very different from that of the revolution. He had defended the
freedoms and traditions of a variety of peoples. He supported the American colonists,
condemned the partition of Poland,129 and criticised Genoa’s cession of Corsica to France.130
Significantly for the future development of self-determination he also pioneered the doctrine of
“trusteeship”, extending the liberal notion of government as a trust to colonial possessions.131
Nonetheless, he also represented the conservative end of the liberal tradition and objected, in
particular, to the innovation of the sovereign nation. Nations and states, in his opinion, could not
be created or abolished at will, rather they grew out of a long historical development:
“[A] nation is not an idea only of local extent, and individual momentary aggregation; but
it is an idea of continuity in time as well as in numbers and in space…  it is made by the
peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil and social
habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time.”132
128 Cobban op. cit. no. 109 vol. 1 at  p. 258.
129 “[N]o wise or honest man can approve of that partition, or can contemplate it without prognosticating great
mischief from it to all countries at some future time.” E. Burke, “Observations on the Conduct of the Minority” in
The Works of Edmund Burke (George Bell & Sons, London, 1876) pp. 467-510 at p. 482.
130 “Thus was a nation disposed of without its consent, like the trees on an estate”. Quoted in A. Cobban,
Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1960) at p. 108.
131 “[T]hey must grant to me in my turn, that all political power which is set over men and that all privilege
claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from the natural
equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit. If this is true with
regard to every species of political dominion, and every description of commercial privilege, none of which can be
original, self-derived rights, or grants for mere private benefit of the holders, then such rights, or privileges, or
whatever you choose to call them, are all in the strictest sense a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to
be rendered accountable; and even totally to cease, when it substancially varies from the purposes for which alone it
could have lawful existence.” E. Burke, “Speech on Mr. Fox’s East India Bill” in The Works of Edmund Burke
(George Bell & Sons, London, 1876) vol. II, pp. 173-248 at p. 178; “We ought to elevate our minds to the greatness
of that trust to which the order of Providence has called us. By adverting to the dignity of this high calling, our
ancestors have turned a savage wilderness into a glorious empire; and have made the most extensive, and the only
honourable conquests, not by destroying, but by promoting the wealth, the number, the happiness of the human
race.” E. Burke, “Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies”, in The Works of Edmund
Burke (George Bell & Sons, London, 1876) vol. I, pp. 450-512, p. 509. See also C. E. Toussaint, The Trusteeship
System of the United Nations (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1956) at pp. 5-7; H. D. Hall, Mandates,
Dependencies and Trusteeship (Stevens & Sons, London, 1948) at pp. 33, 98-9; H. Kohn, “The United Nations and
National Self-Determination” 20 Review of Politics (1958) pp. 526-45 at p. 531; D. Rauschning, “International
Trusteeship System” in B. Simma ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press,
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132 E. Burke, “Speech on Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons” in The Works of Edmund
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Burke evoked the idea of the nation as a permanent body composed of transitory parts:
individuals. As a whole, a nation was, at any one time, neither old, middle aged nor young, but
instead moved through the decay, fall, renovation and progression of its human elements.133 A
national political system was passed from generation to generation: “We…  wish, to derive, all
we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers.”134 Without this link, men were, “little better
than the flies of a summer.”135
This did not mean that there was no opportunity for reform: “A state without the means of
some change is without the means of its conservation.”136 However, political reform was to be
based on a country’s heritage: “a good patriot, and a true politician always considers how he
shall make the most of the existing materials of his country”.137 The two guiding principles were
“conservation” and “correction”.138 If part of a system was defective, its replacement was to be
modelled on the parts that worked well: “in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what
we retain, we are never wholly obsolete.”139 Invoking an analogy of organic natural growth,
Burke cautioned against grafting on a, “scion alien to the nature of the original plant”,140 in other
words, creating institutions not rooted in the national tradition. This reform was a practical
business to be conducted by “great lawyers and great statesmen” not “warm and inexperienced
enthusiasts”.141
Historical development not universal principles lay at the root of national society. “I Never
govern myself”, Burke claimed, “no rational man ever did govern himself, by abstractions and
universals.” Society was highly complex: circumstances were infinite, infinitely combined,
variable and transient. Principles might be necessary to prevent politics degenerating into a
confused jumble, but government was to be guided by circumstances, not subordinated to a
theory. Liberty might be desirable in the abstract, but the critical test was how it was combined
with the practice of government.142 A statesman, he cautioned, should not be confused with a
professor, and a person who attempted to govern on the basis of a theoretical principle, “may
ruin his country for ever.”143
In Burke’s opinion this is what the French Revolution had done. The French Kingdom, though
flawed, was not an incurable despotism, and was open to reform.144 Nonetheless, the Jacobins
had turned their backs on the nation’s history, and armed with, “the polluted nonsense of their
most licentious and giddy coffee-houses”,145 created new institutions without roots in the French
tradition. In doing so, he argued, the essence of France had been separated from the French
state.146 This was, of course, a nationalist argument. The Jacobins derived their political
133 E. Burke, “Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on Proceedings in Certain Societies in London
Relative to that Event” in The Works of Edmund Burke (George Bell & Sons., London, 1876) vol. II, pp. 277-518 at
p. 307
134 Ibid. p. 305.
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legitimacy from the French nation. Burke attacked that legitimacy by distancing them from it,147
and he did so in a very particular way. He placed the emphasis in the definition of a nation on
historical and political ties, expressed through an evolutionary tradition, and, at the same time,
reduced the significance of the will of the people at any given point in time. This formula might
be called the “conservative counter-argument” against popular sovereignty, and, as will be seen
later, it can also be used against self-determination.
6. The Nationality Principle
a. The Congress of Vienna 1815
The nationality principle, the principle that the nation and the state should be congruent,148
played little part in the Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon sometimes toyed with nationality, turning
one of his own creations, the Cisalpine Republic into the republic and then kingdom of Italy.
However, although he used plebiscites to cement his power and legitimise possessions, he
distrusted the people and erected states and borders by convenience not nationality.149
With Napoleon’s defeat a new European system was established at the Congress of Vienna in
1815. The 1815 settlement restored many territories to their former dynastic rulers and proposed
a system of balance of power with the creation of buffer states between the self-styled Great
Powers. Vienna was condemned by nationalists and liberals alike as reactionary: above all in its
147 Conversly, Thomas Paine, in his defence of the French Revolution, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr.
Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution, correspondingly criticised Burke by distancing him, in turn, from both the
English and French nations: “There is a general enigma running through the whole of Mr. Burke’s book…  If his
assertions were as true as they are groundless, and that France, by her Revolution, had annihilated her power, and
become what he calls a chasm, it might excite the grief of a Frenchman (considering himself as a national man), and
provoke his rage against the National Assembly; but why should it excite the rage of Mr. Burke? Alas! it is not the
Nation of France that Mr. Burke means, but the Court; and every Court in Europe, dreading the same fate, is in
mourning. He writes neither in the character of a Frenchman nor an Englishman, but the fawning character of that
creature known in all countries, and a friend to none, a Courtier. Whether it be the Court of Versailles, or the Court
of St. James or Carlton-House, or the Court in expectation, signifies not; for the caterpillar principles of all Courts
and Courtiers are alike. They form a common policy throughout Europe, detached and separate from the interest of
Nations: and while they appear to quarrel, they agree to plunder. Nothing can be more terrible to a Court or a
Courtier, than the Revolution of France. That which is a blessing to Nations, is bitterness to them”. Paine op. cit. no.
82 at p. 126. More generally: “It is now very probable, that the English government (I do not mean the nation) is
unfriendly to the French revolution.” Ibid. p. 232.
148 See e.g. Johann Kaspar Bluntschli: “This is the basis of nationality as a practical principle in politics; it is not
content with the State protecting national language, custom, and culture, but demands that the State itself should
become national. Absolutely stated, it comes to this: Every People has a call and a right to form a State. As mankind
is divided into a number of Peoples, the world must be divided into the same number of States.” J. K. Bluntschli,
The Theory of the State (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885) at p. 95. See also T. Ruyssen, “What is Nationality?“ (The
Principle of Nationality) Part II” 112 International Conciliation (1917) pp. 1-27 at p. 4; E. Hula, “National Self-
determination Reconsidered” 10 Social Research (1943) pp. 1-21 at pp. 6-8; R. Redslob, “The Problem of
Nationalities” 17 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1932) pp. 21-34 at p. 21; R. Brubaker, “Myths and
Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism” in M. Moore ed., National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford
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reconfirmation of the notorious partition of Poland by the “triple gang”,150 Prussia, Russia and
Austria.151 These three states formed the Holy Alliance to resist what those governments saw as
the dangerous principles of liberalism and nationality. Nonetheless, the settlement did make a
modest concession to national rights, according Poles under Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule
national institutions as those states considered it expedient and proper to grant them.152
The nationality principle and popular sovereignty provided principles to challenge Vienna and
the dynastic institutions it reaffirmed.153 This challenge was made by nationalist movements, but
also by states in their diplomacy, above all by France which had most interest in breaking the
system imposed after its defeat. With the rise to power of Napoleon III in 1848 the nationality
principle became a centrepiece of French foreign policy.154 Nonetheless, despite being
incorporated into some states’ constitutions, appealed to in diplomacy, implemented in treaties
and promoted as the basis for international law by some jurists like the Italian P. S. Mancini, the
nationality principle in the nineteenth century remained a political rather than a legal one.155
Writing in 1910 John Westlake argued that it was better for it to remain so, raising the familiar
legal criticism of, “the indefiniteness and instability of all the characters on which nationalities
are based”. “Nationalities”, he continued, “though often important in politics, must be kept
outside international law.”156 However, the line between international law and the politics of
nationality was inevitably a thin one. Although a political principle, nationality did increasingly
form the basis for the basic unit of international law, the state, and the reorganisation of states by
nationality was duly recognised in legal instruments, like treaties.157
b. Liberal Nationalism
The nationality principle encompassed a variety of nationalist doctrines, but one which was
particularly important for the development of self-determination and its subsequent position in
international law was liberal nationalism.158 The industrial revolution of the early nineteenth
150 J. Bentham, “Principles of International Law” in J. Bowring ed., The Works of Jeremy Bentham (William
Tait, Edinburgh, 1838) vol. II, pp. 535-71 at p. 557.
151 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli: “The Congress of Vienna, with utter disregard of national rights, distributed
fragments of great peoples among the restored dynasties. As Poland had already been divided among Russia,
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century brought a number of important social and political changes to developing national
societies. Industrialisation and commercial farming broke down traditional ties to the land and
encouraged the growth of cities.159 Social mobility enlarged and increasingly depended on
education.160 New technologies, like the railways, and improved road systems lead to freer
movement and expanded trade, breaking down local economies.161 Postal services and
newspapers allowed the exchange of ideas. A new class of factory owners and businessmen
emerged who challenged the constraints of traditional agricultural society and did so through
political liberalism. By the 1830s liberal governments had been established in Britain and
France, although elsewhere it made less of an impact.162 This revived liberalism stood above all
for freedom: political freedom by individual liberties and representative government; economic
freedom by freedom of trade and contract. It was not surprising, then, that liberals were also
attracted to another type of freedom: national freedom.
Liberals were attracted to nationalism for a number of reasons. For one thing, liberals and
nationalists were often on the same side. The most illiberal states in Europe were multinational
ones, like Russia, Prussia and Austria, or fragments of a nation, like the German and Italian
states. The nationality principle provided a basis to challenge the title of those emperors, kings
and princes, and many national movements, especially the Risorgimento movement to unite
Italy, had liberal leaderships. Liberals, therefore, had reason to believe that national government
would enhance liberal government.163 But, there were also more fundamental considerations.
Liberals were concerned with the establishment of representative government. Like Rousseau,
they understood that popular self-rule required a sense of solidarity and a common identity
among the population. Representative government was believed to be more effective in a state
where the population shared an identity and where significant cultural barriers did not exist
between them. As John Stuart Mill noted in his work Considerations on Representative
Government: “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different
nationalities. Among a people without fellow feeling, especially if they read and speak different
languages, the united public opinion, necessary for the working of representative government,
cannot exist.”164 Similarly, T. H. Green argued that: “In some states, from want of homogeneity
or facilities of communication, a representative legislature is scarsely possible.”165
Liberalism was not only attracted to nationalism. The law of nations also provided a doctrine
for the realisation of liberal principles.166 These three elements, liberalism, nationalism and the
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law of nations were synthesised, in particular, by the great liberal thinker and father of
utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham,167 who in 1789 coined the phrase “international law”.168
Bentham’s international law was infused with liberal nationalist values.169 He envisioned a
society of nations which worked together for the advancement of mankind: “nations are
associates and not rivals in the grand social enterprise.”170 Love of country could be compatible
with love of humanity, while the, “unjust love of country which turns to hatred against other
nations”,171 was to be rejected. In a series of essays later titled Principles of International Law
Bentham developed this idea of a community of nations conducting their relations on the basis of
mutual utilitarian benefit,172 facilitated by common institutions, like an international court.173
“But ought the Sovereign of a State to sacrifice the interests of his subjects for the advantage of
foreigners?” Bentham asked. “Why not? – provided it be in a case, if there be such an one, in
which it would have been praiseworthy in his subjects to make the sacrifice themselves. Probity
itself, so praiseworthy in an individual, why should it not be so in a whole nation?”174
Liberal nationalism encompassed the nationality principle, but the rights of nations were
balanced on two levels.175 Above the nation were the interests of humanity. “Your first duties”,
Italian nationalist Guiseppe Mazzini argued, “are…  to Humanity. You are men before you are
citizens or fathers.”176 “[I]n spite of my ardent love for my people”, declared Czech nationalist
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historian František Palacký, “I place the interests of humanity and science forever above those of
nationality”.177 National rights were to be exercised as members of an international community.
“What is the reasonable limit of the law of nationalities?” Asked Italian jurist Pasquale Stanislao
Mancini. “Other nationalities.” “What finally is the ultimate aim of the law of nations?” He
continued. “The humanity of the nations of Vico; that is to say, the celebration of humanity and
its civil progress in the free, harmonious and full development of nationalities.”178
Nationality not only respected humanitarian goals, the relationship was also considered to be
reciprocal. Thus, Swiss jurist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli believed that: “The fact that we have
begun to demand recognition for the rights of nationalities implies an advance in civilisation.”179
This was because civilisation was founded on different peoples: “The very fact that the one
humanity parts into many peoples, enables it by means of their competition and their manifold
energies to unfold all those hidden powers of its nature which are capable of common
development, and to fulfil its destiny more abundantly.”180 Similarly, in the opinion of New York
law professor Francis Lieber: “The civilized nations have come to constitute a community, and
are daily forming more and more a commonwealth of nations, under the restraint and protection
of the law of nations”.181 National societies, he continued, were “wholly independent, sovereign,
yet bound together by a thousand ties.”182 But, this international society needed a national basis
in order to properly function: “Without a national character, States cannot obtain that longevity
and continuity of political society which is necessary for our progress.”183
On the other hand, national rights were balanced from below by individual freedoms. “Where
the sentiment of nationality exists in any force,” Mill argued, “there is a prima facie case for
uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to
themselves apart.” “This”, he continued, “is merely saying that the question of government ought
to be decided by the governed.”184 Pasquale Mancini, anticipating later discussions about
“internal” and “external” self-determination, considered that there were two forms essential for
the expression of nationality: “the free internal constitution of the Nation, and its independent
autonomy in the face of foreign Nations. The union of both is the naturally perfect state of a
Nation, to its ethnarchy”.185 Again for Francis Lieber: “The highest national polity yet developed
is the representative national government”.186
Not all liberals, though, were so convinced that nationality complemented individual liberty.
British liberal historian Lord Acton, in reply to Mill’s reflections on nationality, argued that,
“nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the
imperative necessary of making the nation the mould and measure of the State.”187 He continued:
“By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces
practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It
cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the
177 Quoted in Kann op. cit. no. 20 vol. I at p. 176.
178 P. S. Mancini, Della Nazionalità come Fondamento del Dritto Delle Genti (Turin, 1851) at p. 63.
179 Bluntschli op. cit. no. 148 at p. 89.
180 Ibid. pp. 85-6.
181 F. Lieber, Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Inter-Nationalism (Charles Scribner & Co.,
New York, 1868) at p. 22.
182 Ibid. at p. 22.
183 Ibid. at p. 8.
184 Mill op. cit. no. 164 at pp. 360-1.
185 Mancini op. cit. no. 178 at p. 43.
186 Lieber op. cit. no. 181 at p. 5.
187 Acton op. cit. no. 1 at p. 299.
98
State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of its existence.
According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which
claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to
servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence.”188 “The co-existence of several
nations under the same State”, in his opinion, “is a test, as well as the best security of its
freedom.”189
Other limits to the application of the nationality principle in liberal nationalism were
expressed in relation to colonialism. Jeremy Bentham did not exclude the right to self-
government from colonial peoples and in an address to the French people entitled Emancipate
Your Colonies argued:
“You choose your own government: why are not other people to choose theirs? Do you
seriously mean to govern the world, and do you call that liberty? What has become of the
rights of men? Are you the only men who have rights? Alas! My fellow citizens, have
you two measures? ...
… think then what may be the feelings of the colonists. Are they Frenchmen? – they will
feel like Frenchmen. Are they not Frenchmen – then where is your right to govern them?
…
… Do they like to be governed by you? Ask them, and you will know. Yes why ask them,
as if you did not know? They may be better pleased to be governed by you than by
anybody else; but is it possible they should not be still better pleased to be governed by
themselves?”190
Within Bentham’ critique was a coupling of the equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, a formula which would later be taken up by the anticolonial declarations of the
twentieth century. Indeed, the Saudi delegate to the United Nations later remarked in the debate
on the Colonial Independence Declaration, that Bentham’s address, “was said just as though he
were speaking to this Organisation in 1960.”191
Other liberals, though, did not follow Bentham’s approach. The frequent references to
civilisation, progress, science and humanity in liberal nationalism were not without their
implications. The nationality principle was seen to be especially applicable to large, developed
nations who could serve mankind.192 Conversely, size and development became the two
principal factors limiting the application of the principle. “Not every people is capable of
creating and maintaining a State”, Bluntschli argued, “only a people of political capacity can
claim to become an independent nation. The incapable need the guidance of other and more
gifted nations”.193 John Stuart Mill argued that it was better for, “a Breton, or a Basque of French
Navarre…  to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges
of French citizenship…  than to sulk on his own rocks…  revolving in his own little mental orbit,
188 Ibid. at pp. 297-8.
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190 J. Bentham, “Emancipate Your Colonies” in J. Bowring ed., The Works of Jeremy Bentham (William Tait,
Edinburgh, 1838) vol. IV, pp. 407-18 at pp. 408-9.
191 Saudi Arabia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 927 th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 87.
192 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1990) at pp. 30-3.
193 Bluntschli op. cit. no. 148 at p. 103.
99
without participation or interest in the general movement of the world.”194
Mill outlined a liberal approach to colonialism, dividing British possessions into those which
he considered were capable of representative government and those which were not.195 If
colonies capable of representative government wanted to separate from the empire, he argued
that justice and morality required that they should be allowed to do so.196 For those incapable of
representative government, though, colonial rule was legitimate if it advanced their development.
Mill invoked the Burkean concept of trusteeship. This, he claimed, was, “the highest moral trust
which can devolve upon a nation” and those who did not aim for it were “selfish usurpers, on a
par in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age
with the destiny of masses of mankind.”197 This liberal notion of colonial government as a trust
became prominent in Anglo-American thought. For example, in December 1900 President
McKinley described the America’s possession of the Philippines as a, “trust which should be
unselfishly discharged.”198
Such ideas, however, were based on the assumption that good government could be an
acceptable alternative to national government. This, though, was challenged in the Ionian
Islands, a chain of islands off the west coast of Greece which had been assigned to Britain as a
protectorate in 1815. In 1844 a nationalist movement emerged in the islands demanding union
with the Greek Kingdom, which, at the time, under the rule of King Otho enjoyed neither good
nor liberal government. In 1858 the leading British liberal statesman, William Gladstone was
dispatched to the islands with the promise of building good government. However, Gladstone
quickly found that Ionian politicians wanted not better British rule but Greek national
government. With his reforms blocked by the Ionian parliament, he departed in early 1859.199
The Ionians, British Indian viceroy, Lord Lytton observed bitterly, preferred “a bit of bunting
with the Greek colours on it” to the promise of British “good government”.200 The islands were
later transferred to Greece in 1863 in a diplomatic agreement,201 the Treaty of London, which
included the relatively innovative measure that the union was subject to the approval of the
Ionian parliament.202
The nationality principle was not itself inherently liberal. It only stated that the nation and the
state should be congruent. It did not demand that government should be representative, nor that it
should respect individual liberties. Nationalism did have affinities with liberalism, but it could
equally be combined with illiberal doctrines.203 Moreover, there was always a tension in liberal
nationalism. Which did a liberal nationalist value most: liberal government or national
government? If he had to choose one at the expense of the other, which would it be? As Carlton
Hayes noted, in practice in the nineteenth century, liberal nationalism’s, “liberalism waned as its
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nationalism waxed.”204
This became evident in 1848, when, following an uprising in France, revolution broke out
throughout Europe: in the German and Italian states, the Hapsburg Empire and Prussia. This
brought liberals and nationalists briefly to power and gave them a chance to put some of their
ideas into practice. In Germany, German liberals established a National Assembly in Frankfurt.
However, debates in the Assembly saw the majority eschew the idea of community of nations in
favour of German rights over the Danes, Poles and Czechs.205 In 1849 the Assembly clearly
opted for nationalism over liberalism when, in an attempt to unify Germany, it offered the
German crown to the absolutist Prussian monarch Frederick William IV, who had earlier crushed
the brief attempt to liberalise his kingdom. The king replied that would never accept a crown
from the gutter.206
In Hungary the swing from liberalism to nationalism was even more dramatic. Liberals in the
Hungarian Diet in Pressburg (Bratislava) adopted a programme of Magyarisation against non-
Magyar (non-ethnic Hungarian) groups. When a delegation of Hungarian Serbs pressed for a
limited autonomy, the leadership replied: “The sword will decide between us.”207 And so it did.
Hungary’s Slavs and Romanians allied themselves with the reactionary governments of Austria
and Russia to destroy the short-lived regime.208
c. The Nationality Principle in Practice
In the nineteenth century nationality was a principle for the organisation of states, the basic
units of international law, and, although it was not a legal one at the time, its effects were
recognised in legal instruments. Its first legal success was in the London Protocol 1830 which
recognised an independent Greek kingdom,209 the first of a number of peoples to prise
themselves away from the ailing Ottoman Empire. The revolution of 1848 saw nationalists
briefly assume power in the Italian and German states, various parts of the Hapsburg Empire and
the Danubian principalities, before the old governments were restored. These movements failed
in no small part because of their narrow social base, which drew from the towns and the middle
classes but not the wider population.210 However, the revolution in France of 1848, which
sparked the revolts also saw the rise to power of Louis Napoleon (1808-73), who assumed the
mantle of his famous/notorious uncle as the Emperor Napoleon III. Napoleon III, who in his
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youth had taken part in a nationalist uprising in Italy,211 made nationality a cornerstone of French
foreign policy and a principle of international diplomacy.
His first opportunity to apply the principle was at the Vienna Conference of 1855. This
conference was called in the aftermath of the Crimean War (1853-6), which pitted Russia against
the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France and Sardinia. One of the issues on the table were the two
Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, Russian protectorates under Ottoman
suzereignty which had been occupied by Austria during the fighting. Both Moldavia (not to be
confused with today’s Moldova, then known as Bessarabia) and Wallachia were isolated feudal
societies, sharply divided between the land-owning classes and the peasantry.212 But, the two
were largely ethnic Romanian and there was a small nationalist movement composed mainly of
men from the lower levels of the land-owning class, especially those who had been educated
abroad in Paris.213
France at the conference argued that the two should be united on the basis of nationality. It
was supported by Russia, who, although an opponent of nationality, saw a united principality as
a barrier to Austrian influence. Austria for the same reasons wanted the two to remain separate.
It was backed by the Ottomans, who also thought a single principality would weaken their
suzereignty, and Britain, at the time, was keen to support the Ottomans.214 At a second
conference in Paris in 1856, however, Britain changed sides leaving Austria and the Ottomans in
a weaker position. Arguing against the unification of the principalities the two made the tactical
mistake of claiming that the inhabitants of the territories themselves did not want union. (The
vast majority of the population were oblivious to such issues).215 Russia seized on this error by
proposing a vote, and a provision on a plebiscite, subject to a final disposition by the conference,
was included in the Treaty of Paris 1856.216 This was considered above all a triumph for
Napoleon III and his sponsorship of nationality.217
The plebiscite of July 1857 was a victory for continued separation. But, the vote was so
plainly flawed, involving widespread fraud and intimidation by Austria’s allies in the
principalities that acceptance of the results became a test of strength between the powers.218 In
August Britain and France reached a new agreement for a less substantial union between the
principalities.219 A new vote, which was basically seen as an endorsement of this accord,220 was
a victory for union.221 In October nationalists in the Moldavian and Wallachian assemblies
passed a resolution declaring that they were a single people and calling for autonomy, union,
representative government and (that vital symbol of political legitimacy in the old politics) a
211 B. King, The Life of Mazzini (J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1912), at p. 40; Hayes op. cit. no. 162 vol. 2 at pp.
124-5.
212 T .W. Riker, The Making of Roumania: A Study of an International Problem 1856-1866 (Oxford University
Press, London, 1931) at pp. 2-6.
213 Ibid. pp. 16-9; Fischer-Galati loc. cit. no. 20 at pp. 50-3
214 Riker op. cit. no. 212 at pp. 27-9; W. G. East, The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859: An Episode in
Diplomatic History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1929) at p. 54; Wambaugh op. cit. no. 118 at pp. 103-
4.
215 Riker op. cit. no. 212 at p. 67.
216 Ibid. pp. 41-5; Wambaugh op. cit. no. 118 at pp. 105-6.
217 Riker op. cit. no. 212 at p. 51.
218 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 118 at 110-5.
219 East op. cit. no. 214 at p. 131; Riker op. cit. no. 212 at pp. 131-5.
220 East op. cit. no. 214 at p. 145.
221 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 118 at p. 115.
102
prince from a ruling house.222 However, the union agreed to by the powers in the Convention of
Paris 1858 was for a loose non-national union called the United Principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia, with separate flags, princes and assemblies. And this was what was created.
Nonetheless, nationalists were able to exploit one loophole in the convention and elect a single
individual as prince of both principalities.223
Napoleon III’s intervention in Moldavia and Wallachia was followed by a more forceful one
on the Italian peninsula, this time in support of Piedmont-Sardinia. Unlike France, Piedmont had
done well out of the Vienna settlement. The state which grew out of the French-speaking Duchy
of Savoy had enlarged its Italian territory with the addition of the port of Genoa and its protected
status as a buffer state gave it the freedom to pursue an adventurous foreign policy. In 1848 it
took the lead in the Italian nationalist movement with a war against Austria. That lead to a
crushing defeat, but since then under the energetic leadership of its liberal nationalist prime
minister Camillo di Cavour (1810-61) it had become the most dynamic of the Italian states and
the strongest player in the Italian nationalist movement.224
In 1856 Napoleon III and Cavour made an oral agreement at Plombières. Austria would be
expelled from northern Italy. Piedmont could annex Lombardy, Venetia, the Duchies and the
Legations, and a federation would be established with Tuscany, the Papal States and Naples. In
return Sardinia would cede Savoy and possibly Nice to France.225 In April 1859 France
intervened in northern Italy against Austria in support of Piedmont. However, the intervention
also lead to nationalist revolts in Tuscany, Parma, Modena and the Papal State of Romagna. This
was more than Napoleon III had planned. He wanted a federal not a unitary Italy and was
concerned about the effects of the destabilisation of the Papacy on domestic opinion. Therefore,
he retreated from Plombières and instead reached an agreement with Austria at Villafranca in
July 1859 by which Piedmont could annex Lombardy, but the other Italian states would return to
their former rulers.226
However, the French were not the only ones who could use nationality in diplomacy. When
the powers met at Zurich to confirm Villafranca Lord Russell, Foreign Secretary to a newly-
elected British liberal government condemned the agreement for disposing of the Italian peoples
without their consent. He prevailed on Napoleon III to allow plebiscites in Tuscany, Parma,
Modena and Romagna, to which Napoleon III agreed with the stipulation that according to the
French principle of popular sovereignty the vote take place by universal suffrage.227 However, in
return Napoleon III demanded the cession of Savoy and Nice, which in accordance with both
French and Sardinian principles was preceded by plebiscites.228
The next stage in the unification of Italy was the conquest of Sicily and then Naples by troops
lead by Guiseppe Garibaldi between May and September 1860, again endorsed by plebiscites.229
Despite the fact that Garibaldi marched under the banner of the king of Sardinia, he was a
republican, and Cavour used this to pose as the moderate in Italian nationalism and gain French
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support for his own invasion of the Papal States in September.230 The annexation of the
remaining Papal States, except Rome, took place following a plebiscite in November 1860.231 In
February 1861 the first Italian parliament in Turin elected the Sardinian King Victor Emmanuel
King of Italy by grace of God and the will of the nation, reflecting the national and popular basis
of his rule. Britain recognised the new state within a fortnight, France three months later and,
although Russia, Prussia and Austria protested against a state founded on such principles, their
recognition also followed.232 Only Venetia and Rome lay outside the new kingdom and would
not be added until 1866 and 1870, respectively.
If the liberal nationalist leadership of the Italian Risorgimento fuelled expectations that the
nationality principle would lead to liberal government, Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) showed
that it could work equally well for rather less liberal purposes. The Prussian Chancellor was
neither a liberal nor a nationalist. He hated German liberals who reciprocated the sentiment233
and his identity was that of a Prussian patriot.234 Nonetheless, he ably demonstrated that the
French use of nationality could cut both ways, legitimising the annexation of the German states
into a Prussian-lead German Empire235 and ultimately proving to be Napoleon III’s political
nemesis. The creation of this new state took place in three stages. The first was the conquest of
the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.
The Schleswig-Holstein dispute involved both the old politics of dynastic title and the new
politics of nationality. Significant for the old politics, the two duchies were bound to Denmark in
a personal union under the Danish crown. Crucial for the new politics, both were culturally
distinct from Denmark. Holstein was solidly German-speaking, while Schleswig was essentially
German in the south and largely Danish in the north. Overlooked by both was the strong sense of
local patriotism in the Duchies, especially in the towns.236 It was, in fact, the old politics that
triggered the dispute. While the Danish throne could be inherited along the female line, the
Duchies were only inheritable by the male line, and failure of this line in Denmark prompted the
crisis. In 1848 the Danish King issued a single constitution for Denmark and the Duchies. This,
however, clashed with German nationalism which supported the German Prince of
Augustenburg who now stood in line for the Duchies. The crisis lead to Prussian intervention in
the Duchies, but Russia and Britain guaranteed Danish possession, and in the Treaty of London
1852 it was agreed to reconfirm the Danish personal union.237
In 1863 Denmark again integrated the Duchies into the kingdom. Prussia and Austria
responded with a joint invasion and this time other powers were not willing to intervene. An
international conference, though, was held and the issue of partitioning Schleswig by nationality
discussed. The partition plans, however, underscored the enormous difficulty in defining borders
by ethnic nationality. Danish and German populations in the Duchy were often mixed and any
partition would inevitably leave large minorities. Both sides submitted proposals drawing a line
through the population most favourable to them, but were unable to agree and the conference
broke up, after which the two allies crushed Danish resistance. In the Treaty of Vienna 1864
Prussia and Austria established a condominium over the whole of Schleswig and Holstein,
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respecting neither nationality nor the title of the Prince of Augustenburg.238
This condominium did not last and became a centre for Prussian intrigue intended to provoke
a further conflict between the two powers. In 1866 Prussia went to war with Austria and annexed
Schleswig, Holstein and other north German states, establishing a North German Confederation.
These states had a measure of autonomy, but were subordinated to a federal government lead by
the King of Prussia, which, in particular, controlled their foreign and military affairs.239
The construction of the German state was completed with the Franco-Prussian War 1870-1.
The pretext for this conflict again involved dynastic politics, in this case the succession to the
Spanish throne. The Prussian army inflicted a crushing defeat on the French, destroying
Napoleon III’s Second Empire and annexing the French regions of Alsace and Lorraine. The
south German states were added to the North German Confederation and its name changed to the
German Empire. The King of Prussia’s title switched from “President of the Confederation” to
“German Kaiser”.240 However, Bismarck’s adherence to nationality was minimalist and used
only to cement internal support and legitimise Prussian possessions. The German Empire lacked
many of the trappings of a national state, and for years did not even have a flag or an anthem.241
The new Empire repudiated many of the basic assumptions of liberal nationalism. The belief
that external independence would inevitably lead to internal political freedom was personally
dismissed by Bismarck: “I told myself…  once we had gained our independence from the rest of
Europe, we could then move freely in our internal development, organizing our institutions in as
liberal or reactionary manner as seemed just and suitable.”242 The hope of German liberal
nationalists that a national state would lead to a liberal one quickly amounted to nothing.243
After its defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866 it was clear that the Hapsburg Empire could
not go on unreformed. In the Ausgleich (“Compromise”) of 1867 Hapsburg lands were
reorganised into a dual monarchy between a non-national state, Austria, and a national one,
Hungary. This was a limited concession to nationality, and much less than the five-state
confederation envisaged by Slav leaders.244 The main focus of nationality after the creation of
the German Empire, however, was in the Balkans.
In the 1870s other groups sought to follow the example of Greek independence against the
ailing Ottoman Empire. Nationality was appealed to by local leaders and ambituous powers,
especially Russia, which styled itself as the defender of “oppressed nationalities”,245 as they
picked bits off the sick man of Europe. Many of the uprisings against the Ottomans, which were
put down with incredible cruelty, may have been motivated more by social or religious
grievances than nationality.246 Indeed, this was a region that traditionally had been organised by
religion rather than nationality, notably in the Ottoman Millet system of religious self-rule,247 and
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where identities were largely defined by religion.248 Thus, for a long time being “Greek” simply
meant being “Orthodox Christian”249 and a “Turk” was largely used to refer to an Anatolian
peasant, with Turkish-speakers identifying themselves primarily as “Muslims”.250 Nonetheless,
the Treaty of Berlin 1878 recognised the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, and
an autonomous Bulgarian principality (independent in 1908).251 These small new states set their
sights on territorial expansion and turned on each other in a series of irridentist conflicts. In 1885
Serbia attacked Bulgaria, and in 1913 Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Turkey fought
Bulgaria over Macedonia.252
These Balkan wars challenged many of the nineteenth century preconceptions about the
nationality principle. It was not large, advanced nations, but small, undeveloped ones which were
claiming the rights of nationality.253 “Balkanisation” entered the political vocabulary as a
derogatory term for nationalism leading to political fragmentation.254 Moreover, rather than
promoting political progress and representative government, these states seemed marred in
instability and violence. The powers offered a degree of protection to religious minorities in the
new states by connecting their recognition in the Treaty of Berlin with respect for religious
freedom.255 Yet, the wars in the Balkans would also set the big, advanced nations against each
other in a war of unprecedented carnage. Serbia’s success in Macedonia in 1913 fuelled
irridentist ambitions towards Bosnia-Herzegovina which had been annexed by Austro-Hungary.
In June 1914 Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg Empire, was assassinated by
Serb militants in the Bosnian capital Sarajevo setting in motion a course of events that would
lead to the First World War (1914-8).256
7. The End of the First World War
a. From Nationality to National “Self-Determination”
The end of the First World War created new opportunities for the nationality principle. Four
great multinational empires, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman, had been
broken and nationalists were either building new nation-states or enlarging old ones on their
territory.257 The nation-state was becoming the norm.258 Thus, when the victorious powers
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gathered at Versailles outside Paris in 1919 to agree a new political order, it was an order that
nationality would inevitably play a major role in shaping. This new climate also produced a new
slogan in the shape of “self-determination”. The language of national self-determination
(Selbstbestimmungsrecht) had been used by German nationalists in the previous century,259 but
in its post-war usage it appeared to encompass both the nationality principle and existing theories
of liberal government.
The nationality principle had been used by both sides in the Great War. British and French
war aims included the protection of Europe’s smaller nations, especially Belgium and Serbia.260
In 1916 Britain explicitly recognised that: “The principle of nationality should…  be one of the
governing factors in the consideration of territorial arrangements after the war.”261 These war
aims later expanded to the rights of subject nationalities of the Central Powers, such as Poles,
Czechs and South Slavs, although the dissolution of Austro-Hungary was not contemplated until
that process was already well advanced.262 In 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour,
in an attempt to rally international Jewish support for the allied cause, also promised a Jewish
national home in Palestine.263 The Central Powers, on the other hand, highlighted the plight of
the Irish, Boers and Finns.264
Anglo-French use of nationality was, however, somewhat restricted by their alliance with the
Russian Czar, who, far from seeking to liberate nations, wanted to extend his empire to
Constantinople. The Russian Revolution changed all this. In April 1917 the new Russian
Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolsheviks, declared that: “the purpose of free
Russia [was] not domination over other peoples…  but the establishment of a permanent peace on
the basis of the self-determination of peoples.”265 This set the stage for a rhetorical battle as the
allies appealed to self-determination, both against the Central Powers and to seize the initiative
from the Bolsheviks, who overthrew the Russian Provisional Government in November 1917.266
Support for self-determination in the socialist movement never ran particularly deep.
Socialists divided the world by class not by nationality. Nations in their scheme were, at best, a
temporary phenomena, the product of the transition from feudalism to bourgeois capitalism,
which, in turn, would be replaced by international socialism. At worst, they were a division of
the international proletariat.267
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Nonetheless, socialism as a movement could not remain indifferent to the political
environment in which it operated. The Communist Manifesto was published into the storm of
1848 and many socialists realised that even, if they objected to nationalism in theory, in practice
they might have to take it into account. Thus, Marx and Engels supported the national claims of
the Irish and Poles: not because they saw any particular merit in them, but rather because the first
was seen as a distraction from the class struggle in England, and the second, by diminishing
Prussia, could advance German unification and thus the unity of the German working class. This
reflected not only a purely tactical approach to nationality, but also that the two founders of
socialism shared nineteenth century prejudices about large and small, and advanced and
backward nations.268 It was also not surprising that the most developed socialist programme for
national rights in the nineteenth century came from the nationally divided Austro-Hungarian
Empire.269
This multinational composition was, of course, equally true of the “prison of nations”,270 the
Russian Empire, something not lost on Bolshevik leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924).
Lenin supported the adoption of self-determination into the Bolshevik programme as a response
to the movement’s political situation.271 In western Europe, he believed, the goals of bourgeois
nationalism had largely been achieved, but in eastern Europe and Asia this revolution had only
just begun, and it served the Bolshevik interest to align itself with this struggle.272 Thus, when
Lenin declared his support for self-determination, it was in a purely tactical way. If the right
conflicted with the broader strategic goals of socialism, then it was expendable. This was not so
much an embrace of self-determination as a temporary alliance with it. Nonetheless, nationality
was incorporated into the structure of the Soviet Union, which was conceived of as a
multinational federation, even if in reality this was a facade for a highly centralised state. The
USSR also became a staunch advocate of self-determination to promote revolution overseas,
particularly in European colonies. This again illustrates the incredible ability of nationalism to
combine even with doctrines which theoretically conflict with it, not to mention also essentially
illiberal ones.
The western allies, on the other hand, saw self-determination simply as an expression of their
own principles of liberal and national government.273 Both American President Woodrow
Wilson (1856-1924) and British Liberal Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1863-1945)
understood it as government with the consent of the governed.274 Prior to the armistice Lloyd
9-23 at pp. 11-2
268 A. J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (Columbia
University Press, New York, 1990) at pp. 73-7.
269 Ibid. at p. 77.
270 G. Gleason, “The ‘National Factor’ and the Logic of Sovietology” in A. J. Motyl ed., The Post-Soviet
Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (Columbia University Press, New York, 1992) pp. 1-29 at p. 1.
271 J. N. Hazard, “Codification of Soviet Nationality Policies” in H. R. Huttenbach ed., Soviet Nationality
Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR (Mansell, London, 1990) pp. 47-61 at pp. 48-9; Gitelman op. cit. no.
267 at p. 248; Gleason op. cit. no. 267 at p. 12; Motyl op. cit. no. 268 at pp. 80-1; R. J. Hill, “Ideology and the
Making of a Nationality Policy” in A. J. Motyl ed., The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the
USSR (Columbia University Press, New York, 1992) pp. 50-78 at p. 57.
272 V. I. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination” in V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (Foreign Languages
Publishing, Moscow, 1946) vol. I, pp. 564-611 at p. 572.
273 H. Kohn, American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay (MacMillan, New York, 1957) at p. 212; W. S.
Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (Thornton Butterworth Limited, London, 1929) at p. 203.
274 W. Wilson, “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress [4 Points]” in A. S. Link ed., The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984) vol. 46, pp. 318-24 at p. 321; Lloyd George op. cit. no. 260
vol. I at p. 917.
108
George had, in fact, been most explicit about peoples’ rights,275 but it was Wilson who did most
to popularise them. Wilson, with his intellectual background as President of Princeton, and stern
Calvinist faith, fitted comfortably into the role of the preacher of a new political gospel. “I really
think that at first the idealistic President”, the noted pragmatist Lloyd George recorded,
“regarded himself as a missionary whose function it was to rescue the poor European heathen
from their age-long worship of false and fiery gods.”276 Wilson liked to believe that he expressed
the will of the Europe’s peoples and sometimes addressed them directly, much to the displeasure
of European leaders.277 He also shared with the doctrine of self-determination a certain
ambivalence about the law. As American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing recounted:
“Looking back over my years of intercourse with the President I can now see that he
chafed under the restraints imposed by usage and even by enacted laws if they interfered
with his acting in a way which seemed to him right or justified by conditions. I do not say
he was lawless. He was not that, but he conformed grudgingly and with manifest
displeasure to legal limitations.”278
Wilson proposed a revolution in international relations, and without the unsavoury
commitments that Britain and France had made to secure support for their alliance, was
recognised as being in a unique position to achieve it:279
“What we are striving for is a new international order based upon universal principles of
right and justice – no mere peace of shreds and patches…
… Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international
conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must
be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent.
‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their
peril.”280
Wilson fitted comfortably into the liberal political tradition and his approach to the rights of
peoples was no more than a continuation of that tradition.281 Ironically, the political philosopher
who had the most effect on his concept of self-government was Edmund Burke,282 and
explaining it he used to quote from Burke’s Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol:283 “If any ask me
what a free government is, I answer that, for any practical purpose, it is what the people think so;
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and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful and competent judges of this matter.”284 On the
other side of the liberal nationalist coin, Wilson realised the dream of a community of nations285
with the League of Nations.286 This “general association of nations” was specifically envisioned
in the preamble of its Covenant as not only an organisation of states, but also of peoples.287
b. Self-Determination at the Conference
The principle of self-determination remained ambiguous at Versailles. It appeared to inform
many of the Fourteen288 and the Four Points289 that Wilson proposed as the basis for a settlement,
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while never specifically featuring in any of them. It was never explicitly mentioned in any of the
peace treaties either, even in the articles on plebiscites, and was not included in the League
Covenant due to objections from Britain and Wilson’s own legal advisors.290 After the
conference, two international commissions in the Åland Islands dispute in 1920-1 considered
that it was not part of international law.291
However, although self-determination was not a legal principle, it was crucial for the
legitimacy of states and their boundaries, which lay at the foundations of the legal settlement. In
this way a principle, which technically may not have been a legal one, nonetheless, shaped the
content of the law. The principle proposed that peoples provided the model for states, and the
conference relied on ethnographic maps and language, in particular, to draw boundaries between
the new states.292
These assumptions about nationality were, however, challenged by the actual consultation of
peoples in the small number of plebiscites held to determine states’ borders.293 Plebiscites were
held in Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Klagenfurt and Sopron,294 and a
significant proportion of them produced some unexpected results. In Sopron, in which a largely
German-speaking region voted to join Hungary, this could be attributed to oppression,295 but this
could not account for many of the other results. In Allenstein, Protestant Poles who called
themselves “Mazurians” after their locality, the Mazurian Lakes failed to identify with the Polish
national movement and voted en masse to join Germany, largely for economic and security
reasons.296 In Klagenfurt, Slovenes preferred to remain part of Austria than to join the new
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and divide their alpine valley and province of
Carinthia.297 There was also little doubt that if more plebiscites had been held, they would have
shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old,
elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of
the world.” Wilson op. cit. no. 274 at pp. 322-3.
290 Lansing op. cit. no. 278 at pp. 94-5. Wilson had proposed the following provision for the draft of the League
of Nations Covenant: “The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and
territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future
become necessary by reasons of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political
relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the
judgment of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the people
concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may involve material
compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is
superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.” Quoted in ibid. p. 55. On the draft
see N. Berman, “Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism? Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and ‘Peaceful Change’” 65
Nordic Journal of International Law (1996) pp. 421-79 at p. 433.
291 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 3, (October 1920) at p. 5; The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted
to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, (League of Nations Doc. B7 [C]
21/68/106, (April 1921) at p. 27.
292 Walworth op. cit. no. 259 at p. 99; Churchill op. cit. no. 273 at p. 205.
293 E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace (MacMillan, London, 1942) at pp. 42-6; Cobban op. cit. no. 23 at p. 70;
Heater op. cit. no. 266 at p. 111.
294 See Wambaugh op. cit. no. 4. A plebsicite was also held later in 1935 in the Saar. See S. Wambaugh, The
Saar Plebiscite with a Collection of Official Documents (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1940).
295 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 4 vol. I, at pp. 271-97.
296 Ibid. vol. I, at pp. 99-141.
297 Ibid. vol. I, at pp. 163-205; T. Gullberg, State, Territory and Identity: The Principle of Self-Determination,
The Question of Territorial Sovereignty in Carinthia and Other Post-Hapsburg Territories after the First World
111
revealed similar surprises. In Teschen, disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, a planned
plebiscite had to be called off due to Polish objections, after it was found that people previously
assumed to be Poles were planning to vote for Czechoslovakia.298 Indeed, there is evidence that
for many populations, identity remained largely on the local level.299
As a doctrine of political legitimacy, the legitimacy of self-determination itself depended on
its universal character. However, the principle was only applied, in a way absolutely consistent
with its previous usage, to reorganise the territories of the defeated empires. Following Burke’s
dichotomy, Wilson was both a professor and a statesman. The former Princeton President
proclaimed an abstract and high-minded principle, but the US President often applied it in a
politically expedient fashion. There were, in particular, three types of limitation on self-
determination: the principle was only one of a number of principles and considerations before
the conference; size and development; and problems inherent in the principle itself.
Many other principles and considerations shaped the settlement. For reasons of balance of
power, France supported making the Polish state as large as possible as a counterweight to
Germany. For similar reasons, the allies refused to allow the rump Austria to join Germany.300
Some allies nursed territorial ambitions and these had been conceded in binding treaties. In the
secret Treaty of London 1915 Britain, France and Russia conceded to Italy, as its price for
joining the alliance, a shopping list of territories which went well beyond the Italian irridentia
and sought to make it an imperial power.301 Likewise, Japan sought former German possessions
in China and the Pacific.302 Even for Wilson, self-determination may have not been the prime
consideration. He may have overlooked Italy’s annexation of ethnic German South Tyrol in
order to secure Italian support for his pet project, the League of Nations, although he himself
pleaded ignorance on the matter.303
Another consideration was the power of the conference itself. Nationalist movements already
stood in occupation of large territories, and as Lloyd George argued: “The task of the Parisian
Treaty-makers was not to decide what in fairness should be given to the liberated nationalities,
but what in common honesty should be freed from their clutches when they had overstepped the
bounds of self-determination.”304 Often the conference had neither the will nor the resources to
do this. Fear of the Bolsheviks, for example, made the conference sanction the Polish occupation
of predominantly Ukrainian Eastern Galicia.305 A lack of allied troops allowed Poland to scupper
the plebiscite in Teschen.306 Lloyd George estimated that a truly just settlement would have
required over fifty plebiscites,307 but the six that were actually held stretched allied resources to
War (Åbo Akademi University Press, Åbo/Turku, 2000) at pp. 126-32.
298 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 4 vol. I, at pp. 142-62; Kedourie op. cit. no. 117 at p. 124.
299 See R. Brubaker, “Nationalizing States in the Old ‘New Europe’ and the New” 19 Ethnic and Racial Studies
(1996) pp. 411-37 at pp. 426, 428; M. Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-
Building Process in Europe” 198 New Left Review (1993) pp. 3-20 at p. 11; A. Takach, “In Search of Ukrainian
National Identity: 1840-1921” 19 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1996) pp. 640-59 at pp. 640-59; S. Draper, “The
Conceptualization of an Albanian Nation” 20 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1997) pp. 123-44 at p. 128; Gullberg op.
cit. no. 297 at pp. 189-90.
300 Cobban op. cit. no. 23 at p. 92.
301 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. VI, at pp. 10-2; Walworth op. cit. no. 259 at p. 50.
302 A. S. Hershey, “The Shantung Cession” 13 American Journal of International Law (1919) pp. 530-6.
303 Walworth op. cit. no. 259 at pp. 54-5.
304 Lloyd George op. cit. no. 260 vol. I at p. 91.
305 Walworth op. cit. no. 259 at p. 334.
306 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 4 vol. I at pp. 158-9.
307 Lloyd George op. cit. no. 260 vol. I at p. 917.
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breaking point.308
Finally, there was the organisation of the conference itself. If a conference in Paris was to
redraw the map of central and eastern Europe, then it required the collection and distribution of
an enormous amount of information to the relevant decision-makers. But, this may not have been
the case. It has been claimed, for example, that a simple lack of co-ordination between the
different committees responsible for drawing up Hungary’s borders with its neighbours resulted
in the country loosing far more territory than it otherwise would have done.309
A second factor limiting the application of self-determination was size and development.
Allied war aims may have been the protection of small nations, but small states were also
frowned upon.310 Luxembourg was considered too small to join the League of Nations and
Lithuania’s admission set a precedent.311 It was recognised that the new states, wedged between
Germany and Russia, needed population and resources to protect their independence from those
two powers, and, indeed, they would later fall victim to them. A South Slav, or Yugoslav state,
for example, was preferable to separate Serb, Croat and Slovene states. The Yugoslav annexation
of the little Adriatic kingdom of Montenegro may have been seen as dubious at the time,312 but
then so were Montenegro’s prospects as an independent state.313 The cession of a Polish land
corridor and the creation of the Danzig Free State, which gave Poland access to the sea, but
detached substantial German populations from Germany, were both seen as essential for its
viability as an independent state.314
Political development also restricted self-determination. This was particularly evident in the
mandates scheme proposed by South African statesman Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950). Smuts
graded the populations of the former Austrian, Russian, German and Ottoman Empires according
to their development and interpreted the principle of self-determination accordingly. Finland,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were sufficiently developed to be independent states.
However, the populations of former Ottoman territories, he considered, were incapable of self-
government, although this greatly varied: from Iraq (Mesopotamia), “barely capable of
autonomy”, to Syria, “complete statehood is very close.” The territories were to be administered
by a mandatory power and self-determination for those peoples meant the development of
internal self-government.315 At the bottom were the inhabitants of German colonies in the Pacific
and Africa, who, in the opinion of Smuts were, “inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot
possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impractical to apply any idea of political
self-determination in the European sense.”316
Smut’s scheme, a fleshing out of the Anglo-American concept of trusteeship, also fitted into
the liberal nationalist tradition of reconciling nationalism and colonialism through
308 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 4 vol. I at p. 41; Churchill op. cit. no. 273 at p. 209.
309 H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (Constable & Co., London, 1934) at p. 127.
310 See Czech leader Thomas Masaryk’s wartime lecture against the perceived “problem of a small nation”. T. G.
Masaryk, The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis (Lecture given on 19 October 1915), (The Althone
Press, London, 1966).
311 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. VI at p. 559.
312 Nicolson op. cit. no. 309 at pp. 148-52.
313 Lloyd George op. cit. no. 260 vol. I at pp. 37-8.
314 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. VI at p. 258; T. S. Woolsey, “Self-Determination” 13 American Journal of
International Law (1919), pp. 302-5 at p. 303.
315 J. C. Smuts, “The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion” in D. H. Miller ed., The Drafting of the
Covenant (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1928) vol. 2, pp. 23-60 at pp. 29-31.
316 Ibid. p. 28.
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development.317 The idea of mandates matched Woodrow Wilson’s policy of developing self-
governing institutions in the Philippines,318 and the British government claimed it to be an
extension of its colonial policy.319 Mandates, it was also argued, were the logical conclusion of
the allied war aims of no annexations and the disposition of colonies in accordance with the
wishes of the people.320
The scheme, however, met with opposition from the British Dominions. Australia and New
Zealand pressed for the annexation of neighbouring German colonies in the Pacific and the
South African scheme notably did not extend to neighbouring South West Africa. In a
compromise, article 22 of the League Covenant proclaimed three classes of mandate, A, B and
C, ostensibly graded according to development.321 In Class A mandates, which covered former
Ottoman territories, independence was foreseeable and the task of the mandatory was to render
advice and assistance until they could become independent. Class B mandates, former German
colonies in Africa, were less developed and their independence was not envisaged in the
foreseeable future. Those territories were to be administered directly with the goals of protecting
the inhabitants and their freedom of conscience and religion, and prohibiting the trade in slaves,
liquor and arms. In the case of British Togoland and the Cameroons, this was simply done from
an adjacent colony. Class C mandates, which included South West Africa and Pacific islands,
formed the nub of the compromise. Due to their size, sparseness, remoteness or alternatively
their proximity to a mandatory, these territories were to be administered as integral parts of that
state, subject to safeguards for the indigenous population. This was annexation in all but name.
Moreover, there no was procedure for mandates to graduate as they developed, from C to B to A.
Nor did article 22 provide for the independence of Class A mandates, although individual
mandate agreements contained clauses on termination.322
The third factor limiting self-determination were problems inherent in the doctrine itself.323
What was a people? What did it mean for one to self-determine? If self-determination meant the
reorganisation of states along the lines of nationality, then which elements of nationality were
decisive? Czechoslovakia, for example, was constructed using two different interpretations of
nationality. The Czech nation was defined by the historic states of Bohemia and Moravia, and to
a lesser extent Austrian Silesia (which was partitioned with Poland). Slovakia, on the other hand,
with no clear historical precedent, was constructed by ethnic nationality. However, either test of
nationality, historic-political or ethnic, left substantial minorities in the new state: Germans and
317 J. C. Smuts: “Its vital principles are: the principle of nationality involving ideas of political freedom and
equality; the principle of autonomy, which is the principle of nationality extended to peoples not yet capable of
complete independent statehood; the principle of political decentralization which will prevent the powerful
nationality from swallowing the weak autonomy as has so often happened in the now defunct European empires;
and finally an institution like the league of nations, which will give stability to that decentralization and thereby
guarantee the weak against the strong.” Ibid. p. 36.
318 Notter op. cit. no. 282 at pp. 143, 178, 190-2, 260, 538.
319 Tillman op. cit. no. 263 at pp. 90-1, 402.
320 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. II at p. 231; Tillman op. cit. no. 263 at p. 86.
321 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. VI at pp. 501-2; Heater op. cit. no. 266 at p. 91; Tillman op. cit. no. 263 at pp.
91-4; N. Berman, “The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History” in D. Wippman ed.,
International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998), pp. 25-57 at p. 38.
322 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. VI at p. 573.
323 I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1956) at pp. 55-6;
Cobban op. cit. no. 23 at p. 65; Heater op. cit. no. 266 at p. 98; A. Whelan, “Wilsonian Self-Determination and
Versailles Settlement” 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) pp. 99-115 at p. 105; Carr op. cit.
no. 293 at p. 49; Zimmern op. cit. no. 277 at p. 227.
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Poles in the Czech lands, Hungarians and Ukrainians in Slovakia.324
The basic problem of drawing borders by nationality was that, although nationalism proposed
that different nations formed different states, nationalities did not naturally separate from each
other geographically. Even if there was social separation, for example along class lines or by
profession, nationalities still lived in the same location. It might be that, due to differences in
occupation, one group may predominate in towns and another in the country, but even here there
was the task of separating towns from the surrounding countryside. This was impossible without
creating substantial minorities.
In fact, the settlement left between 20-30 million people in national states, with which they
were unable to be connected for ethnic reasons.325 The solution was to accord them minority
rights. Woodrow Wilson tried unsuccessfully to include an article on minority rights in the
League Covenant. Instead, minority protection took the form of a series of separate treaties and
declarations centred on the League. The peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianion,
Neuilly-sur-Seine and Lausanne all contained articles on minority protection. Specific minorities
treaties were agreed with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Lithuania.
Bilateral agreements were concluded between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia, and
Sweden and Finland over the Åland Islands. Moreover, in their accession to the League, Albania,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Iraq made declarations on the protection of minorities.326 “The
idea underlying the treaties”, the Permanent Court considered in Minority Schools in Albania
was:
“[T]o secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs
from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of living peacefully alongside that
population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the
characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing
special needs.”327
However, the legitimacy of the right of self-determination rested with its universal character.
The different treatment of national populations, due in part to the interests of the powers, in part
to the political situation and in part to the nature of self-determination itself threw the principle
into question. Many of those who believed in the right felt betrayed by the settlement. Many of
those who argued that without a definition of who was entitled to exercise it, self-determination
could never be consistently applied and was fundamentally flawed felt vindicated. Foremost
among these critics was Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing who raised both the legal
critique, that the right could not be sufficiently defined, and the nationalist one, that it could not
satisfy all those who might claim it:
“When the President talks of ‘self-determination’ what unit has he in mind? Does he
mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical,
application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability…
324 Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. IV at pp. 267-72.
325 T. Modeen, The International Protection of Minorities in Europe (Åbo Akademi, Åbo/Turku, 1969) at p. 49;
P. Thornberry, “Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes – International Law and Minority Rights” 15 Texas International
Law Journal (1980) pp. 421-58 at p. 431; Macartney op. cit. no. 27 at p. 211.
326 Thornberry op. cit. no. 255 at pp. 38-42; Modeen op. cit. no. 325 pp. 50-2; Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. VI
at pp. 571-2; Tillman op. cit. no. 262 at p. 217.
327 Minority Schools in Albania (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ (1935) Series A/B, No. 64, p. 17.
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The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of ‘self-determination,’
the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain
races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Conference and
create trouble in many lands.
What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists
among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder and rebellion? Will not the
Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it?
How can it be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically committed?
The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be
realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to
be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check
those who attempt to put the principle in force. What calamity that the phrase was ever
uttered! What misery it will cause!”328
Wilson himself conceded his surprise at the reaction to the doctrine:
“When I gave utterance to those words (‘that all nations had a right to self-
determination’) I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are
coming to us day after day…  You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I
have experienced as the result of many millions of people having their hopes raised by
what I have said.”329
In fact, the aftermath of the Versailles conference was a crushing time for the liberal
nationalist assumptions which Wilson and other liberals associated with self-determination.330
The belief that national and liberal government were compatible was met with the fact that, of all
the new national states created in the aftermath of the war, only Czechoslovakia and Finland
remained fully democratic.331 Nations once freed did not necessarily associate on the basis of
equality.332 For new states trying to mould an often-diverse collection of provinces brought
together by nationality into a nation, the protection of national minorities was an unwelcome
impediment to national cohesion. Poland’s denunciation of its minority treaty in 1934 marked
the progressive demise of the minority protection régime.333 Wilson pioneered an organisation,
which realised a community of nations, but the United States would not join it, nor did the
League protect against the threat of war.
Moreover, the right of self-determination was used to legitimise the destruction of the whole
system. In the nineteenth century Napoleon III had used the nationality principle to challenge the
328 Writing after the Peace Conference, Lansing believed that his fears had been thoroughly vindicated: “Since
the foregoing notes were written the impracticability of the universal or even general application of the principle has
been fully demonstrated. Mr. Wilson resurrected ‘the consent of the governed’ regardless of the fact that history
denied its value as a practical guide in modern political relations. He proclaimed it in the phrase ‘self-
determination,’ declaring it to be an ‘imperative principle of action.’ He made it one of the bases of peace. And yet,
in the negotiations at Paris and in the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States, he has by his acts
denied the existence of the right other than as the expression of a moral precept, as something to be desired, but
generally unattainable in the lives of nations.” Lansing op. cit. no. 278 at pp. 97-8.
329 Quoted in Temperley op. cit. no. 263 vol. IVat p. 429.
330 Emerson op. cit. no. 281 at p. 112.
331 Hayes op. cit. no. 162 vol. 2 at pp. 668, 733-9.
332 H. J. Morgenthau, “The Paradoxes of Nationalism” 46 Yale Review (1957), pp. 481-96 at p. 484.
333 Thornberry op. cit. no. 255 at p. 47; Cobban op. cit. no. 23 at p. 87.
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political order established at Vienna. In the 1930s Adolf Hitler used self-determination and the
German “people” outside Germany, in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, to break the
Versailles system and lead the world back to war.334
Concluding Remarks
This chapter is intended to illustrate that the right of peoples to self-determination is product
of a particular set of historical circumstances. In particular, the development of the modern state
gave the right its context and political significance. Three doctrines, nationalism, liberalism and
international law developed from this type of organisation, and have been crucial for defining the
doctrine of self-determination. Even if in the period investigated, self-determination was not
strictly speaking a principle of international law, it had become increasingly essential for the
legitimacy of the states which underpinned that law.
The next chapters will examine how self-determination has developed in international law,
starting with the drafting of international instruments. However, this chapter illustrates that the
right grew out of a western liberal nationalist tradition in which individual liberties, national
equality and a community of nations provided the context in which the right was supposed to
operate. This liberal nationalist matrix survived the Second World War and has continued to
underpin the right in the United Nations era. This will be seen in the drafting of international
instruments in the next chapter.
334 D. Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979) at pp. 4-5; Cobban
op. cit. no. 23 at p. 93; Morgenthau loc. cit. no. 332 at pp. 487, 489-90.
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3
Self-Determination and International Instruments: A
Question of Balance
Outline
This chapter is a survey of international instruments on self-determination. It aims to give the
reader a thorough account of provisions of the main instruments on the right in international law
and their drafting. It will also consider how these instruments have been shaped by the
interaction between nationalism and international law.
A particular problem posed by self-determination in the drafting of international instruments
is how to proclaim the principle as a universal right, essential for its nationalist legitimacy, while
restricting it to defined categories, important for its legal application. The general solution has
been to balance self-determination with other principles, which effectively act to limit its
application. Rupert Emerson and Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz have called this the “big print” and the
“small print”.1 The “big print” is the proclamation of self-determination in a universal form
essential for its nationalist legitimacy, while qualifying it, usually separately, with another
provision, the “small print”. In this way instruments can attempt to limit self-determination, but
still make a declaration that it is a right of all peoples.
There are, however, two problems with this approach. The first is legitimacy. Despite a
formula of words, which avoids explicitly limiting self-determination, this is the obvious
intention of the instrument as a whole. This makes self-determination in those instruments seem
arbitrary and restrictive. As we will see, there have been efforts in instruments such as in the
Friendly Relations Declaration to develop more sophisticated balances which aim to correct this
perception of arbitrariness.
The second problem is that, as we have seen, the principles used to balance self-
determination, territorial integrity, state sovereignty and the preservation of frontiers, can
themselves encapsulate national ideas. As a result, a balance between self-determination and
these principles may also be a conflict between two versions of nationalism. This will be seen, in
particular, in the balance between self-determination and territorial integrity in the Colonial
Independence Declaration, which hinges on whether a particular group is a “country” or a
“people”. Both “country” and “people” represent fertile ground for nationalist politics, and,
consequently, a balance between self-determination and territorial integrity may be more a
political than a legal one.
There is a second feature of legitimacy which has implications for the drafting of provisions
on self-determination. Self-determination is a principle, which runs to the very legitimacy of
states. There is no better illustration of this than the fact that states in the drafting of international
instruments frequently highlight their support for it by recounting its role in their own existence.2
1 R. Emerson, “Self-Determination” 65 American Journal of International Law (1971) pp. 459-75 at p. 459; G.
Arangio-Ruiz, “The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Friendly
Relations” 137 Recueil des Cours (1972) III pp. 419-626 at p. 561.
2 See for example Algeria, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1163rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1163) para. 4; Argentina, 7
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As a result, self-determination, as a concept, which all states can support, or at least not
explicitly oppose, may play an important coalition-building role.3 States can unite in support of
the right in the abstract, while retaining their own interpretations of what it means.
This means that international instruments are more capable of building a consensus around
self-determination, the more generally and abstractly it is put. On the other hand, the more
specific the aspects of the right, the greater the potential for fragmentation. As a result, there
appears to be a pressure in the drafting of instruments away from specific provisions on the
content of self-determination towards more vague formulas capable of different interpretations.
1. The United Nations Charter
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (EXTRACTS)
Preamble
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small…
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are…
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, the United Nations shall promote…
GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) para. 30; Australia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 647th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.647) para. 18; Bolivia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 570th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.570) para. 30; Burma, 21
GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 936th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.936) para. 31; Cameroon, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1180th
mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1180) para. 1; Columbia, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 403rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.403) para. 82; Costa
Rica, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 649th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.649) para. 22; Cuba, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee.,
1162nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1162) para. 38; Czechoslovakia, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449)
para. 17; Dominican Republic 6 GAOR (1951), 3rd Cmttee., 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 42; El Salvador, 5
GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 310th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.310) para. 53; Equador, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 461st mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.461) para. 6; Greece, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 310th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.310) para. 36; Honduras, 7
GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) paras. 47-8; India, ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 40;
Lebanon, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 311th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.311) para. 15; Pakistan, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee.,
671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 27; Peru, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 312th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.312) para. 7; Poland,
ibid. 310th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.310) para. 33; Romania, A/AC.125/SR.70, (1967) p. 3; Turkey, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd
Cmttee., 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 29; Uruguay, 7 GAOR (1952) 3 rd Cmttee., 452nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.452)
para. 6; Yugoslavia, ibid. 448th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.448) para. 21.
3 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Second Edition), (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994) at pp.
69, 121, 123.
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Article 73
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories
whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-
being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to this end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and
educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist
them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
c. to further international peace and security;
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one
another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical
achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as
security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature
relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively
responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
Article 76
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid
down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust
territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of
the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world;
and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United
Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without
prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.
a. The Atlantic Charter
Often seen as a prequel to the UN Charter, the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter affirmed
national self-government, if not exactly national self-determination, as one of the wartime goals
of the allies. The Charter was a joint declaration issued by US President Roosevelt and British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August 1941 and subsequently endorsed by the Soviet
Union, the British dominions and European governments in exile.4 Self-determination was not
specifically mentioned in the Charter, but it has been seen to be connected to the first three
principles:5
4 R. B. Russell and J. E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-
1945 (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1958) at pp. 34-5, 44.
5 E. A. Laing, “The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991” 22 California Western International Law Journal
(1992) pp. 209-308 at pp. 235-6, 251-5; R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian
and African Peoples (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Mass., 1960) at p. 296; G. Starushenko, The Principle
of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy (Foreign Languages Publishing, Moscow, 1964) at p. 142;
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“First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which
they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those
who have been forcibly deprived of them… ”6
These principles were a fairly conservative declaration of national rights, as one commentator
put it: “animated by the spirit of Burke, not of the Jacobins”7. They sought to restore self-
government to countries which had been deprived of it and to prevent forcible changes to
borders, but did not seek to extend new principles of self-government. Indeed, they were drafted
by Churchill,8 the defender of empire, who distinguished the restoration of self-government to
European nations from the position of India and Burma.9
b. We the Peoples…
In April 1945 delegates from fifty states assembled at San Francisco to shape a new peace.
They had at hand the Dumbarton Oaks proposals agreed by American, Soviet, British and
Chinese representatives the previous year, which served as a basis for negotiations. The
Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not include self-determination.10 However, on the initiative of the
Soviet Union,11 it was added to an amendment by the four powers in article 1 on the purposes of
the organisation.12
H. Kohn, “The United Nations and National Self-Determination” 20 Review of Politics (1958) pp. 526-45 at p. 534;
F. Przetacznik, “The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a Prerequisite
for Peace: Its Philosophical Background and Practical Application” 69 Revue de Droit International (1991) pp. 259-
317 at p. 285; H. S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations (A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1967) at
pp. 34-5; M. A. Shukri, The Concept of Self-Determination in the United Nations (Al Jadidah Press, Damascus,
1965) at pp. 38-40.
6 The Atlantic Charter, YBUN (1946-7) at p. 2.
7 E. Hula, “National Self-Determination Reconsidered” 10 Social Research (1943) pp. 1-21 at p. 1.
8 Russell and Muther op. cit. no. 4 at p. 34.
9 Winston Churchill: “[T]he Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which
have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma or other
parts of the British Empire. We are pledged by the Declaration of August, 1940, to help India to obtain free and
equal partnership in the British Commonwealth with ourselves, subject, of course, to the fulfilment of obligations
arising from our long connection with India and our responsibilities to its many creeds, races and interests. Burma
also is covered by our considered policy of establishing Burmese self-government and by measures already in
progress. At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and
national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any
alterations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made.” Parliamentary Debates, 5 th Series, vol. 374,
House of Commons Official Report, 8th vol., Session 1940-1, pp. 68-9.
10 “Chapter I…  The purposes of the Organization should be…  2. To develop friendly relations among nations
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. YBUN (1946-7) at p. 4.
11 Starushenko op. cit. no. 5 at pp. 144-5; A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) at p. 38; S. S. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the
United Nations (Westview, Boulder, 2003) at p. 167.
12 Amendments Proposed by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
China: “Chapter I…  2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
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The Charter of the United Nations,13 was a product of war, intended to contain the use of
force in international relations, and its drafting was filled with a tangible sense of the cruelty and
suffering of the period.14 The League of Nations had failed, but its idea endured. The Charter
was a blueprint for, “a world of free countries”, US President Harry Truman argued in his
closing address to the conference, “which will work and cooperate in a friendly civilized
community of nations”. Moreover, it had, “given reality to the ideal of that great statesman of a
generation ago – Woodrow Wilson.”15 Other delegates endorsed the idea of, “a community of
nations where the rights of man shall be definitely established.”16 It was even proposed that the
organisation should be called the “Community of Nations”.17
The Charter not only outlined a community of states, or nation-states,18 but a world
and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. Doc. 2,
G/29, UNCIO, vol. III, at p. 622.
13 See generally G. S. Swan, “Self-Determination and the United Nations Charter” 22 Indian Journal of
International Law (1982) pp. 264-77; Cassese op. cit. no. 11 at pp. 37-43; K. Doehring, “Self-determination” in B.
Simma ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) pp. 56-72;
Russell and Muther op. cit. no. 4; A. Rigo Sureda, Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination (A. W. Sijthoff,
Leiden, 1973) at pp. 97-101; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, “Self-Determination” in O. Schachter and C. C. Joyner eds.,
United Nations Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) vol. I, pp. 349-89 at pp. 352-4; M. K.
Nawaz, “The Meaning and Range of the Principle of Self-Determination” 82 Duke Law Journal (1965) pp. 82-101
at pp. 88-90; E. Gayim, The Principle of Self-Determination: A Study of its Historical and Contemporary Legal
Evolution (Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Publication No. 5, Oslo, 1990) at pp. 20-6; H. Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (Stevens & Sons, London, 1950) at pp. 1-9,
50-3; H. Quane, “The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination” 47 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (1998) pp. 537-72 at pp. 539-45; G. Schwarzenberger, “The Purposes of the United
Nations: International Judicial Practice” 4 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1974) pp. 11-47 at pp. 17-8, 26-7; R.
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) at pp. 111-
2; J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1968) vol. 1, at pp. 322-3;
J. A. C. Gutteridge, The United Nations in a Changing World (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1969) at
pp. 52-3; L. Hannikainen, The Right to Self-Determination in Contemporary International Law (Helsingin
Yliopiston Julkisoikeuden Laitos Julkaisuja, Helsinki, 1973) at pp. 8-11; E. Chadwick, Self-Determination,
Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1996) pp. 24-
6; Shukri op. cit. no. 5 at pp. 43-52; P. Alston, “Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall” in P. Alston ed., Peoples’
Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 259-93 at p. 260.
14 Edward Stettinius, US Secretary of State: “We bring this Charter to a world that is still wracked by war and
war’s aftermath. A few days ago I talked with some young Americans just back from the battlefront. They lay –
wounded and in pain – in the beds of an Army hospital… … This Charter is a compact born of suffering and of war.
With it now rests our hope for good and lasting peace… … To the governments and peoples of the 50 nations here
represented this Charter is now committed and may Almighty God from this day on and in the months and years to
come sustain us in the unalterable purpose that its promise may be fulfilled.” US, Doc. 8, G/5, UNCIO, vol. I, p.
659.
15 US, Doc. 8, G/5, UNCIO, vol. I, p. 684.
16 Uruguay, Cmttee. I/1, 14 May, p. 10. (The minutes of the debates of the First Committee of the First
Commission, available on microfilm at the Library of the Palais des Nations, Geneva.)
17 Doc. 308, I/1/14, UNCIO, vol. VI, p. 291.
18 Nations and states in discussions were used interchangeably. However, an interesting variation on this was
provided by Mexico. Appealing against the exclusion of Argentina from the conference, the Mexican delegate
advanced the Burkean argument that Argentinian government had separated itself from the nation: “While Argentina
has been branded a Fascist nation, we must bear in mind that here a distinction must be made between the nation and
her government. Argentina is a nation of democratic traditions, long-standing democratic traditions. Also, she has
distinguished herself by her contributions to international law – a great nation that works – a great nation that feels –
a great nation with a people that feels full sympathy with the Allied cause. While it is true that the Government
accidently divorced itself from the sentiments of her people, it would not be fair to punish the people for an
accidental separation of the Government from those deep-rooted sentiments of her Nation.” Mexico, Doc. 8, G/5,
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community of peoples. This was particularly evident in the preamble. The original proposal for
the Charter to include a preamble was made by League Covenant veteran, Jan Christian Smuts,19
who advanced the view of an organisation which respected, “the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small”.20 Smuts’ proposals began, as the League Covenant had done,
with the phrase: “The High Contracting Parties… ” This might have been an accurate reflection
of the drafting process, but it was not very inspiring. It was felt that the preamble should have, “a
language and tone which leads its way into the hearts of men”, which would, “awaken the
imagination of the common man to the points at issue, kindle his feelings and move him.”21 The
Charter, therefore, did not begin with “the high contracting parties”, or even the cosmopolitan
ideal of, “we the people of the United Nations… ”, but with a nationalist vision of a world of
nations: “We the peoples of the United Nations… ”22 The formula was proposed by the United
States from the opening words of its constitution: “We the People… ”23 The US argued that the
phrase represented both the organisation’s “democratic basis” and that it was created by a
“peoples’ war”.24 Nonetheless, despite this presentation of the Charter as the product of the
genius of the world’s peoples, it was in reality drafted by states’ representatives at the
conference.25 Reconciling the two, “we the peoples… ”, was understood to be read with the
preamble’s closing paragraph, “through representatives assembled in the city of San
Francisco… ”26
The position of peoples at the centre of the UN system was underlined by articles 1(2) and 55
of the Charter. Both proposed that friendly relations between nations were based on respect for
the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. This, of course, put self-
determination at the foundations of the international community. Self-determination in article 1
formed part of the purposes of the United Nations, which were described as, “the raison d’être of
the organization”, and, “the object of the Charter”.27 Other purposes, alongside respect for equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, included maintenance of “international peace and
UNCIO, vol. I, p. 352.
19 Doc. 133, I/1/7, UNCIO, vol. VI, at p. 277. See C. Heyns, “The Peamble of the United Nations Charter: The
Contribution of Jan Smuts” 7 African Journal of International and Comparative Law (1995) pp. 329-48; Russell and
Muther op. cit. no. 4 at pp. 911-3.
20 Draft of 3 May 1945, Doc. 2, G/14 (d) (1), UNCIO, vol. III, p. 476. This was the formula used in the Charter.
The original draft referred to, “the equal rights of individuals and of individual nations large and small”. Draft of 26
April 1945, Doc. 2, G/14 (d), UNCIO, vol. III, p. 474
21 Report of Rapporteur, SubCmttee. I/1/A, (Doc. 785, I/1/28), UNCIO, vol. VI, p. 358.
22 See Coordination Committee: “‘peoples’…  is included…  whenever the idea of ‘all mankind’ or ‘all human
beings’ is to be emphasized.” Doc. WD 381, CO/156, UNCIO, vol. XVIII, pp. 657-8.
23 Report of Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, (Doc. 885 I/1/34), UNCIO, vol. VI, p. 391; Russell and Muther op. cit. no.
4 at pp. 913-5.
24 US, Commission I, 14 June, Doc. 1006, I/6, UNCIO, vol. VI, p. 19.
25 See criticisms of France and the Netherlands, WD 435, CO/199, UNCIO, vol. XVII, pp. 277-8.
26 Report of Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, (Doc. 885, I/1/34), UNCIO, vol. VI, at p. 392.
27 Report of Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, (Doc. 885, I/1/34), UNCIO, vol. VI, at p. 388. It should be noted that the
Rapporteur downplayed the significance of the difference between “purposes“ and “principles“ in the Charter: “It
was very difficult, practically impossible, to draw a sharp and clear-cut distinction between what should be included
under ‘Purposes’, ‘Principles’, or ‘Preamble’. Given the nature of the substance we have in view, some single idea
or norm of conduct could go into either of these divisions of the Charter without much difficulty. In fact, some
questions were transferred during our deliberations from ‘Purposes’ to ‘Principles’ and found at least their final
place in the ‘Preamble’… The provisions of the Charter, being in this case indivisible as in any other legal
instrument, are equally valid and operative. The rights, duties, privileges, and obligations of the Organization and its
members match with one another and complement one another to make a whole. Each of them is construed to be
understood and applied in function of the others.” Ibid. pp. 1-2.
123
security” and “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights”. This, of course, fit the
liberal nationalist vision of an international society of liberal nations.
Comments in drafting underlined this fundamental role. The principle, according to the Syrian
Rapporteur of the committee responsible for drafting article 1, worked, “for progress and for
development”,28 and was, “one of the appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”29
Yugoslavia argued that it was, “one of the guiding ideas of peace and solidarity among nations
and of a conciliation and cooperation…  it should be definitely planted among the foundations of
the Charter of the United Nations”.30 “Where would many of us here be”, asked Egypt, “if it
were not for a principle of self-determination?”31
The Nazi regime had, of course, also appealed to self-determination, but it was argued that the
National Socialists had not discredited the right  but merely abused it. In the words of the
Rapporteur:
“Looking at the Austrian example as it was set, the principle of self-determination might
look very nasty, but it is that nasty principle of self-determination which would have
helped, for which people fought the war, and which would help countries like Belgium,
like Norway, like Greece, like Syria to be liberated. When we want to rule it out,
unconsciously, without wanting it, we would be reverting to previous conditions which
lead to many wars. We would be in the same way breathing the air of our enemies, and it is
not fragrant air and we would not like to breathe it.”32
“[A]n essential element of the principle in question”, he later added, distinguishing exercise from
abuse, “is a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples and thus to avoid cases like
those alleged by Germany and Italy.”33
A sceptical view was, however, expressed by Belgium. Its delegate questioned whether
making self-determination the basis for friendly relations might not in fact encourage
intervention by one state in the affairs of another. The Belgian delegate raised the possibility that
a national minority in a state might claim certain rights. “Does it mean”, he argued, “that the
organization should be expected to intervene…  that other states in view of the phrase ‘friendly
relations’ should not take it upon themselves to intervene.”34
c. The Balance in the Charter
The equal rights and self-determination of peoples was framed in general terms in the Charter,
without the peoples being specified. Definitions of what a people might be were particularly
vague. A memorandum from Secretariat to the Co-ordination Committee stated that: “‘peoples’
refers to groups of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or nations.”35 The
Rapporteur noted that the principle might extend to, “a possible amalgamation of nationalities if
28 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 15 May, p. 13. (See note 16).
29 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 1 June, p. 17. (See note 16).
30 Yugoslavia, Cmttee. I/1, 15 May, p. 18. (See note 16).
31 Egypt, Cmttee. I/1, 14 May, p. 24. (See note 16).
32 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 15 May, p. 12. (See note 16).
33 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 1 June, p. 17. (See note 16).
34 Belgium, Cmttee. I/1, 14 May, p. 12. (See note 16).
35 Doc. WD 381, CO/156, UNCIO, vol. XVIII, p. 658.
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they so freely choose – of course, by peaceful means.”36 Among states there was, not
surprisingly, support for self-determination as the right of the people of a state to enjoy self-
government,37 and opposition to a right of secession.38 Such a right, Columbia claimed, would
be, “tantamount to international anarchy”.39
The general provision on equal rights and self-determination was, therefore, balanced by other
Charter provisions, most notably, article 2(7), on non-intervention in matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of states. The Rapporteur noted that: “It was understood…  that the
principle in question [self-determination], as a provision of the Charter, should not be considered
alone but in connection with other provisions.”40 And on this basis: “The Article…  to the effect
that the domestic affairs of each state are its own concern suffices to rule out that possibility of
undue intervention.”41
d. The Trust and Non-Self-Governing Systems
The Charter saw the concept of trusteeship developed into a general principle for colonial
territories. The Charter, in fact, contained not one system of trusteeship but two. Chapters XII-
XIII (articles 75-91) outlined the Trusteeship system for the international supervision of
territories which did not govern themselves. Due British objections,42 this system was limited to
mandate territories, territories detached from enemy states in the Second World War, and those
voluntarily placed under the system.43 Other colonial territories were covered by a Declaration
on Non-Self-Governing Territories, in chapter XI (articles 73-4).
Both systems were based on the doctrine of “trusteeship”.44 This was reflected in the title of
the Trusteeship system, and article 73, which referred to obligations for non-self-governing
territories as “a sacred trust”. Both were aimed at the protection of the well being of the
populations of the territories and their progressive development toward self-government.
Proposals for the goals of the trusteeship system varied considerably. At one end, the Soviet
Union proposed that trusteeship should based on “progressive development toward self-
government and self-determination with active participation of peoples of these territories having
the aim to expedite the achievement of them of the full national independence”.45 China argued
that its goals were, “progressive development toward independence or self-government as may
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people”.46 American and
36 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 1 June, p. 17. (See note 16).
37 Columbia, Cmttee. I/1, 15 May, p. 20 (see note 16); Nicaragua, Doc. 8, G/5, UNCIO, vol. I, p. 557; China
(Republic of): “‘peoples’ can be identified with states. China means the state of China and a logical meaning of that
would be the people of the state of China.” WD 435, CO 199, UNCIO, vol. XVII, p. 280.
38 France, Doc. WD 410, CO/170, UNCIO, vol. XVII, pp. 142-3.
39 Columbia, Cmttee. I/1, 15 May, p. 20. (See note 16).
40 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 1 June, p. 17. (See note 16).
41 Rapporteur, Cmttee. I/1, 15 May, p. 11. (See note 16).
42 D. Rauschning, “International Trusteeship System” in B. Simma ed., Charter of the United Nations A
Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) pp. 933-48 at pp. 935-6; Russell and Muther op. cit. no. 4 at
pp. 85-91, 173-7, 330-8, 342-3, 511, 541, 573-9.
43 Article 77(1). See F. B. Sayre, “Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System” 42
American Journal of International Law (1948) pp. 263-98 at pp. 274-5.
44 C. E. Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the United Nations (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1956) at p. 3.
45 USSR, Doc. 2, G/26 (f), UNCIO, vol. III at p. 618.
46 China (Republic of), Doc. 2, G/26 (e), UNCIO, vol. III at p. 615.
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British proposals were more modest, “progressive development toward self-government”47 and
“the development of self-government in forms appropriate to the varying circumstances of each
territory.”48 French proposals were least substantial: “further the progressive development of
their political institutions”.49
Although the idea of self-government as a goal for trusteeship was generally accepted,
independence proved more controversial. In a compromise, independence was explicitly
included as an aim in the Trusteeship system, while the Declaration on Non-Self-Governing
territories only referred to self-government.50 Article 76 also explicitly stated that the basic
objectives of the Trusteeship system were in accordance with the purposes of the Charter in
article 1, which, of course, would include equal rights and self-determination of peoples.51
The Trusteeship system was also in general more stringent than that for non-self-governing
territories. In article 85 the terms of the trusteeship agreements and any alterations and
amendments to those agreements were to be approved by the UN General Assembly. The only
exception were strategic trusts, in which the approval and modification of agreements was to be
agreed by the Security Council.52 The General Assembly not only considered reports by the
administering authority: which had an obligation to make an annual report based on a
questionnaire drawn up by the Trusteeship Council: it could also examine petitions from the
inhabitants of the trust territories themselves.53 States administering non-self-governing
territories, on the other hand, only had the obligation, under article 73(e), to regularly transmit
information of a technical nature on the economic, social and educational conditions in the
territories.
The obligations towards the inhabitants of the territories under trusteeship were also, at least
semantically, more exacting. Under article 73 states with non-self-governing territories had an
obligation to “ensure” the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
peoples concerned, whereas, under article 76, administering states were to “promote” similar
goals for the inhabitants of the trust territories. Under article 73 administering states were to
“develop” self-government, while, under article 76 the obligation was to “promote” progressive
development towards self-government or independence. In both cases the achievement of self-
government was seen as a progressive process dependent on the circumstances and level of
development of the peoples in question. Nonetheless, these systems, however gradually and in
whatever form, were aimed at the ultimate self-government of the peoples in question. For those
reasons states with territorial claims over colonial territories, such as Ethiopia over Eritrea,
Argentina over the Falkland Islands and Guatemala over Belize, made reservations over those
territories.54 The two systems also provided a framework in which trusteeship could be replaced
by self-determination as the decolonisation process developed.
47 US, Doc. 2, G/26 (c), UNCIO, vol. III at p. 607.
48 UK, Doc. 2, G/26 (d), UNCIO, vol. III at p. 609.
49 France, Doc. 2, G/26 (a), UNCIO, vol. III at p. 605.
50 Report of Rapporteur, Cmttee. II/4, (Doc. 1115, II/4/44 (1) (a)), UNCIO, vol. X at p. 609.
51 U. Fastenrath, “Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories” in B. Simma ed., The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) pp. 923-31 at p. 924.
52 Article 83(1).
53 Articles 87-8.
54 Amendment proposed by the Delegation of Guatemala, 14 May 1945: “Territories which are at present the
object of litigation among allied nations are expressly excluded from the trusteeship system.”, Doc. 386, II/4/15,
UNCIO, vol. X, p. 463; Report of Rapporteur, Cmttee. II/4, (Doc. 1115, II/4/44 (1) (a)), UNCIO, vol. X at p. 610.
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2. The Human Rights Covenants
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (EXTRACTS)55
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice
to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benifit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination,
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
Article 47
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy
and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.
a. The Drafting of the Covenants
The twin Human Rights Covenants,56 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, both contain in
article 1 an identical formulation of the right to self-determination. Both instruments have been
widely ratified and article 1 is generally seen as the most important codification of self-
determination in a binding legal instrument. Moreover, although opened for signature in 1966,
the Covenants were, in fact, the first major instruments to deal with self-determination after the
UN Charter. Article 1 was drafted between 1950 and 1955 by the UN Human Rights
Commission and General Assembly’s Third Committee, and remains the most important
55 6 ILM (1967) pp. 368-85.
56 See generally A. Cassese, “The Self-determination of Peoples” in L. Henkin ed., The International Bill of
Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981) pp. 92-113; S.
Morphet, “Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants: Its Development and Current Significance” in D. M. Hill ed.,
Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice (MacMillan Press, London, 1989) pp. 67-88; M.
Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N. P. Engel, Kehl, 1993) pp. 5-25; M. J.
Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires“ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987) pp. 19-48; Cassese op. cit. no. 11 at pp. 47-66; Y. Dinstein, “Collective Human
Rights of Peoples and Minorities” 25 International and Comparatice Law Quarterly (1976) pp. 102-20 at pp. 106,
110-1; Johnson op. cit. no. 5 at pp. 37-41; Quane loc. cit. no. 13 at pp. 558-61; A. Rosas, “The Right of Self-
Determination” in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1995) pp. 79-86 at pp. 83-5; J. Crawford, “Outside the Colonial Context” in W. J. A.
Macartney ed., Self-Determination in the Commonwealth (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1988) pp. 1-21 at
pp. 3-6; H. Hannum, “Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era” in D. Clark and R. Williamson eds., Self-
Determination: International Perspectives (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996) pp. 12-44 at pp. 20-2.
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expression of self-determination in the 1950s.
The Covenants were part of the “International Bill of Human Rights”: an attempt to flesh out
the rather general human rights provisions in the UN Charter into a set of rights. The first stage
in this process was the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res.
217A(III), in December 1948. Part E of GA Res. 217(III) laid out the next stage of the “Bill”: the
drafting of a legally-binding convention on human rights, which eventually became the two
Human Rights Covenants.
The Universal Declaration itself contained many of the elements of self-determination. Its
preamble reaffirmed the Charter’s vision of a world of peoples and also recognised, “recourse, as
a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression”. A number of writers have also seen a
close connection between self-determination and article 21(3) of the Declaration,57 which
provided that:
“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”58
This provision encapsulated the principle of popular sovereignty. The formula that the will of the
people was the basis of authority reflected a French view that this was a collective people’s right,
although other states held different interpretations.59 The reference to, “or by equivalent free
voting procedures”, also revealed another parallel with the principle of self-determination as it
was understood in this era: the connection between the exercise of rights by a people and its level
of development. The phrase originated with a Swedish proposal that the nature of the democratic
process was conditional on the degree of civilisation of a people.60 Despite these various points
57 See A. Rosas, “Article 21” in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide ed., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A
Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1999) pp. 431-51 at pp. 441-2; T. van Boven,
“Human Rights and Rights of Peoples” 6 European Journal of International Law (1995) pp. 461-76 at p. 471; G.
Alfredsson, “Different Forms and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination” in D. Clark and R. Williamson eds.,
Self-Determination: International Perspectives (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996) pp. 58-84 at p. 66; A. Eide, “In
Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 139-76 at p. 152.
58 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), 3 GAOR (1948) Part I, (A/810) pp. 71-77 at p.
75.
59 France: “… [P]roposed an amendment to paragraph 3…  because, as it stood, it was not comprehensible to
minds trained in the tradition of Roman law. It could not logically be stated, as an individual right, that the
government should conform to the will of the people; such a right was a collective right on the part of the people as
whole. The French amendment was not designed to change the substance of paragraph 3, but merely to clarify it.
The paragraph should first make plain that the will of the people was the source of authority and should then speak
of how that will should be expressed.” 3 GAOR (1948) 3rd Cmttee., 132nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.132) p. 450. The French
amendment was subsequently effectively incorporated into a Chinese (ROC) amendment which was adopted by the
General Assembly’s Third Committee by 39 votes to 3, with 3 abstentions. Ibid. 134th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.134) pp. 468,
472. See also Belgium, ibid. 132nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.132) p. 453; Greece: “It was the people and not the individual
who freely chose their representatives”. Ibid. p. 454. But see New Zealand: “With regard to the French amendment,
without wishing to start a philosophical discussion she would say that the statement that the authority of government
was founded in the will of the people as expressed by free elections was open to challenge. In some countries that
authority was actually based on written constitutions which could not be amended save in certain predetermined
conditions.” Ibid. 133rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.133) p. 460.
60 Sweden: “The phrase, ‘in equivalent, free voting procedures’…  [was] included to take into account the fact
that some primitive people were not accustomed to elections such as were held by more civilized peoples.” 3 GAOR
(1948) 3rd Cmttee., 132nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.132) p. 449.
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of connection, however, the Universal Declaration did not include a specific reference to self-
determination. Nonetheless, although decolonisation was still in its early stages, the political
pressures which would propel self-determination on to the UN agenda were already evident. The
rights of colonial populations were raised by Arab, Asian and Eastern Bloc states,61 and the
Soviet Union pointedly criticised the Declaration for not including the right of self-
determination.62
The USSR raised this criticism again in October 1950 as work started on what was then
intended to be a single draft Covenant.63 This time the issue was taken up in the General
Assembly’s Third Committee by Socialist, Asian and Arab countries.64 In November Saudi
Arabia and Afghanistan successfully introduced an amendment,65 adopted as GA Res.
421D(V),66 requesting the Commission on Human Rights to make a study of self-determination
and prepare recommendations for the General Assembly. The Commission could not make this
study in 1951 and in December of that year Arab and Asian states presented a proposal,67 GA
Res. 545(VI)68 for a draft article based on the formula: “All peoples shall have the right to self-
determination”,69 and for recommendations on the right’s implementation.
61 India, 3 GAOR (1948), Plenary Meeting, 182nd mtg., (A/PV.182) p. 894; Poland ibid. pp. 906-7, 909; Syria,
ibid. 183rd mtg., (A/PV.183) pp. 922-3.
62 Ukrainian SSR: “Neither did the declaration of human rights recognize the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination, a right arising from human rights as each citizen was a member of a community and only the
community could obtain such a right for the individual.” 3 GAOR (1948), Plenary Meetings, 180 th mtg., (A/PV.180)
pp. 871-2; USSR: “The USSR delegation wished to stress that the draft declaration contained no reference to the
highly important question of the right of all nations to self-determination.” Ibid. 183 rd mtg., (A/PV.183) p. 926.
63 USSR, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 289th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.289) para. 34.
64 Poland, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 290th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.290) para. 4; Ukrainian SSR, ibid. 291st mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.291) para. 11; Pakistan, ibid. 295 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.295) para. 41; Afghanistan, ibid. 296th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.296) para. 74; Syria, ibid. 299th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.299) para. 58.
65 Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, (A/C.3/L.88), 5 GAOR (1950) Annexes, Agenda Item 63, p. 14. Adopted by 31
votes to 16, with 5 abstentions. In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Chile, China, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salavador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Uruguay,
Yemen, Yugoslavia. Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, South Africa, UK, US. Abstaining: Brazil, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Thailand,
Venezuala. 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 311th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.311) paras. 67-8.
66 GA Res. 421(V), 5 GAOR (1950) Supplement no. 20, (A/1775) at p. 42-3. Section D was adopted by 30 votes
to 9, with 13 abstentions. The resolution as a whole was adopted by  38 votes to 7, with 12 abstentions. 5 GAOR
(1950) Plenary Meetings, 317th mtg., (A/PV.317) paras. 159, 170.
67 Adopted by the Third Committee by 33 votes to 9, with 10 abstentions. In favour: Uruguay, Venezuala,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatamala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. Against:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, UK, US. Abstaining: Chile, China,
Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Israel, Norway, Peru, Sweden. 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 403rd mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.403) para. 58.
68 “This article shall be drafted in the following terms: ‘All peoples shall have the right of self-determination’,
and shall stipulate that all States, including those having responsibilities for the administration of Non-Self-
Governing Territories, should promote the realization of that right, in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of
the United Nations, and that States having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories
should promote the realization of that right in relation to the peoples of such Territories”. GA Res. 545(VI) 6 GAOR
(1951), Supplement No. 20, (A/2119) pp. 36-7. Adopted by 42 votes to 7, with 5 abstentions. 6 GAOR (1951)
Plenary Meetings, 375th mtg., (A/PV.375) para. 83.
69 Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria
and Yemen, (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) 6 GAOR (1951), Annexes, Agenda Item 29, p. 22.
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In April 1952 the Commission met for a month and produced a draft, which followed its
mandate, although it also contained a major innovation with a provision on permanent
sovereignty, or economic self-determination.70 Recommendations were also made for the
implementation of the right, which were debated in the Third Committee and adopted by the
General Assembly in December 1952 as GA Res. 637(VII).71 These debates also provide a
valuable insight into the position of states in the drafting of the Covenants and indeed influenced
that process.
In 1954 the draft Covenant was split in two, although the twin Covenants continued to share a
common article on self-determination. In November 1955 the Third Committee finally adopted
the draft article 1 by 33 votes to 12, with 13 abstentions.72 This perhaps represented the most
comprehensive debate on self-determination in any international instrument. In October-
November 1966 an additional article on the right of peoples to their natural wealth and resources
was added to the Covenants. Both were opened for signature on 19 December 1966.
A major feature of the debate in the Third Committee was that, whatever disagreement there
was over self-determination, all sides proclaimed general support for the principle itself. In the
words of the Chilean delegate: “Those who supported the amendment [for the study of self-
determination], as well as those who rejected it, recognized the merits of the right to self-
determination.”73 Where there was disagreement, and sharp disagreement, was over whether
self-determination should be translated into a legally binding article, and what form it should
take.
The article’s supporters were drawn, in particular, from Socialist, and Asian and Arab
countries. These countries were acutely aware of the growing movement for independence in
colonial territories and aimed to demonstrate support for those aspirations and accelerate
decolonisation by proclaiming self-determination as a legally binding right.74 These countries
further argued that the right of self-determination was essential for maintenance of international
peace75 and a prerequisite for human rights.76
70 “1. All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely, the right freely to determine
their political, economic, social, and cultural status. 2. All States, including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise
of that right by another people, shall promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall respect the
maintenance of that right in other States, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 3. The
right of peoples to self-determination shall include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. In
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be claimed
by other States.” Commission on Human Rights, Report of the 8th Session, 1952, 14 ESCOR (1952) Supplement no.
4, (E/CN.4/669) para. 91. Adopted by 10 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions. Ibid. para. 70.
71 GA Res. 637(VII) 7 GAOR (1952), Supplement No. 20, (A/2361) p. 26.
72 In favour: Columbia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Uruguay, Venezuala, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Byelorussian
SSR, Chile. Against: France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, UK, US,
Australia, Belgium, Canada. Abstaining: Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Honduras, Iceland, Iran,
Israel, Panama, Paraguay, Brazil, Burma, China. 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 676th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.676) para. 27.
73 Chile, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 311th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.311) para. 24.
74 Ukrainian SSR, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 255th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.255) p. 3; Saudi Arabia, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd
Cmttee., 367th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.367) para. 45; Iran, ibid. 399th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.399) para. 46; Pakistan, 7 GAOR
(1952) 3rd Cmttee., 448th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.448) para. 3; Yugoslavia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3 rd Cmttee., 568th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.568) para. 49; Uruguay, ibid. 580th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.580) para. 33; Egypt, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee.,
639th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.639) para. 8; Syria, ibid. para. 13; Liberia, ibid. 644 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 33;
Philippines, ibid. 646th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.646) para. 39.
75 Indonesia, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 366th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.366) para. 18; Czechoslovakia, ibid. para. 58;
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These proposals were, however, met with scepticism and opposition from many other
delegates, especially, although by no means exclusively, from Western countries. A number of
objections were raised to such an article. First, it was claimed that self-determination was really a
principle and not a right, and consequently had no place in the Covenants.77 Second, it was a
group right, whereas all the other rights in the Covenants were individual.78 Third, self-
determination was extremely hard to formulate as a legal obligation because of its ambiguous
nature, not least the fact that the “peoples” who exercised it were undefined.79 Correspondingly,
there was a danger that it could be used by minorities to dismember states.80 Fourth, the Third
Committee was really trying to amend the Charter, and as such had overstepped its mandate and
might disrupt the delicate balance of rights and duties contained in the instrument.81 Fifth, this
controversy over self-determination might deter states from ratifying the Covenants.82
UN membership at the time was only a fraction of what it is today. Between 1950 and 1955
there were 60-76 members. Western, Latin American, and Asian, Arab and African countries
formed three roughly numerically equal groups,83 with Communist states forming a somewhat
India, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 399th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.399) para. 7; Philippines, ibid. 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400)
para. 22; Pakistan, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 571st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.571) para. 46; Syria, ibid. 572nd mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.572) para. 6.
76 Ukrainian SSR, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 255th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.255) p. 3; Poland, ibid. p. 6; Yugoslavia, ibid.
256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p. 7; Syria, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 311th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.311) para. 4; Indonesia,
6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 401st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.401) para. 45; Pakistan, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 448th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.448) para. 6; Iraq, ibid. 460th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.460) para. 5; Saudi Arabia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee.,
578th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.578) para. 49; USSR, ibid. 565th mtg. (A/C.3/SR.565) para. 24; Afghanistan, 10 GAOR
(1955) 3rd Cmttee., 638th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.638) para. 22; Byelorussian SSR, ibid. 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para.
20; Chile, ibid. 645th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.645) para. 8; Czechoslovakia, ibid. para. 12; El Salvador, ibid. para. 20; Iran,
ibid. para. 29; India, ibid. 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.651) para. 1.
77 UK, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 456th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.456) para., 4; Sweden, 10 GAOR (1955) 3 rd Cmttee.,
641st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.641) para. 14.
78 France, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 309th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.309) para. 62; Turkey, ibid. 310th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.310) paras. 48-9; Peru, ibid. 312th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.312) para. 7; New Zealand, 6 GAOR (1952) 3 rd
Cmttee., 367th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.367) para. 8; Netherlands, ibid. 398th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.398) para. 40; UK, ibid. 401st
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.401) para. 31; Australia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 564th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.564) para. 13; Canada,
ibid. 570th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.570) para. 5; China (ROC), 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 642nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.642)
paras. 4-5.
79 Belgium: “… [U]nless it were defined, the principle [of self-determination] would remain a dead letter, and
States would continue to interpret it to suit their own purposes without fear of reproach because of the absence of
established criteria.” 8 Comm.HR (1952) 252mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.252) p. 7; Sweden, ibid. 259th mtg.,
(E/CN.4/SR.259) p. 5; Ethiopia, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 312th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.312) para. 3; Denmark, 9
GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 571st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.571) para. 13; Columbia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 639th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.639) paras. 34-5; Canada, ibid. 645th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.645) para. 4; Turkey, ibid. 649th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.649) para. 4; US, ibid. 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 27; New Zealand, ibid. 674th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.674) para. 40.
80 Belgium, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 361st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.361) paras. 10, 13; UK, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd
Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 24; Netherlands, ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 8; New Zealand,
ibid. 460th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.460) para. 24; China (ROC), 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 642nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.642)
para. 7; Israel, ibid. 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) paras. 22, 29.
81 UK, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 309th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.309) para. 58; France, ibid. para. 62; US, ibid. 310 th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.310) para. 28; Canada, ibid. para. 32; Greece, ibid. para. 36; Nicaragua, ibid. 312th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.312) para. 5; Turkey, 6 GAOR (1951) 3 rd Cmttee., 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 31.
82 New Zealand, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 571st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.571) para. 59; Sweden, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd
Cmttee., 641st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.641) para. 13; UK, ibid. 642nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.642) para. 21; Israel, ibid. 643rd mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.643) para. 32;
83 YBUN (1950) pp. 1012-3; YBUN (1955) pp. 452-3.
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smaller group. Moreover, these geographical groupings, with the exception of the Soviet Bloc,
were quite heterogeneous in their views on self-determination, although Arab and Asian
countries were at the time organising themselves into a group.84 Thus, support for the self-
determination of peoples encompassed a wide range of possible situations and actions. No group
was in a position, as would later be the case, to push through its agenda without regard to its
opponents.
b. The Two Human Rights Committees
Subsequent practice in the interpretation of the Covenants is also provided by reports to the
two human rights committees established to promote the implementation of the Covenants: the
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article
40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for states parties to
submit reports to the Human Rights Committee (established in 1976) on their implementation of
rights in the Covenant.85 Article 40(1)(a) requires an initial report to be made within a year of
ratification of the Covenant (or the Covenant’s entry into force in March 1976). Thereafter,
under article 40(1)(b), reports must be submitted whenever requested by the Committee, which
has been interpreted to mean every five years.86 The Committee, under article 40(4) has also
produced a general comment on the right of self-determination, General Comment No. 12 (21),
and in General Comment Nos. 23 and 25, explored its relationship with minority rights, and the
right to vote and take part in public affairs, respectively.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also provides, in article
16(1), for states parties to report on implementation of rights in the Covenant, although it did not
spell out when or in what form these reports should be submitted.87 In 1976 a three stage
reporting system was set up by the Economic and Social Council. States’ reports were examined
by a Working Group established in 1979, and replaced in 1986 by the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, in a six-year cycle. Every two years states were to report on the rights
in articles 6-9, and then 10-12, followed by 13-15.88  This system did not specifically cover
article 1 and, although states were supposed to pay “full attention”89 to it, it was remarked that,
“the Committee had never received more than three or four lines on the right to self-
determination”.90 In 1988 the three stage reporting procedure was replaced by a single report on
articles 1-15 to be submitted after two years and thereafter every five years.91 The issues in these
84 Morphet op. cit. no. 56 at p. 71.
85 See D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991); T. Opsahl, “The Human Rights Committee” in P.
Alston ed., The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) pp. 369-
443; D. D. Fischer, “International Reporting Procedures” in H. Hannum ed., Guide to International Human Rights
Practice (MacMillan, London, 1984) pp. 165-85 at pp. 168-73.
86 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR.303, para. 2.
87 See M. C. R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on
its Development (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) esp. 30-105; P. Alston, “The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural rights” in P. Alston ed., The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1992) pp. 473-508; Fischer op. cit. no. 85 at pp. 173-6.
88 ECOSOC Res. 1988(LX), E/C.12/1989/4, (1988) pp. 3-5.
89 ESC Res. 1988(LX), E/C.12/1989/4, pp. 3-5; CESCR, E/C.12/1987/2, (1987) pp. 1-20.
90 Mr. Alston, CESCR, E/C.12/1989/SR.3, (1989) para. 9.
91 ECOSOC Res. 1988/4, E/C.12/1989/4, (1988) pp. 30-3.
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reports have tended to duplicate those submitted to the Human Rights Committee. Indeed, some
states have simply referred to their earlier reports to that committee.92 The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also appears to be generally less active on self-
determination than the Human Rights Committee and has not yet produced a general comment
on article 1.
c. The Balance in the Covenants
The drafting of article 1 appeared to be based on a contradiction. On one hand, states
explicitly framed the right as a universal one: “All peoples have the right to self-
determination… ” On the other, they clearly intended to limit its application. While it was
certainly the case that advocates of an article on self-determination had colonial peoples largely
in mind, it was also clear that if they pushed for a narrow interpretation of self-determination,
they also risked undermining its legitimacy. Delegates, after all, in the debate had underlined the
broad significance of the right by citing historical arguments,93 or its role in their own
existence.94 To limit the right to one category of people, therefore, would be to undermine its
credibility.95 One of the main criticisms which states levelled at each other’s drafts and
proposals, often on a partisan basis, was that they fell short of a universal standard.96 In fact, the
universality of self-determination enjoyed broad support.97 The general approach of supporters
92 E.g. Algeria, CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.22, (1990) p. 4; Guatemala, CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.24, (1990) p. 2;
Kyrgyz Republic,  CESCR, E/1990/5/Add.42, (1990) p. 3.
93 See eg. Syria, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 397th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.397) paras. 6-9; Netherlands, 7 GAOR
(1952) 3rd Cmttee., 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) paras. 4-11; US, ibid. para. 23; Greece, ibid. 454th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.454) paras. 22-3; Israel, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 23; Saudi
Arabia, ibid. 672nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 23.
94 El Salvador, 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 310th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.310) para. 53; Lebanon, ibid. 311th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.311) para. 15; Peru, ibid. 312th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.312) para. 7; Turkey, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 400th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 29; Dominican Republic, ibid. para. 42; Columbia, ibid. 403rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.403)
para. 82; Poland, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 1; India, ibid. 447th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.447) para. 40; Yugoslavia, ibid. 448th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.448) para. 21; Czechoslovakia, ibid. 449th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.449) para. 17; Argentina, ibid. 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) para. 30; Honduras, ibid. 449th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.449) paras. 47-8; Uruguay, ibid. 452nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.452) para. 6; Greece, ibid. 454th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.454) paras. 22-3; Ecuador, ibid. 461st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.461) para. 6; Bolivia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee.,
570th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.570) para. 30; Australia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 647th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.647) para. 18;
Costa Rica, ibid. 649th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.649) para. 22; Pakistan, ibid. 671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 27.
95 See e.g. criticisms of Belgium: “The principle of self-determination was universal; to attempt to limit its
application to an arbitrary defined category of population would be to distort a great principle and seriously weaken
its value.” 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 446th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.446) para. 31; Yugoslavia: “It was hard to see how
‘all’ peoples could enjoy the right of self-determination if only one class of signatory  States was under an obligation
to ensure the exercise of the right.” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 657th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.657) para. 12; Canada, 7
GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 457th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.457) para. 1.
96 USSR, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 254th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.254) p. 3; US, ibid. 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p. 6;
Yugoslavia, ibid. p. 8; France, ibid. 257th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.257) p. 4; Lebanon, ibid. p. 8.
97 Belgium, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 252nd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.252) p. 7; Lebanon, ibid. 254th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.254)
p. 10; Afghanistan, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 362nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.362) para. 11; Poland, ibid. 400th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.400) para. 12; USSR, ibid. para. 57; Denmark, ibid. 401st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.401) para. 21; Haiti, 7 GAOR
(1952) 3rd Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 40; US, ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 32; Ukrainian
SSR, ibid. 448th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.448) para. 45; Greece, ibid. 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 26; UK, ibid. 456th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.456) para. 11; Honduras, ibid. para. 37; Guatamala, ibid. para. 59; Netherlands, ibid. 457th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.457) para. 6; Australia, ibid. 458th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.458) para. 12; Syria, ibid. para. 21; Mexico, ibid.
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of colonial self-determination, reflected in GA Res. 545(VI), the Human Rights Commission’s
draft, GA Res. 637(VII), and finally article 1, was that the right was universal but of particular
relevance for colonial peoples.98
This has continued in the reports to the Human Rights Committee, which show a general
consensus that self-determination is a universal right.99 A couple of states have dissented from
this line. India,100 Sri Lanka101 and briefly Azerbaijan102 have argued that article 1 applied only
to peoples under colonial or foreign domination. However, this position has attracted repeated
criticism from the Committee and from other states.103
For opponents of article 1 universality was tactically useful. If self-determination was a right
of all peoples, states with colonies could deflect the attention being deliberately focussed on
them by pointing to other situations where it was being denied. The Netherlands, for example,
argued that: “There were more peoples and nations outside the colonial orbit which were
para. 57; Venezuala, ibid. para. 60; Pakistan, ibid. 459th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.459) para. 3; Israel, ibid. para. 9; Iraq, ibid.
460th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.460) para. 8; Philippines, ibid. para. 13; Brazil, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 586th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.586) para. 6; El Salvador, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 645th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.645) para. 24; New
Zealand, ibid. 649th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.649) para. 9; India, ibid. 671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 14.
98 Poland, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 11; Afghanistan, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd
Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) paras. 14, 16; Honduras, ibid. 456th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.456) para. 37; India, ibid.
457th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.457) paras. 51-3; Syria, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 458th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.458) para. 21;
Mexico, ibid. para. 54; Venezuala, ibid. paras. 60, 62; Pakistan, ibid. 459th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.459) paras. 2-3; Iraq,
ibid. 460th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.460) para. 8; Philippines, ibid. 460th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.460) para. 13; Brazil, 9 GAOR
(1954) 3rd Cmttee., 586th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.586) para. 6.
99 Netherlands, (CCPR.C/10/Add.3) 11-16 YHRC (1981-2) II, p. 156; Jordan, (CCPR/C/1/Add.55) ibid. p. 199;
German Federal Republic, (CCPR/C/28/Add.6) 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) II, p. 262; Senegal, 29-30 YHRC (1987) I,
SR.722, para. 8; Mexico, (CCPR/C46/Add.3) 34-6 HRCOR (1988-9) II, p. 37; Republic of Korea,
CCPR/C/114/Add.1, (1998) p. 7. See comments by Mr. Sadi, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I, SR.222, para. 4; Mr. Bouziri,
17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR. 477, para. 67; Mr. Tomuschat, ibid. SR.478, para. 1; Mr. Ermacora, ibid. para. 29; Mr.
Ndiaye, ibid. para. 33; Mr. Aguilar, ibid. para. 38; Sir Vincent Evans, ibid. SR.503, para. 13; Mr. Dimitijevic, ibid.
para. 28.
100 India, (CCPR/C/10/Add.8) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 343; 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.498, para. 6;
(CCPR/C/37/Add.13) 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) II, p. 138.
101 Sri Lanka, (CCPR/C/14/Add.6) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 261; 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.477, para. 51;
CCPR/C/70/Add.6, (1994) pp. 1-2; CCPR/C/70/Add.6 (1994) p. 1.
102 Azerbaijan, CCPR/C/81/Add.2, (1994) p. 4. Mr. Herndl: “[D]id not understand how it could be asserted that
the right of self-determination should be reserved exclusively for former colonies, when according to article 1 of the
Covenant, all peoples had the right of self-determination.” CCPR/C/SR.1332, (1996) para. 20; Mrs. Chanet, ibid.
para. 28; Mrs. Evatt, ibid. para. 47; Mr. Pocar, ibid. para. 62. See also CCPR/C/79/Add.38, (1994) p. 2. Later
Azerbaijan took the position that self-determination should be interpreted as strengthening the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states whose governments reflect the interests of all members of their
populations without distinction. CCPR/C/AZE/99/2, (2000) p. 10.
103 Criticism of Sri Lanka: Mr. Ermacora: “[H]e was unable to accept the interpretation of article 1 given by the
representative of Sri Lanka”, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.477, para. 66; Mr. Bouziri: “[M]embers of the Committee
had expressed the unanimous view that the article was addressed to all States and that sovereign and independent
States thus had obligations thereunder. That did not mean that separatism should necessarily be encouraged. The
interpretation given by Sri Lanka, which was not in accordance with the Covenant, should be reconsidered.” ibid.
para. 67; Sir Vincent Evans, ibid. para. 68; Mr. Tomuschat, ibid. SR.478, para. 1; Mr. Klein: “It was furthermore
frankly incorrect to state that the right to self-determination did not apply to sovereign independent States.”
CCPR/C/SR.1436, (1995) para. 39; Mr. El Shafei, ibid. para. 50; Mr. Buergenthal, ibid. para. 63. Criticism of India:
Mr. Tomuschat: “[A]sked for clarification of the reservation made by India with respect to article 1 and for an
assurance that it did not deny the Indian people’s right to self-determination.” 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.494,
para. 6; Mr. Serrano Caldera, ibid. para. 32; Mr. Bouziri, ibid. para. 54; Mr. El Shafei, 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) I,
SR.1039, para. 30; Mr. Aguilar Urbina, ibid. para. 43; Mr. Wennergren, ibid. para. 44. See also objections to India’s
reservation by France, Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. E/C.12/1988/1, p. 20.
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deprived of all opportunity of determining their political status than there were within it.”104
Moreover, if the right was universal there was no reason why minorities might not claim it.
Opponents could raise the spectre that a legal right to self-determination would only encourage
secession and instability. It was simply too hot to handle.105
Opponents of article 1, though, as much as its supporters had no interest in encouraging
secession. Consequently, states in the debate balanced the right of all peoples to self-
determination with other principles. The two balancing principles which appeared to have most
support were the territorial integrity of states,106 and that a population be sufficiently developed
to exercise the right.107 Other factors were: peace and stability,108 the circumstances of the
population and the territory,109 human rights,110 respect for neighbours’ rights,111 and the
existence of a legal dispute over the status of the territory.112 Within this balance four categories
of populations could be identified: colonial peoples, the peoples of states, peoples under foreign
or alien domination and minorities.
i. Colonial Peoples
The right of colonial peoples to self-determination was, of course, a principal motivating
factor behind article 1. Colonial peoples are the only category of people, which can be implied
104  Netherlands, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 3
105 UK: “On the question of minorities, many representatives appeared to have been indulging in wishful
thinking, and had not analysed the facts objectively…  No one wanted to encourage separatist or irridentist
movements. But if it were acknowledged that certain minorities could be regarded, as peoples, article 1 indubitably
sanctioned their right to independence, with all the dangers that that involved.” 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 652nd
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.652) para. 19.
106 Bolivia, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) paras. 43-4; Haiti, ibid. 444 th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.444) para. 41; Netherlands, ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 8; US, ibid. 447th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.447) para. 27; Ecuador, ibid. 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 6; Peru, ibid. 457th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.457)
para. 28; Venezuala, ibid. 458th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.458) para. 60; China (Republic of), 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee.,
570th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.570) para. 16; Columbia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 639th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.639) para. 35;
Costa Rica, ibid. 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 24.
107 Belgium, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 252nd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.252) p. 7; India, ibid. 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p.
5; Netherlands, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 398th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.398) para. 40; Chile, ibid. 399th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.399) para. 20; France, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 32; Australia, ibid.
445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 38; Mexico, ibid. 447 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) paras. 14, 18; New Zealand, ibid.
450th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.450) para. 9; Ecuador, ibid. 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 6, Greece, ibid. 454th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.454) para. 28; Denmark, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 1; Brazil, ibid.
650th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.650) para. 6; UK, ibid. 652nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.652) para. 20; El Salvador, ibid. 674th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.674) para. 12.
108 Belgium, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 446th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.446) para. 25; US, ibid. 447th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.447) para. 27; Ethiopia, ibid. 453rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.453) para. 11; Syria, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee.,
572nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.572) para. 6; Argentina, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 42;
UK, ibid. 652nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.652) para. 20; Lebanon, ibid. 673rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.673) para. 13.
109 France, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 32; UK, ibid. 456th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.456) para. 4; Canada, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 645th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.645) para. 5; Guatamala, ibid.
647th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.647) para. 36; Lebanon, ibid. 649th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.649) para. 29; Ethiopia, ibid. 650th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.650) para. 30.
110 Argentina, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 42; Lebanon, ibid. 673rd mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.673) para. 13.
111 UK, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 28.
112 Argentina, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.641) para. 22.
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from a literal reading of the Covenants. Article 1(3) provides that states parties, “including those
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing or Trust Territories”, shall
promote realisation of the right of self-determination. Nonetheless, the debates revealed some
ambiguity around the concept of colonial peoples. Different claims were made by Honduras and
Saudi Arabia over the status of Belize (British Honduras),113 and by Indonesia and Syria, and the
Netherlands over West Irian (West Papua).114 Argentina, presumably in a reference to the
Falkland Islands, also argued that territories subject to litigation were not entitled to unilaterally
change their status.115
ii. The Peoples of States
It is not surprising that one people that states’ representatives in the drafting of the Covenants
would accord the right of self-determination were states’ populations.116 In this case, self-
determination involved safeguarding and strengthening the independence of those peoples,
especially in the economic field.117 State independence was, of course, already supported by the
principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Self-
determination was considered to be a corollary of those principles, especially non-
intervention.118
This connection has been supported in subsequent states’ reports to the Human Rights
Committee and by the Committee itself in General Comment No. 12 (21).119 Not surprisingly the
strongest advocates of this connection have been states that have been subject to considerable
outside interference. As El Salvador put it: “El Salvador has been one of the keenest defenders of
the right of peoples to self-determination…  El Salvador has reiterated its attachment to this
fundamental principle of international law and has vigorously condemned any outside
interference in the internal affairs of countries and, in particular, in the internal affairs of El
Salvador.”120 Similar sentiments were echoed by Lebanon,121 by Ba’athist Iraq (somewhat
hypocritically) about interference resulting from the Iran-Iraq and First Gulf wars,122 and
113 Honduras, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 456th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.456) para. 47; Saudi Arabia, 7 GAOR (1952)
3rd Cmttee., 446th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.446) para. 36.
114 Indonesia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 27; Syria, ibid. 648 th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.648) para. 9; Netherlands, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 652nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.652) para. 30.
115 Argentina, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) para. 22.
116 UK, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 253rd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.253) p. 6; US, ibid. 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p. 6; Saudi
Arabia, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 446th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.446) para. 36; Lebanon, ibid. 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454)
para. 13.
117 Chile, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 253rd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.253) p. 6; Uruguay, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 452nd
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.452) para. 13; Afghanistan, ibid. 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 54; Poland, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd
Cmttee., 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 36; Bolivia, ibid. 654th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.654) para. 31.
118 US, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p. 6; Israel, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 450th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.450) para. 42; Venezuala, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 646th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.646) para. 42; Columbia,
ibid. 648th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.648) para. 2.
119 General Comment 12: “States must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other States and thereby
adversely affecting the exercise of the right to self-determination.” 39 GAOR (1984), Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40)
para. 6.
120 El Salvador, (CCPR/C/14/Add.5) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 241.
121 Lebanon, (CCPR/C/1/Add.60) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 211.
122 Iraq, (CCPR/C/37/Add.3) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 191; (CCPR/C/64/Add.6) 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) II, pp.
326-7.
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especially by Central and South American countries.123 Costa Rica even cited its treason laws as
evidence of its respect for self-determination.124 Committee members have also questioned states
about interventions in Afghanistan,125 Cambodia126 and Uganda.127
However, some practice in the Committee has shown that the line between defending self-
determination and violating it may be thin and subjective. Yugoslavia, for example, was asked
whether its support for peoples struggling against imperialism was not simply a pretext for
interference in the internal affairs of other states.128 When El Salvador complained to the
Committee about destabilisation by Cuba, one member, Mr. Movchan replied that Cuba was
simply following the tradition of Simón Bolívar in struggling against foreign domination.129
iii. Peoples under Foreign or Alien Domination
A literal reading of article 1(3) suggests that the obligation to promote the realisation of self-
determination applied to states with non-self-governing and trust territories, but was not
exclusive to them. This interpretation was supported by the Human Rights Committee in General
Comment No. 12 (21). It stated that article 1(3) imposed, “specific obligations on States parties,
not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples which have not been able to
exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right to self-
determination.”130 But, who were these peoples?
Delegates in the Third Committee evidently contemplated the application of self-
determination in a wider range of situations than colonial territories or states. Lebanon argued
that self-determination imposed three classes of obligations: “States in general, those which
administered Non-Self-Governing Territories and those which exercised the right of sovereignty
over another people.”131 This latter category could be called peoples under foreign or alien
domination. Delegates raised a number of peoples who might fall into this category. With war on
the Korean peninsula, different states argued over Korean self-determination.132 Pakistan raised
the question of Kashmir.133 Iraq and Syria demanded rights for the Palestinian people.134
Some states also raised the plight of peoples in Eastern Europe who had been either annexed
by the Soviet Union or who were nominally independent but controlled by the superpower.135
123 Venezuala, (CCPR/C/6/Add.3) 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) II, p. 11; Uruguay, (CCPR/C/1/Add.57) ibid. p. 213;
Mexico, (CCPR/C/46/Add.3) 34-6 HRCOR (1988-9) II, p. 38; Dominican Republic, (CCPR/C/32/Add.16) 37-9
HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 178.
124 Costa Rica, (CCPR/C/1/Add.46) 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) II, p. 449.
125 Mr. Pocar, 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) I, SR.603, para. 55; Mrs. Higgins, ibid. SR.604, para. 44; Mr. Opsahl, ibid.
SR.606, para. 67. See also Mr. Opsahl, ibid. SR.565, para. 8.
126 Mr. Ando, 37-9 HRCOR (1989-90) I, SR.982, para. 11.
127 Mr. Sadi, 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR.282, para. 6.
128 Mr. Tomuschat, 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) I, SR.98, para. 61.
129 Mr. Movchan, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.474, para. 2.
130 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984), Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) pp. 142-3, para. 6.
131 Lebanon, 8 Comm.HR (1952), 258th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.258) p. 6.
132 US, 6 GAOR (1951), 3rd Cmttee., 364th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.364) para. 19; Byelorussian SSR, 7 GAOR (1952),
3rd Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 4. Venezuala, ibid. 451st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.451) para. 31.
133 Pakistan, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 448th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.448) para. 17.
134 Syria, 9 GAOR (1954), 3 rd Cmttee., 572nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.572) para. 7; Iraq, 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee.,
643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 4.
135 Belgium, 8 Comm.HR (1952), 254th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.254) p. 6; 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 446th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.446) para. 15; Yugoslavia, 8 Comm.HR (1952), 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p. 7; 6 GAOR (1951), 3rd
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Other states, though, appeared to draw a distinction between the political reality of colonial
peoples and those behind the Iron Curtain. The Philippines recognised that: “Another important
aspect of the problem of self-determination was an increasing consciousness of the plight of
formerly sovereign peoples, which had lost everything as a result of the Second World War save
the outward trappings of independence. The United Nations could not yet take any effective
action on their behalf… ”136 The Indian delegate, believed that: “it was futile to promise the same
treatment to Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories on the one hand and to recently enslaved
nations on the other.”137 For other delegates this area of self-determination seemed only to
provoke apathy.138
Peoples under foreign or alien domination represented an open-ended category. Subsequent
practice by the Human Rights Committee has also revealed it to be an extremely political one. In
the 1970s and 1980s, in particular, states before the Committee could be expected to be
extensively probed by certain committee members on their support for the Palestinian, Namibian
and South African peoples.139 These were, of course, issues, that were especially prominent in
the UN General Assembly at the time. Support for the self-determination of East Timor or
Western Sahara, on the other hand, was only raised by states themselves,140 or when Morocco
presented its report.141 Sometimes these questions appeared to go far beyond the Committee’s
mandate. For example, Mr. Bouziri asked Iran, then at war with Iraq, on the basis of respect for
the right of self-determination: “Why had the Iranian government not accepted the cease-fire
proposed by Iraq, so that Iraq could go and fight the Israelis?”142 A striking criticism of this
selective promotion of self-determination came from Lebanon: “Although many members of the
Committee had asked what Lebanon was doing to promote the self-determination of the
Cmttee., 372nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.372) paras. 3-7; 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 33;
10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 647th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.647) para. 41; US, 6 GAOR (1951), 3rd Cmttee., 364th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.364) para. 19; UK, ibid. 401st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.401) paras. 24-6; Lebanon, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee.,
454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 13; China, (ROC), 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 642nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.642) para.
2.
136 Philippines, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 453rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.453) para. 28.
137 India, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 455th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.455) para. 12.
138 Venezuala: “It was true that certain sovereign States had been annexed by others by force of arms since the
beginning of the Second World War; but the majority of the Members of the United Nations regarded those States
simply as temporarily suspended from the exercise of their sovereign rights. Their people could not be described as
‘slaves’ under international law, since such a description would be tantamount to recognition of the existence of
international slavery as a juridical fact; whereas the de facto subjugation of those peoples gave rise to no rights or
obligations for anyone.” 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 451st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.451) para. 35.
139 M. Scheinin, “The Right to Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” in P. Aikio
and M. Scheinin eds., Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Åbo Akademi
University, Turku, 2000) pp. 179-99 at p. 188.
140 Portugal, (CCPR/C/6/Add.6), 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) II, p. 97; Barbados, 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR.267, para.
4; Mexico, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.404, para. 16; Spain, 23-28 YHRC (1985-6) I, SR.587, para. 41; Senegal,
(CCPR/C/37/Add.4) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 82; Congo, (CCPR/C/36/Add.2) ibid. p. 137; Tanzania,
(CCPR/C/42/Add.12) 46-8 HRCOR (1992-3) II, p. 56.
141 Mr. Ermacora, 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR.327, para. 13; Mr. Tarnopolsky, ibid. para. 35; Morocco, ibid.
SR.332, para. 10; Morocco, 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) I, SR.1033, paras. 3-4; Mr. Ndiaye, ibid. para. 6; Mr. Aguilar
Urbina, ibid. paras. 7-9; Mr. Ando, ibid. paras. 11-2; Mrs. Higgins, ibid. paras. 13-4; Morocco, ibid. paras. 15-23;
Ms. Chanet, ibid. para. 24; Mr. Fodor and Mr. Myullerson, ibid. para. 25; Ndiaye, ibid. para. 26; Mr. Aguilar
Urbina, ibid. para. 27; Morocco, ibid. paras. 28-9; Morocco, CCPR/C/SR.1788, (2000) para. 8; Ms. Evatt, ibid. para.
56; Ms. Medina Quiroga, ibid. para. 37.
142 Mr. Bouziri, 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR. 365, para. 35 and SR.368, para. 40. See also Mr. Al Douri’s
reference to Israel as, “the Zionist entity, which had refused to recognize the Palestinian people’s right to self-
determination since its creation in 1948.” Ibid. SR.356, para. 41.
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Palestinian people, few of them had expressed any interest in what Lebanon was doing to
promote the self-determination of its own people, which was after all the matter of greatest
priority.”143
iv. Minorities
It was unlikely that states’ representatives in drafting the Covenants would ever show any
great enthusiasm for the idea that specific populations within states could claim the right to
freely determine their political status. As the Netherlands warned delegates: “States were the
principal subject of existing international law; those who undermined the State were at the same
time undermining the whole world order.”144 There was considerable opposition to a right of
self-determination which either embraced minorities or extended to secession.145 The aim of
balancing self-determination with the principle of the territorial integrity was to restrict this
possibility. The rights of ethnic minorities, or rather persons belonging to such groups, were
recognised in a separate provision in the Civil and Political Covenant: article 27. However, the
issue was not clear-cut.
In part this can be attributed to the tactics of opponents of article 1 in the debate, who raised
the issue of minorities claiming self-determination to highlight the danger in codifying a legal
right. However, the debate also revealed how hard it was to restrict the right of all peoples to
self-determination without appearing arbitrary and selective. The following exchange is
illustrative:
“Mrs. MEHTA (India) pointed out that the question of minorities and of the self-
determination of peoples should not be confused.
…
Mr. NISOT (Belgium) asked the Indian representative whether, in her delegation’s
opinion, minorities should, in principle, have the right to self-determination denied to
them.
Mrs. MEHTA (India) replied that all depended on what was meant by minorities.”146
Indeed, some of the distinctions between peoples and minorities were not just arbitrary but
clumsy. Syria, for example, after defining a nation as, “comprised of people of the same ethnic
group”, dismissed the possibility of secession on the grounds that peoples within states did not
want it.147 Iraq argued that self-determination applied, “not to a secessionist movement”, but, “to
143 Lebanon, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.446, para. 3.
144 Netherlands, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 8.
145 Saudi Arabia, 5 GAOR (1950), 3rd Cmttee., 310th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.310) para. 3; Liberia, 6 GAOR (1951), 3rd
Cmttee., 366th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.366) para. 29; India, ibid. 399 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.399) para. 5; New Zealand, ibid.
400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 23; Ethiopia, 7 GAOR (1952), 3rd Cmttee., 453rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.453) para. 14;
China (ROC), 9 GAOR (1954), 3rd Cmttee., 570th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.570) para. 16; Columbia, 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd
Cmttee., 639th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.639) para. 35; Sweden, ibid. 641st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.641) para. 15; Iran, ibid. 645th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.645) para. 30; Venezuala, ibid. 646th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.646) para. 42; Greece, ibid. 647th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.647) para. 6; Saudi Arabia, ibid., 648th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.648) para. 19; Costa Rica, ibid. 670th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.670) para. 24; Iraq, ibid. 671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 8.
146 8 Comm.HR (1952), 253rd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.253) pp. 13-4.
147 Syria, 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 648th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.648) paras. 8-9.
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a people under foreign domination”.148 But, presumably a secessionist movement (e.g. the
Kurds) might be able to present quite a convincing argument that they were under foreign
domination.149
Moreover, states identified self-determination with groups which could easily be considered
minorities.150 A draft by the Soviet Union on self-determination encompassed minority rights.151
Denmark argued that border populations had the same right to self-determination as the peoples
of non-self-governing territories.152 Mexico described the partition of the Ewe, an ethnic group
which straddles the borders of Ghana and Togo, as, “a glaring example of the violation of the
right of peoples to self-determination.”153 Consequently, while there was little support for the
right of minorities to self-determination, the limitation of the right to such groups was also not
completely clear.
This same problem has also been evident in the practice of the Human Rights Committee. The
Committee itself has shown little enthusiasm for secession,154 (unless a state explicitly provides
for such a right in its constitution).155 However, although in General Comment No. 23 (50) it
drew, “a distinction between the right to self-determination and the rights [of persons belonging
to minorities] protected under article 27”,156 it has not clarified the distinction between peoples
and minorities themselves.157 States have also been unclear on the issue. For example, when
148 Iraq, 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 8.
149 See D. Z. Cass, “Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law
Theories” 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (1992) pp. 21-40 at p. 35.
150 USSR, 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 668th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.668) para. 15; El Salvador, ibid. para. 16;
Yugoslavia, ibid. 669th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.669) para. 1; US, ibid. 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 28.
151 USSR Draft (E/CN.4/L.21), Comm.HR, Report 8th Session, 14 ESCOR (1952) Supplement No. 4, para. 59.
152 Denmark, 10 GAOR (1955), 3rd Cmttee., 669th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.669) para. 6.
153 Mexico, 5 GAOR (1950), 3rd Cmttee., 311th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.311) para. 32.
154 Mr. Graefrath, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.472, para. 38;  Mr. Tomuschat, ibid. SR.504, para. 45; Mr.
Cooray, ibid. SR.513, para. 42; Mr. Prado Vallejo, ibid. SR.514, para. 23; Mr. Bouziri, ibid. para. 31; Mr. Opsahl,
23-8 YHRC (1985-6) I, SR.590, para. 15; Mr. Prado Vallejo, ibid. para. 18; Mrs. Higgins, 43-5 HRCOR (1991-2) I,
SR.1149, para. 42.
155 Mr. Tomuschat (to USSR), 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) I, SR.109, para. 51; Mr. Ermacora (to USSR), 23-8 YHRC
(1985-6) I, SR.565, para. 11; Mr. Lallah (to Byelorussian SSR), 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) I, SR.117, para. 27; Mr.
Tarnopolsky (to Ukrainian SSR), 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I, SR.154, para. 38; Mr. Tarnopolsky (to Yugoslavia),  1-5
YHRC (1977-8) I, SR.99, para. 20; Mr. Herndl, Mr. Prado Vallejo and Mr. Sadi (to Yugoslavia), 43-5 HRCOR
(1991-2) I, SR.1144, paras. 30, 52 and 56.
156 General Comment No. 23 (50), 49 GAOR (1994) Supplement No. 40, (A/49/40) p. 107, para. 3.1.
157 Mr. Tomuschat, “[T]he question of the concept of a people…  had given rise to differences of opinion, but he
felt that it was not the Committee’s role to deal with that problem”. 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.478, para. 1; Mr.
Opsahl, “… agreed that it would be useful to define the concept of the people, but that it was not the Committee’s
role to do so.”, ibid. para. 3; Mr. Dimitrijevic: “In some languages, the word ‘people’ had ethnic and other
connotations which he felt the Committee should avoid.”, ibid. SR.514, para. 36; Mr. Serrano Caldera, “[T]he
Covenant did not draw a distinction between ‘peoples’ and ‘ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’, although it
was true that under article 1 of the Covenant ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination’ while article 27
granted certain specific rights under certain conditions to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. To establish a
distinction between ‘peoples’ and ‘ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’, it would be necessary to define those
terms and that was not the central purpose of the Committee’s discussion.” 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) I, SR.608, para.
37; Mr. Dimitrijevic,“[T]he Covenant made an implicit distinction between ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ in according
them different rights”, ibid. para. 40; Mr. Bouziri: “While the Covenant did not draw a direct distinction between
‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’, it did so indirectly as the existence of articles 1 and 27 showed.”, ibid. para. 45; Mrs.
Higgins, “[I]t was generally agreed that…  under the Covenant peoples have the right to self-determination while
members of ethnic minorities have other rights.”, ibid. para. 48; Mr. Opsahl: “Minorities coming from peoples
which had a national State and which had exercised their right of self-determination in connection with that State
could not claim that right in relation to another State under article 1.”, ibid. SR.618, para. 56; Mr. Opsahl,
140
Senegal was asked whether groups in the province of Casamance, where there had been a long-
running secessionist conflict,158 could be peoples,159 its representative was unable to answer,
although he claimed that most people there felt thoroughly Senegalese.160
States have also blurred the line between the self-determination of peoples and the
constitutional protection of minorities. Finland, for example, has argued that the autonomy of the
Åland Islands represented, “an example of how self-determination of a distinct population group
can be realized within a larger community.”161 Similarly, Belgium has looked at the
constitutional relationship between the country’s Flemish, French and German communities
under article 1.162 The United States has also reported on Native Americans under article 1,
although it was stressed that “sovereignty” and “self-determination” in this context where
different from their meaning in international law.163 This is not to mention Armenia, which, with
irridentist claims against Azerbaijan, has argued that Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh have a
right to self-determination.164
d. Self-Determination
i. Immediate or Progressive?
The trust and non-self-governing systems and the concept of “trusteeship” were based on the
progressive development of self-government dependent on the capacity of a population for such
government. Self-determination, as codified in article 1, posed a challenge  to this concept with
the argument that the basis for political authority resided with peoples. Peoples had the right to
freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. It was not for other countries to make those decisions for them. However, if self-
determination challenged the basic legitimacy of colonial rule, what obligations did it actually
entail?
The way in which the self-determination of colonial peoples was interpreted depended on how
the general object of that process, statehood was viewed. Was possession of a state simply an
inherent right of all peoples, or was statehood an institution which needed to be viable before
peoples could obtain it? These two perceptions shaped the process of self-determination. If
statehood was simply an inherent right of all peoples, then self-determination was a short process
involving the acquisition of independence. If, on the other hand, statehood required a capacity
for self-government, then self-determination might be a more progressive right dependent on
political development. Eleanor Roosevelt drew the analogy that: “Self-determination was the
“[M]inorities coming from peoples which had a national faith [state] and which had performed an act of self-
determination could not claim protection under article 1.” Ibid. SR.590, para. 15; Mrs. Chanet: “[N]o clearly drawn
distinction had been made between article 27 and the right to self-determination”, CCPR/C/SR.1294, (1994) para. 6;
Mr. Prado Vallejo: “[N]o express distinction was drawn in the text of the Covenant itself between the right to self-
determination and the right protected under article 27.” Ibid. para. 35.
158 See L. S. Woocher, “The ‘Casamance Question’: An Examination of the Legitimacy of Self-Determination in
Southern Senegal” 7 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2000) pp. 341-79.
159 Mr. Wennergren, 29-30 YHRC (1987) I, SR.722, para. 14.
160 Senegal, 29-30 YHRC (1987) I, SR. 722, para. 15.
161 Finland, (CCPR/C/58/Add.5) 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) II, pp. 74-5; 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) I, SR.643, para. 32.
162 Belgium, (CCPR/C/57/Add.3) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-2) II, pp. 148-9.
163 US, CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994) pp. 8-21; CCPR/C/SR.1405, (1995) para. 67.
164 Armenia, CCPR/C/92/Add.2 (1998) pp. 6 and 8.
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building of roads and bridges, not the mere decision to build them, but the process of finding the
engineers, the teachers and the money and seeing the job through.”165
Supporters of an immediate right attacked the idea that colonial peoples were actually
progressively obtaining a capacity for self-government under the trust and non-self-governing
territory systems. According to Yugoslavia: “If the colonial Powers had not been able to bring
their colonial peoples to an adequate stage of development in two centuries, they would be
unlikely to be able to do so in the two ensuing decades.”166 It was also argued that peoples were
ready for self-determination as soon as they had been “awakened” and demanded it.167
The basic ideas behind trusteeship were also attacked: “good government”, argued India,
“was no substitute for self-government; whatever advantages a people enjoyed, freedom was the
prime desideratum.”168 This was more than simply President Coolridge’s adage, quoted by Brazil
that, “it was preferable to have people err by themselves rather than to have others err for
them.”169 Foreign rule was an intolerable denial of freedom, and if the cost of obtaining freedom
was anarchy, in Manuel Quezon’s words to be ruled like hell, it was still preferable. Saudi
Arabia put it in particularly stark Quezonesque terms:
“The metropolitan States averred that, if they were to withdraw from the territories under
their control, the peoples of those territories would cut one another’s throats, the fallacy of
that argument had been proved by experience but even if it were true, that risk was
preferable to their position of subjugation.”170
Self-determination therefore encompassed two positions. These were, however, not mutually
exclusive and statehood as a right of peoples could be balanced with the requirements for self-
government. The staunchest anticolonial states generally considered self-determination to be an
immediate right.171 However, the progressive approach, which attracted many Western and Latin
American states, appeared to command the greatest support in the Committee.172 This was also
165 US, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 28.
166 Yugoslavia, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 448th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.448) para. 24.
167 Afghanistan, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 24; see also Indonesia, ibid. 451st
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.451) para. 8; Venezuala, ibid. 451st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.451) para. 33.
168 India, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.651) para. 1. See generally H. K. Jacobson, “The
United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal” 16 International Organization (1962) pp. 37-56 at pp. 46-
7.
169 Brazil, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 565th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.565) para. 41.
170 Saudi Arabia, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 398th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.398) para. 37. Later qualified in 402nd
meeting: “[H]e had said…  not that he condoned throat-cutting, but that even if, as the colonial Powers contended,
the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, on being freed, did cut one another’s throats, that would be
preferable to shedding blood in fighting foreign troops sent to stifle their national aspirations.” 6 GAOR (1951) 3 rd
Cmttee., 402nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.402) para. 20.
171 Ukrainian SSR, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 367th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.367) para. 19; Byelorussian SSR, ibid.
368th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.368) para. 15; USSR, ibid. 370th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.370) para. 12; Syria, ibid. 400th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.400) para. 4; Poland, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 6.
172 Belgium, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 252nd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.252) p. 7; Greece, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 454th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 28; Netherlands, 6 GAOR (1951) 3 rd Cmttee., 398th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.398) para. 40;
Chile, 399th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.399) para. 20; Australia, ibid. 400th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.400) para. 19; France, 7 GAOR
(1952) 3rd Cmttee., 445th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.445) para. 32; Mexico, ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) paras. 14, 18;
Argentina, ibid. 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) para. 25; New Zealand, ibid. 450th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.450) para. 9;
Ecuador, ibid. 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 6; UK, ibid. 456th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.456) para. 3; Sweden, 10 GAOR
(1955) 3rd Cmttee., 641st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.641) para. 16; Denmark, ibid. 644 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 1; Brazil,
ibid. 650th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.650) para. 6; El Salvador, ibid. 674th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.674) para. 12. Some states argued
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consistent with other UN practice regarding colonial territories at the time, such as the UN
Commission for Eritrea in 1950, which clearly connected a right to statehood with a capacity for
self-government.173
One factor against an immediate right was the practical reality of decolonisation. Lebanon, for
example, was faced with the dilemma of whether to:
“[O]pt for…  progressive realization, but that would be contrary to justice and the wishes of
many delegations. To opt for immediate realization would lead to other difficulties,
because it was recognized that there were cases in which it was not possible for the right of
peoples to self-determination to be exercised immediately.”174
The danger for anticolonial states was that if they pushed for too radical interpretations of
self-determination, their drafts might not pass, or the Covenant might not be ratified. The
composition of the Committee made some compromise necessary. These states were also faced
with the uncomfortable reality that countries with the greatest influence on the timing and
methods of self-determination were those with colonial possessions. Some delegates believed
that it was more productive to engage rather than alienate those states.175 As the debate
progressed, progressive self-determination seemed to gain the upper hand. Some prominent
supporters of an immediate right, such as Saudi Arabia, appeared to soften their position.176
Although article 1 could accommodate different interpretations of self-determination, the phrase
“promote the realization” in article 1(3) may be seen to be more orientated towards the
progressive implementation of the right.177
This was in the 1950s. However, this division between an immediate and a progressive right
that self-determination was best achieved by agreement between the representatives of the dependent peoples and
the administering authorities. Norway, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 450th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.450) para. 17; Israel, ibid.
459th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.459) para. 12.
173 Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea (Majority Report): “A fair and lasting solution for the
problem of Eritrea must be realistic and take into account all the salient facts of the case…  Attention is, firstly,
drawn to the fact that Eritrea is a poor country, without any prospects of progressing as a separate economic entity,
and dependent in most vital respects on Ethiopia’s rich farming resources and transit trade. In the view of the
delegations of Burma, Norway and the Union of South Africa, these facts preclude a solution which has as its aim
the creation of an entirely separate Eritrean State, whether in the immediate future or after an interval of
international trusteeship.” 5 GAOR (1950), Supplement No. 8, (A/1285), at p. 24, paras. 155-6.
Memorandum Submitted by the Delegations of Guatamala and Pakistan (Minority Report): “All peoples have
the right to be free. The Eritreans have the right to independence, since a majority of the population claims it and
there are no jurisdictional reasons justifying any other procedure…  We observed that, while Eritrea possesses
trained people, it does not have a sufficient number of them to assume the government of the territory immediately.
A period of time is necessary for the political, economic, social and educational development of the inhabitants, and
to ensure the tranquillity of the territory before they are able to take over the government…  we are of the opinion
that the most appropriate course would be for the United Nations to take direct charge of the administration.” Ibid. p.
31, paras. 205-8.
174 Lebanon, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 673rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.673) para. 11.
175 Mexico, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 402nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.402) para. 5; Philippines, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd
Cmttee., 453rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.453) para. 33; India, ibid. 455th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.455) para. 9; Pakistan, ibid. 459 th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.459) para. 2.
176 Saudi Arabia: “Brazil wanted the right of self-determination to be exercised gradually; but that was precisely
what was proposed in article 1.” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 648th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.648) para. 21.
177 India, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 458th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.458) para. 48; UK, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee.,
670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 17; Lebanon, ibid. 673rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.673) para. 14. See Cassese op. cit. no. 56
at p. 99.
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has continued in the practice of the Human Rights Committee. Some states in their reports have
called for the immediate termination of all forms of colonial government.178 On the other hand,
some states with dependent territories have connected article 1 with articles 73 and 76 of the
Charter.179 Britain and France, in particular, have also made declarations that in any conflict
between article 1 and their obligations under the Charter, under article 103 of the Charter, those
obligations would prevail.180
ii. Economic Self-determination
In 1952 Chile introduced a proposal in the Human Rights Commission for the inclusion of a
right of “permanent sovereignty”, or economic self-determination into the draft Covenant.181
Somewhat amended, and with the phrase “permanent sovereignty” deleted,182 the provision
became article 1(2).
The basic idea of economic self-determination was not new. The right of states to determine
their economic systems, to control resources, regulate economic activity and to nationalise or
expropriate foreign companies was an established part of state sovereignty.183 However, in
international law these rights were also balanced by obligations. International agreements were
binding, and expropriation and nationalisation were to conform to international standards of a
public purpose, non-discrimination and compensation. Economic self-determination, or
permanent sovereignty, created the possibility, in the name of peoples’ rights, of changing that
balance. Opponents argued that this peoples’ right was not a human right at all, only a re-
branding of states’ rights.184
The potential implications of this challenge were immense. “If self-determination included
inalienable sovereignty by the people over their natural resources,” France warned, “all
international agreements would be subject to revocation by either of the parties.”185 Most
proponents of the right did not go that far. However, while they agreed that nationalisation
178 Romania, (CCPR/C/1/Add.33) 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) II, p. 53; Algeria, (CCPR/C/62/Add.1) 43-5 HRCOR
(1991-2) II, p. 78. See also Mr. Graefrath, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I, SR.161, para. 37.
179 New Zealand, (CCPR/C/10/Add.6) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 269; UK, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I, SR.161,
paras. 5-8; (CCPR/C/1/Add.17), 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) II, p. 97.
180 France, (E/C.12/1988/1) p.9; UK, ibid. p. 17. See comments by Mr. Koulishev, 1-5 YHRC (1977-8) I, SR.70,
para. 3.
181 Chilean Draft, (E/CN.4/L.24) Comm.HR, Report 8th Session, 14 ESCOR (1952) Supplement No. 4, p. 8, para.
67; see commentary by Chile, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p. 10.
182 See N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1997) at pp. 49-53.
183 See J. N. Hyde, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources” 50 American Journal of
International Law (1956) pp. 854-67 at pp. 862, 867; S. K. Banerjee, “The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources – An Analysis”8 Indian Journal of International Law (1968) pp. 515-546 at p. 543; P. J.
O’Keefe, “The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” 8 Journal of World Trade Law
(1974) pp. 239-82 at pp. 244, 252, 257; V. I. Sapozhnikov, “Sovereignty over Natural Resources”Soviet Yearbook
of International Law (1964-5) pp. 93-5 at p. 94.
184 UK, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 257th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.257) p. 13; France, ibid. 260th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.260) p. 9;
Australia, ibid. p. 12; Sweden, ibid. 261st mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.261) p. 5. But see Chile: “[I]n countries which were still
developing, such as those in Africa and Latin America, human rights were so intermingled with the rights and duties
of States that it was almost impossible to distinguish between them.” Ibid. 260th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.260) p. 11.
185 France, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 257th mtg., (E/C.4/SR.257) p. 5.
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required compensation, they were notably ambiguous as to what form it might take.186
The right of peoples rather than states to control resources, though, created problems. The
concept of a people was, after all, far from clear. El Salvador referred to a tribe in Tanganyika
deprived of its ancestral land, although this was later qualified as an example of “large human
groups”, and not necessarily peoples.187 Australia also warned that the right could be used by
minorities against states.188
If peoples remained ambiguous, article 1(2) did little to clarify economic self-determination.
The right was expressed by a delicately worded balance with five elements, each reflecting the
different interests of states in the Committee. First, “all peoples”, could, “for their own ends,
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources”. This appeared to have a counterpart in a
second phrase, “without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation”. This was followed by a third element, “the principle of mutual benefit”, which
appeared to be balanced with a fourth, “international law”. These four were then balanced by a
fifth element: “In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” The
trouble was, though, that it was unclear exactly how these elements interacted. The terms were
undefined and so was the way in which they related to each other.
The right of peoples to freely dispose of natural resources “for their own ends” was
controversial and only narrowly adopted.189 Britain argued that such a provision was selfish and
allowed peoples to engage in economic activities contrary to the interests of others.190 Costa Rica
disputed this, pointing out that the phrase was balanced by references to co-operation, mutual
benefit and international law.191 Nonetheless, Indonesia considered that states did have the right
to refuse to co-operate with other states.192
Peru understood “co-operation” as balancing the right to expropriate with a duty to
compensate.193 Costa Rica, Argentina and Guatemala interpreted “international law” as also
protecting investors.194 However, the United States and Columbia claimed that “co-operation”,
“international law” and “mutual benefit” were not clear enough.195 Britain expressed concern
186 See eg. Saudi Arabia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 576th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.576) para. 25; Columbia, 10 GAOR
(1955) 3rd Cmttee., 639rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.639) para. 36; Ecuador, ibid. 647 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.647) para. 52; Peru,
ibid. para. 55; Panama, ibid. 650th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.650) para. 28; Bolivia, ibid. 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.651) para. 18;
Costa Rica, ibid. 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 24. Haiti: “fair compensation”, ibid. 677th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.677)
para. 3. The United States insisted on, “prompt, adequate and effective compensation.” ibid. 670 th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.670) para. 27.
187 El Salvador, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 674th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.674) para. 8, 33.
188 Australia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 669th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.669) para. 20.
189 Adopted by 21 votes to 17, with 20 abstentions. In favour: Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece,
India, Indonesia, Liberia, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Costa Rica. Against: Denmark, Dominican Republic,
France, Haiti, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, UK, US, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, China. Abstaining: Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Burma, Columbia. 10
GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 676th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.676) para. 23.
190 UK, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 14.
191 Costa Rica, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 23.
192 Indonesia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 671st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.671) para. 18.
193 Peru, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 647th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.647) para. 54.
194 Costa Rica, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 24; Argentina, ibid. 672nd mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.672) para. 28; Guatamala, ibid. 673rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.673) para. 28.
195 US, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 28; Columbia, ibid. 675th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.675) para. 45.
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that “mutual benefit” might provide an escape clause for treaty commitments.196 And some states
did interpret the phrase this way. Syria, which had argued that one-sided investment treaties were
invalid, believed that “mutual benefit” and “international law” were essential to prevent
exploitation under the guise of “co-operation”.197 Uruguay, on the other hand, interpreted
“mutual benefit” as referring to economic co-operation within the tenets of international law.198
The phrase, “based on the principle of mutual benefit”, was adopted by 21 to 14, with 23
abstentions.199
The final sentence on subsistence was very controversial. Britain said that it was puzzling,200
and Guatemala that it was too broad,201 while Egypt and Iraq claimed that it was self-
explanatory.202 The most detailed interpretation was provided by Saudi Arabia: “It was intended
to prevent a weak or penniless government from seriously compromising a country’s future by
granting concessions in the economic sphere – a frequent occurrence in the nineteenth
century.”203 El Salvador cited two examples: Nauru, which lost substantial amounts of its main
resource, phosphates, under trusteeship; and the aforementioned tribe in Tanganyika:204 although
these were not necessarily examples of “peoples”.205 The United States complained that “in no
case” implied an absolute principle,206 while El Salvador considered that it was subject to
international law.207 Greece argued that it could not jeopardise investments in under-developed
countries,208 but Israel thought that it might throw them into question.209 In Egypt’s opinion the
phrase was a matter of judgment: “the term…  did not mean totally deprived. It left the door open
for commercial concessions, so long as such concessions were reasonable and just.”210 But what
was “reasonable and just”? The provision was ultimately adopted by 25 votes to 8, with 25
abstentions.211
196 UK, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 14.
197 Syria, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 452nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.452) para. 26; 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 672nd
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.672) para. 25.
198 Uruguay, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 676th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.676) para. 29.
199 In favour: Boliva, Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatamala, India,
Indonesia, Liberia, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
Argentina. Against: Australia, Burma, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Turkey, UK, US. Abstaining: Burma, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuala. 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 676th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.676) para. 24.
200 UK, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 15.
201 Guatemala, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 673rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.673) para. 28.
202 Egypt, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 675th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.675) para. 20; Iraq, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee.,
643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 7.
203 Saudi Arabia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 672nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.672) para. 36.
204 El Slavador, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 674th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.674) para. 8;
205 El Salvador, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 674th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.674) para. 33.
206 US, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 670th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.670) para. 31.
207 El Salvador, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 668th mtg., (A/C.3/668) para. 5.
208 Greece, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 672nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.672) para. 43.
209 Israel, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.543) para. 31.
210 Egypt, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 260th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.260) p. 12.
211 In Favour: Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
Argentina, Bolivia, Byelorussian SSR, Chile. Against: Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, UK, US,
Australia, Canada. Abstaining: Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Thailand,
Turkey, Venezuala, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, China. 10 GAOR (1955) 3 rd Cmttee., 676th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.676) para.
25.
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Article 1(2) was adopted by 26 votes to 13, with 19 abstentions.212 However, its ambiguous
balance between rights and duties was further complicated in 1966 with the addition of a second
article on natural wealth and resources (article 25 in the Economic, Social and Cultural
Covenant, and article 47 in the Civil and Political Covenant). There were three striking features
of articles 25 and 47. First, they included a right of peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely
their natural wealth and resources without any explicit qualifications. In other words, their right
was framed as an absolute right. Second,  they were separate from the other rights of the
Covenants, in the section on implementation. Third, they were framed negatively. Nothing the
Covenants was to be interpreted as impairing the right of peoples to their resources. This raised
the question of which provisions in the Covenants might restrict an absolute right to resources?
The obvious answer was article 1(2). Articles 25 and 47 can be seen, therefore, as an attempt to
change the interpretation of the balance in article 1(2) without actually being an amendment to
the paragraph.
Behind this new article was the radically different composition of the United Nations in 1966.
In 1955, when article 1 was completed, Asian and African, Western and Latin American
countries formed roughly equal groupings. However, by 1966, when articles 25 and 47 were
drafted, Asian and African states formed about fifty percent of member states.213 This new
composition made the General Assembly an ideal platform for developing countries to challenge
the old international law.
In 1962 the General Assembly, with the exception of the Eastern Bloc which abstained,
reached a consensus on economic self-determination in the Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803(XVII).214 This agreement struck a similar
balance to article 1(2), with the right of permanent sovereignty balanced by international
obligations, but with sufficient ambiguity, for example, the standard of compensation was
“appropriate”, that almost all states could support it.
However, by 1966 it was clear that this consensus had fallen by the wayside. The new mood
was reflected in the debate on article 25 of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, in
October of that year. The Third World majority, rather than seeking compromise, simply flexed
its voting muscle. Malaysia hoped that a generally acceptable formula could be found,215 and it
appears that such efforts were being made behind the scenes.216 But, these hopes were in vain. A
day after the debate began the representative of Congo (Brazzaville) moved for a motion of
closure and this was passed by 48 votes to 21, with 30 abstentions. A vote then followed and the
article adopted by 75 votes to 4, with 20 abstentions.217 In November an identical article (50,
212 In favour: Egypt, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Byelorussian SSR,
Chile, Costa Rica; Czechoslovakia, Ecuador. Against: France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Turkey, UK, US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China. Abstaining: El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Thailand, Venezuala, Brazil, Burma,
Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic. 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 676th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.676) para.
26.
213 YBUN (1966) pp. 1069-70.
214 GA Res. 1803(XVII), 17 GAOR (1962) Supplement No. 17, (A/5217) pp. 15-6.
215 Malaysia, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405) para. 20.
216 D. J. Halperin, “Human Rights and Natural Resources” 9 William and Mary Law Review (1967-8) pp. 770-87
at p. 782.
217 In Favour: Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria,
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later 47) was added to the Civil and Political Covenant, without debate and by an unrecorded
vote of 50 to 2, with 17 abstentions.218
Although brief, the debate supports the literal reading that the articles were intended to
endorse an unrestricted right to resources. Sri Lanka argued that because of the change in UN
membership it was necessary to take account of a new absolute right to resources.219 Articles 25
and 47 were not an amendment to article 1, but delegates hoped that they would qualify it. Iraq
considered that, “the right enunciated in article 1 was accompanied by restrictions which limited
its scope, whereas the proposed article had the advantage of recognizing that the right was
absolute.”220 “The right of peoples to the enjoyment of their natural resources was affirmed
unambiguously”, in the article, Algeria claimed, “whereas it was enunciated with qualifying
restrictions in article 1, paragraph 2.”221 Tunisia similarly believed that, “certain obligations were
no longer valid”, although it was not specified what they were.222 Columbia considered that the
article would supplement the sentence on “means of subsistence”,223 which had been seen as a
possible escape clause for international obligations.
The intent to qualify article 1(2) can be clearly seen in the reaction to a Venezuelan proposal
that the phrase, “without prejudice to the provisions of article 1, paragraph 2, of the present
Covenant”, be inserted in the article.224 This was rejected presumably because the idea of the
article was precisely to prejudice article 1(2).
Subsequent practice in the Human Rights Committee has done little to clarify the complex
balance of rights and obligation in the Covenants. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of states
referred to the more absolute right to resources proclaimed as part of the New International
Economic Order.225 Others, though, argued that the right to resources was subject to international
obligations.226 General Comment No. 12 (21) seemed to follow Mr. Aguilar’s suggestion that, “a
cautious approach was needed”,227 to article 1(2). It merely stated that the right entailed
corresponding duties for all states and the international community. States were to indicate any
factors or difficulties, which prevented the free disposal of their natural wealth and resources
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, UAR, Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuala,
Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China (Republic of), Columbia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo
(Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras. Against: New Zealand, Norway, UK, US. Abstaining: Iceland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Niger, Portugal, Sweden, Upper Volta, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Gabon, Greece. 21 GAOR (1966) 3 rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405)
para. 43.
218 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1436th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1436) para. 1.
219 Ceylon, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405) para. 9.
220 Iraq, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1404th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1404) para. 46; see also India, ibid. para. 42;
Hungary, ibid. para. 48; Iraq, ibid. 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR./1405) para. 3; Cuba, ibid. para. 4.
221 Algeria, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405) para. 22.
222 Tunisia, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405) para. 28.
223 Columbia, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405) para. 35.
224 Venezuala, 21 GAOR (1966) 3rd Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1405) para. 10.
225 Iraq, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I, SR.204, para. 5; Senegal, ibid. SR.219, para. 46; Romania,
(CCPR/C/32/Add.10) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 170; Mexico, (CCPR/C/46/Add.3) 34-6 HRCOR (1988-89) II, p.
38. See also Mr. Hanga, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I, SR.199, para. 10; SR.214, para. 14; 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I,
SR.291, para. 12; 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.476, para. 17. See also Mr. Graefrath, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) I,
SR.216, para. 54.
226 France, (CCPR/C/22/Add.2) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 192.
227 Mr. Aguilar, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.476, para. 37.
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contrary to article 1(2) and to what extent that affected the enjoyment of other rights.228 There
was no attempt to clarify the balance of rights and obligations in article 1(2) and the relationship
between this paragraph and article 47.
iii. Democratic Government, and Internal and External Self-Determination
In the drafting of the Covenant there was considerable support for the idea that self-
determination included a right to democratic or representative government.229 A number of states
also connected the right to article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.230 In the
practice of the Human Rights Committee there has also been widespread support for self-
determination as a right to democratic government.231 In the case of Hong Kong it appears to be
the only interpretation of self-determination.232 However, this had not been universal. Some
states have argued that self-determination is satisfied in a single party state, although the end of
the Cold War has thinned out their numbers.233 In general states have taken the view that their
228 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) para. 5.
229 Pakistan, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 253rd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.253) p. 13; India, ibid. 256th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.256) p.
4; Brazil, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 38; Afghanistan, ibid. 445th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.445) para. 16; US, ibid. 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 28; Norway, ibid. 450 th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.450)
para. 17; Israel, ibid. para. 40; Uruguay, ibid. 452nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.452) para. 8; Lebanon, ibid. 454th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.454) para. 13; Liberia, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd Cmttee., 572nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.572) para. 50; Belgium, 10
GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 643rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 8; Greece, ibid. 647th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.647) para. 9;
Denmark, ibid. 674th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.674) para. 21.
230 Costa Rica, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 452nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.452) para. 2; Mexico, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd
Cmttee., 570th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.570) para. 40; India, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.651) para.
3.
231 UK: “The right to self-determination in the United Kingdom itself is exercised primarily through the electoral
system.” (CCPR/C/58/add.6) 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) II, p. 175; Netherlands: “The Netherlands electoral system
sufficiently guarantees the Netherlands people’s right to self-determination.” CCPR/C/70/Add.7, (1995) p. 11;
Australia: “Australia interpreted self-determination as the matrix of civil, political and other rights required for the
meaningful participation of citizens in the kind of decision-making that enabled them to have a say in their future.
Self-determination included participation in free, fair and regular elections and the ability to occupy public office
and enjoy freedom of speech and association.” 31-3 HRCOR (1987-8) I, SR.807, para. 19; German Federal
Republic: “The exercise of self-determination requires a democratic process, and this democratic process is
inseparably linked with the unrestricted exercise of human rights.” (CCPR/C/52/Add.3) 37-9 HRCOR (1989-90) II,
p. 163; Costa Rica: “Without representative democracy it is impossible for there to be effective and free self-
determination of peoples.” (CCPR/C/37/Add.10) 37-9 HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 149; Canada, 6-10 YHRC (1979-80)
I, SR.211, para. 9; Portugal, (CCPR/C/6/Add.6) ibid. p. 97; Morocco, (CCPR/C/10/Add.2) ibid. p. 183; Mexico,
(CCPR/C/22/Add.1) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 9; Luxembourg, (CCPR/C/31/Add.2) 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) II, p.
197; Panama, (CCPR/C/42/Add.7) 40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) II, p. 277; Columbia, (CCPR/C/64/Add.3) 43-5 HRCOR
(1991-2) II, p. 118; Cyprus, CCPR/C/32/Add.19 (1994) p. 3; Nepal, CCPR/C/74/Add.2 (1994) p. 1; Paraguay,
CCPR/C/84/Add.3 (1994) p. 9; US, CCPR/C/81/Add.4, (1994) p. 5; Mauritius, CCPR/C/64/Add.12 (1995) p. 2;
Bolivia, CCPR/C/63/Add.4 (1996) p. 3; Equador, CCPR/C/84/Add.6 (1997) p. 5; Cambodia, CCPR/C/81/Add.12
(1998) p. 11; Chile, CCPR/C/95/Add.11 (1998) p. 11; Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/114/Add.1 (1998) p. 7;
Venezuala, CCPR/C/VEN/98/3 (1999) p. 3; Czech Republic, CCPR/C/CZE/2000/1 (2000) p. 7. See also Mrs.
Higgins: “In her view, however, it was questionable whether any system short of election on the basis of the ‘one
person, one vote’ principle could be a satisfactory expression of self-determination”. 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) I,
SR.604, para. 44.
232 Hong Kong (SAR), CCPR/C/HKSAR/99/1 (1999) p. 5.
233 USSR: “Referring to the internal aspect of the right to self-determination, on of the basic requirements of the
first Programme of the Communist Party had concerned the right to self-determination for all peoples of the State.
The Soviet State had from the outset granted all peoples of former Tsarist Russia full independence in deciding their
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constitutional arrangements reflect the wishes of the people and thus satisfy self-determination.
Despite the statement in General Comment No. 12 (21) that states parties should describe how in
practice, not just on paper, their constitutional and political process allow for exercise of the
right,234 states have tended to report on the latter.235
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains in article 25 a right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs and to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections.
These rights were recognised in the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 25 (57)
as being, “related to, but distinct from the rights covered by article 1”, on account of being rights
of individuals. The Comment continued that under article 1 peoples, “enjoy the right to choose
the form of their constitution or government.”236
Connected to this, the drafting of the Covenants also saw the coining of a distinction between
the “internal” and “external” aspects of self-determination. In January 1952 the Syrian delegate
distinguished between what he described as the “domestic” and “international” aspects of self-
determination:
“The principle of the right of peoples to self-determination had two aspects, according to
whether it was considered from the domestic or the international point of view. From the
domestic point of view, it took the form of self-government, that is to say a people’s right
to adopt representative institutions and freely choose the form of government, which it
wished to adopt. From the international point of view, it led to independence.”237
In November in the debate on GA Res. 627(VII) a similar idea was expressed by Mr. Beaufort of
the Netherlands as the “internal” and “external” aspects of self-determination:
“[T]he idea of self-determination was a complex of ideas rather than a single concept. Thus
the principle of internal self-determination, or self-determination on the national level,
should be distinguished from that of external self-determination, or self-determination on
the international level. The former was the right of a nation, already constituted as a State,
to choose its form of government and to determine the policy it meant to pursue. The latter
was the right of a group which considered itself a nation to form a State of its own.”238
This distinction was subsequently taken up by opponents of article 1. Mr. Beaufort, in
particular, used it to demonstrate self-determination’s complexity and thus unsuitability as a
legal right, as well as, to highlight that its denial was a far wider phenomenon than colonial
own destiny.” 23-8 YHRC (1985-6) I, SR.565, para. 2; Romania, (CCPR/C/1/Add.33), 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) II, p.
52; Congo, (CCPR/C/36/Add.2) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 136; Zaire, (CCPR/C/4/Add.10) ibid. p. 149; Zambia,
(CCPR/C/36/add.3) 31-3 HRCOR (1987-8) II, p. 16; Cameroon, (CCPR/C/36/Add.4) 34-6 HRCOR (1988-9) II, pp.
256-7; Tanzania, (CCPR/C/42/Add.12) 46-8 HRCOR (1992-3) II, pp. 56-7. But see later reports of: Romania,
CCPR/C/58/Add.15 (1992) p. 5; Zambia, CCPR/C/63/Add.3 (1995) p. 3.
234 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984), Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40), para. 4.
235 Mr. Bouziri, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.478, para. 7.
236 General Comment No. 25 (57), 51 GAOR (1996) Supplement No. 40, (A/51/40) p. 98, para. 2. See Mrs.
Higgins: “It was important to differentiate between the right of self-determination, as described in article 1 of the
Covenant, and the right of the individual to vote, which was covered by article 25… ” CCPR/C/SR.1399 (1995) para.
48; Mr. Kretzmer, ibid. para. 44; Mrs. Evatt, ibid. para. 51. See also Mr. Scheinin, CCPR/C/SR.1672 (1998) para. 3;
Mrs. Chanet, ibid. para. 4; Mrs. Evatt, ibid. para. 5; Mr. Zahkia, ibid. para. 10.
237 Syria, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 397th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.397) para. 5.
238 Netherlands, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 4.
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situations.239 Similarly, Denmark and Australia rejected a draft of article 1 because it did not
specifically spell out the internal aspects of the right.240 Such criticisms, on the other hand, were
rejected by Greece as “hair-splitting”.241
However, the internal and external division of self-determination also pointed to more
fundamental issues. It has been argued that the concept of self-determination, as it was promoted
by Woodrow Wilson and other western leaders at Versailles grew out of a liberal nationalist
tradition. This tradition continued with the UN Charter, which affirmed, however imperfectly, a
vision of a world community of peoples in which peace and security was preserved and the
rights and freedoms of individuals were respected. However, if liberal nationalism supposed that
liberalism and nationalism could work in a partnership, the codification of self-determination in
article 1 had actually seen a shift in that relationship. Supporters of the right justified its place in
the Covenants on the basis that self-determination was the prerequisite for human rights.242
Indonesia called it the, “conditio sine qua non of individual human rights.”243 Poland claimed
that “freedom of the individual was a snare and a delusion as a long as the nation of which he
was part was not free.”244 In other words, in the order of human rights self-determination came
first. National government and nationalism took priority over liberal government and individual
rights.
The division of self-determination into internal and external aspects was arguably an attempt
to redress this imbalance. Internal self-determination (respect for individual and democratic
rights) corresponded neatly with liberal government, while external self-determination (the right
of peoples to choose their state) equated with national government. The identification of two
parts in self-determination ensured that attention could be focussed on its liberal as well as its
nationalist aspects. As Australia argued:
“Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17 and 20 [of the Civil and Political Covenant]…  seemed to
provide a more logical standard for measuring the extent of ‘internal’ self-determination
than the simple claim that the exercise of the right of self-determination was a prerequisite
of the enjoyment of other rights.”245
However, an internal and external division of self-determination still reveals the same
problems experienced by liberal nationalism. Subsequent practice by the Human Rights
Committee has revealed some disagreement on the relationship between self-determination and
other human rights, including an internal and external division of the right.246 There is general
239 Netherlands, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 642nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.642) para. 25.
240 Denmark, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) paras. 2, 6; Australia, 10 GAOR (1955)
3rd Cmttee., 669th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.669) para. 22.
241 Greece: “The Greek delegation would therefore not take part in arguments on technicalities which had aptly
been described as ‘hair-splitting.’ For his part, he could not accept subtle distinctions drawn by some representatives
between individual and collective human rights and between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self-determination.” 7 GAOR
(1952) 3rd Cmttee., 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 25.
242 For criticism of this see K. J. Partsch, “Fundamental Principles of Human Rights: Self-Determination,
Equality and Non-Discrimination” in K. Vasak and P. Alston eds., The International Dimensions of Human Rights
(Greenwood Press, Westport, 1982) vol. I, pp. 61-86 at p. 68.
243 Indonesia, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 401st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.401) para. 45.
244 Poland, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 255th mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.255) p. 6.
245 Australia, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 647th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.674) para. 26.
246 See Mr. Mavrommatis: “He was not certain that everyone meant the same thing by the internal aspect of self-
determination.” 43-5 HRCOR (1991-2) I, SR.1092, para. 47; Mr. El Shafei: “In the absence of any problem of
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agreement that self-determination is not an individual right. For example, when Barbados
claimed that self-determination was a right of individuals to determine their own political
status,247 Committee members replied that the right was held by peoples not individuals.248 States
have continued to argue that self-determination is a prerequisite for human rights,249 while West
Germany claimed that: “Where the political will cannot be expressed freely and in a democratic
manner, the right of self-determination is a travesty.”250 Moreover, the assumption that self-
determination and human rights, like nationalism and liberalism, are essentially complementary
has been challenged, in particular, in the report of the disintegrating Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia:
domestic self-determination in which groups of people were calling for autonomy, he would consider the
appropriate article of the Covenant under which such a question should be raised to be article 25.” Ibid. para. 40;
Mrs. Higgins: “[I]t was a long-standing practice of the Committee to consider self-determination as having both an
internal and external aspect. Questions on internal self-determination had generally been raised only with respect to
non-democratic or non-pluralist States parties.” Ibid. para. 41; Mr. Prado Vallejo: “[T]he question of minorities in
other countries had been dealt with under article 27. There was no internal self-determination problem in Equador,
but the question might possibly relate to the existence of indigenous populations who were to be found throughout
the Andean region, in which case it should be dealt with under article 27.” Ibid. para. 43; Mr. Aguilar Urbina: “The
question seemed to imply the existence of movements that were seeking to separate from Equador…  If the idea was
to ascertain what rights and protection were afforded to indigenous peoples, the issue should appear under section
XIV on the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” Ibid. para. 46; Mr. Mavrommatis: “To him, it [internal self-
determination] meant deciding democratically on the political and economic system of a country. Any question of
secessionist movements would come under the external aspect.” Ibid. para. 47; Mr. Sadi: “The Working Group had
never intended the question to refer to the rights of minorities or of indigenous peoples but to the right of the people
to exercise self-determination and decide on the kind of social and economic system they wished to have by holding
democratic elections.” Ibid. para. 48.
247 Barbados, (CCOR/C/1/Add.36) 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) II, p. 65.
248 Mr. Bouziri, 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR.264, para. 28; Mr. Sadi, ibid. para. 43; also Mr. Ermacora, ibid.
SR.265, para. 34. See also Costa Rica, CCPR/C/103/Add.6 (1998) p. 3.
249 Columbia, (CCPR/C/37/Add.6/Rev.1) 31-3 HRCOR (1987-8) II, p. 274; Chile, (CCPR/C/58/Add.2) 37-9
HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 103; Dominican Republic, (CCPR/C/32/Add.16) ibid. p. 178; Iraq, (CCPR/C/64/Add.6)
40-2 HRCOR (1990-1) II, p. 326; Ecuador, (CCPR/C/58/Add.9) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-2) II, p. 56; Peru,
(CCPR/C/51/Add.4) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-2) II, p. 109; Armenia, CCPR/C/92/Add.2 (1998) p. 5. General Comment
No. 12 (21): “The right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essential
condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and
strengthening of those rights.” 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) para. 1. Mr. Movchan, “[W]ithout
the exercise of the right to self-determination, the rights of individuals were non-existent or precarious: all members
of the Working Group, who were of different beliefs or ideologies, had been in agreement on that point.” 17-22
YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.474, para. 2; Sir Vincent Evans, “[T]he adjective ‘non-existent’ was much too strong…  the
end of the paragraph could be changed to read: ‘the rights of individuals…  could not be fully effective and would be
much more vulnerable’.” Ibid. SR.476, para. 19; Mr. Opsahl, “[N]on-existent…  reflected a historical reality”. Ibid.,
SR.478, para. 4; Mr. Bouziri: “Several members of the Committee had found the adjective ‘non-existent’…
excessive. He found the expression quite correct.” Ibid. para. 10; Mr. Ndiaye, “[S]elf-determination is an essential
condition for the effective guarantee and enjoyment of human rights and for the protection and strengthening of
those rights.” Ibid. para. 17; Mr. Aguilar: “[T]he realization of the right of peoples to self-determination was a ‘sine
qua non’…   for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights…  was too strong…  some peoples might not
be in a position to exercise their right to self-determination for economic or cultural reasons or because their
numbers or resources were inadequate, and those circumstances need not prevent observance of other rights
contained in the Covenant. The right to self-determination was not, like the right to life laid down in article 6 of the
Covenant, a sine qua non for the exercise of the other rights provided for in that instrument.” Ibid. SR.504, para. 39;
Mr. Ermacora: “The right to self-determination could not be freely exercised unless it was also possible to exercise
other rights, such as freedom of expression and of opinion.” Ibid. para. 51.
250 German Federal Republic, (CCPR/C/52/Add.3) 37-9 HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 163.
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“If we proceed from the fact that human rights belong primarily to the individual and that
tendencies towards national homogenization and identification are realized through giving
preference to national rights, we can state that in Yugoslavia the other rights of citizens are
restricted and not infrequently suspended in favour of a group called a nation.”251
Indeed, one Committee member argued that individual rights should not “straitjacket” self-
determination, which was as a “revolutionary reservation” to the other rights in the Covenant.252
3. The Colonial Independence Declaration
DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES
AND PEOPLES, GA RES. 1514(XV), (FULL TEXT)253
The General Assembly,
Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom,
Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly
relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion,
Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such
peoples in the attainment of their independence,
Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of
such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,
Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust
and Non-Self-Governing Territories,
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations,
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic
co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates
against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,
Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based on the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law,
Believing that the process of liberation is irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be
put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,
Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and
independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trend towards freedom in such territories which
have not yet attained independence,
Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty
and the integrity of their national territory,
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms
and manifestations;
And to that end
251 Yugoslavia, (CCPR/C/52/Add.9) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-2) II, p. 195.
252 Mr. Graefrath: “He personally did not believe that the Covenant was ever intended to put the right of self-
determination into a straitjacket of individual rights or that it could ever succeed in doing so. Article 1 might in a
sense be understood as a revolutionary reservation.” 11-6 YHRC (1981-2) I, SR.366, para. 26.
253 GA Res. 1514(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) pp. 66- 7.
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Declares that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of
fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the
promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for
delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in
order to enable them to exercise their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national
territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken in Trust and Non-Self-Governing or all other territories which have not yet
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race,
creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference
in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial
integrity.
a. Drafting
1960 marked at turning point in the policy of the General Assembly towards colonial self-
determination. At this time the decolonisation process had gained momentum, with seventeen
new states taking up their seats that year.254 On 23 September 1960 Soviet Chairman Nikita
Khrushchev presented the Assembly with a draft declaration on the granting of independence to
colonial countries and peoples.255 This was taken up and on 28 November, when debate opened
on the issue, twenty-five Asian and African states submitted their own declaration on colonial
independence.256 This draft drew on resolutions of the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in
1955 and the first and second conferences of African states at Accra and Addis Ababa in 1958
254 D. A. Kay, “The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process” 21
International Organization (1967) pp. 786-811 at p. 789; R. Emerson, “Colonialism, Political Development, and the
UN” 19 International Organization (1965) pp. 484-503 at p 493.
255 “1. All colonial countries and Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories must be granted forthwith complete
independence and freedom to build their own national States in accordance with the freely-expressed will and desire
of their peoples. The colonial system and colonial administration in all these forms must be completely abolished in
order to afford the peoples of the territories concerned an opportunity to determine their own destiny and form of
government. 2. Similarly, and strongholds of colonialism in the form of possessions and leased areas in the territory
of other States must be eliminated. 3. The Governments of all countries are urged to observe strictly and steadfastly
the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of this Declaration concerning the equality and respect for the
sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all States without exception, allowing no manifestations of colonialism or
any special rights or advantages for some States to the detriment of other States.” USSR, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary
Meetings, 869th mtg., (A/PV.869) para. 183. UN Doc. A/4502, 15 GAOR (1960) Annexes, Agenda Item 87, pp. 2-7.
256 Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey plus
Cyprus, Mali and the UAR. Cambodia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 926th mtg., (A/PV.926) paras. 9-10. At
the end of the debate there were forty three sponsors.
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and June 1960.257 On 14 December it was adopted without changes, by 89 votes to 0, with 9
abstentions,258 as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, GA Res. 1514(XV).259 The Colonial Independence Declaration has been called the
“Magna Charta” of decolonisation.260 And it is a landmark document. If the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789 signalled the emergence of nationalism as a political force,
the Colonial Independence Declaration marked its global conquest. It was also a watershed,
which specifically repudiated many of the basic assumptions in earlier instruments, like the UN
Charter. In particular, size and development were no longer held to be prerequisites for
statehood, at least for trust and non-self-governing territories. As a resolution of the UN General
Assembly, the Declaration, unlike the UN Charter or the Covenants, is not formally legally
binding. Nonetheless, it has been considered by the International Court of Justice in determining
international law in the Namibia261 and Western Sahara262 advisory opinions.
b. The Balance in the Colonial Independence Declaration
As its title suggests, GA Res. 1514(XV) was essentially concerned with the independence of
colonial countries and peoples. The basis for that independence was the right of self-
determination. But, the general order of business was nicely summed up by the United Arab
Republic (the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria): “the right of peoples and nations to
independence – that is to say, the right of self-determination”.263
257 The Bandung Communiqé 1955: “(a) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which
should be speedily brought to an end; (b) in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation”. Quoted by Togo, 15 GAOR (1960)
Plenary Meetings, 936th mtg., (A/PV.936) para. 63. See also Ghana, ibid. 927th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 49-50;
Indonesia, ibid. (A/PV.936) para. 52; Cyprus, ibid. 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 106.
258 In favour: Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian
SSR, USSR, UAR, Upper Volta, Uruaguay, Venezuala, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina,
Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Slavador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Gabon, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea. Against: None. Abstaining: Portugal, Spain, South Africa, UK, US, Australia, Belgium,
Dominican Republic, France. 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para. 34.
259 See generally M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine of the United
Nations (Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1982) at pp. 11-2; S. K. N. Blay, “Self-Determination Versus Territorial
Integrity in Decolonization” 18 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1986) pp. 441-72 at
pp. 442-9; R. J. Maguire, “The Decolonization of Belize: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity” 22 Virginia
Journal of International Law (1982) pp. 849-79 at pp. 859-67; A. Whelan, “Self-Determination and Decolonization:
Foundations for the Future” 3:4 Irish Studies in Interrnational Affairs (1992) pp. 25-52 at pp. 30-6; Ofuatey-Kodjoe
op. cit. no. 13 at pp. 357-9; Quane loc. cit. no. 13 at pp. 548-50; L. Tita-Ghebdinga, African and O.A.U. Diplomacy
on Dual Paradigms of Self-Determination 1945-1985 (Lund Political Studies No. 81, Lund, 1993) at pp. 65-7.
260 H. Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 at p. 8.
261 Namibia (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1971) p. 31, para. 52.
262 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) pp. 31-2, paras. 55-7.
263 UAR, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 929 th mtg., (A/PV.929) para. 161; see also Iran, ibid. 926th mtg.,
(A/PV.926) para. 46; Ethiopia, ibid. 928th mtg., (A/PV.928) para. 31; Libya, ibid. 929 th mtg., (A/PV.929) para. 2;
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The formula for colonial independence in the Declaration was a general proclamation that,
“All peoples have the right to self-determination… ”, (grafted in from the draft Covenant)264 in
principle 2. This was balanced with protection for the national unity and territorial integrity of a
“country”, in principle 6. Meanwhile, specific provisions in principles 1, 3, 4 and 5, legitimised
by the article on self-determination, spelled out the basis for colonial independence.
In simple terms, this balance may be seen to allow the Declaration to appeal to self-
determination as the basis for colonial independence, while protecting the integrity of states.
However, the result was much more ambiguous. Principle 6 stated that any attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a “country” was
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. But what was a “country”?
Was it a colony, a state or a nation? Principle 6 allowed for all three interpretations265 and this
was unfortunate because not all of them were compatible. Some states interpreted the principle
as protecting the integrity of a colony.266 Arab states cited Palestine as an example of the unjust
division of such a territory.267 Others argued that it upheld the integrity of a state.268 The
disintegrating Congo was used to illustrate the importance of this.269 Still others argued that it
supported the integrity of a nation, which might not correspond to existing frontiers.270 This was,
in fact, a challenge to the integrity of states and colonies. Examples included Somalia,271
Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara and Mauritania,272 Indonesia’s over West Irian (West
Papua),273 Ireland’s over Northern Ireland274 and Guatemala’s over Belize.275 Guatemala at one
point attempted unsuccessfully to insert a paragraph into the Declaration recognising the right of
states to recover national territory.276
Not surprisingly, states interpreted principle 6 as it suited them best. Morocco, for example,
supported all three interpretations depending on the situation: in Palestine, the integrity of a
colony, in the Congo, the integrity of a state, and in Mauritania, the integrity of a nation.277
Consequently, paragraph 6 and its open concept of “country” did not so much establish legal
clarity, as simply represent a vehicle for nationalist claims.
Another source of ambiguity was colonialism. Principle 1 condemned the subjection of
US, ibid. 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) para. 19.
264 Nepal, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 935th mtg., (A/PV.935) para. 70.
265 See Maguire loc. cit. no. 259 at p. 864; Blay loc. cit. no. 259 at pp. 443-9.
266 Nepal, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 935th mtg., (A/PV.935) para. 74; Cyprus, ibid. 945 th mtg.,
(A/PV.945) paras. 92-3.
267 UAR, ibid. 929th mtg., (A/PV.929) para. 180; Iraq, ibid. 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) paras. 127, 134; Morocco,
ibid. 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 51.
268 Netherlands, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para. 62.
269 Tunisia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 929th mtg., (A/PV.929) para. 104; UAR, ibid. para. 179.
270 Argentina, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 927th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 10; Ireland, ibid. 935th mtg.,
(A/PV.935) para. 112; Somalia, ibid. 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) paras. 18-20; Iran, ibid. 946th mtg., (A/PV.946) para.
54; Guatamala, ibid. 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para. 63-5
271 UAR, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 929th mtg., (A/PV.929) para. 179.
272 Morocco, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 46.
273 Indonesia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 936th mtg., (A/PV.936) para. 55.
274 Ireland, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 935th mtg., (A/PV.935) para. 112.
275 Guatemala, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 933rd mtg., (A/PV.933) para. 133. But see Mexico, ibid.
934th mtg., (A/PV.934) para. 133.
276 Guatemala: “7. The principle of self-determination of peoples may in no case impair the territorial integrity of
any State or its right to the recovery of territory.” UN Doc. A/L.325, 15 GAOR (1960) Annexes, Agenda Item 87, p.
7. See comments by Jordan, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 946th mtg., (A/PV.946) para. 39; Iran, ibid. para.
54; Indonesia, ibid. 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) paras. 8-10.
277 Morocco, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) paras. 158-61.
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peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation as a denial of fundamental rights,
contrary to the UN Charter and an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-
operation. But “alien” subjugation, domination and exploitation was again an ambiguous
concept. It related most obviously to dependent territories, although states administering non-
self-governing territories denied that they were engaged in subjugation, domination and
exploitation.278 The term, though, also had a wider possible use. Many states identified the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, especially in Tibet, as colonial situations.279
The charge of colonialism was also made against Israel and Zionism by Arab states.280
The response to these charges was similar. In all cases states attempted to rebut the charge of
colonialism or alien domination by highlighting their national basis and the idea of a people.
Portugal and Spain who denied that they had colonies but overseas provinces constructed
national ideas, which eschewed geography and race in favour of ties of politics, language and
history.281 The Spanish delegate called his country “an immense archipelago”.282 Israel
emphasised ties of history, descent and territory.283 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was not
278 UK, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para. 49.
279 UK, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 925th mtg., (A/PV.925) para. 19; Argentina, ibid. 927 th mtg.,
(A/PV.927) para. 36; Columbia, ibid. 929th mtg., (A/PV.929) para. 83; Honduras, ibid. 930th mtg., (A/PV.930) para.
17; Guatamala, ibid. 933rd mtg., (A/PV.933) para. 121; Philippines, ibid. para. 194; Ireland, ibid. 935 th mtg.,
(A/PV.935) para. 93; Malaya, ibid. para. 128; China (ROC), ibid. paras. 146-169; US, ibid. 937th mtg., (A/PV.937)
paras. 21-4; Uruguay, ibid. para. 57; Italy, ibid. para. 85; Belgium, ibid. 938 th mtg., (A/PV.938) para. 19; Thailand,
ibid. 939th mtg., (A/PV.938) para. 111; Spain, ibid. 944th mtg., (A/PV.944) para. 29; South Africa, ibid. 945th mtg.,
(A/PV.945) para. 3; Israel, ibid. 946th mtg., (A/PV.946) para. 6; Portugal, ibid. 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para. 101.
280 Saudi Arabia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 927th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 114; UAR, ibid. 929th mtg.,
(A/PV.929) paras 180; Jordan, ibid. 930th mtg., (A/PV.930) para. 47; Lebanon, ibid. 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) paras.
41-50; Iraq, ibid. para. 127.
281 Portugal: “Portugal has been for centuries a unitary nation and it has been recognized as such by the
international community. We are, like many other nations, multi-racial; our land and our people are dispersed over
several continents, as is also the case with other nations. But we form only one unit, completely independent and
solid – politically, juridically and socially, one country with the same strong national feeling. Nowhere in my
country is there any subjugation of peoples to foreign domination because all our people, wherever they may live,
are themselves the body and soul of the nation… … When the Portugese nation was set up and extended over other
continents, usually on unoccupied or unused land, some very striking factors became apparent: to those peoples
which had not yet conceived the idea of a homeland, it offered one; it also offered a common language, the
guarantee of peace and an organized economic and community life without disrupting the indigenous way of life.”
15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 934th mtg., (A/PV.934) para. 86.
Spain: “I shall not dissemble the fact – and I am proud to state it – that Spain is a Euro-African Power and has been
such for many centuries; that it has had possessions or, rather, establishments in Africa that are more ancient than
any establishments that the Moslem kings can boast of, as I have shown. I have no need to add that this north of
Africa was never at any time a hard and fast unity, as invented history asserts. This was quite clearly proved in the
discussion about Mauritania. We Spaniards were a colony not of Morocco – although that is partially true – but
definitely of Mauritania…  between 1094 and 1149. The Mauritanians, the Almoravides, or probably people from
those tribes, occupied a great part of Spain, built a castle in the Alfajería and controlled practically the whole of
Moslem Spain. We were an Afro-Asian colony – and I say it proudly – there is no need to hide the fact. To that
circumstance we owe the Alhambra of Grenada, Cordoba and the immense cultural monuments that have become
part of our culture.” 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 57.
282 Spain, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 944th mtg., (A/PV.944) para. 24.
283 Israel: “[W]e repudiate as morally unworthy and historically stupid the attempt to equate Zionism with
colonialism. Zionism is one of the noblest, the most moving, the most constructive national movements in human
history. Behind it lies a unique and unbroken connexion, extending over 4,000 years, between the Jewish people and
Palestine. No Jew could dwell in Israel as a stranger or an alien, for there is not a foot of its soil unhallowed by the
bones of his Biblical ancestors. It was here that the moral and spiritual genius of our people gave birth to Judaism,
from which also sprang the Chrisitian religion. It was here that our people enjoyed national independence, which
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a national state, but, nonetheless, presented itself as a community of free and equal nations
united in their common economic, social and political endeavours.284 These ideas did nothing to
mollify critics. Portugal’s ideas, for example, were dismissed as fairy tales.285 But, they
underline a common perception of colonialism. The defining feature of colonial government was
that it was non-national. Correspondingly, a crucial defence against the charge of colonialism
was to present oneself as a national state.
c. Self-Determination
The Colonial Independence Declaration was the product of political change. The
decolonisation process had clearly gathered pace and the composition of the Assembly had
changed, with the admission of seventeen new states that year injecting a real sense of
momentum. The debate, punctuated by references to “the wind of change”286 and “the
irreversible course of history”,287 showed an intense consciousness that colonialism was being
brought to an end. This new composition and perspective resulted in a shift in interpretations of
self-determination, with greater emphasis on immediate realisation. This was reflected, in
particular, by principle 3, which repudiated the basic logic of trusteeship and the rationale of
they lost and regained and lost again, in the perpetual struggle against the great colonial empires of that time. The
vital bond between the Jewish people and the land of Israel is the very essence of our long and often tragic
history… … I would refer to the statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister…  that Israel Arabs enjoy exactly the same
political rights as do Israel Jews; that their economic, social and cultural standards have risen rapidly since the
establishment of the State of Israel; and that ‘no Arab State can point to the achievement of a standard of living for
the masses of its population that may be compared favourably to the standard of living of the Israel Arabs’.” 15
GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 946th mtg., (A/PV.946) paras. 3, 7.
284 USSR: “It may be said that it is easy for the Soviet Union to advocate the liquidation of the colonial system,
since the Soviet Union has no colonies. Yes, that is so. We have no colonies and no capital in other countries. But
there was a time when may of the nationalities inhabiting our country suffered the bitter oppression of Tsarism, of
the landlord-bourgeois system. Conditions in remote areas of the Tsarist empire hardly differed from those of
colonies because their populations were cruelly exploited by the autocracy, by capitalism. Whereas the autocracy
looked upon the peoples of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, and other nationalities inhabiting the Russian Empire as
a source of profit, after the October revolution, when these peoples obtained complete freedom, they quickly
improved their economic, cultural amd social condition. Let us take, for example, the Soviet Republics of Central
Asia. Today Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan – all the sister republics of Central
Asia – have been transformed from backward colonies of Tsarist Russia into advanced, industrially developed
socialist republics…  Enormous economic and cultural progress has also been made by other relatively small
nationalities of the Soviet Union, united in autonomous republics. Thus, for example, during the period from 1913 to
1959, large-scale industrial production in the Yakut ASSR increased by 53 times, in the Komy ASSR by 109 times,
in the Tatar ASSR by 147 times and in Bashkir ASSR by 163 times… The Tsarist Government pursued in the
borderlands of Russia an essentially colonialist policy which differed little from what can be observed today in
colonial countries. Ukbeks, Kakakhs, Tadziks and other non-Russian nationalities were scornfully called ‘aliens’.
They were not considered human beings and were ruthlessly exploited. National differences, hatred and dissension
were formented between these nationalities, and the Tsarist Empire was held together only be bayonets and
oppression. When the peoples of Russia, showed their capabilities in the development of their national economy and
culture. Did the development of our country suffer by the granting to the peoples of the right of independence and
self-determination? Is there strife and enmity between nationalities in our multinational country or a disintegration
of the State? No, there is nothing of the sort, nor can there be.” 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 869th mtg.,
(A/PV.869) paras. 192-3, 197, 207-8.
285 Byelorussian SSR, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 934 th mtg., (A/PV.934) para. 86.
286 Iran, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 926th mtg., (A/PV.926) paras. 34-5.
287 Malaya, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 935th mtg., (A/PV.935) para. 119.
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articles 73 and 76: “Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”288
This was also the attitude of many states in the Assembly.289 Sri Lanka (Ceylon), for example,
introduced a proposal, which stated that: “The Trusteeship system has not justified itself
anywhere and should be buried together with the entire colonial system, which is an
anachronism.”290 Nonetheless, this shift was not total. Two different approaches to statehood
could still be seen in the General Assembly. On one hand, Brazil argued that:
“[I]t is necessary that the peoples still under a colonial régime convince themselves that
independence is not just a magic word followed by a flag, an anthem and diplomatic
representation, but the effective political, economic and cultural mastery of the country’s
wealth and heritage, their utilization in the service of the whole population, and the
practice of liberty through political institutions based on a representative régime with full
freedom of opinion.”291
On the other, Argentina claimed that:
“It would not be in keeping with the dignity of the human person to say that a people
cannot accede to independence because it does not have the material resources to support
itself, or because it does not have enough technicians to establish an industry or because it
does not have officials qualified to constitute an organic administration.”292
Statehood was not a question of political capacity but dignity. “Independence”, Argentina
argued, “is a spiritual value”.293 Many delegates expressed the conviction that independence
would lead to rapid political, social and economic development.294 However, even if it did not, it
was still better than colonial rule. The Ghanaian delegate underlined this with a slogan from his
country’s independence struggle, “we prefer complete independence with danger to servitude in
tranquillity”.295
Nonetheless, a significant number of states saw the process of self-determination as
progressive,296 and their position was to some extent accommodated in the Declaration. Principle
288 See E. Jiménez de Arechaga, “International Law in the Past Third of a Century” 159 Recueil des Cours
(1978) I pp. 1-343 at pp. 102-3; K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at pp. 200, 203.
289 Ethiopia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 928th mtg., (A/PV.928) para. 22; Mali, ibid. 931st mtg.,
(A/PV.931) para. 26; Liberia ibid. para. 77; Romania, ibid. 932nd mtg., (A/PV.932) para. 63; Guinea, ibid. para. 82;
Ukrainian SSR, ibid. 933rd mtg., (A/PV.933) para. 225; Byelorussian SSR, ibid. 934th mtg., (A/PV.934) para. 60;
Sudan, ibid. 935th mtg., (A/PV.935) para. 39; Iraq, ibid. 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) para. 135; USSR, ibid. 939th mtg.,
(A/PV.939) para. 7; Morocco, ibid. 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 57.
290 Ceylon, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 926th mtg., (A/PV.926) para. 116.
291 Brazil, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 934th mtg., (A/PV.934) para. 125.
292 Argentina, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 927th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 20.
293 Ibid. para. 20.
294 Ghana, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 927th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 58; Liberia, ibid. 931st mtg.,
(A/PV.931) paras. 77-9; Guinea, ibid. 932nd mtg., (A/PV.932) paras. 105-6; Sudan, ibid. 935th mtg., para. 39;
Morocco, ibid. 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 42.
295 Ghana, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 927th mtg., (A/PV.927) para. 67.
296 UK, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 925th mtg., (A/PV.925) paras. 32-45; New Zealand, ibid. 932nd mtg.,
(A/PV.932) para. 9; Australia, ibid. 933rd mtg., (A/PV.933) paras. 54-68; Japan, ibid. paras. 92, 94, 101; Ecuador,
ibid. para. 167; Philippines, ibid. para. 189; Greece, ibid. 934th mtg., (A/PV.934) para. 7; Brazil, ibid. para. 126;
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5 called for “immediate steps” to be taken in trust and non-self-governing territories to enable the
peoples to enjoy independence and freedom. However, “immediate steps” was not the same as
“immediate”. It could be interpreted as, “a call to all those Powers that presently administer
dependent territories to take immediate action with a view to enabling the peoples of those
territories to achieve independence without delay.”297 But, it could also mean, “we shall proceed
towards to the goal and shall not allow ourselves to be stopped by unnecessary hindrance.”298 A
Soviet amendment which would have set a deadline (the end of 1961) for the termination of
colonialism299 was defeated by 47 votes to 29, with 22 abstentions.300
Another significant aspect of self-determination was its relationship to the use of force.
Principle 4 of the Declaration prohibited all armed or repressive measures against dependent
peoples in order to enable them to exercise their right to independence. This was subject to a
qualification by many states that the prohibition of force should not effect the maintenance of
law and order.301 A number of states expressed the hope that decolonisation could be achieved
peacefully,302 although Sri Lanka (Ceylon) argued that a perpetuation of colonialism could give
rise to violence on the principle of, “peacefully if we may, forcibly if we must”.303 Nonetheless,
the general orientation of the Declaration was towards the peaceful transfer of power.304
Iceland, ibid. (A/PV.936) para. 18; US, ibid. 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) para. 29; Italy, ibid. paras. 78-9, 82, 89;
Belgium, ibid. 938th mtg., (A/PV.938) paras. 9-10; Gabon, ibid. paras. 66, 70; Argentina, ibid. 944 th mtg.,
(A/PV.944) para. 18; Madagascar, ibid. paras. 39-40, 42; France, ibid. 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) paras. 132-3, 141-2;
Denmark, ibid. paras. 174-5; Sweden, ibid. 946th mtg., (A/PV.946) para. 15; Netherlands, ibid. 947th mtg.,
(A/PV.947) para. 60.
297 Iraq, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) para. 135.
298 Denmark, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 945 th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 178. See also Argentina, ibid.
944th mtg., (A/PV.944) para. 18.
299 USSR, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 945th mtg., (A/PV.945) para. 123. (UN Doc. A/L.328), 15 GAOR
(1960) Annexes, Agenda Item 87, p. 7.
300 In favour: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, UAR, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Hungary. Against: Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, UK, US, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Denmark, El
Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland. Abstaining: Indonesia,
Nepal, Nigeria, Paraguay, Senegal, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuala, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Celyon, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana,
Haiti, India. 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para. 32.
301 Burma, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 930th mtg., (A/PV.930) paras. 12-3; New Zealand, ibid. 932nd
mtg., (A/PV.932) para. 21; Australia, ibid. 933rd mtg., (A/PV.933) para. 84; US, ibid. 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) para.
150.
302 US, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 937th mtg., (A/PV.937) para. 20; Argentina, ibid. 944 th mtg.,
(A/PV.944) para. 17; Madagascar, ibid. para. 40.
303 Ceylon, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 947th mtg., (A/PV.947) paras. 72-3.
304 Chadwick op. cit. no. 13 at p. 45.
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4. General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV)
PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GUIDE MEMBERS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR
NOT AN OBLIGATION EXISTS TO TRANSMIT THE INFORMATION CALLED FOR
UNDER ARTICLE 73e OF THE CHARTER, GA RES. 1541(XV), (EXTRACTS)305
Principle I
The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that Chapter XI should be applicable to
territories which were then known to be of the colonial type. An obligation exists to transmit information
under Article 73e of the Charter in respect of such territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government.
Principle II
Chapter XI of the Charter embodies the concept of Non-Self-Governing Territories in a dynamic state of
evolution and progress towards a “full measure of self-government“. As soon as a territory and its peoples
attain a full measure of self-government, the obligation ceases. Until this comes about, the obligation to
transmit information under article 73e continues.
Principle III
The obligation to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter constitutes and international
obligation and should be carried out with due regard to the fulfilment of international law.
Principle IV
Prima facie there is an obligation to transmit information in respect to a territory which is geographically
separate and distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.
Principle V
Once it has been established that such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctness
of a territory exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration. These additional elements may
be, inter alia, of an administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the
relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places
the latter in a position or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is an obligation to
transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter.
Principle VI
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by:
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or
(c) Integration with an independent State.
Principle VII
(a) Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory
concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. It should be one which respects the
individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the
territory which is associated with an independent State the freedom to modify the status of that territory
305 GA Res. 1541(XV) 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) pp. 29-30.
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through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.
(b) The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside
interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people.
This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association
agreed upon.
Principle VIII
Integration with an independent State should be on the basis of complete equality between the peoples of the
erstwhile Non-Self-Governing Territory and those of the independent country with which it is integrated. The
peoples of both territories should have equal status and rights of citizenship and equal guarantees of
fundamental rights and freedoms without any distinction or discrimination; both should have equal rights and
opportunities for representation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and
judicial organs of government.
Principle IX
Integration should come about in the following circumstances:
(a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political
institutions, so that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and
democratic processes;
(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples acting with
full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and
democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations
could, when it deems necessary, supervise those processes.
a. Drafting
Not to be confused with GA Res. 1514(XV), the other major resolution of 1960, GA Res.
1541(XV)306 was very much a counterpart to the Colonial Independence Declaration. While the
declaration proclaimed the right of colonial peoples to independence, GA Res. 1541(XV)
defined the basic colonial unit, the non-self-governing territory, and the means by which those
territories could attain self-government. As argued earlier, the right to self-government points to
a goal, while self-determination emphasises a process. GA Res. 1541(XV) by defining the non-
self-governing territory and outlining the methods for achieving the goal of self-government,
also effectively defined the process of self-determination in the colonial context. In doing so, it
revealed the same problems inherent in definitions of peoples and self-determination: that any
criteria will appear either arbitrary or inconsistent, or both. Like the Colonial Independence
Declaration, GA Res. 1541(XV) is not legally binding, but has been considered by the ICJ in
respect to self-determination in Western Sahara.307
Article 73 of the UN Charter provided in 1945 that members administering non-self-
governing territories assumed certain obligations, one of which was to transmit information
under article 73(e). By the end of 1946 the UN Secretary-General had received information from
Australia, France, New Zealand, Britain, the United States, Belgium, Denmark and the
Netherlands on their overseas territories.308 Spain and Portugal, which also had colonial
306 See generally Pomerance op. cit. no. 259 at pp. 10-2; Whelan loc. cit. no. 259 at pp. 30-1; Ofuatey-Kodjoe op.
cit. no. 13 at pp. 359-60; T. D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1997) at pp. 71-3.
307 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) pp. 32-3, para. 57.
308 For the list of territories see GA Res. 66(I), 1 GAOR (1946) (A/64/add.1) pp. 124-5.
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territories, were not UN members at the time.
There was some disagreement as to what exactly a non-self-governing territory was. This
emerged, in particular, in debates over the US territory of Puerto Rico when it adopted an
associated status.309 In November 1953 the General Assembly adopted a list of factors to be
taken into account in deciding whether a territory had achieved full self-government, GA Res.
742(VIII).310 However, when Spain and Portugal joined the UN in 1955 the issue became
critical. At a time when many UN members were denouncing colonialism as slavery, the two
argued that they had no non-self-governing territories at all, but only “overseas provinces”.
General Assembly action became inevitable.
In 1959 the General Assembly established a special committee, the Committee of Six,
composed of three members which administered non-self-governing territories and three
members which did not.311 Its task was to enumerate the principles to guide members as to
whether there was an obligation to transmit information under article 73(e). On 3 October 1960
the six agreed, with reservations by some, to an Indian draft outlining twelve principles which
would effectively serve to define a non-self-governing territory.312 The twelve principles were
debated in the Fourth Committee between 1-14 November, and adopted by the General
Assembly on 15 December, by 69 votes to 2, with 21 abstentions.313
b. The Non-Self-Governing Territory
The twelve principles in the resolution, according to the Indian delegate responsible for the
draft, were based on universal principles without reference to particular territories. However, it
was obvious that the principles, which were intended to, “remove any uncertainty with regard to
the existence of an obligation to transmit information”, were tailored to Western overseas
territories.314 Delegates also clearly understood that they were focussed on Spain and Portugal.
Panama, for example, expressed satisfaction that they, “met the situation which has arisen as a
result of the establishment of so-called overseas provinces.”315
309 See R. S. Clark, “Self-Determination and Free Association – Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific
Islands Trust” 21 Harvard International Law Journal (1980) pp. 1-86 at pp. 41-6.
310 GA Res. 742(VIII), 8 GAOR (1953) Supplement No. 17, (A/2630) pp. 21-3.
311 GA Res. 1467(XIV) 14 GAOR (1959), Supplement No. 16, (A/4354) p. 36. Composed of India, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, UK and US.
312 Report of the Special Committee of Six (A/4536), 15 GAOR (1960) Annexes, Agenda Item 38, pp. 1-3.
313 In favour: Chile, Columbia, Congo (Leopolville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden,
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, UAR, Upper Volta, Venezuala, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina,
Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad. Against:
Portugal, South Africa. Abstaining: China, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, UK, US, Albania,
Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR. 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 948th mtg., (A/PV.948) para.
88.
314 India, 15 GAOR (1960) 4 th Cmttee., 1031st mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1031) para. 4.
315 Panama, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1039th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1039) para. 21. See especially Ukrainian SSR,
ibid. 1033rd Cmttee., (A/C.4/SR.1033) para. 21; El Salvador, ibid. para. 35; Nepal, ibid. 1034th mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.1034) paras. 25-6; Israel, ibid. 1037th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1037) para. 13; Senegal, ibid. para. 16; Saudi
Arabia, ibid. para. 24; Poland, ibid. 1038th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1038) para. 3; Guinea, ibid. para. 6; Lebanon, ibid.
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The test in GA Res. 1541(XV) for a non-self-governing territory had three elements. The first,
in principle IV, was geographical separation, the so-called “salt-water” test. Second, also in
principle IV, was “ethnic and/or cultural” distinctiveness from the administering country.
Together these criteria established a prima facie case for non-self-government. Third, once this
prima facie case had been established, principle V provided for a further set of criteria. These
were administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical factors which effected the
relationship between the metropolitan state and the territory so as to arbitrarily place the latter in
a position or status of subordination.
As a test for territories “of the colonial type” principles IV-V were somewhat curious, at least
if colonialism was understood as alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. If these were
the characteristics of colonial territories, then the critical tests would be a position of arbitrary
subordination and ethnic or cultural distinctiveness to establish the rule as alien. Geographical
separation as a general test would seem superfluous. Many of history’s great empires would have
been unaffected by it. The Hapsburg, Russian, Chinese, Mongol, Persian, Inca, Aztec, Ghanian,
Malian and Mughal empires would have passed it unscathed. In the Roman Empire it would
have distinguished island provinces such as Britannia or Cyprus, but not Gaul or Germania and,
if the Bosporus Straits counted as insufficient salt-water, Palestine or North Africa. In
contemporary cases of the time, South West Africa (Namibia), governed by South Africa in
violation of its mandate, would have failed the non-self-governing test. It also gave the
successors to the Tsars and Chinese Emperors little to fear.
Moreover, despite talk in the Assembly of the UN Charter as a living document, the concept
of a non-self-governing territory in principle I was frozen to territories, “then known to be of the
colonial type”, at the time of the Charter. The Philippines, which elsewhere had expressed
concern about the rise of “iron and bamboo curtains”,316 argued this excluded territories which
had become non-self-governing since the time of the Charter.317
The argument that colonialism was wider than the overseas territories of Western powers was,
of course, not new. Many states, most notably Belgium,318 had argued this. However, it would
1039th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1039) paras. 27-8; Liberia, ibid. 1041st mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1041) para. 25; Morocco, ibid.
1046th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1046) para. 36. See generally Yugoslavia, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1031st mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.1031) para. 30; Ghana, ibid. 1032nd mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1032) para. 6; Burma, ibid. 1033rd mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.1033) para. 5; Jordan, ibid. para. 17; Mali, ibid. para. 30; Liberia, ibid. 1034 th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1034)
para. 4; UAR, ibid. para. 17; USSR, ibid. para. 30; Czechoslovakia, ibid. 1035th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1035) para. 7;
Ceylon, ibid. para. 14; Nigeria, ibid. para. 31; Iraq, ibid. 1036th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1036) para. 1; Tunisia, ibid. para.
31; Byelorussian SSR, ibid. 1037th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1037) para. 4; Romania, ibid. para. 26; Togo, ibid. 1038th mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.1038) para. 30; Libya, ibid. 1039th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1039) para. 9; Sudan, ibid. para. 11; Albania, ibid.
para. 29; Bulgaria, ibid. paras. 51-2; India, ibid. 1040th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1040) paras. 8-10; Chad, ibid. para. 25; US,
ibid. 1041st mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1041) paras. 21-2.
316 Philippines, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 933rd mtg., (A/PV.933) para. 194.
317 “If his delegation voted if favour of principle I, it would be on the express understanding that territories of the
colonial type included not only those in existence at the time the United Nations Charter had been drafted but also
any territories lacking a full measure of self-government which might have come within the scope of the
classification since then.” Philippines, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1043rd mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1043) para. 17.
318 The so-called “Belgian thesis” that the “non-self-governing territory” was wider than overseas territories.
Belgium: “[A] number of States were administering within their own frontiers territories which were not governed
by the ordinary law; territories with well-defined limits, inhabited by homogeneous peoples differing from the rest
of the population in race, language and culture. Those populations were disenfranchised; they took no part in the
national life; they did not enjoy self-government in any sense of the word.” 9 GAOR (1954) 4 th Cmttee., 419th mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.419) para. 20. See also Josef L. Kunz, “Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in Action” 48
American Journal of International Law (1954) pp. 103-10 at pp. 108-9.
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have been evidently self-defeating for a resolution intended to focus pressure on Spain and
Portugal to have proclaimed an open-ended and ambiguous definition of a non-self-governing
territory. Indeed, Nepal stated that it, “would have been happier if there had been no need to
enunciate principles and if information had been transmitted on all Non-Self-Governing
Territories.”319
The essentially makeshift nature of the principles can be seen in the fact that, although a
number of states had ethnically distinct island provinces which might appear prima facie non-
self-governing, only the Philippines was sufficiently concerned to expressly qualify them.320
Other such states, which one might expect to have been worried, were not. Pakistan, which at the
time was divided into two “wings”, separated by a large tract of the Indian Ocean, even argued
that geographical separation and ethnic distinctiveness created a presumption of non-self-
governance that was for a state to disprove.321 This was retrospectively unwise because when
East Pakistan seceded in 1971 as Bangladesh, it was precisely argued that its geographical
separation and ethnic distinctiveness marked it out as a West Pakistani colony.322
On the other hand, states were also making qualifications to those territories that the test was
actually intended to identify as prima facie non-self-governing: namely the Portuguese colonies,
like Goa, Macau and East Timor.323 The most far-reaching qualification came from Somalia,
which, “reserved the right to advocate a more general application of the principles.”324 This was,
in fact, a rejection of the salt-water test altogether, as Somalia argued that Somali inhabited
territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti were overland colonies.
As a definition for a non-self-governing territory, GA Res. 1541(XV), therefore, showed the
same problems inherent in the definition of a people. On one hand, the test for non-self-
government fell notably short of all peoples under alien subjugation or denied self-government.
The requirement of geographical separation in principle IV, and the time limit imposed on the
loss of self-government in principle I added quite arbitrary limitations on the scope of the non-
self-governing territory. On the other hand, the principles that were proclaimed were not
consistently applied. In the drafting of the resolution states were making exceptions to territories
which fulfilled the criteria for a non-self-governing territory and this continued throughout the
decolonisation process.
c. Self-Government
Another crucial feature of a non-self-governing territory was that by definition it had not yet
obtained self-government. Principle VI outlined three ways in which a territory could do this:
emergence as a sovereign independent state, free association with an independent state or
integration with an independent state. No conditions were set for self-government by
319 Nepal, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1034th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1034) para. 26.
320 Philippines: “With regard to principle IV, his delegation’s approval would be subject to the express
understanding that its provisions did not apply to a country – such as the Philippines – which consisted of an
archipelago inhabited by peoples of different ethnic origin yet enjoying equal rights.” 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee.,
1043rd mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1043) para. 18.
321 Pakistan, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1035th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1035) para. 4.
322 V. P. Nanda, “Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities – Islamabad (West
Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)” 66 American Journal of International Law (1972) pp. 321-36 at pp. 328-336.
323 USSR, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1047th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1047) para. 25; Poland, ibid. 1048th mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.1048) para. 26; China (ROC), ibid. 1049th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1049) para. 16.
324 Somalia, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1037th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1037) para. 35.
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independence, but conditions were attached to integration and free association. Free association,
in principle VII, was to be established by the free and voluntary choice of the people concerned
expressed by informed and democratic means. The individuality and culture of the territory had
to be respected and its people had the right to determine their internal constitution without
outside interference. This status, moreover, was not necessarily permanent and could later be
changed by democratic means. Integration, in principles VIII and IX, was to take place on the
basis of equality: people were to have equal status, citizenship, fundamental rights,
representation and participation. The prerequisite for integration was an advanced stage of self-
government with free political institutions to enable people to make a free and informed choice
with full knowledge of their change of status. This was to be done with democratic processes
based on universal adult suffrage, which could, if deemed necessary, be supervised by the United
Nations.
The conditions set for free association and integration reflected the suspicion of many states
that colonial powers would use them to prolong colonialism.325 On the other hand, though, these
states also proceeded on the assumption that any claim by an independence movement to
represent a people was automatically valid and did not need to be objectively tested.
GA Res. 1541(XV) was essentially a practical political document. The principles proclaimed
were intended to, “provide a legal and constitutional basis for any action which the General
Assembly might take in the matter”:326 above all, against the two recalcitrant Iberian states.
However, this made the General Assembly the arbiter of what was or was not a non-self-
governing territory. No such authority was vested in the Assembly by the Charter, and a number
of states argued that it had overstepped its authority.327 On the other hand, other states argued
that the Charter was a living document which had to evolve with events.328
Using its new self-appointed authority, the majority in the Assembly passed GA Res.
1542(XV) classifying Portuguese territories as the non-self-governing.329 Spain had earlier
backed down and agreed to transmit information on its territories.330 As a result, territories which
had been called “overseas provinces” by Portugal to avoid its Charter obligations, were re-
325 Indonesia: “[H]is delegation was afraid that in a few years the administering Powers would report that all the
Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration had become associated or integrated with the
metropolitan States in accordance with ‘the voluntary choice of the territory concerned’”. 15 GAOR (1960) 4 th
Cmttee., 1043rd mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1043) para. 31; Togo, ibid. para. 22; Guinea: “No doubt the administering Powers
would be willing to organize plebiscites on the question of integration, but they would ensure that the results were in
accordance with their plans by installing puppet governments in the Territories concerned which would agree to
integration regardless of the wishes of the people. Thus little by little all the colonial possessions would be
swallowed up.” Ibid. para. 36; Mali: “There must be no possibility of the Organization’s being told that 99 per cent
of the population had voted for integration with the metropolitan country by means of a referendum, as had actually
happened in 1958.” 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1044th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1044) para. 18. See also Togo and Tunisia
ammendment, (A/C.4/L.650), 15 GAOR (1960) Annexes, Agenda Item 38, pp. 6-7.
326 India, 15 GAOR (1960) 4 th Cmttee., 1031st mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1031) para. 4.
327 Canada, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1046th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1046) para. 2; Belgium, ibid. para. 5; Brazil,
ibid. 1049th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1049) para. 4; France, ibid. para. 5; Australia, ibid. para. 6; UK, ibid. para. 10; US, ibid.
para. 12; Belgium, ibid. para. 22; Canada, ibid. para. 25.
328 Yugoslavia, 15 GAOR (1960) 4th Cmttee., 1031st mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1031) para. 26; Ireland, ibid. 1032nd mtg.,
(A/C.4/SR.1032) para. 16; Burma, ibid. 1033rd mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1033) para. 12; Jordan, ibid. para. 16; Pakistan, ibid.
1035th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1035) para. 4; Czechoslovakia, ibid. para. 6; Indonesia, ibid. 1037th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1037)
para. 21; Afghanistan, ibid. para. 28; Libya, ibid. 1039th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1039) para. 9; Sudan, ibid. para. 11. See
also Report of the Special Committee of Six, 15 GAOR (1960) Annexes, Agenda Item 38, para. 18
329 GA Res. 1542(XV), 15 GAOR (1960) Supplement No. 16, (A/4684) at pp. 30-1.
330 Spain, 15 GAOR (1960) 4 th Cmttee., 1038th mtg., (A/C.4/SR.1038) para. 27.
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branded by the General Assembly as “non-self-governing territories” in order to enforce those
commitments.
5. The Friendly Relations Declaration
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GA RES. 2625(XXV), (EXTRACTS)331
[5] The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples
[1] By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
[2] Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render
assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding
the implementation of the principle, in order:
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples
concerned;
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a
violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental rights, and is contrary to the Charter.
[3] Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter.
[4] The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by the people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination of that people.
[5] Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in
the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In
their pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
[6] The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate
and distinct from the territory administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall
exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-
determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.
[7] Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
[8] Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
territorial integrity of any other State or country.
331 GA Res. 2625(XXV), 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 28, (A/8028) at pp. 121-4.
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a. Drafting
In 1963 the General Assembly set up a Special Committee332 to work on the formulation of
seven legal principles for friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the
UN Charter.333 Among them was the principle of equal rights and self-determination, and with
the right’s established status as basis for friendly relations,334 it featured prominently in the
debate in the Special Committee and the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. The Special
Committee, in fact, began work on the principle quite late, not until 1966, after which it became
one of the main sticking points until a consensus was finally reached in 1970.335 The Friendly
Relations Declaration,336 GA Res. 2625(XXV) was adopted by a consensus on 24 October 1970.
Like GA Res. 1514(XV) and GA 1541(XV), the Declaration is not formally binding, but has
been widely used by the ICJ337 and national courts338 in considering the state of international
332 GA Res. 1966(XVIII), 18 GAOR (1963) Supplement No. 15, (A/5515) pp. 70-1. Membership: Afghanistan,
Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Ghana, Guatamala, India, Italy, Japan,
Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, USSR, UAR, UK, US, Venezuala,
Yugoslavia. In 1965 Algeria, Chile, Kenya and Syria joined and Afghanistan was replaced by Burma.
333 These were outlined in GA Res. 1815(XVII), 17 GAOR (1962) Supplement No. 17, (A/5217) pp. 66-7.
334 See e.g. statements of Yugoslavia, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 6; Czechoslovakia, ibid. p. 7; Canada, ibid. p.
9; Kenya, ibid. p. 22; Nigeria, A/AC.125/SR.91 (1968) pp. 110-1; Ghana, ibid. p. 112; Syria, A/AC.125/SR.93
(1968) pp. 138-9; Madagascar, A/AC.125/SR.106 (1969) p. 58; USSR, ibid. p. 61; France, ibid. p. 64; Ukrainian
SSR, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 928th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.928) para. 18; Congo (Brazzaville), ibid. 998th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.998) para. 9; Afghanistan, ibid. 1000th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1000) para. 47; Rwanda, ibid. para. 65; UAR,
ibid. 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 6; Tunisia, ibid. 1004th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1004) para. 18.
335 21 GAOR (1966) Annexes III, Agenda Item 87, (A/6230) para. 520; 22 GAOR (1967) Annexes III, Agenda
Item 87, (A/6799) paras. 231-5; 23 GAOR (1968) Annexes II, Agenda Item 87, (A/7326) paras. 192-203; 24 GAOR
(1969) Supplement No. 19, (A/7619) paras. 180-91; 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 18, (A/8018) para. 61.
336 See generally I. M. Sinclair, “Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States” in M. K. Nawaz ed., Essays in Honour of Krishna Rao, (Sijthoff, Leyden, 1976) pp. 107-40; O.
Sukovi?, “Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples” in M. S?hovi? ed. Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation (Institute of International Politics and
Economics, Belgrade, 1972) pp. 323-73; G. Arangio-Ruiz loc. cit. no. 1 at pp. 419-628; Cassese op. cit. no. 11 at pp.
109-25; R. Rosenstock, “The Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations: A
Survey”, 65 American Journal of International Law (1971) pp. 713-35; R. W. Witten, “The Declaration on Friendly
Relations”, 12 Harvard International Law Journal (1971) pp. 509-19; E. McWhinney, “Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States: Debate at the Twentieth General Assembly, United Nations”, 60 American Journal of
International Law (1966) pp. 356-61; P. H. Houben, “Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States”, 61 American Journal of International Law (1967) pp. 703-36; L. T. Lee, “The
Mexico City Conference of the United Nations Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States”, 14 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1965) pp.
1296-1313; G. Arangio-Ruiz, “Friendly Relations Resolution”, in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Volume 2, (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2000) pp. 485-90; A. Tanca, “The Prohibition of Force in the
U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970” in A. Cassese ed., The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of
Force (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986) pp. 397-412; H. A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by
National Liberation Movements (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) at pp. 96-9; Ofuatey-Kodjoe op. cit. no. 13 at pp.
360-3.
337 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 33, para. 58; Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986) pp. 99-100, para. 188, p. 101, para. 191; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), (2004), www. icj-cij.org
(12/07/04) paras. 87-8, 156.
338 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Tatarstan Case, 30:3 Statutes and Decisions of the USSR and
Its Successor States (1994) pp. 40-1; Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Chechnya Case, 31:5 Statutes
and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States (1995) p. 52; Supreme Court of Canada, Re.
Secession of Quebec, 161 Dominion Law Reports (1998) 4th Series, pp. 435-6, para. 119, p. 438, paras. 126 and 128,
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law.
As a consensus agreement, the provisions of the Declaration were a compromise and in the
words of Britain: “Like most compromises, it was less than satisfactory to all.”339 Differences
over self-determination evident in the debates on the Covenants and the Colonial Independence
Declaration remained. However, the political context behind the self-determination had moved
on. The decolonisation process had progressed and the General Assembly was now increasingly
focussed on the territories held by a recalcitrant Portugal, the white minority regimes in South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and Namibia, then occupied by South Africa. In reaction many
states in the General Assembly increasingly interpreted self-determination as encompassing a
right to armed struggle. However, this interpretation was not shared by others and the issue
profoundly split the Assembly. The result was a declaration, which in some areas consolidated
on earlier instruments, like GA Res. 1514(XV) and GA Res. 1541(XV), but in others barely
papered over fundamental disagreement.
b. The Balance in the Friendly Relations Declaration
i. An Improved Balance?
In debates in the Special Committee a few states did explicitly argue that self-determination
applied only in particular circumstances. According to India, “the principle of self-determination
was applicable to peoples under alien domination or colonial rule but not to parts of existing
states.”340 Similarly, Burma argued that: “To understand it [self-determination] as covering
peoples who constituted a sovereign State would have the effect of re-writing history to suit a
political concept”.341 Nigeria stated quite bluntly that, “the principle was applicable only to
people under foreign or colonial domination.”342 Ghana set limits on the exercise of the right:
“self-determination could be exercised only once.”343 However, these states represented a small
minority. Nigeria also later recognised the principle as universal.344 The majority of states,
although they may have had their own ideas as to how self-determination should be applied,
nonetheless, argued that it applied to all peoples.345 This consensus encompassed states from all
the different factions in the Assembly. Socialist and Non-aligned drafts referred to the right of
“all peoples” to self-determination, while US and UK drafts simply referred generally to
p. 440, para. 133.
339 UK, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 73.
340 India, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 10.
341 Burma, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 8.
342 Nigeria, A/AC.125/SR.91 (1968) p. 111
343 Ghana, A/AC.125/SR.91 (1968) p. 115.
344 Nigeria: “While recognizing the universality of the principle, he felt that it should be stated with special
reference to its interrelationship with other principles enshrined in the Charter.” 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee.,
1162nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1162) para. 90.
345 UK, A/AC.125/SR.57 (1967) p. 6; US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 5; Yugoslavia, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p.
4; France, ibid. p. 12; Australia, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 6; Cameroon, ibid. p. 13; Venezuala, ibid. p. 20;
Guatamala, A/AC.125/SR.91 (1968) p. 107; Madagascar, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 122; Netherlands,
A/AC.125/SR.101 (1969) pp. 31-2; Romania, A/AC.125/SR.105 (1969) p. 49; USSR, A/AC.125/SR.106 (1969) p.
62; Indonesia, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 935th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.935) para. 32; Bolivia, 24 GAOR (1969) 6 th
Cmttee., 1160th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1160) para. 4; Bulgaria, ibid. 1162nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1162) para. 87; Portugal, 25
GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1182nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1182) para. 4; Spain, ibid. para. 23.
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“peoples”.
Correspondingly, the Declaration followed a familiar formula. Self-determination was a right
of “all peoples”, but was balanced with other principles, notably the territorial integrity of
states,346 while, at the same time, its application was promoted in certain areas: developing
friendly relations between states and bringing a speedy end to colonialism. The Declaration, in
fact, contained two provisions on territorial integrity. Paragraph 8 was a relatively
straightforward provision: states should refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of another state or country. However,
paragraph 7 is perhaps more interesting. Arguably it represented an attempt to deal with some of
the problems of legitimacy in balancing by creating a more sophisticated balance. Not only that,
it also appeared to do so by balancing nationalism with liberalism. It is notable that the draft for
paragraph 7 originated with three Western states whose drafts effectively set up representative
government as the standard for self-determination. However, at the same time, it also revealed
the shortcomings in balancing nationalism with liberalism and with liberal nationalism in
general.
Paragraph seven was framed as an exception to the previous provisions on self-determination.
Nothing in the previous paragraphs was to be construed as authorising or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people of the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. The provision caused
considerable interest because of its apparent connection between the protection of the territorial
integrity of a state and the enjoyment of representative government.347 However, this formula
346 Australia, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 935th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.935) para. 8; Kenya, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th
Cmttee., 997th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.997) para. 6; Canada, ibid. 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 30; Senegal, ibid.
1002nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 3; Spain, ibid. para. 49; Guatamala, 23 GAOR (1968) 6 th Cmttee., 1086th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1086) para. 53; Argentina, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1161st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1161) para. 18; Nigeria,
ibid. 1162nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1162) para. 90; Greece, ibid. 1181st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1181) para. 33.
347 R. McCorquodale, “Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach” 43 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly (1994) pp. 857-85 at pp. 879-80. More generally there are some notable similarities between the
Committee’s position and McCorquodale’s “Human Rights” approach to self-determination. See also Cassese op.
cit. no. 11 at pp. 109-25; F. L. Kirgis Jr., “The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era” 88
American Journal of International Law (1994) pp. 304-10 at pp. 305-6; E. Suzuki, “Self-Determination and World
Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation” 16 Virginia Journal of International Law (1975-6)
pp. 779-862 at pp. 847-8; S. R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States” 90
American Journal of International Law (1996) pp. 590-624 at p. 611; M. G. K. Nayar, “Self-Determination Beyond
the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect” 10 Texas International Law Journal (1975) pp. 321-45 at pp. 337-8;
Ofuatey-Kodjoe op. cit. no. 13 at pp. 362-3; P. H. Kooijmans, “Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination” 43
Netherlands International Law Review (1996) pp. 211-7 at p. 212; Quane loc. cit. no. 13 at p. 562; V. P. Nanda,
“Self-Determination under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede” 13 Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (1981) pp. 257-80 at p. 269-70; P. H. Brietzke, “Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential
Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict” in R. McCorquodale ed., Self-Determination in International Law
(Dartmouth, Aldershot, 2000) pp. 77-140 at p. 95; K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection:
Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000)
at p. 289-90; Hannikainen op. cit. no. 13 at p. 23; Higgins op. cit. no. 13 at pp. 117-8; Musgrave op. cit. no. 306 at
pp. 183, 188-9, 209; Knop op. cit. no. 288 at pp. 75-7; C. Tomuschat, “Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial
World” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 1-20 at pp.
9-10; M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982) at pp.
253-4; Z. Skurbaty, As If Peoples Mattered…: Critical Appraisal of ‘Peoples’ and ‘Minorities’ From the
International Human Rights Perspective and Beyond (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000) at pp. 266-8; R. A.
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can also be seen as an attempt to resolve one of the essential problems in balancing: how to limit
the right of self-determination without being seen to arbitrarily deny it.
The story of paragraph seven started in 1966 with an American draft on self-determination,
which provided that:
“The existence of a sovereign and independent State possessing representative
Government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory is
presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights and self-determination as regards those
peoples.”348
This formula was essentially repeated in a British draft the following year.349
Both delegations denied that drafts were intended to encourage secession.350 The British
delegate, Mr. Sinclair, stated quite bluntly that, “the United Kingdom proposal was not intended
to encourage or condone secessionist movements.”351 Mr. Reis, of the United States, believed
that the value of his country’s draft was that in certain cases it might be legitimately open to
doubt whether ethnic groups occupying contiguous geographical territories could claim the right
to self-determination. In those cases a sovereign independent state with representative
government functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory, was presumed to
satisfy the equal rights and self-determination of those peoples.352 Both drafts, therefore,
represented refinement on the balancing of self-determination with territorial integrity. By
equating self-determination with representative government,353 they sought to limit it on its own
terms: by satisfaction rather than arbitrary restriction.354 Also by concentrating on self-
determination as a process focussed on the state, they avoided the problem of defining peoples.
The drafts received a mixed reception in the Special Committee. Syria and Czechoslovakia
were sceptical as to their value.355 Burma called the UK draft, with its emphasis on
representative government, “a mild attempt to impose certain of its own political persuasions on
the constitutional law and practice of other States.”356 Kenya was concerned about its impact in
Miller, “Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy?” 41 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (2003) pp. 601-48 at p. 622-3.
For a good criticism of some of these inferences from the paragraph see D. L. Horowitz, “A Right to Secede?” in S.
Macedo and A. Buchanan ed., Secession and Self-Determination (New York University Press, New York, 2003) pp.
50- 76 at pp. 60-8.
348 US, (A/AC.125/L.32) 21 GAOR (1966) Annexes III, Agenda Item 87, (A/6230) para. 459.
349 UK: “States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and possessed of a representative government,
effectively functioning as such with respect to all distinct peoples within their territory, shall be considered to be
conducting themselves in conformity with this principle as regards those peoples.” (A/AC.125/L.44, part VI), 22
GAOR (1967) Annexes III, Agenda Item 87, (A/6799) para. 176.
350 On Anglo-American conduct more generally in this area see Horowitz op. cit. no. 347 at pp. 61-2.
351 UK, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 19; also UK, A/AC.125/SR.105 (1969) p. 55.
352 US, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 133.
353 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 5; UK, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 19.
354 UK: “Paragraph 2(c) aimed at establishing the duty of every State to refrain from acts which might disrupt the
national unity of another State, but within the framework of that principle it was necessary to provide that fully
sovereign and independent States were conducting themselves in conformity with the principle as regards peoples
subject to their jurisdiction, if they had representative and effective internal machinery of government.”
A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 19.
355 Syria, A/AC.125/SR.113 (1970) p. 18; Czechoslovakia, ibid. p. 20.
356 Burma, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 9.
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multinational states.357 However, Australia welcomed the drafts as a realistic attempt to ensure
that the principle of equal rights and self-determination did not disrupt the unity of existing
states. The text, its delegate believed, did not encourage secession, but implied that respect for
self-determination, at a minimum, required effective representative institutions through which
the legitimate aspirations of minorities might find expression.358 The Netherlands, though, did
not exclude the possibility of secession if it were the case that a people was, “being
fundamentally discriminated against”, within a state.359
In 1970 the ideas in the American and British drafts were developed in an informal draft
presented by Italy:
“States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and possessed of a government
representing the whole of their population, shall be considered to be conducting themselves
in conformity with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
regards that population. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing any action which would impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity, or
political unity, of such States.”360
This followed the US and UK drafts in providing that representative government was an
expression of self-determination,361 limiting the right again by satisfaction rather than arbitrary
exclusion.
The Italian text was welcomed by Canada which expressed satisfaction that it effectively
safeguarded territorial integrity: “there would thus be no danger that some might be misled in
attempting to invoke the principle to justify the dislocation of a State within which various
communities had been co-habitating successfully and peacefully for a considerable time.”362
Poland also endorsed the inclusion of the phrase, “the whole population belonging to the
territory”, into the draft, which, “could in no circumstances be interpreted or invoked as
providing legal justification for any State to make territorial claims against other States”.363
However, the development of the draft did not end there. The Italian text was given a new
357 Kenya: “Kenya was a country of many different tribal, racial, ethnic and religious groups, all of which were
treated as equals, and to enunciate the principle that each group was entitled to self-determination would be carrying
that principle to an absurd extreme. Although paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom proposal attempted to exclude
such a possibility, the inevitability of complaints of unequal treatment wherever ethnically different people
coexisted in one nation made the attempt unpractical. Of course, if there were genuine discrimination against any
ethnic group in an independent State, that group would have to rebel against the central Government and exercise its
right of self-determination, but that would be a domestic matter outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations.”
A/AC.125/SR.107 (1969) p. 88.
358 Australia, A/AC.125/SR.107 (1969) p. 75.
359 Netherlands: “[S]o long as adequate provision was made against abuse, the Committee would not serve the
cause of justice by excluding the possibility that a people within an existing or future State would possess sufficient
individual identity to exercise the right of self-determination. If, for example – in the opinion of the world
community – basic human rights and fundamental freedoms which imposed obligations on all States, irrespective of
their sovereign will, were not being respected by a certain State vis-à-vis one of the peoples living within its
territory, would one in such an instance – whatever the human implications – wish to prevent the people that was
being fundamentally discriminated against from invoking its right to self-determination?” A/AC.125/SR.107 (1969)
p. 85.
360 Italy, A/AC.125/L.80, 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 18, (A/8018) para. 63.
361 Italy, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 45.
362 Canada, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 57.
363 Poland, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 58.
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twist, courtesy of an amendment by Lebanon, which proposed that after “population” should be
added the words: “including the indigenous population and without distinction as to race, creed
or colour,”364 The words “indigenous population” were not added to the final draft, but “without
distinction as to race, creed or colour” was. This phrase had been previously used the Colonial
Independence Declaration, and, as has been noted, was more a slogan than a description:365
“race” presumably rendering “colour” superfluous.
Nonetheless, with the addition of this phrase, governments that made a distinction as to race
(i.e. apartheid South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) might not be considered to be in conformity
with the principle of self-determination and their territorial integrity, correspondingly, not
respected. Thus amended, the paragraph became consistent with the argument that states who
assisted national liberation movements fighting against racist regimes were not violating the UN
Charter. It was perhaps no coincidence that the only delegation to comment on paragraph seven
in debate in the Sixth Committee was South Africa, which argued that its language, “could only
encourage subversive activities”.366 However, presumably for many states that was precisely the
intention.
Thus, to some extent, the innovative provisions of paragraph seven became like so many other
provisions in the consensus-based declaration: meaning some things to some states other things
to others. From a Western perspective it appeared to equate respect for self-determination with
representative government.367 For the Third World it appeared to support the fight against white
minority rule in Africa.368 Significantly, subsequent interpretations of the paragraph in the
Vienna Declaration 1993 and the UN Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration 1995 have been closer to
the original Western formula: “a Government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction of any kind.”369 Nevertheless, the paragraph did arguably represent
an attempt to resolve some of the problems associated with balancing self-determination with
territorial integrity.
This, of course, raises the question of how correct the assumptions behind the paragraph were.
364 Lebanon, A/AC.125/L.81, 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 18, (A/8018) para. 64.
365 P. Thornberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on
Federalism” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 101-
38 at p. 117.
366 “[South Africa] wished to express its reservation regarding the seventh paragraph of the same principle,
which implied that the rule that a State might not violate the territorial integrity of other States would not apply
where that State maintained that the other States did not possess Governments representing the whole people. His
delegation was unable to accept such qualifications of the rule of the inviolability of territorial integrity. In fact they
rendered that principle nugatory giving every State discriminatory powers to take action against another State to
which it was hostile on the pretext that the peoples of the latter State were entitled to its support or that the
Government of that State was not representative of the whole people.” South Africa, 25 GAOR (1970) 6 th Cmttee.,
1184th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1184) para. 15.
367 Rosenstock loc. cit. no. 336 at p. 732.
368 Pomerance op. cit. no. 259 at p. 39; H. Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination” 34 Virginia Journal of
International Law (1994) pp. 1-69 at p. 17; P. Thornberry, “Self-determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A
Review of International Instruments” 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1989) pp. 867-89 at pp.
876-7.
369 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 32 ILM
(1993) pp. 1663-87 at p. 1665; Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, GA
Res. 50/6, 50 GAOR (1995) Supplement No. 49, (A/50/49) at p. 13. See A. Eide, “The National Society, Peoples
and Ethno-Nations: Semantic Confusions and Legal Consequences” 64 Nordic Journal of International Law (1995)
pp. 353-67 at pp. 358-60; D. F. Orentlicher, “International Responses to Separatist Claims: Are Democratic
Principles Relevant?” in S. Macedo and A. Buchanan ed., Secession and Self-Determination (New York University
Press, New York, 2003) pp. 19-49 at p. 23; Cassese op. cit. no. 11 at p. 306; Alfredsson op. cit. no. 57 at pp. 65-6.
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Representative government may satisfy self-determination from a liberal perspective, but from
the nationalist perspective the only question is whether a people exists. The paragraph cleverly
side-stepped this issue, but it also notably did not exclude the possibility that peoples might exist
within states. If such peoples did exist then the problem from a nationalist perspective is why
those peoples’ rights should be limited. It may be all very well saying that the territorial integrity
of states enjoying representative government should be protected, but still, a nationalist could
argue, why should some peoples have fewer rights than others?
ii. Peoples
The balance of principles for the restriction and promotion of self-determination in the
Declaration had significance for four different categories of population: colonial peoples, the
peoples of states, peoples under alien or foreign domination and minorities. The right of colonial
peoples to self-determination was a clear objective in the Declaration. Paragraph 2 stated a duty
of states to promote the realisation of equal rights and self-determination to bring “a speedy end
to colonialism”. Paragraph 6 specified that the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing
territory had a separate and distinct status from the territory administering it and this status
continued until the people had exercised their right to self-determination in accordance with the
Charter. This reflected the drafts of Socialist and Non-Aligned states, which asserted that
colonies could not constitute integral parts of the colonising state. These states also argued that
this separate status followed from the basic illegality of colonialism,370 and that non-intervention
should not be invoked to prevent support for a people struggling for their right to self-
determination.371
The concept of the non-self-governing territory was, however, not without dispute. A number
of states invoked territorial ties over colonies. Spain, with an eye to Gibraltar, argued that
decolonisation, “could not be made to cover artificial groups, which historically were not nations
or provide a way of concealing the dismemberment of a country’s territory”.372 Argentina, with a
claim on the Falkland Islands, “attached particular importance to the territorial aspects of the
principle of self-determination, which safeguarded the rights of peoples whose territorial
integrity had been violated by the activities of colonial Powers”.373 Somalia, with irridentist
ambitions against its neighbours believed that: “The term ‘territorial integrity’ had to be
interpreted in light of the circumstances”.374 Guatemala, which claimed Belize protested that,
“the automatic and indiscriminate application of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination…  would be incompatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
States.”375
Paragraph 2 also expressly linked the principle of equal rights and self-determination to the
promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among states. There was wide support among
delegates that the peoples of states had the right to freely choose their political and economic
development.376 This mirrored non-intervention and sovereign equality, and the right was
370 Ghana, A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) p. 14.
371 Cameroon, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 14.
372 Spain, 22 GAOR (1967) 6 th Cmttee., 1002nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 49.
373 Argentina, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1161st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1161) para. 18.
374 Somalia, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 47.
375 Guatamala, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 35.
376 Ukrainian SSR, 21 GAOR (1966) 6 th Cmttee., 928th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.928) para. 16; Nepal, ibid. 931st mtg.,
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explicitly connected to these principles by many states.377 This was expressed by some states as
the “internal” and “external”, or “domestic” and “international”, aspects of self-determination.378
Some delegations equated self-determination with the right of a people to representative
government,379 although for others it simply meant that their choice of political or social system
was not subject to outside interference.380
Like the Colonial Independence Declaration, the Declaration referred in principle 2 to peoples
under alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. Alien domination was a potentially wider
concept than the overseas colonialism of Western states, and a number of possible situations
might have fallen into this category. Many states drew attention to the racist regimes of South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia381 and the “foreign minorities”382 they represented. Arab states
highlighted the Palestinians.383 Pakistan, presumably with Kashmir in mind, argued that
subjugation should be, “purged of any racial or continental connotation”, and, “a people was
dependent when its territory was occupied by another State in contravention of international
agreements or Security Council resolutions”.384 With war in Vietnam, states from different
perspectives argued for Vietnamese self-determination.385 The United States referred to the
recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as a clear violation of self-determination.386 The US
draft also referred to, “the restoration of self-government”, as a means of satisfying self-
determination, which was seen as a reference to the Baltic States.387
(A/C.6/SR.931) para. 3; USSR, ibid. para. 20; Burma, ibid. 936th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.936) para. 31; Ethiopia, ibid. para.
36; Afghanistan, ibid. para. 43; Cuba, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 993rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.995) para. 9; Congo
(Brazzaville), ibid., 998th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.998) para. 9; Liberia, ibid. 1001st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1001) para. 2;
Mongolia, ibid. para. 58; Ecuador, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1163rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1163) para. 15;
377 Yugoslavia, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 5; Canada, ibid. p. 9; Venezuala, A/AC.125/SR.73 (1967) p. 5; UK,
ibid. p. 20; Ghana, A/AC.125/SR.88 (1968) p. 73; Cameroon, A/AC.125/SR.91 (1968) p. 105; Nigeria, ibid. p. 111;
Ukrainian SSR, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 928th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.928) para. 16; Columbia, ibid. 929th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.929) para. 12; France, ibid. 932 mtg., (A/C.6/SR.932) para. 34; Afghanistan, ibid. 936th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.936) para. 43; Mali, ibid. 938th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.938) para. 15; Rwanda, 22 GAOR (1967) 6 th Cmttee.,
1000th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1000) para. 65; Liberia, ibid. 1001st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1001) para. 2. Sukovi? op. cit. no. 336
at pp. 350-1.
378 India, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 10; Guatamala, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th Cmttee., 1086th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1086)
para. 52.
379 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 4.
380 Ukrainian SSR, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 928th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.928) para. 16;
381 Kenya, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 22; Columbia, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 929th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.929)
para. 15; USSR, ibid. 931st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.931) para. 19; Congo (Brazzaville), 22 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 998th
mtg., (A/C.6/SR.998) para. 9; Cameroon, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th Cmttee., 1086th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096) para. 19;
Algeria, ibid. 1096th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096) para. 30;
382 Cameroon, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1160th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1160) para. 19.
383 Syria, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 18; Algeria, 23 GAOR (1968) 6 th Cmttee., 1096th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096)
para. 30; Libya: “[S]elf-determination of peoples should be accepted in its widest meaning and applied not only to
peoples under alien subjugation but also to peoples under military occupation. It was indeed inconceivable that
peoples in that position – the Palestinian Arab people, for instance – could be thought of as enjoying those rights.”
24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1162nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1162) para. 78.
384 Pakistan, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th Cmttee., 1096th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096) para. 19.
385 Hungary, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 925th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.925) para. 2; Ukrainian SSR, ibid. 928th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.928) para. 15; USSR, ibid. 931st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.931), para. 20; Romania, ibid. 934th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.934) para. 12; Congo (Brazzaville), 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 998th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.998) para. 9;
Syria, ibid. 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 16; Mongolia, ibid. 1001st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1001) para. 56. On the
other hand see US, A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) p. 16.
386 US, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 129.
387 Houben loc. cit. no. 336 at p. 724.
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There appeared to be little general enthusiasm for the idea that self-determination extended to
minorities. Secession was referred to by delegates as the “misuse”388 or “abuse”389 of self-
determination. The Philippines considered: “The word ‘peoples’ should be construed broadly,
although not so widely as to include tribal, racial, ethnic, and religious groups”.390 Even so, some
states referred to groups within states,391 while others contemplated that self-determination could
encompass a right of secession even if they did not approve of it.392
c. Self-Determination
i. Immediate or Progressive
One area of self-determination where there appeared to be a growing consensus among states
was that it was part of positive international law.393 A few states even considered it jus cogens, a
peremptory norm of international law,394 although opinions varied as to its precise legal position.
A number of states placed particular emphasis on the role of the Colonial Independence
Declaration in the development of this law,395 and many expressed regret that no reference had
been made to it.396 Other states, though, were more cautious as to its role.397
In other areas differences remained. There was still division over whether self-determination
was realised immediately or progressively. This was reflected in the various drafts. Socialist and
Non-Aligned drafts took the position that the self-determination of colonial peoples was an
immediate right. In the Czechoslovak draft, for example, colonialism was to be, “liquidated
388 Senegal, 22 GAOR (1967) 6 th Cmttee., 1002nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 33.
389 US, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 132.
390 Philippines, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1163rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1163) para. 18. See also Ecuador, 22
GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 55.
391 France, A/AC.125/SR.106 (1969) pp. 64-5.
392 Mali, 20 GAOR (1965) 6 Cmttee., 893rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.893) para. 28.
393 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 3; Ghana, ibid. pp. 17-8; Yugoslavia, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 4; Kenya,
A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 22; Cameroon, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 12; Nigeria, A/AC.125/SR.91 (1968) p. 111;
Madagascar, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 122; Syria, A/AC.125/SR.93 (1968) p. 139; Nepal, 21 GAOR (1966) 6 th
Cmttee., 931st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.931) para. 3; Indonesia, ibid. 935th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.935) para. 32; Ceylon, ibid. 936 th
mtg., (A/C.6/SR.936) para. 9; Afghanistan, ibid. para. 43; China (ROC), ibid. 937th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.937) para. 27;
Somalia, ibid. para. 36; Congo (Brazzaville), 22 GAOR (1967) 6 th Cmttee., 998th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.998) para. 9;
Ukrainian SSR, ibid. 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 44; Senegal, ibid. 1002nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 4;
Spain, ibid. para. 49; UAR, ibid. 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 6; Tunisia, ibid. 1004th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1004)
para. 18; Libya, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th Cmttee., 1090th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1090) para. 14. Sukovi? op. cit. no. 336 at p.
329.
394 Romania, A/AC.125/SR.61 (1967) p. 4; Iraq, 25 GAOR (1970) 6 th Cmttee., 1180th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.1180)
para. 6; Ethiopia, ibid. 1182nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1182) para. 49; Trinidad and Tobago, ibid. 1183rd mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1183) para. 5.
395 See e.g. India: “India stood fully committed behind that resolution, which should remain the guiding star in
the fight for the liquidation of the remaining relics of colonialism.” A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 69.
396 Poland, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 58; Nigeria, ibid. p. 58; Madagascar, ibid. p. 60; Czechoslovakia, ibid. p.
60; Zambia, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1178th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1178) para. 13; Tanzania, ibid. 1179th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1179) para. 43; Iraq, ibid. 1180th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1180) para. 7; Democratic Republic of Congo, ibid.
para. 40; Bulgaria, ibid. 1181st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1181) para. 2; Algeria, ibid. para. 14; Mali, ibid. para. 37; Mongolia,
ibid. 1182nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1182) para. 12; Kenya, ibid. para. 59; Trinidad and Tobago, ibid. 1183rd mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1183) para. 5; India, ibid. para. 11; Ecuador, ibid. para. 34; Togo, ibid. para. 11.
397 See Canada: “While his delegation would not wish to ignore the General Assembly’s declaration on
colonialism (resolution 1514 (XV)), which was an important political document, it did not regard that declaration as
a mandatory source.” A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 10.
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completely and without delay”.398 On the other hand, US and UK drafts took a more progressive
approach, with emphasis on the development of the institutions of free self-government. It was
sufficient that the administering authority, “maintain a readiness to accord self-government,
through free choice”, and in “good faith” develop self-governing institutions.
The Declaration to some extent accommodated both positions. It followed the formula in the
Colonial Independence Declaration that alien subjugation, domination and exploitation was a
denial of fundamental rights and contrary to the Charter. It also called for, “a speedy end to
colonialism”. However, “speedy” was not the same as “immediate”,399 and as the US delegate
noted, “reasonable men could differ as to the meaning of ‘speedy’.”400 The US also considered
that: “Nor were Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter in any way altered.”401
As to the ways in which self-determination could be implemented, the Declaration built on the
options contained in GA Res. 1541(XV). Although, like GA Res. 1514(XV), it equated “self-
determination and freedom and independence”, the Declaration stated that either a sovereign and
independent state, integration or free association could be modes for implementing self-
determination. This was considered by some states to be sensible and realistic considering that
many of the remaining colonies were small islands with few resources.402 Moreover, in addition,
the Declaration stated that an act of self-determination could involve, “any other political status
freely determined by a people”. The United States, in particular, considered that this reference to
the free expression of the will of the people constituted the essence of self-determination.403
ii. The Use of Force
However, there were deeper divisions opening up over the implementation of self-
determination. A major area of contention in the drafting was over the use of force in self-
determination. The issue fundamentally split the Assembly. On one hand, with attention
increasingly focussed on Portugal and the white minority regimes in South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia, there was strong support for the use of force in self-determination. This was a
predominant position among African, Asian and Socialist states. Typically, it was argued that
peoples engaged in an armed struggle for self-determination were acting in self-defence.404 It
398 Czechoslovakia, (A/AC.125/L.16, part VI), 21 GAOR (1966) Annexes III, Agenda Item 87, (A/6230)
para.457.
399 See Iraq, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1180th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1180) para. 7.
400 US, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1180th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1180) para. 25.
401 US, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 83.
402 Canada, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1179th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1179) para. 30; New Zealand, ibid. 1181st
mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1181) para. 8.
403 US, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 129.
404 India, A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) p. 5; Algeria, A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) pp. 6-7; Poland, A/AC.125/SR.64
(1967) p. 8; Ghana, A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) pp. 13-4; Syria, A/AC.125/SR.65 (1967) pp. 11-2; Yugoslavia,
A/AC.125/SR.65 (1967) p. 14; Kenya, A/AC:125/SR.65 (1967) p. 18; Romania, A/AC.125/SR.66 (1967) p. 9;
Madagascar, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 11; Cameroon, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 14; USSR, A/AC.125/SR.89
(1968) p. 93; Czechoslovakia, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 924th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.924) para. 25; Ukrainian SSR,
ibid. 928th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.928) para. 15; Romania, ibid. 934th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.934) para. 12; Libya, ibid. 935 th
mtg., (A/C.6/SR.935) para. 20; Mongolia, ibid. para. 25; Indonesia, ibid. para. 32; Cuba, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th
Cmttee., 995th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.995) para. 9; Congo (Brazzaville), ibid. 998th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.998) para. 6;
Hungary, ibid. 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 8; Tanzania, ibid. para. 65; Senegal, ibid. 1002nd mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 34; Somalia, ibid. 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 47; Tunisia, ibid. 1004 th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1004) para. 17; Iraq, 23 GAOR (1968) 6 th Cmttee., 1095th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1095) para. 25; Zambia, ibid.
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was also claimed that those peoples could receive assistance,405 and that such assistance was not
a violation of the UN Charter or the territorial integrity of states.406
What this right of self-defence entailed varied. Hard-liners argued that the mere existence of
colonialism was inherent aggression to which people were entitled to self-defence by whatever
means necessary.407 A more moderate view was that peoples who had been denied the
opportunity to exercise self-determination peacefully then had a right to self-defence.408 Support
for self-defence, therefore, encompassed a range of positions, and states sometimes shifted their
stance according to the circumstances.409
Although self-defence was proclaimed as a general right of colonial peoples, it appeared to be
primarily directed at Portuguese colonies,410 and the regimes of South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia.411 Some Arab states also raised Palestine.412 Some states differentiated between
colonial situations. Cameroon offered what it called the “‘progressive’ colonial Powers” a
compromise in which force was a last resort, but would be “unreasonable” if a procedure was
available for self-determination to be implemented “within a reasonable period”.413
On the other hand, there were other states, prominently Western, who staunchly opposed such
ideas. They argued that self-defence, under article 51 applied only to states,414 and the extension
of the concept was incompatible with the Charter,415 detrimental to peace,416 and a licence for
terrorism.417 The US called the right to assistance, “an open invitation for the illegal use of force
and for intervention in the internal affairs of other States.”418
The resulting compromise, contained in paragraph 5, constituted a delicately worded balance,
which really papered over rather than resolved the differences between states. First, every State
had the duty to refrain from any forcible action, which deprived peoples referred to in the
1096th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096) para. 22; Algeria, ibid. para. 29; Cyprus, ibid. para. 41; Kuwait, 24 GAOR (1969) 6 th
Cmttee., 1162nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1162) para. 4; Mexico, ibid. para. 57; Sudan, ibid. para. 64; Bulgaria, ibid. para.
87; Pakistan, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1179th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1179) para. 19.
405 Senegal, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 1002nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 34; Mexico, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th
Cmttee., 1162nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1162) para. 57.
406 Indonesia, 21 GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 935th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.935) para. 30; Iraq, ibid. 938 th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.938) para. 35; Afghanistan, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1161st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1161) para. 22;
Mongolia, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1182nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1182) para. 16.
407 Ghana, A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) p. 14.
408 Cameroon, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 14.
409 Yugoslavia: “The right of self-defence of peoples under colonial domination constituted an exception to the
prohibition of the use of force, which for the Yugoslav delegation was the universal and absolute rule. The exception
applied only in the event of repressive measures being taken by a colonial power against a people aspiring to self-
determination.” A/AC.125/SR.65, (1967), p. 14. “Peoples were entitled to claim the right to secede and fight by all
means for their national liberation”. A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 4.
410 See Tanzania, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 64; Tunisia, ibid. 1004th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1004) para. 17; Algeria, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th Cmttee., 1096th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096) para. 30.
411 Tanzania, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 65; Cameroon, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th
Cmttee., 1086th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1086) para. 19.
412 Syria, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1160th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1160) para. 23; UAR, ibid. para. 55.
413 Cameroon, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1160th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1160) para. 17.
414 France, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 15; Argentina, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) pp. 16-7; Australia,
A/AC.125/SR.107 (1969) p. 76.
415 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 5;
416 Canada, A/AC.125/SR.66 (1967) p. 17; Japan, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 17; Italy, A/AC.125/SR.89 (1968)
p. 83; Netherlands, A/AC.125/SR.107 (1969) p. 86.
417 UK, A/AC.125/SR.65 (1967) p. 7.
418 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 6; also Sweden, 21 GAOR (1966) 6 th Cmttee., 933rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.933)
para. 21;
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Declaration of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. Second, such
peoples forcibly deprived of self-determination were entitled to take action against and resist
such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination. Third, those
peoples were entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter.
States, therefore, were prohibited from forcible action, which deprived peoples of their right
to self-determination.419 This, however, was arguably no more than the duty on states in
paragraph 2 to promote the realisation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination.420
Some states, particularly those with dependent territories, argued that this did not prejudice the
maintenance of law and order, which was considered to be an obligation under the Charter and
international law, and necessary for the people’s advancement.421 The text itself only referred to
forcible action which deprived peoples of their right to self-determination, which might not
necessarily preclude the use of force for other purposes.422 Indonesia, though, pointed out that
phrases like “police action” and “law and order” could be euphemisms, which from its own
experience evoked bitter memories.423
Peoples who had been forcibly deprived of self-determination were entitled, “in pursuit of
their right to self-determination”, to take “actions against” and “resistance to” such “forcible
action”. This was a more moderate version of the self-defence argument than the Non-Aligned
drafts, which referred to peoples who had merely been “deprived” of the right,424 and fell well
short of the inalienable right to struggle in Socialist drafts.425 Precisely what form this action or
resistance could take was not elaborated. The obvious inference was that resistance to forcible
action would likewise involve force, but the issue was left open.
Such peoples in their resistance were entitled to seek and receive support from states. This
support was, however, to be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
Consequently, its nature depended on how states read the Charter. If the Charter’s purposes and
principles were to prohibit the threat or use of force and to promote the peaceful settlement of
disputes, then support might only be limited to humanitarian or other non-military assistance.426
419 Czechoslovakia, A/AC.125/SR.62 (1967) p. 8; Kenya, A/AC.125/SR.65 (1967) p. 17; Yugoslavia,
A/AC.125/SR.87 (1968) p. 51; Romania, A/AC.125/SR.88 (1968) pp. 68-9; Netherlands, A/AC.125/SR.107 (1969)
p. 86; France, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 48.
420 Cassese op. cit. no. 11 at p. 152; Pomerance op. cit. no. 259 at pp. 50-1.
421 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 5; UK, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) pp. 19-20; Japan, A/AC.125/SR.105 (1969)
p. 52; Australia, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 63.
422 Arangio-Ruiz loc. cit. no. 1 at pp. 567-8.
423 Indonesia, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1182nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1182) para. 75.
424 13 Power (Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, Dahomey, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria,
UAR, Yugoslavia): “[P]eoples who are deprived of their legitimate right of self-determination and complete
freedom are entitled to exercise their inherent right of self-defence, by virtue of which they may receive assistance
from other States.” (A/AC.125/L.31 and Add.1-3) 24 GAOR (1969) Supplement No. 19, (A/7619) para. 139; 10
Power (Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, UAR, Yugoslavia), (A/AC.125/L.48)
ibid. para. 143.
425 Czechoslovakia: “Peoples have an inalienable right to eliminate colonial domination and to carry on the
struggle, by whatever means, for their liberation, independence and free development. Nothing in this Declaration
shall be construed as affecting the exercise of that right.” (A/AC.125/L.16, part VI) 24 GAOR (1969) Supplement
No. 19, (A/7619) para. 138; Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and USSR: “Peoples who are under colonial
domination have the right to carry on the struggle, by whatever means, including armed struggle, for their liberation
from colonialism and may receive in their struggle assistance from other States.” (A/AC.125/L.74) ibid. para. 145.
426 US, “The text recognized that, in those cases where the right to self-determination was being forcible denied,
the peoples entitled to that right might seek and receive support which was in accordance with the Charter. In the
view of the United States, that language did not enlarge rights contained in the Charter and did not constitute a
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However, if they were to promote respect for the right to self-determination and to end
colonialism, then the scope for support could be wider and perhaps encompass forcible action.427
In short, paragraph 5 represented a consensus but not an agreement. By some careful
linguistic juggling and intentional ambiguity, it was able to offer something, though not
everything, to all sides. Sharp disagreement between states was cushioned by vague
formulations. One such ambiguity was the purposes and principles of the Charter, which was
especially ironic as the Declaration was intended as a codification of those principles.
This concept of self-determination and forcible action in the Declaration was further
developed in the General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314(XXIX), of
1974.428 Like the Declaration, this was a consensus instrument, which, in article 3, outlined acts
which “regardless of a declaration of war, shall…  qualify as an act of aggression”. In article 7,
however, nothing in the Definition, in particular article 3, was in any way to prejudice the right
to self-determination, freedom and independence, derived from the UN Charter, of peoples who
were forcibly deprived of the right and who had been referred to in the Friendly Relations
Declaration. These peoples were, in particular, those under colonial and racist regimes or other
forms of alien domination. The Definition did not prejudice the right of such peoples to struggle
to that end, and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter
and in conformity with the Declaration on Friendly Relations.429
This article was, therefore, an exception to a definition of aggression,430 and comments by
states suggest that it was intended, in particular, to apply to article 3(g),431 which defined as
aggression: “The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State”. This would appear to
place the article in the context of guerrilla warfare by national liberation movements.
The article was explicitly based on the Declaration, which it referred to twice, and like the
Declaration it represented a delicately worded balance. The peoples in the article were explicitly
those, which had been referred to in the Declaration. They were peoples that had been “forcibly
general licence for an international traffic in arms.” A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) p. 83.
427 Cameroon: “Violation of the principle of self-determination by colonial Powers, in particular by the threat or
use of force, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to international law; hence the colonial peoples
concerned were entitled to liberate their territory from foreign occupation, and it was the duty of the community of
nations to give them every kind of assistance in doing so.” A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 14.
428 GA Res. 3314(XXIX), 29 GAOR (1974) Supplement No. 31, (A/9631) pp. 142-4.
429 Article 7: “Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-
determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right
and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial
and racist régimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to
seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration.”
430 B. V. A. Röling, “The 1974 U.N. Definition of Aggression” in A. Cassese ed., The Current Legal Regulation
of the Use of Force (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986) pp. 413-21 at p. 418.
431 Egypt: “[T]he fact that the definition included the acts enumerated in article 3(g) could in no way prejudice
the right of peoples to fight for their right of self-determination, freedom and independence or the right of other
States to assist those peoples in their just struggle.” A/AC.134/SR.113 (1974) p. 52; Kenya: “It should be noted that
subparagraph (g) had no relevance whatsoever to the right of a State to give support to peoples struggling against
colonialism, foreign domination or racist oppression. That right was recognized in the Declaration on Friendly
Relations and was explicitly safeguarded in article 7 of the draft definition.” 29 GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1474th
mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1474) para. 24; Algeria, ibid. 1479th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1479) para. 33; Ghana, 28 GAOR (1973) 6th
Cmttee., 1442nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1442) para. 66; Democratic Republic of the Congo, A/AC.134/SR.45 (1969) pp.
178-9.
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deprived” of the right of self-determination and were, in particular, “peoples under colonial and
racist régimes or other forms of alien domination”.
This specification of “peoples under colonial and racist régimes” was a development on the
Declaration, where such groups were only implied. The common denominator between these
peoples was alien domination. However, alien domination was also recognised as not being
exclusive to these situations and was left open-ended: “other forms… ” States were unclear as to
what these other forms might be, although a number referred to Palestine.432 Some states
expressed concern about this ambiguity. Australia, for example, raised the spectre that: “A
dissident group – and what State could claim that there was no such group within its borders –
need only invoke the right to self-determination to gain entitlement to use force and to call on
and receive assistance from outside sources.”433
The right of these peoples forcibly deprived of self-determination to struggle again
represented a softer version of the self-defence argument, although some states made their own
interpretations of, “forcibly deprived”. Tunisia, for example, qualified its understanding of
“forcibly” with “or by other more indirect means”.434 Yugoslavia also argued that, “peoples
deprived of their rights by subtle rather than forcible means were equally entitled to fight for
them.”435 The concept of “struggle” also varied considerably among states. Canada considered
that “struggle” meant, “struggle by peaceful means, and not as a condonation of the use of force
contrary to the provisions of the Charter.”436 Yugoslavia, on the other hand, believed peoples
could use, “all means at their disposal”437 and Democratic Yemen specified that it encompassed
“armed force”438
The support which these peoples could seek and receive was in accordance with the principles
of the Charter and conformity with the Declaration. The Declaration had, of course, been notably
ambiguous about the principles of the Charter and a familiar division was again expressed about
the nature of support they entitled states to give. Belgium, for example, believed that the Charter
did not sanction the use of force in self-determination.439 Australia claimed it could not be used
to, “condone the use of armed force in the name of self-determination.”440 The United States
considered that, “the article did not legitimize acts of armed force by a State, which would
otherwise constitute aggression.”441 On the other hand, Zambia argued that material support for
liberation struggles did not constitute aggression under the Charter,442 and for Uganda such
432 Iraq, A/AC.134/SR.59 (1970) p. 80; Syria, A/AC.134/SR.73 (1970) p. 102; Saudia Arabia, 23 GAOR (1968)
6th Cmttee., 1074th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1074) para. 46; Indonesia, 27 GAOR (1972) 6th Cmttee., 1349th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1349) para. 69.
433 Australia, A/AC.134/SR.95 (1972) p. 33.
434 Tunisia, 29 GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1482nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1482) para. 26.
435 Yugoslavia, A/AC.134/SR.113 (1974) p. 33.
436 Canada, 29 GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1474th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1474) para. 15.
437 Yugoslavia, 29 GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1479th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1479) para. 9.
438 Democratic Yemen, 29 GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1479th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1479) para. 27.
439 Belgium, 29 GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1476th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1476) para. 11. See also Netherlands, 29
GAOR (1974) 6th Cmttee., 1473rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1473) para. 5; UK, ibid. 1477th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1477) para. 24;
FRG, ibid. 1478th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1478) para. 19.
440 Australia, A/AC.134/SR.95 (1972) pp. 32-3.
441 US, A/AC.134/SR.113 (1974) p. 29
442 Zambia, 27 GAOR (1972) 6th Cmttee., 1351th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1351) para. 8. See also Ghana,
A/AC.134/SR.73 (1970) p. 97; Indonesia, A/AC.134/SR.106 (1973) p. 24; Bulgaria, A/AC.134/SR.108 (1973) p.
42; Afghanistan, 25 GAOR (1970), 6th Cmttee. 1206th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1206) para. 50; Pakistan, ibid. 1207th mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1207) para. 20; Kenya, 27 GAOR (1972) 6th Cmttee., 1350th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1350) para. 33; GDR, 28
GAOR (1973) 6th Cmttee., 1441st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1441) para. 17; Cuba, ibid. para. 31; USSR, 29 GAOR (1974) 6th
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support could include arms and personnel.443
6. The Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE: FINAL ACT
(EXTRACTS)444
VIII. Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at
all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the
relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right,
in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without
external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as
among States: they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.
CHARTER OF PARIS FOR A NEW EUROPE (EXTRACTS)445
We reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations and with relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial
integrity of States.
a. Background
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was an important symbol of détente,
a certain thawing in Cold War relations between the countries of NATO and the regimes of the
Warsaw Pact. 35 countries were involved (all 33 European states, except Albania, plus the
United States and Canada), and the conference took place in three stages: Helsinki in 1973,
Geneva in 1974 and then Helsinki again in 1975. The resultant Helsinki Final Act 1975 included
a declaration of ten principles to guide relations between states.446
Cmttee., 1472nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1472) para. 5; Libya, ibid. 1477th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1477) para. 15; Turkey, ibid.
para. 27; Congo, ibid. 1478th mtg. (A/C.6/SR.1478) para. 35; Algeria, ibid. 1479 th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1479) para. 33;
Cameroon, ibid. 1483rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1483) para. 13.
443 Uganda, A/AC.134/SR.73 (1970) p. 93.
444 Helsinki Final Act 1975, 14 ILM (1975) pp. 1292-1324 at p. 1295.
445 Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990, 31 ILM (1991) pp. 193-209 at p. 197.
446 See generally T. Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act: Conclusions”, in
T. Buergenthal ed., Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord (Allanheld, Osmun & Co., Montclair,
1977) pp. 3-10; A. Cassese, “The Helsinki Declaration and Self-determination” in ibid. pp. 83-110; H. S. Russell,
“The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingag or Lilliput?” 70 American Journal of International Law (1976) pp. 242-72;
J. Salo, “Self-determination: An Overview of History and Present State with Emphasis on the CSCE Process” 2
Finnish Yearbook of International Law (1991) pp. 268-342 at pp. 310-9; Cassese op. cit. no. 11 at pp. 278-92; B.
Meissner, “The Right to Self-Determination After Helsinki and its Significance for the Baltic Nations” 13 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (1981) pp. 375-384 at pp. 375-8; G. Arangio-Ruiz, “Human Rights
182
The basis for these principles was the UN Charter,447 and for many states the Friendly
Relations Declaration.448 Although the Final Act itself was not formally legally binding: “a
solemn political and moral obligation”,449 according to Norway; “a moral commitment to be
ignored at our mutual peril”, for Britain, but, “not a treaty”:450 its principles were treated as
significant elaborations of those of the Charter. As the host nation Finland argued, “the
principles…  are not merely repeating what has been said before but, proceeding from an
established basis, recognizing its value, they mean developing a new set of standards to open up
new dimensions in the mutual relations of States.”451 The Final Act has been considered by the
ICJ (though not in relation to self-determination)452 and the Canadian453 and Russian454 courts in
determining the state of international law.
b. The Balance in the Final Act
Draft proposals on self-determination were submitted to the conference by the Soviet
Union,455 Yugoslavia,456 the Netherlands,457 and France,458 and the right also featured in a West
German proposal on frontiers. The result was principle VIII, which drew, in particular, on the
French and Yugoslav drafts, and represented an accommodation of various interpretations of
and Non-Intervention in the Helsinki Final Act” 157 Recueil des Cours (1977) IV pp. 195-328 at pp. 223-31.
447 GDR, (CSCE/I/PV.3) pp. 8-10; Yugoslavia, (CSCE/I/PV.5) p. 33.
448 Spain, CSCE/I/PV.3) p. 87; Austria, (CSCE/I/PV.5) p. 39; Italy, (CSCE/I/PV.6) p. 7; Turkey, (CSCE/I/PV. 6)
pp. 23-5.
449 Norway, (CSCE/III/PV.5) p. 76.
450 UK, (CSCE/III/PV.2) pp. 12, 16.
451 Finland, (CSCE/III/PV.4) p. 72.
452 Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986) p. 100, para. 189.
453 Supreme Court of Canada, Re. Secession of Quebec, 161 Dominion Law Reports (1998) 4th Series, p. 436,
para. 121, pp. 438-9, para. 129.
454 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Tatarstan Case, 30:3 Statutes and Decisions of the USSR and
Its Successor States (1994) p. 41.
455 USSR: “equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with which all peoples possess the right
to establish a social regime and choose a form of government which they consider expedient and necessary to secure
economic, social and cultural development of their country”. (CSCE/I/3) p. 3.
456 Yugoslavia: “The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples for the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation between States in Europe and
the world as a whole and the for the eradication of any form of subjugation or of subordination contrary to the will
of the peoples concerned.They will observe the right of every people freely to determine its political status and to
pursue, independently and without external interference, its political, economic, social and cultural development.
They will refrain from any forcible or other action denying the equal rights or right of self-determination of any
people.” (CSCE/I/28) p. 4.
457 Netherlands: “Every participating State shall conduct its relations with every other participating State on the
basis of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations.The participating States recognize the inalienable right of every people, freely and with all due respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, to choose, develop, adapt or change its political, economic, social or
cultural system, without interference of any kind on the part of any State or group of States.” (CSCE/II/A/8) p. 1.
458 France: “The participating States recall that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the development
of friendly relations among nations is based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples. By virtue of this principle, all peoples have the right to determine their internal and external political status
in full freedom and without external interference and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development; and
all States have the duty to respect this right. The participating States consider that respect for these principles must
guide their mutual relations just as it must characterize relations among all States.” (CSCE/II/A/12) p. 4.
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self-determination.
The universal nature of self-determination was affirmed in all three paragraphs of the final
act: “the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination”; “all peoples always have
the right, in full freedom to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external
political status… ”; “participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and
effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of
friendly relations among themselves as among States”. However, respect for self-determination
was to be “at all times” in conformity with “the purposes and principles of the Charter” and “the
relevant norms of international law”, the most explicit of which was, “the territorial integrity of
States.” The relationship between self-determination and other principles can be divided in two
along the lines of the “internal” and “external” political status of people provided in paragraph
two.
As a right of peoples to determine their external political status, self-determination was
balanced, in particular, by principle IV, the territorial integrity of states, and principle III, the
inviolability of frontiers. The obvious intent in the reference to territorial integrity was to prevent
self-determination being used to legitimise secession. This was apparently especially a concern
for Canada and Yugoslavia.459 Territorial integrity was also appealed to by Spain to override the
principle of self-determination in Gibraltar.460
The relationship between self-determination and the principle of the inviolability of frontiers
appeared to have more fluidity. All the Eastern Bloc regimes stressed the inviolability of
frontiers.461 For the Soviet Union, which had divided Germany, moved Poland, and annexed the
Baltic States and parts of Finland, Romania, Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia, recognition
of existing frontiers was an especially important goal. Poland, with a sensitive border with
Germany, objected to any connection between frontiers and self-determination, and made a
corresponding reservation to the right in its “external” application.462
Western countries, though, appeared to take the view that inviolability of frontiers did not
mean “immutability”.463 The idea that the principle allowed the possibility of peaceful change
was championed, in particular, by West Germany, which submitted a proposal connecting it with
self-determination.464 The explicit aim was to create, “a state of peace in Europe in which the
German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination.”465 Similarly, the Irish
459 Russell loc. cit. no. 446I at pp. 269-70.
460 Spain, (CSCE/I/PV.3) p. 87. See also Interpretative Statement by the Spanish Delegation, 8 June 1973,
(CESC/HC/51).
461 USSR, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 13; Poland, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 30; GDR, (CSCE/I/PV.3) p. 11; Romania,
(CSCE/I/PV.4) p. 38-40; Bulgaria, (CSCE/I/PV.4) p. 62; Czechoslovakia, (CSCE/I/PV.4) p. 87; Hungary,
(CSCE/III/PV3) p. 73.
462 Statement by the Delegation of the Polish Peoples Republic, (CSCE/II/A/33), p. 1.
463 Ireland, (CSCE/I/PV.6) p. 86; Denmark, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 22; Canada, (CSCE/I/PV.4) p. 26; FRG,
(CSCE/I/PV.3) p. 26; US, (CSCE/I/PV.5) p. 72; Belgium, (CSCE/I/PV.6) p. 73; Netherlands, (CSCE/I/PV.7) p. 19;
UK, (CSCE/III/PV.2) p. 11; Greece, (CSCE/III/PV.2) p. 26; Sweden, (CSCE/III/PV.4) pp. 52, 53-5; Spain,
(CSCE/III/PV.4) p. 82.
464 Federal Republic of Germany: “The participating States have the duty to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the existing international frontiers of another participating State or for the settlement of territorial
disputes and questions relating to State frontiers. The participating States regard one another’s frontiers, in their
existing form and irrespective of the legal status which in their opinion they possess, as inviolable. The participating
States are of the opinion that their frontiers can be changed only in accordance with international law, through
peaceful means and by agreement with due regard for the right of the peoples to self-determination.” FRG,
(CSCE/II/A/3) p. 4. See also US, (CSCE/I/PV.5) p. 72.
465 FRG, (CSCE/III/PV.2) p. 92.
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Republic, with an eye to Northern Ireland, stressed the possibility that frontiers could evolve, “by
peaceful means and by agreement.” It was added that a union with the North, “could and should
only happen if and when a majority of the people in Northern Ireland declare their willingness to
join with us in a future united Ireland.”466
Self-determination, however, even in the West German proposal, was not the only principle to
be taken into account in the modification of boundaries. Any changes were to take place
peacefully, referring to the principles of the prohibition of the threat or use of force,467 non-
intervention468 and the peaceful settlement of disputes;469 and with the agreement of the states
concerned, referring to the principle of sovereign equality.470
The internal aspects of self-determination appeared to be connected to its relationship with the
principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, in principles I and VI, respectively. In fact
paragraph 2, on the right of all peoples to determine their internal political status and to pursue as
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development, bore a striking similarity to
principle I on sovereign equality: “participating States will respect…  each other’s right freely to
choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems...” A number of states
implicitly connected the three principles,471 and the three were explicitly connected by the
Netherlands:
“It will…  be important that in the final document on principles, adequate mention be made
of the inalienable right of the people of every State freely to choose, to develop and, if
desired, to change its political, economic, social and cultural systems without interference
in any form by any other State or group of States and with due respect to human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
In the…  [Friendly Relations Declaration] this element is mentioned three times, that is, in
the Chapter on sovereign equality, in that on equal rights and self-determination of peoples
and in that on non-intervention.”472
Eastern European states also connected self-determination to sovereignty and non-
intervention as they had done at the United Nations to support the principle that their social and
political order was not subject to outside interference.473 However, the hope in the West was that
respect for the three principles would create an opportunity for peoples in Eastern Europe to
develop their own political systems without the Soviet interference that had taken place in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968. This would correspond to the earlier uses of
“internal” and “external” self-determination as an attempt to promote liberal government. The
Netherlands, referring to “internal self-determination”, stated that:
“It can happen that a nation, which at some moment in its history had adopted a certain
political or social-economic system, may want to adjust this system to changed
466 Ireland, (CSCE/III/PV.3) p. 52.
467 Denmark, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 22; Belgium, (CSCE/I/PV.6) p. 73; Greece, (CSCE/III/PV.2) p. 26.
468 Greece, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 26.
469 Canada, (CSCE/I/PV.4) p. 26.
470 Denmark, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 22; US, (CSCE/I/PV.5) p. 72; Greece, (CSCE/III/PV.2) p. 26.
471 San Marino, (CSCE/I/PV.6) p. 97; Portugal, (CSCE/III/PV.5) p. 11; US, (CSCE/III/PV.5) pp. 23-5.
472 Netherlands, (CSCE/I/PV.7) p. 19.
473 USSR, (CSCE/I/PV.2) p. 13, (CSCE/III/PV.3) pp. 42-5; Yugoslavia, (CSCE/III/PV.4) p. 21; Czechoslovakia,
(CSCE/I/PV.4) p. 87; Romania, (CSCE/III/PV.5) p. 82.
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circumstances. If in such a situation the peoples’ democratic rights to adapt its structures
were interfered with, either from within or especially from outside, tensions could build up
which might endanger peace and security.”474
c. The Paris Charter 1990
Many of these relationships between self-determination and other principles, which were
mostly theoretical in the Final Act, were being tested at the time of the debate on the Paris
Charter 1990. When delegates met in Paris in November of that year, they did so in a very
different Europe from that of Helsinki in 1975. The previous year had seen Communist regimes
fall in rapid succession in Eastern Europe from the Elbe River to the Black Sea. The Soviet and
Yugoslav regimes were liberalising, but also noticeably fraying. Germany had been reunified.
Aspirations, expressed as self-determination, which only a few years ago were just dreams, could
now be realised. However, the dilemma at Paris was that, while self-determination could be
liberating, it could also be highly destabilising. The liberal government, long hoped for in
Eastern Europe seemed inseparable from nationalism. As French President François Mitterrand
asked the conference in his opening address, “have we overcome the division of Europe into two
blocs only to see it disintegrate as a result of aspirations which had been too long stifled by
force?”475
This new political situation also appeared to be reflected in the balance between self-
determination and other principles.476 The Charter’s provision on self-determination seemed to
be a trimmed down version of principle VIII of the Final Act. The universal significance of the
right, its basis for friendly relations and its internal and external aspects were all cut. The Charter
only reaffirmed the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity
with the UN Charter and the relevant norms of international law, which included the territorial
integrity of states.
This formula of less emphasis on self-determination but consistent support for territorial
integrity reflected the mood in Paris. Self-determination was seen to encapsulate legitimate
aspirations. A newly liberated Hungary highlighted the plight of Eastern Europe: “Nations lost
their independence, others waited hopelessly for the enjoyment of their right to self-
determination. Now the world echoes to the watchword of freedom and this demand must be met
to everyone’s satisfaction.”477 However, there was widespread concern over the rise of
destabilising nationalism.478 Poland warned of, “sinister clouds of resurging conflicts of bygone
474 Netherlands, (CSCE/I/PV.7) p. 18.
475 France, (CSCE/SP/VR.1) p. 3.
476 See generally Cassese op. cit.  no. 11 at pp. 292-6; Salo loc. cit. no. 446 at p. 320.
477 Hungary, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 8. See also Iceland: “[T]here are conflicts these very days between minorities
and majorities and between nations where people are struggling to regain independence lost through a forceful and
unwarrented division of Europe after the Second World War. The rights of self-determination of all people must be
honoured.” (CSCE/SP/VR.3) pp. 34-5. The Holy See: “I will confine myself to referring to just some of these
conditions which the Holy See regards as being particularly important…  respect for the right of peoples to self-
determination in conformity with the rules of law and of peaceful international coexistence, particularly where
historic considerations of justice justify their aspirations to recover their national and State individuality.”
(CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 84.
478 US, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 25; Czechoslovakia, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 43; Switzerland, CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 51;
UK, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) pp. 61-2; Turkey, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 89; Yugoslavia, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 14; Spain,
(CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 23; Austria, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 40; Cyprus, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) pp. 45-6; Germany,
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days”.479 Cyprus recalled from its own experience, “what extreme nationalism can bring in terms
of suffering, destruction and destitution”.480 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev raised the spectre
of, “the ‘Balkanization’ or, even worse, the ‘Lebanization’ of entire regions”.481
To counter these disruptive effects, self-determination was to be contained by territorial
integrity and the inviolability of frontiers. According to France: “Europe has paid a high price to
learn that you cannot play with frontiers with impunity. But too many communities have
experienced frontiers as the blade of a guillotine.”482 Greece argued that, “national frontiers are
inviolable boundaries and not lines of confrontation.”483 The Soviet Union raised the spectre that
territorial changes might have, “a destructive snowball effect that would throw Europe back into
the kind of situation, which it knows only too well from its own history.”484
Nonetheless, there were situations in which states were not prepared to see frontiers as
absolutely inviolable. Many states congratulated Germany on its reunification,485 which had been
achieved, according to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, “in conformity with the right of nations
to self-determination,”486 Similarly, with regard to the Baltic States, Sweden put it on record that
it, “supports their right to self-determination, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the
Helsinki Final Act.”487 Other states argued that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should be involved
in the CSCE process,488 perhaps as observers.489 Britain also repeated the Western position at
Helsinki that territorial changes might be permissible under certain circumstances. Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that: “The Helsinki Accords made clear that borders can only
be changed peacefully by agreement and never by force.”490
Consequently, the balance in the Charter appeared to reflect the view that self-determination
might express legitimate aspirations, but it needed to be considered with other principles and
wider interests of peace and stability. This limited concept of self-determination was perhaps
best summed up by Finnish President Mauno Koivisto: “All peoples have the right to self-
determination and political sovereignty. These aims should be sought through negotiations.”491
(CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 58; Norway, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 64; Bulgaria, (CSCE/SP/VR.4) pp. 30-1.
479 Poland, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 10.
480 Cyprus, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 46.
481 USSR, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 37.
482 France, (CSCE/SP/VR.5) p. 2.
483 Greece, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 28.
484 USSR, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 37.
485 Italy, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 10; US, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 25; Sweden, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 65; Turkey,
(CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 87; Ireland, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 2; Hungary, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 5; Cyprus, (CSCE/SP/VR.3)
p. 45; Belgium, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 53.
486 Germany, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 55.
487 Sweden, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 65.
488 Poland, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 11; Norway, (CSCE/SP/VR.3) p. 64.
489 Czechoslovakia, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 44.
490 UK, (CSCE/SP/VR.2) p. 62.
491 Finland, (CSCE/SP/VR.4) p. 14.
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7. The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1982-)
THE DRAFT DECLARTION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
(EXTRACTS):492
Preamble
[para. 1] Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal in dignity and rights to all other peoples, while
recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as
such,
[para. 14] Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirm the
fundamental importance of the right of self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
[para. 15] Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their right of
self-determination,
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 8
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities
and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as indigenous and be identified as such.
Article 31
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal or local affairs, including culture, religion,
education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and
resources management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing
these autonomous functions.
Article 45
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.
a. Drafting
It is argued in this chapter that states are effected by nationalist considerations of legitimacy
in the drafting of instruments. In the final instrument of this chapter, the draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples these considerations have actually been directly articulated. This
declaration is unique among the instruments covered in that its drafting includes representatives
of indigenous groups and these delegates have challenged the position of states with nationalist
492 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1, pp. 1-11; E/CN.4/2004/81/Add.1, p. 4.
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arguments. The draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples493 does currently
remain a draft. Nonetheless, if it is eventually completed it is likely to be one of the most
important instruments on the issue of self-determination for indigenous and non-state
populations.
The drafting of the Declaration has been a long and still on-going process. Work began in
1982 with the establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations under the
Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities (now the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights).494 This was a group of five experts, originally chaired by Asbjørn Eide and then by
Erica-Irene A. Daes. By 1993 this group had reached agreement on a draft declaration,495
endorsed by the Sub-Commission in 1994. The matter then moved up the UN chain to the
Commission on Human Rights. In 1995 the Commission established another Working Group
under Resolution 1995/32, after which it is named, to further elaborate the draft Declaration.496
This group, chaired by José Urrutia until 1999 and then by Luis-Enrique Chávez, both from
Peru, includes representatives from the 53 states on the Human Rights Commission, who vote on
the proposals, as well as other interested states, international organisations and accredited NGOs.
This work continues to this day.
The drafting brings in representatives from both states and indigenous organisations, and both
are actively involved in the preparation of drafts and in stating their positions. In the first
Working Group on Indigenous Populations the actual draft was prepared by the five experts,
with input from state and indigenous representatives. In the second Working Group under
Resolution 1995/32 the draft is prepared by representatives of the 53 members of the Human
Rights Commission, although again based on proposals by states and indigenous NGOs.497 In
terms of international law, the two sides do not start from equal positions. States will provide the
opinio juris in what is intended to ultimately be a non-binding General Assembly resolution, but
indigenous organisations undoubtedly provide legitimacy for the whole enterprise. The result has
been a mix of nationalist and legal arguments from both the state and non-state perspective, in a
process which has so far rumbled on for over twenty-two years.
b. The Balance in the Draft Declaration
The were two fundamental issues in indigenous self-determination. First, were indigenous
groups “peoples”? Second, what did a right of self-determination involve for such peoples? The
first question ran to the very identity of the declaration itself. Was it a declaration on the rights of
493 On the draft Declaration see E-I A. Daes, “Dilemmas Posed by the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” 63 Nordic Journal of International Law (1994) pp. 205-12; M. C. Lâm, At the Edge of the
State: Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination (Transnational Publishers, New York, 2000) at pp. 68-76; C. M.
Brölmann and M. Y. A. Zieck, “Indigenous Peoples” in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck eds., Peoples and
Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 187-220 at pp. 212-5; Knop op. cit. no. 288
at pp. 248-74; Alfredsson op. cit. no. 57 at pp. 67-9; Alston op. cit. no. 13 at pp. 277-8; E. Gayim, The UN Draft
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples: Assessment of the Draft Prepared by the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 1994); D. Sanders, “Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples” in
C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 55- 81 at pp. 76-81.
494 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33, pp. 3-4.
495 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, Annex I, pp. 50-60.
496 E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 1, para. 1.
497 Lâm op. cit. no. 493 at pp. 70-1, 80-1.
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indigenous populations, indigenous peoples or the generic indigenous people? Each title
reflected a different approach to indigenous rights and generally the issue revealed markedly
different responses from states’ and indigenous representatives.
States were concerned with the use of “peoples” as a legal term of art, specifically connected
with rights under international law. A “people” basically equated with a “self-determination
unit”. The concern of states was to define who was and was not entitled to the right and there
were three particular aspects to their approach.
First, there was considerable attention paid to the question of whether indigenous groups
should be classified as “peoples” or “populations”. The former entailed a right to self-
determination, the latter did not. Many states reluctant to accord this right preferred the use of
“indigenous populations”.498 Alternatively, America argued that indigenous groups should be
interpreted, like minorities, in a non-collective way: “persons belonging to indigenous
groups… ”.499
Second, to the extent that “indigenous peoples” was accepted by states, it was often in a
qualified way. Canada argued that it should be specified that the use of “peoples” had no
consequences for international law, in particular, regarding secession.500 Other states sought to
follow the precedent of ILO Convention No. 169, which specifically distinguished “peoples”
from rights normally attached to the term in international law.501 This effectively set up
“indigenous peoples” as a third category of group in international law, alongside “peoples” and
“persons belonging to…  minorities”, with its own particular rights.
Third, states pressed for objective definitions of peoples to establish, “identifiable and
practicable rights and obligations”.502 States were concerned about the lack of objective criteria
to identify “indigenous peoples”,503 as well as, a variety of other undefined terms in the draft
including “nation”.504 Japan warned that, “having the term ‘indigenous peoples’ unqualified…
could eventually open the way to subjective definitions and, as a consequence, to confusion.”505
China argued that drafting the Declaration without a definition was, “like building a house
without knowing who was going to live in it.”506 This was not simply to delimit the category of
indigenous peoples but also to exclude other populations. Thus, China, which was one of the
498 E/CN.4/2002/98, p. 22.
499 US, E/CN.4/1999/82, pp. 7-8, para. 40. The phrase was modelled on article the Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, GA Res. 47/135, 47 GAOR (1992)
Supplement No. 49, (A/47/49) pp. 211-2.
500 Canada, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 19, para. 62.
501 “The use of the term ‘peoples’ in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards
the rights which may attach to the term under international law.” Article 1(3), Convention concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO Covention 169, 28 ILM (1989) pp. 1384-92 at p. 1385. See ILO,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36, p. 10, para. 30; US, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 19, para. 73; Sweden, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29,
p. 19, para. 64; Chile, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2, pp. 6-7, para. 5; Mexico, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.1, p. 3, para. 3.
However, all indigenous organisations opposed this reference, E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 10, para. 40.
502 US, E/CN.4/1999/82, p. 7, para. 40.
503 Argentina, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2, p. 5, para. 7; Ukraine, ibid. p. 11, para. 2; Japan, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 23,
para. 112; China (PRC), E/CN.4/1998/106, p. 8, para. 37; US, E/CN.4/1999/82, p. 7, para. 40; Bangladesh,
E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 12, para. 69.
504 Canada, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 13, para. 49; Brazil, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 26, para. 132; Australia, ibid.
para. 133; Malaysia, ibid. para. 134; Switzerland, ibid. p. 27, para. 140; Japan, p. 28, para. 142. Also
E/CN.4/2002/98, p. 16, para. 67 and p. 17, para. 70.
505 Japan, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 19, para. 73.
506 China (PRC), E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 44, para. 229.
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most insistent states on a definition, actually argued that it didn’t have any indigenous peoples.507
Its aim was to prevent its own minorities from claiming indigenous rights.
States, therefore, took a legal approach, concerned with defining specific terms with a view to
the content and scope of the right. This, though, was challenged by indigenous representatives
with an essentially nationalist approach to the question of peoples. These representatives, first,
claimed that indigenous peoples should be recognised as “peoples” in international law with
rights equal to others. Second, they sought the widest, most subjective definition of indigenous
peoples. An objective definition with specific criteria was condemned as exclusionary.508
Indigenous peoples had a right to define themselves,509 and this was considered to be an integral
part of their right to self-determination.510 Third, they understood the concept of indigenous
people in the most colloquial way, basing their claims on popular perceptions of nationality. If
indigenous populations looked like the sort of groups that were normally called peoples, then
they were peoples:511
“There can be no doubt that we are peoples with distinct historical, political and cultural
identities and will remain so. We are united by our histories as distinct societies, as well as
by our languages, laws and traditions…
Indigenous peoples are unquestionably peoples in every legal, political, social, cultural and
ethnological meaning of the term. It would be discriminatory, illogical and unscientific to
identify us in the United Nations Declaration…  as anything less than peoples.”512
Many states too doubted whether it was possible or desirable to establish any objective
definition of indigenous peoples.513 It was well-known that international law had failed to
produce a generally-accepted definition of a “people”. However, there were also advantages for
states in leaving indigenous peoples undefined. Without any identifiable international standards,
the implementation of indigenous rights would then have to fall back on national legislation.
Thus, Australia emphasising, “the futility of…  an all-embracing definition of indigenous
peoples”, believed that the matter was best left to national legislation.514 Russia too was prepared
to accept the ambiguities of indigenous self-identification as long as it did not impede its own
national legislation.515
However, this approach was criticised by the Maori Legal Service and the Ka Lahui Hawai’i as
507 China (PRC), E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2, p. 8, paras. 4 and 8. See also US, E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 14, para. 67.
508 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Campaign: “[E]xpressed…  concern that some Governments wanted to define
indigenous peoples in an attempt to water down the draft.” E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 13, para. 56; Asian Cultural Forum
on Development: “[I]f Governments wanted the draft Declaration to keep its universal character they should not
insist on a definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’.” E/CN.4/1999/82, p. 5, para. 26.
509 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20, p. 18, para. 102. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner: “Self-identification as laid down in article 8 was widely recognized in international human rights
law and he referred in that regard to article 1(2) of ILO Convention No. 169.” E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 46, para. 237.
510 International Indian Treaty Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 2, para. 7; E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 7, para. 30;
Indigenous Woman Aboriginal Corporation, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 43, para. 224.
511 “The Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees…  pointed out that they had defined themselves as peoples since
time immemorial.” Grand Council of the Crees, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 20, para. 66.
512 Annex II, Proposals by Indigenous Representatives, Explanatory Note on the Use of the Term Indigenous
“Peoples”, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 32.
513 Switzerland, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 11, para. 46; Denmark, ibid. p. 23, para. 110; Fiji, ibid. p. 26, para. 130.
514 Australia, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 47, para. 240.
515 Russia, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 46, para. 238.
191
leaving the Declaration as only an exercise in, “cosmetic window-dressing”.516
States’ and indigenous representatives also had different views on the scope of the right to
self-determination. The draft Declaration contains in article 3 a general proclamation of the right,
specifically modelled on article 1(1) of the Covenants,517 and in article 31 a more specific
provision, which expands on the right as one of autonomy and internal self-government.
States tended focus on the status of positive international law and there was a lot of talk about
whether practice had moved self-determination from a colonial to some sort of post-colonial
right.518 However, to the extent that they accepted self-determination for indigenous groups,
article 31 was seen to reflect the maximum content of the right: that is one of autonomy or
internal self-government and not of secession.519 Some states argued that articles 3 and 31 should
be combined so that self-determination was spelled out as autonomy or internal self-
government.520 However, many states were concerned about even going that far. Brazil has
considered that article 31 should not prejudice the internal organisation of the state.521 Canada
and New Zealand have similarly argued that self-determination must be exercised within the
constitutional framework of states.522 The Nordic countries also tried unsuccessfully to trim the
article down, cutting it after “local affairs… ”.523 Nonetheless, despite this connection to article
31, neither the language of article 3, nor previous practice, suggested that self-determination was
naturally restricted to autonomy or internal self-government. Argentina pointed out that article 3
used the same formula as the Colonial Independence Declaration (again taken from the
Covenants) and this had been used to promote independence.524
Indigenous representatives, on the other hand, tended to see article 31 as a minimum content
of self-determination along the lines of, “including but not limited to”.525 They pressed for an
516 Maori Legal Service and Ka Lahui Hawai’i, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 13, para. 75.
517 Technical Review of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Note by the
Secretariat, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2, p. 7, para. 30.
518 New Zealand: “… [A] distinction could be made between the right of self-determination as it currently existed
in international law, a right which developed essentially in the post-Second World War era and which carried with it
a right of secession, and a proposed modern interpretation of self-determination within the bounds of a nation-State,
covering a wide range of situations but relating essentially to the right of a people to participate in the political,
economic and cultural affairs of a State on terms which meet their apsirations and which enable them to take control
of their own lives.” E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 17, para. 52; Australia: “[S]elf-determination is not a static concept,
but rather an evolving right which includes equal rights, the continuing right of peoples to decide how they should
be governed, the right of peoples as individuals to participate fully in the political process (particularly by way of
periodic free and fair elections) and the right of distinct peoples within a state to make decisions on and administer
their own affairs (relevant both to indigenous peoples and to national minorities).” E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2, p.
4, para. 8; Canada: “[I]nternational law did not clearly define ‘self-determination’ or ‘peoples’; it was traditionally
understood as the right of colonized peoples to statehood. However, a survey of State practice and academic
literature suggested it was an ongoing right which was expanding to include the concept of an internal right for
groups living within existing States, and which respected the territorial and political integrity of the State.”
E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 63, para. 332; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22, p. 19, para. 99; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22, p. 15, para. 56;
Argentina, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2, p. 3, para. 6; Mexico, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.1, p. 6, para. 3; Morocco, ibid.
p. 6, para. 3; Japan, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 64, para. 338; Pakistan, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 13, para. 77; Guatemala, ibid.
p. 15, para. 88.
519 Columbia, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 59, para. 312; Finland, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 13, para. 76.
520 Venezuela, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 60, para. 318; US, E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 6, para. 22.
521 Brazil, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 64, para. 334;
522 Canada, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 63, para. 332; New Zealand, E/CN.4/2000/84, pp. 13-4, para. 78.
523 Norway, E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 6, para. 19; E/CN.4/2004/81, p. 13, para. 79.
524 Argentina, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 65, para. 340.
525 E/CN.4/2004/81, p. 13, paras. 81 and 83; International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development,
E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 59, para. 311.
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unlimited right of self-determination and did so with primarily nationalist arguments. Self-
determination was an “inherent”526 and “primordial”527 right, which every people had, regardless
of state practice.528 It was also universal529 and any restrictions on it were a “double standard”,
racist and discriminatory.530 These were also backed up with positive legal arguments. The self-
determination had already been recognised as a right of all peoples in instruments, such as the
UN Charter, the Covenants, the Vienna Declaration and Banjul Charter,531 as well as the practice
of various human rights bodies.532 It would, therefore, be unlawful for the Working Group to
limit it. It would also violate the norms of non-discrimination and the prohibition of racial
discrimination.533 It was even argued that the right of all peoples was jus cogens so that if self-
determination was narrowed in scope the resultant Declaration would become void.534
The NGOs made a familiar set of claim about self-determination, almost identical to ones
made in the drafting of the Covenants. Self-determination was not only a right, but a prerequisite
for human rights.535 Moreover, this “cornerstone”536 of the Declaration was also essential for all
the other rights in the draft,537 as well as peace and development,538 and the very survival of
526 “[T]he right of self-determination was an inherent right Governments could neither give nor take away.”
E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 11, para. 47; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 18, para. 68, p. 28, para. 122; Upper Sioux Community,
E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 48, para. 250; Comisión Jurídica para el Autodesarrollo de los Pueblos Originarios Andinos,
ibid. p. 60, para. 315; Movimento Indio “Tupaj Katari”, ibid. p. 61, para. 322.
527 International Indian Treaty Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 5, para. 25.
528 “… [T]he right of self-determination…  was not primarily a post-Second World War concept but had existed
since time immemorial and was not dependent exclusively on international law for its understanding.”
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 17, para. 56; International Indian Treaty Council: “[T]here was no doubt that the right to
self-determination existed without regard to time: that was to say, that the right pre-existed the norm as set out in the
Charter.” E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 3, para. 12.
529 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, p. 26, para. 128; Saami Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 6, para. 6; World Council
of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 62, para. 327;
530 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 28, para. 122; E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 11, para. 47; New South Wales Aboriginal Land
Council, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 62, para. 326.
531 National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 18, para. 58; E/CN.4/1996/84, p.
9, para. 35; Central Land Council, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 63, para. 331; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner, ibid. p. 65, para. 342; International Indian Treaty Council, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 10, para. 57;
ibid. pp. 10-1, paras. 58-9; Saami Council, ibid. p. 12, para. 71; International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs,
ibid. p. 13, para. 76; Indian Law Resource Centre, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 7, para. 40; ibid. pp. 11-2, paras. 66-7.
532 Saami Council, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 12, para. 71; E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 18, para. 105.
533 Saami Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 6, para. 6; World Council of Indigenous Peoples,
E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 9, para. 6; Indian Law Resource Centre, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 12, para. 73; International
Indian Treaty Council, ibid. para. 74.
534 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 18, para. 57; E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 12, para. 71.
535 International Indian Treaty Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 3, para. 8; Saami Council, ibid. p. 6, para. 9;
World Council of Indigenous Peoples, ibid. p. 9, para. 6; International Organization of Indigenous Resource
Development, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 14, para. 60; Comisíon Jurídica para el Autodesarrollo de los Pueblos
Originarios Andinos, ibid. p. 60, para. 315; E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 8, para. 44; Saami Council, ibid. p. 12, para. 71. See
also Denmark, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, pp. 16-7, para. 51.
536 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36, p. 18, para. 56; New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 13,
para. 58; Indigenous World Association, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 61, para. 319; Consejo de Todas las Tierras,
E/CN.4/1998/106, p. 6, para. 24; Delegados Indígenas de Sur- y Centroamérica, ibid. para. 29.
537 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 18, para. 57; Comisíon Jurídica para el Autodesarrollo de los Pueblos Originarios
Andinos, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 60, para. 315; Movimiento Indio “Tupaj Katari”, ibid. p. 61, para. 322; Mejlis
Crimean Tatar People, ibid. para. 323; Commission for the Defence of Human Rights in Central America, ibid. para.
324; International Organization for Indigenous Resource Development, ibid. p. 62, para. 328; Central Land Council,
ibid. p. 63, para. 331; Cordillera Peoples Alliance, ibid. p. 65, para. 344; Foundation of Aboriginal and Islander
Research Action, E/CN.4/1998/106, p. 6, para. 25; Indigenous Initiative for Peace, ibid. p. 7, para. 33;
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indigenous peoples.539 It was also argued that, as collective rights were the combined rights of
individuals in a group, they could not lead to the denial of individual rights.540 States, on the
other hand, warned that collective rights like self-determination could infringe on individual
human rights.541
Indigenous organisations also claimed that there was no need for states to be concerned about
an unlimited right of self-determination:542 1) Secession was generally not a practical option for
indigenous peoples.543 2) Indigenous peoples had a different, “non-statist” view of self-
determination, not tied to territorial sovereignty.544 3) The right of self-determination actually
strengthened states and was thus the best way to avoid their break up.545 4) Self-determination
should be thought of more in terms of a process, rather than a particular outcome,546 or as a
“procedural” right.547 Nonetheless, these NGOs also often kept a margin of ambiguity over
whether self-determination actually included secession. The right did “not necessarily”,548 “not
always”549 or “not automatically”550 lead to separate statehood, but it still was a “possibility”.551
The fact was, of course, that the circumstances of indigenous groups varied. The Cree, for
example, pointed out that the crucial factor in their status was the possibility of secession: not by
themselves but by a non-indigenous minority, the Québécois, which would then effect their
political position.552
This argument that self-determination was a right of “all peoples” was also one that
governments were sensitive to.553 Many indigenous representatives also recognised a need to
E/CN.4/1999/82, p. 4, para. 19; E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 8, paras. 43-4; Navajo Nation, ibid. p. 10, para. 55; ibid. p. 22,
para. 122; Fiji, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 63, para. 330; Guatemala, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 13, para. 73; France, ibid. para,
77.
538 Delegados Indígenas de Sur- y Centroamérica, E/CN.4/1998/106, p. 6, para. 29.
539 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33, p. 15, paras. 70, 72; International Indian Treaty Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 4,
para. 17; Lumad Mindanaw Peoples Federation, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 53, para. 276; Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 8, para. 46; Taller de Historia Oral Andina, ibid. p. 9,
para. 51; Movimiento Indio “Tupaj Katari”, E/EC.4/2001/85, p. 15, para. 86; Explanatory Note on the Collective
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/2002/98, p. 28.
540 E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 9, para. 39.
541 Sweden, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 20, para. 69; Australia, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2, p. 4, para. 9.
542 “[R]ecognizing indigenous peoples’ unqualified right to self-determination is not a threat to State sovereignty
and territorial integrity.” World Council of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 8, para. 3.
543 E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 11, para. 47.
544 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, pp. 25-6, paras. 126-7, 130.
545 International Indian Treaty Council, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 5, para. 24; Association of Indigenous Peoples
of the North, Siberia and Far East, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 8, para. 46; Comisión Jurídica para el Autodesarrollo de los
Pueblos Originarios Andinos, ibid. p. 12, para. 68.
546 E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 8, para. 47; Saami Council: “[S]elf-determination should be understood as an ongoing
process of choice for the achievement of human security and the fulfilment of human needs with a broad scope of
possible outcomes suited to specific situations.” E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 12, para.71.
547 “[T]he right of self-determination [should be viewed] as containing a procedural right that could be exercised
through negotiations between indigneous peoples and Governments, and realizing that the outcome of exercising
this right of self-determination would not lead to secession but could take many forms.” E/CN.4/1996/84, p. 11,
para. 47.
548 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33, p. 15, para. 72; World Council of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 10,
para. 7.
549 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22, p. 19, para. 97.
550 American Indian Movement of Colorado, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 18, para. 60.
551 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22, p. 14, para. 52.
552 Grand Council of the Crees, E/CN.4/1997/102, pp. 12-3, para. 53.
553 Australia, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2, p. 2, para. 2; Finland, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 10, para. 45; Canada,
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balance self-determination.554 Therefore, attention has turned to the balance between self-
determination and other principles. Various possible balances have been identified for the draft
Declaration. The first would be one based on the present article 45, which provides that nothing
in the Declaration was to be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.555 A
second possibility might be to include a balance with territorial integrity or just “principles of
international law” in the preamble.556 A third and less subtle option would be to add a reference
to territorial integrity to article 3,557 although this is one that NGOs have been quite unhappy
with.558
Nonetheless, as a Hawaiian representative pointed out, “the concept of territorial integrity
imposed a requirement of legitimacy on the State”.559 Thus, the drafting has often turned towards
the possibility of a more sensitive balance like the one in the Friendly Relations Declaration. The
principle of territorial integrity did appear more acceptable to indigenous NGOs, or at least
harder to argue against, if it was qualified with conditions of representative government.560 The
drafting also seems to confirm the recent trend in the balance of dropping of “race, creed and
colour” as a requirement in representation. Paragraph 7 was generally interpreted as meaning the
whole people,561 and one organisation specifically required that the balance should be formulated
in this way.562
The use of this balance by states again seemed to be with the intent of supporting territorial
integrity rather than allowing for secession. The balance was raised, in particular, by Western
states, who set the standard for representative government as democracy, which they knew they
could easily fulfil.563 Only one state, Australia, actually attempted to explore how this balance
ibid. p. 63, para. 332; E/CN.4/1999/82, p. 13, para. 68; Norway, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 14, para. 81; France,
E/CN.4/2004/81, p. 6, para. 19.
554 World Council of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 10, para. 8; International Organization for
Indigenous Resource Development, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 62, para. 328; Grand Council of the Crees, ibid. p. 64,
para. 335; Metis National Council, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 8, para. 48; Rights and Democracy, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 12,
para. 72; Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, ibid. p. 16, para. 91; ibid. para. 97.
555 E/CN.4/2004/81/Add.1, p. 8. See Canada: “Canada would interpret article 45 as referring to, inter alia, the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 24, para. 117; Fiji, ibid. p. 63, para. 330.
Finland: “[A]rticle 45 of the declaration should be elaborated in accordance with formulations used in other human
rights instruments…  in particular…  article 8.4 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992 [“Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as permitting
any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial
integrity and political independence of States.”]” E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 12, para. 70; Denmark, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 16,
para. 92. See also World Council of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 10, para. 8.
556 Norway, E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 17; E/CN.4/2004/81, pp. 12-3 and 20.
557 New Zealand, E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 17; Canada, ibid. p. 18.
558 E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 16, para. 94.
559 E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 15, para. 87.
560 E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 7, para. 24.
561 Australia, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 17, para. 66; E-I A. Daes, Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1, p. 4, paras. 20-1; World Council of
Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 10, para. 10;
562 Indian Law Resource Center, E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 6, para. 20.
563 Australia: “[I]t would be difficult to say that a government elected by free and universal suffrage could be
described as unrepresentative of its people or peoples.” E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2, pp. 3-4, para. 7; New
Zealand, E/CN.4/2000/84, pp. 13-4, para. 78; Norway, ibid. p. 14, para. 81; Spain, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 14, para. 83;
Canada, ibid. p. 15, para. 85;
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might lead to a right of secession and even this was extremely cautious. Australia began with the
view that the break up of a state was essentially a domestic matter outside the scope of self-
determination in international law. It also noted that the issue of the representativeness was one
on which states had been reluctant to pass judgment. Nonetheless, to the extent that a right of
secession might exist, the bar for the right was very high: “gross and systematic abuses of the
human rights of a group which could be characterised as a people”.564
Nonetheless, the balance did leave open the possibility of remedial secession and indigenous
NGOs could widen this possibility by lowering the bar. The World Council of Indigenous
Peoples, for example, argued that a right of secession emerged if a government was, “so abusive
and unrepresentative…  that the situation is tantamount to classic colonialism”.565 The concept of
“colonialism” is, of course, open to various interpretations. The International Alliance of
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forest argued that a refusal to recognise a right of
self-determination and autonomy constituted, “domination and exploitation.”566 Indigenous
NGOs also inverted the equation of self-determination with democracy, which underpinned the
balance, arguing that democracy required the realisation of self-determination for all peoples.567
This balance has also been fleshed out, most notably by the Canadian Supreme Court in Re.
Secession of Quebec, with the internal and external aspects of self-determination. There was also
a great deal of discussion about this division in the drafting of the Declaration. Self-
determination in the draft has been interpreted by Erica-Irene A. Daes, the chair of the first
Working Group (1984-93), and a number of states as an internal right.568
However, the drafting has also shown that it is possible to punch holes in the distinction from
a number of directions. Legally, it has been considered that there is no agreement on the status or
content of internal and external self-determination.569 Indigenous NGOs have also been able to
raise the nationalist criticism that the distinction is “artificial” and “unhelpful”.570 The limiting of
indigenous rights to just internal self-determination, in particular, has been called
“discriminatory”.571 They have also been able to breakdown the distinction by opening up the
concept of external self-determination. It was argued that this did not simply mean secession,
and that indigenous peoples were, in fact, exercising self-determination on an external level at by
their participation in the UN Working Group.572 This does raise questions about how convincing
the division is as a way of dealing with the rights of groups within states.
564 Australia, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2, pp. 3-4, paras. 6-7.
565 World Council of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/4, p. 10, para. 11
566 International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forest, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 14, para.
80.
567 Indian Law Resource Centre, Assembly of First Nations, International Treaty Four Secretariat and Grand
Council of the Crees, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 10, para. 59.
568 E-I A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 17, para. 67; Chile, E/CN.4/1997/102, p. 61, para. 320; Finland,
E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 13, para. 76; Russia, ibid. pp. 15-6, para. 90; New Zealand, ibid. p. 18, para. 109; US,
E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 6, para. 22.
569 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22, p. 12, para. 61; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20, p. 13, para. 68; US, E/CN.4/2000/84, p. 9,
para. 49; E/CN.4/2003/92, p. 7, para. 24.
570 E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 13, para. 78. See also “Report on the 6th Session of the Commission on Human Rights
Working Group on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in A. Molbech ed., The Indigenous World
(IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2001) pp. 414-47 at p. 423.
571 Saami Council, E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 14, para. 79; Indian Council of South America, ibid. p. 14, para. 84.
572 E/CN.4/2001/85, p. 13, para. 78.
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Concluding Remarks
The normal technique in the drafting of instruments on self-determination has been to balance
it with other principles, notably territorial integrity, which limit its application. Nonetheless, the
examples have shown two particular problems with this approach. The first is the perception of
the arbitrary restriction of self-determination. As has been seen, an attempt was made in the
Friendly Relations Declaration to soften this perception by connecting self-determination with
representative government and limiting it by satisfaction rather than restriction. The second is
that the balancing principles themselves may encapsulate national ideas. In the Colonial
Independence Declaration the territorial integrity of a “country” proved as much a vehicle for
nationalist claims as the self-determination of a “people”.
The coalition-building role of self-determination could also be seen in the drafting of
instruments. Self-determination represented a principle which states could support in general
while retaining their own interpretations of what it meant. This was also accommodated in
instruments with ambiguous formulas to encompass these differences. Thus, the division
between self-determination as immediate or progressive, which continued throughout the
decolonisation process, was covered by terms such as “immediate steps” and “speedy”.
Likewise, the split over the use of force in self-determination was reconciled by the intentionally
ambiguous phrase, “purposes and principles of the Charter”.
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4
Self-Determination and Courts: Tipping the Balance
Outline
This chapter will look at the approaches taken by courts and other international bodies when
making decisions about self-determination. The first thing to note about approaches to self-
determination it that the right seems to put these bodies in a difficult position. Cases on self-
determination usually involve delicate political situations, which may call into question the very
existence of certain states, while instruments leave courts with only an ambiguous set of
provisions to work with.
There is no better illustration of these problems than the implementation of article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the Human Rights Committee. It may be
recalled that in the drafting of the Covenants that a number of objections were raised to the
inclusion of an article on self-determination. Sceptics argued that, unlike other rights, self-
determination was not held by individuals, but an undefined collective body, the people, and
pointed to the danger that it could be used by minorities to challenge the integrity of states.
Nonetheless, supporters of the article, keen to show their sympathy for colonial peoples,
successfully pressed for its adoption. However, in effect, these problems were not resolved, but
merely transferred. They ended up with the Human Rights Committee, which under the Optional
Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant, could consider communications from individuals
over the violation of rights under the Covenant.
Sure enough the committee began to receive petitions from individuals claiming to represent
groups within states who were peoples with a right to self-determination. In 1980 it received a
communication from the Grand Captain of the Mikmaq Tribal Society alleging that the “Mikmaq
people” had been denied self-determination by Canada and that, “the Mikmaq nation be
recognised as a State.”1 This complaint was dismissed in 1984 on the grounds that the author had
not shown himself to be the authorised representative of the society,2 a decision which avoided
the key question of whether the Mikmaqs were actually a people.3
Nonetheless, petitions continued and in 1990 the Committee made decisions on Lubicon Lake
Band, E. P et al. v. Columbia, South Tirol and Whispering Pines Indian Band, in which it laid
out its approach to self-determination. This was to reject a right of petition over violations of
article 1, and limit communications only to individual rights.4 This approach was somewhat at
1 A. D. v. Canada (Mikmaq Tribal Society), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 200, paras. 2.1-
2.2.
2 Ibid. p. 203, para. 8.2.
3 This was criticised by Committee member Roger Errera, who raised three questions which he considered were
not addressed by the decision: “(1) Does the right of ‘all peoples’ to ‘self-determination’, as enunciated in article 1,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant, constitute one ‘of the rights set forth in the Covenant’ in accordance with the terms of
article 1 of the Optional Protocol? (2) If it does, may its violation by a State party which has acceded to the Optional
Protocol be the subject of a communication from individuals? (3) Do the Mikmaq constitute a ‘people’ within the
meaning of the above-mentioned provisions of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Covenant?” Ibid. p. 204.
4 “The Optional Protocol provides a procedure under which individuals can claim that their individual rights
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odds with the actual wording of the Optional Protocol, which referred to the Committee’s
competence to receive communications on, “any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”5 It also
squared badly with the committee’s own finding that self-determination was, “an essential
condition for the effective guarantee of observance of individual rights and for promotion and
strengthening of those rights”.6 Nonetheless, as the committee recognised in Lubicon Lake and
South Tirol, the approach did avoid the difficult question of whether those groups were actually
peoples.7
The International Court of Justice has also shown a notable caution when dealing with self-
determination. Despite the right’s prominent position in the UN Charter and instruments like GA
Res. 1514(XV), the Court made no reference to it until the Namibia Advisory Opinion of 1971.
This was not for a lack of opportunity. In the Right of Passage (Portugal v. India) case8 1960
and the South West Africa cases 1962 and 19669 both sides in the disputes submitted arguments
involving self-determination. The principle also seemed particularly relevant to the Northern
Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom) case 1963, which involved a disagreement over a
plebiscite in a trust territory.10 Still, aside from the individual opinions of several judges,11 it was
the Namibia Opinion which marked the Court’s first explicit recognition of the principle.12
have been violated. These rights are set out in part III of the Covenant, articles 6 to 27, inclusive.” Bernard
Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, 45 GAOR (1990)
Supplement No. 40, (A/45/40) vol. II, p. 27, para. 32.1; E. P. et al. v. Columbia, Communication No. 318/1988, 45
GAOR (1990) Supplement No. 40, (A/45/40) vol. II, p. 187, para. 8.2; A. B. et al. v. Italy, Communication No.
413/1990, 46 GAOR (1991) Supplement No. 40, (A/46/40) p. 321, para. 3.2; R. L. et al. v Canada, Communication
No. 358/1989, 47 GAOR (1992) Supplement No. 40, (A/47/40) p. 365, para. 6.2.
5 See M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel, Kehl, 1993) at p.
19; J. Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future” in P. Alston
ed., Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 7-67 at p. 36.
6 E. P. et al. v. Columbia, Communication No. 318/1988, 45 GAOR (1990) Supplement No. 40, (A/45/40) vol.
II, p. 187, para. 8.2.
7 Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, 45 GAOR
(1990) Supplement No. 40, (A/45/40) vol. II, p. 27, para. 32.1; A. B. et al. v. Italy, Communication No. 413/1990,
46 GAOR (1991) Supplement No. 40, (A/46/40) p. 321, para. 3.2.
8 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) (Merits), ICJ Reports (1960) pp.
16, 25 and 31.
9 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ
Reports (1962) p. 325, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase),
ICJ Reports (1966) pp. 12, 15; ICJ Pleadings (1966) Vol. I, pp. 189, 193, 195, 198; Vol. II, pp. 70-4, 103-4, 117-8;
Vol. V, pp. 17-8; Vol. VI, pp. 419-20, Vol. IX, p. 374.
10 Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ
Reports (1963) pp. 15-39.
11 Judge Bustamante, Separate Opinion, South West Africa Cases, ICJ Reports (1962) pp. 350-1, 354; Judge
Bustamante, Dissenting Opinion, Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports (1963) p. 178; Judge Wellington Koo,
Dissenting Opinion, South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1966) p. 234; Judge Tanaka, Dissenting
Opinion, ibid. pp. 303-4; Judge Jessup, Dissenting Opinion, ibid. pp. 440-1; Judge Padilla Nervo, Dissenting
Opinion, ibid. p. 470. The most forthright opinion came from Judge Ammoun: “… [T]he principle of equality and
that of non-discrimination on racial grounds which follows therefrom, both of which principles, like that of the right
of self-determination, are imperative rules of law.” Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, Barcelona Traction (Belgium
v. Spain) (Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1970) p. 304.
12 Namibia (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1971) p. 31, paras. 52-3. See J. Dugard, “Namibia (South West
Africa): The Court’s Opinion, South Africa’s Response, and Prospects for the Future” 11 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (1972) pp. 14-49 at p. 21; O. J. Lissitzyn, “International Law and the Advisory Opinion on
Namibia” 11 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1972) pp. 50-73 at pp. 56-8; N. K. Hevener, “The 1971
South-West African Opinion: A New International Juridical Philosophy” 24 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly (1975) pp. 791-810 at pp. 793-4; V. S. Mani, “The Advisory Opinion in Namibia Case: A Critique” 11
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However, while the Court in Namibia did recognise the general applicability of self-
determination to non-self-governing territories, it did not take the next step of applying it directly
to the situation in Namibia. The Western Sahara Opinion of 1975 was also notably ambiguous.
The Court did not find anything to prevent the application of self-determination to the territory,
but was unclear as to what this entailed, speaking ambiguously about the “will of the peoples of
the Territory”,13 without ever defining who they were.
Questions about the Court’s approach were also fuelled by the East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia) Case of 1995.14 This concerned the Timor Gap Treaty 1989 between Australia and
Indonesia, which provided for the exploitation of the offshore oil resources of the Portuguese
colony of East Timor, which Indonesia had forcibly annexed in 1975. Portugal brought the case
against Australia for, among other things, infringing East Timorese self-determination and
permanent sovereignty by concluding this treaty. Portugal could bring an action against Australia
because it had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but not against Indonesia which
had not, and did not participate in the proceedings. This proved to be the critical flaw in the
Portuguese case. The Court found, by fourteen votes to two, that to decide the Portuguese claims
it would first have to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia’s conduct without its consent and
declined to exercise jurisdiction.15 The basis for this was the so-called Monetary Gold Rule that
the Court could not exercise jurisdiction if the legal interests of an unrepresented third party
formed, “the very subject-matter of the decision.”16 However, in previous cases,17 including
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, which dealt with the exploitation of the resources of a trust
territory,18 the Court had taken a restrictive view of this rule. East Timor was the first time in
Indian Journal of International Law (1971) pp. 467-80 at pp. 473-4
13 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 68, para. 162.
14 See C. M. Chinkin, “East Timor Moves to the World Court“ 4 European Journal of International Law (1993)
pp. 206-22; M. C. Maffei, “The Case of East Timor before the International Court of Justice – Some Tentative
Comments” 4 European Journal of International Law (1993) pp. 223-38; C. Chinkin, “The East Timor Case
(Portugal v. Australia)” 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1996) pp. 712-25; C. Antonopoulos,
“Effectiveness v. The Rule of Law Following the East Timor Case” 27 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
(1996) pp. 75-111; B. F. Fitzgerald, “Portugal v. Australia: Deploying the Missiles of Sovereign Autonomy and
Sovereign Community” 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996) pp. 260-71; P. H. F. Bekker, “East Timor” 90
American Journal of International Law (1996) pp. 94-8; K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International
Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at pp. 190-211; Crawford op. cit. no. 5 at pp. 33-6.
15 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 105, para. 35.
16 Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and United States of America (Preliminary Objections) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1954) p. 32.
17 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America) (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), ICJ Reports (1984) p. 431, para. 88;
Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) (Application by
Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene), ICJ Reports (1990) pp. 114-22, paras. 52-73.
18 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru concerned a claim against Australia by the Pacific island of Nauru for the
rehabilitation of land that had been mined for phosphates, its principal resource, while under Australian trusteeship.
The Government of Nauru claimed that Australia bore responsibility for the breach of its legal obligations,
including: “First: the obligations set forth in Article 76 of the United Nations Charter and Articles 3 and 5 of the
Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru of 1 November 1947. Second: the international standards generally recognized as
applicable in the implementation of the principle of self-determination. Third: the obligation to respect the right of
the Nauruan people to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources… ” (ICJ Reports (1992), p.
243, para. 5.) Australia, though, had not been alone in its responsibilities for the island. In 1920 when the island was
put under mandate, responsibility was shared by Australia, Britain and New Zealand. In 1947 when this was
succeeded by trusteeship all three states were jointly designated as “the Administering Authority”. In practice,
however, Nauru was the responsibility of an Australian administrator, who acted subject to his government’s
instructions. Britain and New Zealand received reports on the island, but these were treated as being for information
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seventeen years that it had refused to exercise its own jurisdiction.19 Moreover, aside from this,
while recognising that self-determination was, “one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law”,20 the Court was also delicately non-committal on whether the East Timorese
themselves had such a right: “The Court…  has taken note…  that, for the two Parties, the territory
of East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory and its people has the right to self-
determination.”21 The Court noted agreement between the two sides that the people of East
Timor had a right to self-determination without actually explicitly supporting it itself.
However, on the other hand, the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Opinion of 2004 did seem to mark a bolder approach from the ICJ, with a remarkably
straightforward decision on Palestinian self-determination. The Court identified the Palestinians
as a people with a right of self-determination,22 which Israel had an obligation to respect.23 It
found that Israel, by constructing a wall on occupied Palestinian territory, which gave expression
in loco to illegal settlements and changes to the status of Jerusalem, and altered the demographic
composition of the region, had breached that obligation.24 This entailed specific consequences
for Israel and for other states. Israel was to halt construction of the wall in the occupied territory,
dismantle those sections of the wall, end its associated legal régime and make reparations to
those persons effected.25 States were to not to recognise, nor to aid or assist this illegal situation,
and were also see to it, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, that this
impediment to self-determination was brought to an end.26 (These different aspects of the Wall
opinion will be examined in more detail in the next chapter).
If the behaviour of courts and other bodies may be effected by various factors surrounding
only. Australia argued that as Nauru’s administration had been shared with Britain and New Zealand, any
determination of its legal position would necessarily prejudice that of its former partners. However, in a
controversial nine to four decision, the Court pierced the veil of “the Administering Authority”, finding that it, “did
not have an international legal personality distinct from those of the States”. In practice, Australia had, “played a
very special role”, in the administration of the island. (ICJ Reports (1995), p. 258, para. 47.) Highlighting the fact
that Australia had a greater responsibility than its nominal partners, the Court found that the position of Britain and
New Zealand did not form “the very subject matter” of the dispute. Nor was it not a “prerequisite” for Australian
responsibility. (ICJ Reports (1995), p. 261, para. 55.) The case was ultimately settled out of court. (Agreement
between Australia and the Republic of Nauru for the Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice
Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 31 ILM (1993) pp. 1474-9).
19 Bekker loc. cit. no. 14 at p. 98; Antonopoulos loc. cit. no. 14 at p. 83; Chinkin loc. cit. no. 14 at p. 719.
An interesting commentary on this is provided by James Crawford, who represented Australia in the case:
“… [T]he Court was not assisted by the approach of Portugal, which relied exclusively on the right of self-
determination as the basis for an obligation of non-recognition, thereby necessarily calling on the Court to find, as
against Indonesia, that the right was being violated. The position might, perhaps, have been different had Portugal
relied instead on the obligation of states not to recognize a change of territorial sovereignty procured by the use of
force. It seems to be settled that the obligation of non-recognition arises irrespective of the legality of the underlying
use of force. For example, it does not matter whether Israel was acting in self-defence in occupying the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip during the Six Day War, in the sense that, whether or not it was then acting lawfully, third states
are obliged not to recognize its sovereignty over those territories pending a final settlement. But if that is so, it could
have been argued that all the Court needed to find in relation to East Timor was that Indonesia’s occupation resulted
in fact from a use of force, whether or not that force was unlawful.” Crawford op. cit. no. 5 at p. 35.
20 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29.
21 ICJ Reports (1995) pp. 105-6, para. 37.
22 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 118.
23 Ibid. paras. 122, 149.
24 Ibid. para. 122.
25 Ibid. paras. 151-3.
26 Ibid. para. 159.
201
self-determination, and if they also often display a marked caution when dealing with it, what
impact does the interaction between nationalism and international law have on their decisions?
Nationalism and international law are two very different doctrines and they have two very
different approaches to the concept of justice. From a legal perspective, courts resolve cases by
applying the relevant law to the facts of the case, based on evidence before the court that
conforms to certain accepted standards. On the other hand, the nationalist perspective is very
different. In its view, the legitimacy of a law or an institution depends on its representation of
nations and peoples. Thus, a common feature in nationalism is the use of facts in a selective and
subjective way to support particular national theories.
How do these two approaches effect the decisions of courts and tribunals? An obvious
approach already seen from the previous chapter is to balance self-determination with other
principles, which allow some degree of certainty in its application, while allowing it to be
proclaimed in a universal form. This balancing has two particular problems. First, these balances,
however they are expressed, are intended to restrict self-determination and may appear arbitrary
and restrictive. Second, as legal principles can be closely associated with national ties, any
balance between them may depend on the interpretation of nationalist concepts, like “people”
and “country”. What superficially seems to be a balance of legal principles becomes inseparable
from the politics of an underlying nationalism.
These are problems with balancing in the abstract, when applied to peoples in general. They
become much clearer when balancing is applied to particular peoples. The legitimacy of peoples’
rights generally derives from the fact that those peoples are seen as “natural” or “authentic”. As
the Permanent Court of International Justice recognised in the Greco-Bulgarian Communities
Opinion, the existence of national communities, “is a question of fact; it is not a question of
law”,27 It is very difficult to deal with peoples’ rights simply with abstract legal principles. In
fact, in these circumstances it may be hard to demonstrate that a particular balance of principles
is not simply a fiat imposed by international lawyers to deny a people its right to self-
determination.  It will be shown with the Badinter Opinions, in particular, that limiting self-
determination with principles, while basically sitting on the fence as to whether those groups are
peoples or not, is an extremely insecure and unstable position.
A better approach may be to address these nationalist concerns head on and support a legal
balance with a legitimising nationalist rhetoric. Nationalism, after all, supports legal positions if
they are seen as representative of nations and peoples. A balance of principles could be
legitimate as long as it was presented as an expression of particular national groups. The effect of
this would be that, where self-determination was to be promoted, courts would identify peoples,
and where it was to be restrained the identity of groups would be diminished. However, if courts
use peoples in this way to support their legal balances, then they may also do so in an essentially
nationalist way. Descriptions of peoples may not simply represent stating the facts of the case or
filling in the background. They may be highly selective and subjective interpretations of the
populations in question specifically shaped to legitimise a particular position.
This chapter will compare balancing with and without nationalism. It will first look at two
cases where a legal balance has been struck without any explicit supporting nationalism:
Katangese Peoples Congress v Zaïre and the Badinter Opinions Nos. 1, 2 and 3. It will then
examine cases where legal principles are supplemented with a nationalist rhetoric: the Burkina
27 Interpretation of the Covention between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, Signed at
Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27th, 1919 (Question of the “Communities“) (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ (1930) Series
B, No. 17, p. 22.
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Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute case, the two Åland Islands decisions, Re. Secession of Quebec,
Tatarstan and Chechnya, and Western Sahara. The chapter will conclude with Judge Ammoun’s
Separate Opinion in Namibia, which may be the most overtly nationalist decision ever to have
come out of the International Court of Justice.
1. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire: Balancing as States’ Rights
An interesting contrast to the Human Rights Committee’s blanket refusal to consider self-
determination is provided by the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaïre.28 This related to a regional instrument, the
African or Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981. Article 20 of the Charter
proclaimed that:
“1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and
shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have
freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of
domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or
cultural.”29
However, in what has been called an, “obvious abdication of responsibility”,30 the Committee
responsible for drafting the Charter left the concept of “people” undefined on the grounds that
they didn’t want to, “indulge in concepts that would end up in difficult discussions.”31 Again,
like the Third Committee in the Covenants, the problem of the people was passed along, and
with Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaïre it landed in the hands of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. The case concerned a complaint brought under article 20(1) of the
Charter in 1992 by an organisation claiming to represent the population of Katanga, a mineral
rich region of Zaïre, now Democratic Republic of Congo, which had previously attempted to
secede from that country in 1960. Its aim was to obtain recognition for the organisation as a
liberation movement entitled to support to achieve independence, to gain recognition for an
independent Katanga and to secure the evacuation of Zaïre from the region. Unlike the Human
Rights Committee, the African Commission did examine the merits of the complaint, and
28 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Communication No. 75/92, in R. Murray and M. Evans eds.,
Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) at p. 389.
29 Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 ILM (1982) pp. 58-68 at p. 62.
30 M. K. Addo, “Political Self-Determination within the Context of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights” in R. McCorquodale ed., Self-Determination in International Law (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 2000) pp. 267-
278 at p. 269.
31 Quoted in E. G. Bello, “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis” 194 Recueil
des Cours (1985) V, pp. 9-268 at p. 32. See also R. N. Kiwanuka, “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 82 American Journal of International Law (1988) pp. 80-101 at p. 82; P. Kunig,
“The Role of Peoples’ Rights in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights” in K. Ginther and W. Benedek
eds., New Perspectives and Conceptions of International Law: An Afro-European Dialogue (Austrian Journal of
Public and International Law, Supplement No. 6, Springer-Verlag, Vienna, 1983) pp. 162-9 at p. 167.
203
dismissed it on the grounds that no rights in the Charter had been violated.
The Commission responded to the Katangese claim by establishing a balance between self-
determination and the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. It found, on the one
hand, that self-determination could be exercised in a variety of ways: “independence, self-
government, local government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of
relations that accords with the wishes of the people”. However, at the same time, its exercise was
to be, “fully cognisant of other recognised principles such as sovereignty and territorial
integrity.” The Commission specifically recognised that it had an obligation, “to uphold the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaïre, a member of the OAU and a party to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”
The Commission did to try to soften its balance and make it appear less arbitrary by
considering two factors that might effect it. The first was, “concrete evidence of violations of
human rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called into question”.
The second was, “evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in
Government as guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the African Charter”. However, no such evidence
had been presented in this case. Katanga was, therefore, “obliged to exercise a variant of self-
determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.” The
Katangese claim was consequently rejected. There had been no violation of the rights under the
Charter.
As to the underlying issues of peoples behind the balance, the Commission offered little but
ambiguity. It took no position on whether the Katangese were a people or not. Indeed, it
considered that whether, “the Katangese consist[ed] of one or more ethnic groups”, to be,
“immaterial”. Instead it left a series of unanswered questions. If self-determination was a right of
peoples, did the fact that Katanga was entitled to a “variant of self-determination” mean that it
was a people? How did the balancing of self-determination with territorial integrity and
sovereignty relate to article 19 of the Charter, which stated that all peoples shall be equal and
that nothing shall justify the domination of one people by another? The impression left is that the
Commission was more concerned with the protection of OAU states, than the rights of peoples.
This would only seem to confirm previous criticisms levelled at the Committee that it was,
“downplaying of any meaningful conception of peoples’ rights”, and had “a strong statist
orientation”.32 Certainly such a neglect of the concept of peoples would seem hard to square with
the work of a commission on peoples’ rights.
2. The Badinter Opinions Nos. 1, 2 and 3: The Limits of Balancing
The problems of balancing are even more explicit in the first three opinions of the Badinter
Commission,33 in particular, Opinion No. 2. The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on
32 P. Alston, “Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall” in P. Alston ed. Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2001) pp. 259-93 at pp. 286-7.
33 See M. C. R. Craven, “The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia” 66 British
Yearbook of International Law (1995) pp. 333-413; M. Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” 86 American Journal of International Law (1992) pp. 568-607 at pp.
587-96; A. Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-
Determination of Peoples” 3 European Journal of International Law (1992) pp. 178-85; D. McGoldrick,
“Yugoslavia – The Responses of the International Community and of International Law” 49 Current Legal
Problems (1996) pp. 375-94 at pp. 381-4; Knop op. cit. no. 14 at pp. 167-90; M. Rady, “Self-Determination and the
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Yugoslavia, or “Badinter Commission”, after its chairman Robert Badinter, was established by
an EC Declaration on 27 August 1991. It consisted of the presidents of the French, German,
Spanish and Italian Constitutional Courts and the Belgian Court of Arbitration, and its role was
to deliver non-binding opinions on various aspects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The title
of an arbitration commission was, in fact, somewhat misleading. Badinter was a consultative
body, intended to develop policy towards Yugoslavia in a legal framework.34 The EC (now EU)
was free to ignore its opinions and did so on more than one occasion.35 The Commission
delivered ten opinions between January and July 1992, and then reformulated, another five in
1993, although it is only the first three, all given on 11 January 1992, which concern us here.
EC policy itself was outlined in a Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, on 16 December 1991. This Declaration was
explicitly based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. It emphasised
self-determination, but also based recognition policy on “respect for the inviolability of all
frontiers, which could only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement”.36
The Badinter Commission appeared to recognise the general applicability of self-
determination in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, the principle was not really used to
determine the political entities emerging from the break up. Instead, self-determination was
balanced and contained with the principle of uti possidetis, which upheld the existing borders of
the Yugoslav republics. This was done by first highlighting the ambiguity in self-determination:
“international law as it currently stands does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-
determination.”Uti possidetis was then used to establish clarity: “However, it is well established
that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States
concerned agree otherwise.”37
Uti possidetis had previously been invoked in decolonisation in Latin America, Africa and
Asia, but its application in the context of the dissolution of a state was somewhat novel. The
Commission, though, cited the International Court’s finding in the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier
Dispute case that uti possidetis was, “a general principle, which is logically connected with the
phenomenon of obtaining independence, wherever it occurs.”38 In further support, it noted that
article 5 of the Yugoslav Constitution stipulated that the territories and boundaries of the
republics could only be altered with their consent. The Commission also found, from the
Friendly Relations Declaration, the Helsinki Final Act and the draft Convention of the
Conference on Yugoslavia, a well-established principle that the alteration of existing frontiers by
Dissolution of Yugoslavia” 19 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1996) pp. 379-390 at pp. 382-7; S. Tierney, “In a State of
Flux: Self-Determination and the Collapse of Yugoslavia” 6 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights
(1999) pp. 197-233; R. Bieber, “European Community Recognition of Eastern European States: A New Perspective
for International Law” 86 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1992) pp. 374-8; L.
Wildhaber, “Territorial Modifications and Breakups in Federal States” 33 Canadian Yearbook of International Law
(1995) pp. 41-74 at pp. 68-71.
34 S. Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation
(Kluwer, The Hague, 2000) at pp. 222-3
35 M. Halperin, D. Scheffer and P. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, 1992) at pp. 34-5.
36 Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 31
ILM (1992) pp. 1486-7.
37 Opinion No. 2, 31 ILM (1992) p. 1498, para. 1.
38 Opinion No. 3, p. 1500.
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force was incapable of producing a legal effect.39 This principle was then reinforced with general
political considerations of stability and peace. The Commission, again citing the Frontier Dispute
case, considered that: “Its [uti possidetis’] obvious purpose is prevent the independence and
stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles… ”40
However, there were two problems with this balance. The first was that the Commission also
found “the rights of peoples and minorities” to be “peremptory norms of general international
law”.41 In other words, peoples’ rights were of such fundamental importance that they might
override other rules and principles unless they were also peremptory. This finding was
convenient for the Commission as it ensured that peoples’ and minority rights applied to all the
Yugoslav successor states regardless of their prior obligations. But, it stood somewhat at odds
with its finding that self-determination in international law was ambiguous. More seriously,
though, it threw into question the whole balance between self-determination and uti possidetis. If
peoples’ rights, which presumably included self-determination, were peremptory, then uti
possidetis would have to be too, simply to maintain the balance. This would mean that frontiers
were not only inviolable, but could not be changed even by mutual agreement between states.
This, though, would appear to contradict the Commission’s own finding that uti possidetis meant
no changes to existing frontiers, “except where the States concerned agree otherwise.”42
A second more serious problem concerned the legitimacy of the balance. This had been
established in Opinion No. 2 in response to a question from Serbia: “Does the Serbian population
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the
right to self-determination?”43 This question was evidently loaded, asserting that Serb
populations were a people and then asking rhetorically whether as a people they had a right to
self-determination. The Commission’s response was that uti possidetis prevented changes to
existing frontiers under self-determination unless where the states agreed otherwise.44
However, this balance suffered from problems of legitimacy. The essential question in
restriction of self-determination is whether or not the population is a people. The population may
be called a “minority”, in which case it might not have a legal right to self-determination, but this
could be seen as arbitrary. Alternatively, it might be called a “people”, but if that were the case it
would be harder to legitimately argue that it did not have the right to freely determine its external
political status. The position the Commission took, in fact, was to sit on the fence. In an opinion,
which one commentator said could, “charitably be described as unclear”,45 it found that Serbs
had both minority rights, which implied that they weren’t peoples, and a right of self-
determination, which implied that they were.
The Commission found that, “ethnic, religious or language communities…  have the right to
recognition of their identity under international law.” This right to identity was supported by:
“the – now peremptory – norms of international law [which] require States to ensure respect for
the rights of minorities…  The Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia must
therefore be afforded every right accorded to minorities under international conventions as well
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Opinion No. 1, p. 1496.
42 Opinion No. 2, p. 1498.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 H. Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination” 34 Virginia Journal of International Law (1994) pp. 1-69 at p.
54.
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as national and international guarantees consistent with the principles of international law”.46
Self-determination was also found to apply to these populations, even though the Commission
ruled out changes to borders without agreement. It has been argued that under these
circumstances self-determination meant the “internal” aspect of the right.47 In fact, what was
being proposed was not the self-determination of peoples at all, but its reformulation along
individual lines.48 The basis for this was apparently the Covenants: “Article 1 of the two 1966
International Covenants on human rights establishes that the principle of the right to self-
determination serves to safeguard human rights. By virtue of that right every individual may
choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or linguistic community he wishes.” Stripped of
its collective dimension, self-determination became a possibility for the Serbian population, not
as a people, but as individuals to freely determine their political status: “one possible
consequence of this principle might be for the members of the Serbian population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia to be recognized under agreements between the Republics as having
the nationality of their choice, with all the rights and obligations which that entails with respect
to the States concerned.”49
Exactly where this individually framed right of self-determination came from is something of
a mystery.50 The text of article 1 of the Covenants proclaims self-determination as a right of
peoples. The drafting of the Covenant makes it clear that states contemplated self-determination
as a right of peoples. Subsequent practice in the Human Rights Committee has confirmed self-
determination to be a right of peoples. It may be recalled that when Barbados suggested that self-
determination could be an individual right it was readily criticised. The idea that self-
determination was a prerequisite for individual rights was certainly expressed, but not that it was
an individual right itself.
By limiting self-determination with uti possidetis but still according Serb populations both
minority rights and some form of self-determination, the opinion strove to maintain its
nationalist legitimacy at the cost of its legal coherence. Nor was it very successful in protecting
that legitimacy. The opinion has been widely perceived as having arbitrarily restricted the right
of peoples to self-determination.51 Balancing self-determination with other legal principles,
therefore, evidently needs to be supported with more than mere ambiguity.
46 Opinion No. 2, p. 1498.
47 Craven loc. cit. no. 33 at pp. 383-5.
48 Rady loc. cit. no. 33 at p. 384.
49 Opinion No. 2, p. 1498, para. 3.
50 See Craven loc. cit. no. 33 at pp. 394-5; J. A. Frowein, “Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations under
International Law” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp.
211-23 at p. 217.
51 Marc Weller: “[I]n this episode the right to secede, although based on the right to self-determination, was not
applied generally to reorganize peoples (i.e., individuals sharing common and distinctive ethnic, linguistic and
cultural characteristics) into political units matching their geographical distribution. It was applied only to those
inhabiting a region whose territorial limits had previously been defined by an autonomous government and
administration (e.g., federal states).” Weller loc. cit. no. 33 at p. 606. Matthew Craven: “The Arbitration
Commission did not directly consider the applicability of the principle of self-determination in relation to the acts of
independence of the various Republics. Indeed, it appears to have implicitly rejected the relevance of self-
determination as a determining factor in the acquisition of statehood.” Craven loc. cit. no. 33 at p. 381. Hurst
Hannum: “If former Yugoslav republics were exercising their right of self-determination, that right does not appear
to have belonged to any objectively identifiable ‘people’, unless ‘people’ is defined simply as those who inhabit a
particular administrative territory.” Hannum loc. cit. no. 45 at p. 37.
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3. The Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute: Adding a Little Nationalism to
the Balance
Balancing, then, suffers from serious limitations when applied to cases. A balance of legal
principles may lack nationalist legitimacy and trying to resolve it with a non-committal line may
only lead to legal incoherence, as in the case of the Badinter Opinions. However, the best way to
counter problems of nationalist legitimacy may be to meet them head on. If a balance of legal
principles can be reduced to different national ideas, then the most fruitful strategy might be to
use these ideas to support those principles. This has arguably been the approach of courts and
other similar bodies in the remaining cases in this chapter.
A good place to start is with the International Court’s decision in the Burkina Faso/Mali
Frontier Dispute case.52 This is almost a reprise of the Badinter example, as the Commission
explicitly used the case as the basis for its own balance. However, the difference is that, although
the relationship between self-determination and uti possidetis was similar, the Court arguably
rationalised this balance by appealing to the logic of African nationalism.
Self-determination, in fact, only played a small role in the Frontier Dispute judgment,
appearing only in one paragraph, which examined its relationship with uti possidetis:
“At first sight this principle [uti possidetis] conflicts outright with another one, the right of
peoples to self-determination. In fact, however, the maintenance of the territorial status quo
in Africa is often seen as the wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples
who have struggled for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive
the continent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice. The essential requirement of
stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually consolidate their independence in all
fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial
frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-
determination of peoples.”53
The Court had earlier underlined the significance of uti possidetis:
“[T]he ‘principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization’…  is not a
special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general
principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of obtaining independence,
wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent fratricidal struggles provoked by the
challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.”54
This again was a legal defence of an existing policy. In this case it was the decision by the
Organisation of African Unity to uphold the borders which African states inherited on
52 See G. J. Naldi, “Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali: Uti Possidetis in an
African Perspective” 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1987) pp. 893-903; J. Klabbers and R.
Lefeber, “Africa: Lost between Self-determination and Uti Possidetis” in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck
eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 37-76; K. Oellers-Frahm,
“Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Mali)” in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
Volume 2, (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2000) pp. 490-4.
53 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) (Judgment) ICJ Reports (1986) p.
567, para. 25.
54 ICJ Reports (1986) p. 565, para. 20.
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independence, as provided for in article III(3) of the OAU Charter of 1963 and the Cairo
Declaration of 1964. The Court did this by striking a balance between self-determination and uti
possidetis in which the latter prevailed. The pre-eminent position of uti possidetis in this balance
was then reinforced by general political considerations of peace, stability and development. The
obvious purpose of the principle, it was considered, was to “prevent fratricidal struggles” and to
give states the “essential requirement of stability” to survive and develop.
However, unlike Badinter, these considerations of peace, stability and development were not
only used to support uti possidetis, but also to give it a nationalist logic. In this case to connect it
to African nation-building. “At first sight”, the Court noted, uti possidetis, “conflicts outright
with…  the right of peoples to self-determination.” The evident assumption here was that peoples
were identifiable entities, which could be seen not to conform with colonial frontiers. But, the
Court only considered this impression superficial and took a closer look. Uti possidetis created
conditions essential for, “peoples who have struggled for their independence”, to, “gradually
consolidate their independence in all fields”. This consolidation by peoples of their independence
may be seen as a reference to nation-building, building nations within states: a familiar concept
for African nationalism.55
These considerations, the Court argued, have, “induced African States judiciously to consent
to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the
principle of self-determination of peoples.” The interpretation of peoples was connected with the
consolidation of independence. The concept of “people” was, therefore, implicitly shifted away
from certain identifiable groups to nations which were built within political structures supported
by uti possidetis. They were, to use Robert Rotberg’s phrase, “nations of intent”.56
Thus, the Court did not simply treat the relationship between uti possidetis and self-
determination as one between legal principles, or even between political considerations, but it
connected all these elements to the dynamics of African nationalism. This represents nationalist
construction at its most basic.
4. The Åland Islands, Part 1: The Commission of Jurists
The Åland Islands57 (pronounced O-land = “river land” in Swedish) are an archipelago lying
55 R. Emerson, “Nation-Building in Africa” in K. W. Deutsch and W. J. Foltz eds., Nation-Building (Atherton
Press, New York, 1963) pp. 95-116 at pp. 95-6, 101.
56 R. I. Rotberg, “African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?” 4 Journal of Modern African Studies (1996) pp.
33-46 at p. 37.
57 See J. Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1968); J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1968) at
pp. 328-32; N. J. Padelford and K. G. A. Anderson, “The Aaland Islands Question” 33 American Journal of
International Law (1939) pp. 465-87; P. M. Brown, “The Aaland Islands Question” 15 American Journal of
International Law (1921) pp. 268-72; A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1995) at pp. 27-31; S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War with a Collection
of Official Documents (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1933) vol. I at pp. 515-8, N.
Berman, “Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination in International Law” in M. Koskenniemi ed., International
Law (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1992) pp. 389-443 at pp. 410-4; N. Berman, “‘But the Alternative is Despair’:
European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law” 106 Harvard Law Review (1993) pp. 1792-
1903 at pp. 1862-73; Hannum loc. cit. no. 45 at pp. 8-11; E. Gayim, The Principle of Self-Determination: A Study of
Its Historical and Contemporary Evolution (Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Publication No. 5, Oslo, 1990) at
pp. 15-8; J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) at pp. 85-7; A.
Rigo-Sureda, Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination (A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1973) at pp. 29-34, 111-7.
209
in the gulf of Bothnia between Finland and Sweden, which on Finnish independence in 1917
became the source of a dispute between them. The islands themselves were neither rich nor
populous. 25,000 people lived in the archipelago, mostly engaged in farming, fishing and
shipbuilding. The main settlement, Mariehamn, with a population of 1,600, was little more than a
quaint seaside village. The islands, however, had considerable strategic importance. Napoleon
once remarked that the group which lay on the approach to the Swedish capital was, “the key to
Stockholm”.58 However, if the sea froze over in winter, they also provided a land route for an
invasion of Finland. Crucially for the dispute, although part of the Grand Duchy of Finland since
its creation in 1809, the islanders were overwhelmingly Swedish in language and culture.
On 4 December 1917 Finland declared its independence from Russia. Shortly afterwards it
descended into civil war between pro- and anti-Communist camps, which also drew in Russian
and German forces. Finland’s bid for separation, however, was pre-empted by the Ålanders. On
20 August delegates from the islands’ communes met and communicated a desire to be reunited
with Sweden: to which the whole of Finland had originally been attached before its annexation
by Russia in 1809. A plebiscite followed in June 1919 producing a 96.4% vote in favour of union
with Sweden.59
Matters came to a head in June 1920 when Finnish troops were dispatched to the islands and
two leaders of the Åland movement were arrested for treason. The same month the dispute was
referred to the Council of the League of Nations by Britain and ultimately examined by two
international commissions. The first commission, the Commission of Jurists, was established the
following month in July and composed of three law professors: F. Larnaude, A. Struycken and
Max Huber. The Jurists’ mandate was quite limited. Principally, it was whether under
international law the Åland question should be left entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of
Finland. There was also the question of international obligations concerning the demilitarisation
of the islands. The significance of the first question was whether, under article 15(8) of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the League Council was competent to exercise jurisdiction
over a dispute.
Although the Jurists’ mandate did not directly address whether or not the Åland Islanders had
a right to self-determination, it evidently lay at the centre of the dispute. The Jurists approached
the question of domestic jurisdiction by striking two separate balances between self-
determination and other principles.
The first was between self-determination and state sovereignty. In this legal balance self-
determination was clearly the weaker of the two, contained by state sovereignty. The Jurists
considered that:
“Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an important part in modern
political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be pointed out that there is no
mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of this principle in
a certain number of international treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon
the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations.
On the contrary, in the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of
disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State.
Positive International Law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such, to
separate themselves from the State of which they form part of by simple expression of a
58 Barros op. cit. no. 57 at p. 2.
59 Wambaugh op. cit. no. 57 vol. I at p. 516.
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wish, any more than it recognises the right of other States to claim such a separation.”60
According to the Jurists, “under normal conditions” the separation of groups within a state fell
under its domestic jurisdiction. Any other conclusion was to undermine not only “the very idea
embodied in the term ‘State’”, but also stability and the interests of the international community.
This balance, in which self-determination was contained by state sovereignty, however, only
applied to a state which was, “definitely constituted”.61 In cases where states were, “not yet fully
formed or…  undergoing transformation or dissolution” and the situation was “obscure and
uncertain from a legal point of view”, then, “the principle of self-determination of peoples may
be called into play.”62
There was also another factor which might shift the balance, although the Jurists did not
explore it: “The Commission…  does not give an opinion concerning the question as to whether a
manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power, to the detriment of a section of the population
of a State, would…  be considered as one which is not confined to the domestic jurisdiction of the
State concerned, but comes within the action of the League of Nations”63 In any case, it was
argued, this, “certainly does not apply to the case under consideration”.64
Allowing the possibility that self-determination might be called into play, the Jurists struck
another balance: between self-determination and minority rights. The two were found to have a
common goal: “to assure to some national Group the maintenance and free development of its
social, ethnical or religious characteristics.”65 Self-determination and minority rights were,
therefore, not ends in themselves but merely different methods of achieving this particular goal.
Whether self-determination was the appropriate method depended on a number of factors:
“geographical, economic and other similar considerations may put obstacles in the way of its
complete recognition.”66 If self-determination were limited by this open-ended and evidently
political list of “considerations”, then an, “an extensive grant of liberty to minorities”, might
prove more appropriate, “according to international legal conception”, and, “the interests of
peace”.67
Having established two balances: self-determination and state sovereignty, and self-
determination and minority rights: the Jurists then applied the first to Finland. In this case, the
containment of self-determination by state sovereignty depended on whether the Finnish state
had, “a definite and normal character”, or whether it was a, “transitory or not fully developed
situation.”68 The Jurists concluded that when the Åland dispute arose Finland, “had not yet
acquired the character of a definitely constituted State.”69 As a result, the Åland question did not
just involve Finland and the League of Nations Council was competent to make
recommendations for a settlement under article 15 of the Covenant. The reasoning behind the
Jurists’ conclusions and their ideas of “Finland” and the “Åland Islands” are interesting because
60 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 3, (October 1920) at p. 5.
61 Ibid. p. 5
62 Ibid. p. 6.
63 Ibid. p. 5.
64 Ibid. p. 5.
65 Ibid. p. 6.
66 Ibid. p. 6.
67 Ibid. p. 6.
68 Ibid. p. 7.
69 Ibid. p. 14.
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they are almost diametrically opposed to those later expounded by the Commission of
Rapporteurs.
Essential to the Jurists’ reasoning was the question of whether Finland was a historic political
entity. In 1809, when it was annexed by the Czar from Sweden, Finland had been established as
a Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire, with its own diet and a broad measure of autonomy
except in foreign policy. Could this Grand Duchy be considered a state? The Jurists noted that
most legal commentators on the subject believed that it could. However, they played down the
Grand Duchy’s political significance, highlighting that after the Russification programme of
1899 Finland had been treated as an ordinary province. Moreover, they stressed the limits of
Finland’s former autonomy: that it had never controlled its external affairs and was indissolubly
bound to Russia.70
The Jurists also down played the legal significance of international recognition of Finland:
“The experience of the last war shows that the same legal value cannot be attached to recognition
of new States in war-time, especially to that accorded by belligerent powers, as in normal
times…  In many cases they were only recognitions of peoples or nations, sometimes, even, mere
recognitions of Governments.”71 Moreover, they noted that Sweden, despite its recognition, had
always shown an interest in the Åland Islands, and “acted” as if its recognition was subject to
reservations.
There was also the, “very abnormal character of…  [Finland’s] internal situation”, which, of
course, was a reference to the civil war:
“In the midst of revolution and anarchy, certain elements essential to the existence of a
State, even some elements of fact, were lacking for a fairly considerable period. Political
and social life was disorganised; the authorities were not strong enough to assert
themselves; civil war was rife…  It is, therefore, difficult to say at what exact date the
Finnish Republic, in the legal sense of the term, actually became a definitely constituted
sovereign State…  It would appear that it was in May, 1918, that the civil war ended and
that foreign troops began to leave the country, so that from that time onwards it was
possible to re-establish order and normal political and social life, little by little.”72
Finland was, therefore, not a historic political entity, but, “a new political phenomenon…
not…  a mere continuation of a previously existing political entity,”73 which apparently only
dated from May 1918. The Jurists, thus, broke “Finland” as a legal entity and a historical
political idea.74 The republic could not, “claim that the future of the Aaland Islands should be the
70 Ibid. p. 7.
71 Ibid. p. 8.
72 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
73 Ibid. p. 9.
74 This has been criticised by J. H. W. Verzijl: “There would doubtless be considerable force in this argument if
the starting point of the Commission of Lawyers, which was focussed in its construction of regenerated Finland as a
‘phénomène polititique nouveau’, were correct, but that is precisely what its critics disputed, and in my opinion
quite correctly. According to their view the Finnish State, which had in December 1917 appeared as a new sovereign
member of the community of States, recognized on 4 January 1918 by both her former sovereign and Sweden, was
wholly identical with the Finland that had in 1809 been created as a separate autonomous constitutional unit under
the Russian Tsar-Finnish Grand Duke, possessed on her declaration of independence in 1917 of an exactly defined
territory of her own, which had never been disputed during more than a century. Even if the Commission of
Lawyers’ thesis that Finland’s political autonomy had in the beginning of the 20 th century been completely
annihilated by the Tsarist Government were correct – which they denied –, then  it would still be a flouting of the
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same as hers simply because of the one fact that the Islands formerly formed part of the Finnish
political organisation in the Russian Empire.”75 Nor could Finnish sovereignty be retroactively
applied. This left an extremely fluid situation:
“The extent and nature of the political changes, which take place as facts and outside the
domain of law, are necessarily limited by the results actually produced. These results alone
form the basis of the new legal entity which is about to be formed, and it is they which will
determine its essential characteristics. If one part of a State actually separates itself from
that State, the separation is necessarily limited in its effect to the population of the territory
which has taken part in the act of separation.”76
By marginalising Finnish sovereignty and thus domestic jurisdiction, the Jurists had cleared
the way for an international settlement. However, they had taken some bold steps, such as
denying Finnish sovereignty even though the state was internationally recognised. What
implications did this have for other states? The Jurists may have balked at undermining the idea
of the state, but they had taken a major step in that direction to solve the Åland question. This,
then, required that this question deserved serious attention. Thus, the Jurists’ balance between
sovereignty and self-determination not only involved the deconstruction of “Finland” as a
historical political entity, but also the building of an “Åland” idea.
Therefore, after demolishing Finnish statehood, the Jurists turned to the Åland claims,
drawing particular attention to the, “political expressions of the wishes of the people”,77
especially the plebiscite of June 1919.78 The fact that the Jurists highlighted the plebiscite was,
however, perhaps not as significant as how they interpreted it:
“[T]he populations of the Aaland Islands and from the mainland of Finland, though they
acted together in order to separate themselves from Russia, have, from the outset,
expressed quite different hopes for their ultimate political future. The population of the
mainland wished to form an independent State, the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands
wished to reunite with Sweden, and they expressed this wish in such a way that, even if the
disturbed condition of Russia and Finland at first had a considerable influence upon the
aspirations of the Islanders, nevertheless, this wish can be looked upon as a unanimous,
sincere and continued expression of feeling.”79
The key word here is “continued”. The plebiscite was interpreted as the expression of long-
held differences in the identities and aspirations of the islanders and the Finnish mainland. This
echoed the claims of Åland leaders themselves, who argued that their aspirations were the result
of historic differences between the islands’ “ancient Swedish nationality” and the “Finnish-Ugric
law and an undue prostration before mere brute facts if lawyers and the League of Nations attributed precedence to
that act of injustice over Finland’s irrefutable legal status, and on that ground denied her continuing identity. The
lawyers were therefore entirely unjustified in considering the Åland archipelago after Finland’s severance from
Russia as a ‘territoire-épave’ – a territorial wreckage floating on the waters of the Baltic and abandoned to the mercy
of the waves of international politics.” Verzijl op. cit. no. 57 at p. 330.
75 Jurists p. 10.
76 Ibid. pp. 9-10.
77 Ibid. p. 10.
78 Ibid. p. 11.
79 Ibid. p. 12.
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nationality” of the mainland (referring to Finns by their common ancestry with Hungarians):
“[E]ver since their country was violently torn from their motherland in 1809 and united
with Finland under the Russian yoke, they have never been able to forget the land of their
origin. Deep within the national consciousness has the feeling of community with Sweden
and the longing to be received once more into the mother’s arms existed, even if while
under the Russian yoke it was impossible that this could be expressed in public.”80
This was an interpretation apparently endorsed by the Jurists:
“[T]he population of the Islands, which is very homogeneous, inhabits a territory which is
more or less geographically distinct; further, the population is united by ties of race,
language and traditions to the Swedish race, from which it was only separated by force…  It
must be added that the population of the islands had no means of asserting its nationalist
aspirations during the period of Russian rule.”81
In their report the Jurists introduced two balances: one between self-determination and state
sovereignty, the other between self-determination and minority rights. The balance between state
sovereignty and self-determination was weighed to open the Åland question to international
jurisdiction and subsequent examination by a Commission of Rapporteurs. However, the
legitimacy of this balance required the Jurists to make their own interpretations of historical ties:
removing them from Finland, while adding them to the Åland Islands. The Commission of
Rapporteurs resolved the dispute with a different balance for self-determination and
correspondingly their interpretation of “Finland” and “Åland” was also very different.
5. The Åland Islands, Part 2: The Commission of Rapporteurs
After the Jurists’ report, the League Council, in September 1920, created the Commission of
Rapporteurs to examine the Åland question and recommend a solution. The Commission was
composed of former Swiss president Felix Calonder, former Belgian foreign minister Eugène
Beyens and Emil Nielsen, a former US ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and a member of the
New York Court of Appeals. Their report in April 1921 was drafted by Beyens from an agreed
outline drawn up over several days of discussion.82 The report of the Commission of Rapporteurs
was again based on two balances: self-determination and state sovereignty, and self-
determination and minority rights. However, with a broader mandate than the Jurists, they were
able to fully explore both.
The balance between state sovereignty and self-determination lay at the heart of the
Rapporteurs’ deliberations: “the primary question at issue, and which no ethnical or political
considerations allow to be brushed aside, is a legal one – that of Finland’s right of sovereignty
with regard to the Aaland Islands.”83 This question of sovereignty broke in two: was Finland a
80 Statement Submitted by the Aaland Landsting, The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council
of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7 [C] 21/68/106, (April
1921) Annex 6 at p. 48.
81 Jurists p. 12.
82 Barros op. cit. no. 57 at pp. 302-11.
83 The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission
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sovereign state after the dissolution of its ties to Russia, and did Finnish sovereignty extend to
the Åland Islands? Although this sovereignty was the primary issue, the Rapporteurs kept “sight”
of ethnic and political considerations. The result of this was that the Rapporteurs interpreted the
concepts of “Finland” and “Åland” in a radically different way from the Jurists. As the Jurists
had knocked Finland down as a historical political entity, so the Rapporteurs built it up.
Both Finland and Sweden produced various historical documents and maps to support their
claims. These were broadly dismissed by the Rapporteurs, who only attributed, “a relative
importance to this historical problem, however absorbing it may be for both parties.”84 History,
though, was far from unimportant, and in the face of the “contradictions and uncertainties” of
Finnish and Swedish historical evidence, the Rapporteurs focussed on a single fact: “the
historical fact that Aaland, from the year 1634, has always been united to the Abo [Finland’s
historic capital] Administration”.85 This historical fact was pivotal: “Even whilst admitting that
the term Finland was nothing but a purely geographical signification, it is none the less true that
Aaland in 1634 was definitely joined to the provinces of Abo and Björneborg”.86 Therefore,
despite criticising historical arguments, raised, “by reason of preconceived ideas”,87 the
Rapporteurs followed those same preconceptions, picking out a single fact which supported the
historical unity of Finland and the Åland Islands.
History, then, revealed a “geographical signification” called Finland. The Rapporteurs
developed this geographical unity between the Åland Islands and the mainland. The Skiftet, a
stretch of water dotted with islets and rocks which separated the islands from Finland, was found
to be, “not a boundary traced by nature”, “a bad frontier between two States, extremely arbitrary
from a geographical point of view.”88 The Åland Sea, between the islands and Sweden, on the
other hand, was a, “natural dividing line…  a branch of the sea containing only a few islets.”89
With history and geography now behind Finland, the Rapporteurs turned to its existence as a
political entity. In this they examined the same facts as the Jurists: the establishment of an
autonomous Grand Duchy in 1809 and then the stripping of that autonomy in 1899 under
Russification. However, the difference was that, while it might be said that the Jurists saw the
cup of Finnish sovereignty as half empty, the Rapporteurs saw it as half full. The Jurists
concentrated on what Finland lacked: power over external relations. The Rapporteurs looked at
what it had: “an autonomous State…  granted its own constitution, and enjoying the attributes of
sovereignty, with the exception of the direction of foreign policy and national defence”.90 The
Jurists, somewhat incredibly considering their proclaimed support for minority rights, attached
legal significance to the stripping of autonomy under Russification in 1899. The Rapporteurs,
however, played it down. The Czar’s policy was an illegal action pursued by stealth.91
The result was that the Grand Duchy was found to be an autonomous and constitutional state,
which had existed for 108 years within the same geographical limits under the sovereignty of the
of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7 [C] 21/68/106, (April 1921) at p. 22.
84 Ibid. p. 7.
85 Ibid. p. 10.
86 Ibid. p. 9.
87 Ibid. p. 8.
88 Ibid. p. 3.
89 Ibid. p. 29.
90 Ibid. p. 22.
91 “Nicholas II did not dare to pronounce the abrogation of the Finnish Constitution: rather, he sought to sap its
foundations and reduce it to nothing. Little by little, after some years of sterile effort, he decided on wiser courses
and recalled the illegal measures which he had taken.” Ibid. p. 22.
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Czar.92 Finland may have been dependent, but it was a state nonetheless, and on independence,
“became thereafter…  a sovereign State instead of a dependent State.”93 In December 1917,
therefore, “a new regime was created in Finland, but not a new State, without the loss of a yard
of the national territory to another Power.”94 The historic political entity of Finland, “attained
independence en bloc…  and in this ‘bloc’ since 1809 the Aaland Islands were indubitably
included.”95
As to the Åland Islands, while the Jurists saw gaps in Finnish sovereignty,96 the Rapporteurs
saw acts of its sovereignty.97 The Jurists pointed to the lack of Finnish governmental authority
over the country during the civil war, whereas the Rapporteurs highlighted that the legal
government always exercised authority over part of the country and, “reconquered the provinces
one by one”.98 The presence of foreign troops similarly, for the Rapporteurs, did not detract from
Finnish sovereignty.99 As to Sweden’s reservations in its recognition of Finland, the Rapporteurs
found that, as they were implied rather than explicit, acceptance of such reservations would,
“lend itself to varying interpretations leading to controversy.”100 Finally, the fact that Åland
delegates had expressed a desire for union with Sweden meant only that: the Ålanders wished for
union with Sweden.101 The Rapporteurs concluded that: “the right of sovereignty of the Finnish
State over the Aaland is, in our view, incontestable and their present legal status is that they form
part of Finland.”102
This might have been the end of the matter. State sovereignty prevailed in its balance with
self-determination. The Jurists had found that international jurisdiction could be exercised
because Finland had not been definitely constituted as a state, but for the Rapporteurs it was
unquestionably sovereign. Nonetheless, they agreed that the Åland question extended beyond
Finnish domestic jurisdiction.103 On this basis, they examined whether there were “adequate
reasons” and “sufficiently weighty considerations” to grant the Ålanders a plebiscite and modify
their situation.104 With this they turned to the second balance between self-determination and
minority rights.
The Rapporteurs concurred with the Jurists that self-determination was, “not, properly
speaking a rule of international law” and described it as a principle of “justice and liberty,
expressed by a vague and general formula which has given rise to the most varied interpretations
and differences of opinion.”105 Justice and liberty were not only embodied in self-determination,
but also in minority rights and were not just a common denominator, but a common goal. The
difference between self-determination and minority rights was not one of ends, but of means. It
was essentially practical. Two factors apparently determined whether justice and liberty were to
be obtained through self-determination or minority rights: stability and oppression. In a widely
92 Ibid. p. 13.
93 Ibid. p. 22.
94 Ibid. p. 23.
95 Ibid. p. 23.
96 Jurists p. 13.
97 Rapporteurs p. 25.
98 Ibid. p. 23.
99 Ibid. p. 25.
100 Ibid. p. 24.
101 Ibid. p. 25.
102 Ibid. p. 25.
103 Ibid. p. 22.
104 Ibid. p. 25.
105 Ibid. p. 27.
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quoted statement, the Rapporteurs considered that:
“To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a
population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it
is their wish or good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to
inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with
the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.”106
Against the factor of stability was the question, raised by the Jurists but not explored, of a state
consistently oppressing a group. In this case justice and liberty may not be served by continued
association with the state:
“The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation
in another State can only be considered an exceptional solution, a last resort when the State
lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.”107
How did this apply to Finland and the Åland Islands? The Rapporteurs rejected the analogy
that because Finland had determined its own status, the same right applied to Ålanders. Finns
had an indisputable, “natural right…  born of inherent justice, to proclaim their independence”.
However, Ålanders as, “only a small part of the Finnish territory, and…  a small fraction of the
Finnish nation”, did not have the same right. The Rapporteurs considered it self-evident that:
“one cannot treat a small minority, a small fraction of a people, in the same manner and on the
same footing as a nation taken as a whole.”108
Self-determination, therefore, only appeared to be a right of established national political
entities. The Rapporteurs pointed out that Finland had been an autonomous state since 1809 and
had a “clearly defined territory” and a “well-developed national life”.109 Ties of, “history,
geography and politics”, which the Rapporteurs drew special significance to, and which
supported Finnish self-determination, nonetheless, worked for the Ålanders, “in favour of the
status quo.”110
In a balance between self-determination and minority rights the legitimacy of Åland self-
determination rested primarily on two facts. The first was the clear will of the population for
union with Sweden. The second was that the islanders were almost exclusively Swedish
speaking. These were, however, just facts, and the question was how they were interpreted.
Åland leaders and the Jurists interpreted them in a way that supported Åland rights. The
Rapporteurs, on the other hand, attacked the significance of both in turn.
It was clear that the Ålanders had voted overwhelmingly for union with Sweden, and the
Rapporteurs were in no doubt that that they would do so again: “a new plebiscite, were such
authorised, would confirm by a sweeping majority, almost unanimously, the wish for reunion
with Sweden.”111 However, what interested the Rapporteurs was not the vote, but what
motivated it. They dismissed Finnish arguments that the people were simply being manipulated
by the Åland leaders. One motive might have been the concern of this, “peaceable and
106 Ibid. p. 28.
107 Ibid. p. 28.
108 Ibid. p. 27.
109 Ibid. p. 27.
110 Ibid. p. 29.
111 Ibid. p. 27.
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conservative population” over the spread of bolshevism on the Finnish mainland and the
subsequent civil war, but the principal one was nationality.112
The Rapporteurs never questioned the Swedish character of the Ålanders: “They are
altogether Swedish in origin, in habits, in language and in culture; 96.2% of the inhabitants are
Swedes. The men are tall, strong and squarely built, and bear clearly the marks of their race.”113
It was natural that they would feel certain ties to Sweden:
“In Sweden they see their natural guardian of their language, their customs, their
immemorial traditions, of which they are so proud and to which they are attached above
everything else. Even more than Russian domination they fear Finnish domination, which
would lead to their gradual denationalisation, the absorption of their population, which has
remained free from all ethnical mixture, by a race of whose language they are ignorant and
whose invasion they abhor.”114
This interpretation of nationality, though, was different from the Åland leaders and the Jurists.
The desire for union was motivated by, “the instinct of self-preservation”,115 not long-standing
aspirations. The Rapporteurs questioned the historical depth of Åland claims. They noted that a
French writer visiting the islands during the Crimean War in 1856 recorded the islanders’ desire
to join Sweden: “But after that, no trace of these distant and persistent aspirations recurred.”116 In
fact, in their opinion, the peasants and sailors of the islands confined at the extremity of Finnish
territory in isolation developed “a pronouncedly insular mentality” and “an essentially local
patriotism”.117 They were, in other words, not an integral part of the Swedish nation, torn from
their homeland by force, but an isolated and insular people looking for security in a threatening
and uncertain time. This was less a question of correcting historic wrongs than protecting the
character of a population threatened by political change. It was a question for minority rights.
There were, however, two factors that could shift the balance between minority rights and
self-determination: oppression and stability. The first of these, oppression, though, was found by
the Rapporteurs to work in favour of Finland. Under the Czar, “Finland [had]…  been oppressed
and persecuted” and “her tenderest feelings [had]…  been wounded by the disloyal and brutal
conduct of Russia.” The Ålanders had not been oppressed in this way. The arrest of two leaders
of the Åland movement did not amount to general persecution. The population was, “threatened
in its language and its culture”, but this was not from oppression and the Rapporteurs believed it
possible to appeal to the “good will” of the Finnish government to reach a settlement which
guaranteed their cultural identity.118
The second factor, stability generally worked against Åland self-determination and the
Rapporteurs used it to attack the other fact in favour of an Åland people: their Swedish ethnicity.
In addition to the Ålanders, Finland had a substantial Swedish-speaking minority of around
350,000. The Rapporteurs considered that the Ålanders were, “in certain respects…  not one with
those which are Swedish-speaking…  above all in their separatist spirit, which carries them
towards Sweden, alienating them from their brothers in race who have remained Finnish at
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heart.”119 However, aside from this difference in aspirations, which had already been explained
in terms of their local peculiarities, the Ålanders did, “not form a different ethnical group”. On
the contrary, “they constitute[d] the fifth part of the Swedes of Finland, from whom they are not
isolated geographically.”120 It was pointed out that the islands off Turku/Åbo, the Ålanders’ most
immediate neighbours, were also, “almost exclusively Swedish”. The Skiftet separating Åland
from Finland was, therefore, “no more an ethnographical than a natural frontier.”121
This, though, raised the question of selectivity. If the Skiftet was not an ethnographical barrier
and the Ålanders were only part of the Swedish ethnicity in Finland, then what about the Åland
Sea between the islands and Sweden? It was scarcely plausible that this short stretch of water
between the ethnically Swedish Åland Islands and ethnically Swedish Sweden was an
ethnographic barrier. If Ålanders were but a fraction of the ethnic Swedes in Finland, what of
those in Sweden?
Nonetheless, with the Ålanders established as a fifth of the Swedish ethnicity in Finland, the
Rapporteurs could flesh out the issue of stability. Finnish Swedes, it was noted, were, “strongly
pronounced against the separation of the Islands”, and there were good reasons why their views
should be taken into account. The new Finnish Constitution established an equality between the
Finnish and Swedish languages. However, the Rapporteurs found, “a certain tension – even a
certain distrust – between the two linguistic groups”. They cited concerns by Finland’s Swedish
party that if Åland were ceded to Sweden, “the agreement between the two unequal fractions of
the nation would be irretrievably compromised”. The Rapporteurs raised the spectre that bitter
resentment among Finns caused by the loss of the islands “would be swift to change to hatred…
against their fellow-citizens of Swedish stock”. The Finns, were apparently, “vindictive”, by
nature and, “their vengeance would turn first of all on their unfortunate associates.” Any
solution, which ignored the wishes of Finland’s Swedes (for the islands to remain with Finland),
therefore, would have “disastrous consequences”.122
Finland’s stability had far wider implications: “sooner or later Russia will rise from this chaos
to become once again one of the important factors in the future of Europe. Shall we then see a
restoration of Pan-Slavist imperialism, as in the time of the Romanoffs? Whatever happens, it is
in the general interest to hasten the consolidation of the States which have freed themselves from
the Empire of the Czars to live an independent existence, and to help them to live and to
prosper.”123 Finland had been a bulwark against Russian expansion: “The services which Finland
rendered to others as well as to herself, in repelling the attacks of Bolshevist Communism,
should not be forgotten.”124 The Swedes, on the other hand, the Rapporteurs pointedly noted, had
not intervened in this war: “A large part of the population considered the Finnish Civil war if
anything as a class struggle rather than a battle to the death between legal order and communist
anarchy.”125 “It would be”, the Rapporteurs considered, in view of Finland’s services, “an
extraordinary form of gratitude…  to wish to despoil her of territory to which she attaches the
greatest value.”126
In conclusion, Sweden was recommended to, “bow with good grace” and follow the example
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it set with the peaceful separation of Norway.127 Åland independence was also dismissed: “the
Archipelago has not the certain resources, which would enable it to bear all the expenses both in
internal administration and communications with abroad.“128 The problem of Åland self-
preservation was to be solved by autonomy. This involved the expansion of the Law of
Autonomy passed by the Finnish Diet on 7 May 1920 with various measures on education,
property rights and migration. Autonomy, the Rapporteurs argued, was the most realistic
solution. The idea of Åland self-determination was nothing more than that: “if they leave the
heights of their dreams for the terra firma of reality, the privileges which have been offered to
them will no longer seem so worthless.”129
However, the balance established by the Rapporteurs between minority rights and self-
determination was still subject to considerations of oppression. A warning was attached to the
autonomy proposal: “in the event that Finland, contrary to our expectations and to what we have
been given to understand, refused to grant the Aaland population the guarantees which we have
just detailed, there would be another possible solution, and it is exactly the one which we wish to
eliminate. The interest of the Aalanders, the interests of a durable peace in the Baltic, would then
force us to advise the separation of the islands from Finland, based on the wishes of the
inhabitants which would be freely expressed by means of a plebiscite.”130
6. Re. Secession of Quebec: Burke Revisited
The Commission of Rapporteurs built a counter-argument against the use of self-
determination to disrupt a state’s territorial integrity by focussing on the right as one of
historically constituted political units. Emphasis was placed on stability and the historical
development of political life. Conversely, the significance of the will of the people at any
particular time was played down. This represented a conservative counter-argument similar to
the one originally invoked by Edmund Burke against French Revolution. And this conservative
tradition can be seen even more clearly in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Re.
Secession of Quebec.131
In September 1996 the Governor in Council, under section 53 of the Supreme Court Act,
referred three questions to the Supreme Court concerning the legal situation in the event of a
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secession attempt by Quebec. The questions, although hypothetical, were far from theoretical.
The background was Canada’s near miss with secession on 30 October 1995, when the
population of Quebec rejected a declaration of sovereignty in a controversial referendum by a
razor thin 50.58%. The first question asked was whether under the Canadian constitution the
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec could unilaterally effect the secession
of Quebec from Canada? Second, whether international law gave those bodies the right to effect
a unilateral secession and whether there was a right of self-determination in international law,
which would entail such a right? Third, in the event of a conflict between domestic and
international law over the secession of Quebec, which would take precedence?132 As the
perspective here is international law, question two will be examined before question one. The
answer to question three was that there was no conflict between domestic and international
law.133
The Supreme Court’s approach to the second question was based on two balances. The first
balance was between self-determination and territorial integrity, in which self-determination was
not only limited, but effectively contained: “international law expects that the right to self-
determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and
constantly with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states.”134
This was, however, subject to a second balance. The Rapporteurs had struck a balance
between self-determination and minority rights, which tilted one way, or the other according to
considerations of stability or oppression. In Re. Quebec this balance was expressed through
“internal” and “external” aspects of self-determination, which could similarly be effected by
considerations of stability and oppression. Internal self-determination was defined by the Court
as, “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state.” External self-determination was defined, quoting the Friendly
Relations Declaration, as: “The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people… ”.135
Citing, “recognized sources of international law”, the Court considered that self-determination
was, “normally fulfilled through internal self-determination”.136 In support of this it invoked
considerations of stability: “such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an
existing state’s territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.”137 In a
limited number of circumstances, though, it might be expressed externally. The first category
were colonial peoples.138 Second were peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation outside a colonial context.139 Third, the Court claimed that a “number of
commentators”, who it did not name, asserted that, “when a people is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to
exercise it by secession.”140 The Vienna Declaration 1993, in its opinion, added credence to this
claim, although it considered that, “it remains unclear whether this third proposition actually
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reflects an established international law standard”.141 Thus, “at best”142 external self-
determination could be exercised in only three situations: all of which were characterised by
subjugation and domination.
Quebec, evidently, did not fall into any of these three situations: “The population of Quebec
cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to government.”143 Failure to reach agreement on
amendments to the Constitution, the Court noted, while a matter of concern, did not amount to a
denial of self-determination.144 Consequently, “even if characterized in terms of ‘people’ or
‘peoples’”, Quebec did not have a right to unilateral secession.145
This ambivalence towards the question of whether or not Quebec was a people was typical of
the Court’s attitude in Re. Secession of Quebec. This was curious considering that the Court
acknowledged that characterisation as a “people” was the “threshold step” for access to the right
of self-determination.146 Moreover, it notably considered that, “‘a people’ may include only a
portion of the population of an existing state.”147 Did this mean that the population of Quebec
could be a people? Again the Court was ambivalent: “While much of the Quebec population
certainly shares many of the characteristics (such as a common language and culture) that would
be considered in determining whether a specific group is a ‘people’, as do other groups within
Quebec and/or Canada, it is not necessary to explore this legal characterization to resolve
Question 2 appropriately.”148
Two factors lay behind this apparent ambivalence. First, in the same manner as the Friendly
Relations Declaration, the Court had shifted the emphasis in self-determination from the
existence of peoples as such to the enjoyment of representative government or in this case
“internal” self-determination. It also shifted the burden of legitimacy on to the secessionists.
Remedial secession might not, in the Court’s own opinion, be established in international law,
but by raising it, like the Rapporteurs, it could show that the population in question was not
oppressed:149
“[T]o reflect the phraseology of the international documents that address the right to self-
determination of peoples, Canada is a ‘sovereign and independent state conducting itself in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction’”.150
Second, the Court’s ambivalence over whether Quebec was a people in question two was, in
fact, only apparent. It was able to be nonchalant because in answering question one it had
already carefully constructed an idea of Canadian nationality, which diminished the significance
of Quebec’s claim to be a people. This was an idea of Canada as a political nation founded in
shared values and institutions. Canada was not a country founded along narrow ethnic lines, but
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a people of peoples in which, “diversity could be reconciled with unity”.151 Quebec might have
its own language and culture, but that did not undermine its position in the wider Canadian
nation. The Court quoted George-Etienne Cartier:
“When we are united, he said, we shall form a political nationality independent of the
national origin or the religion of any individual…  In our own federation, we will have
Catholics and Protestants, English, French, Irish and Scots and everyone, through his
efforts and successes, will add to the prosperity and glory of the new confederation. We are
of different races, not so that we can wage war on another, but in order to work together for
our well-being.”152
This political nation, it was stressed, had contractual origins, which were themselves the
expression of a longer democratic tradition. The Canadian Confederation was not created by an
“Imperial fiat”, but by an, “initiative of the elected representatives of the people”,153 in which,
the Court stressed, the people of Quebec had played a central role. In particular, the Constitution
Act 1867, which the Court described as, “an act of nation-building”,154 was based on the
“Quebec Resolutions”, adopted at a conference in the province in 1864.155 Moreover, these
events were the culmination of a longer process. “‘[T]he Canadian tradition’”, the Court recalled,
was “one of evolutionary democracy”:
“The evolution of our democratic tradition can be traced back to the Magna Charta (1215)
and before, through the long struggle for Parliamentary supremacy which culminated in the
English Bill of Rights in 1688-89, the emergence of representative political institutions in
the colonial era, the development of responsible government in the 19th century, and
eventually the achievement of the Confederation itself in 1867.”156
This emphasis on the evolution of political structures out of a long historical tradition seemed
to closely follow Edmund Burke’s original attack on the political foundations of self-
determination. Indeed, the Court’s description of, “the ongoing process of constitutional
development and evolution of our Constitution as a ‘living tree’”157 invoked an organic analogy
of historical national growth similar to Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution.
This emphasis on the contractual nature of the Canadian nation based on the desire to live
under common institutions, however, raised a question: what was to prevent Quebec, if it so
wished, from repudiating that contract and withdrawing from those institutions? Burke in his
original conservative counter-argument had a two-fold response to the arbitrary dismantling of a
state. First, he emphasised the length of the state-building process. The state was not a short term
contract, “a partnership agreement in the trade of pepper and coffee…  to be taken up for a little
temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties.”158 It was a series of
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agreements forged over a considerable period of time: “The idea of a people is the idea of a
corporation…  many a weary step is to be taken before they can form themselves into a mass,
which has a true, politic personality.”159 This building of a nation through many a weary step
was echoed by the Court with a quote from the Attorney General of Saskatchewan:
“A nation is built when the communities that comprise it make commitments to it, when
they forego choices and opportunities on behalf of a nation…  when the communities that
comprise it make compromises, when they offer each other guarantees, when they make
transfers and perhaps most pointedly, when they receive from others the benefits of
national solidarity. The threads of a thousand acts of accommodation are the fabric of a
nation.”160
A particular feature of the compromises needed to create Canada was the reconciliation of
unity and diversity through federalism. The function of federalism was, “to enable citizens to
participate concurrently in different collectivities and to pursue goals at both a provincial and a
federal level.”161 These were the compromises that allowed Canadian democracy to function, and
while the system needed democratic legitimacy, the will of the people could not be arbitrarily
invoked to change it:
“[D]emocracy in any real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule of law. It is the
rule of law that creates the framework within which the ‘sovereign will’ is to ascertained
and implemented…  Equally, however, a system of government cannot survive through
adherence to the law alone. A political system must also possess legitimacy…  that requires
an interaction between the rule of law and the democratic principle”.162
The “sovereign will” noticeably appeared in quotation marks. The will of the people was not
so much sovereign as a factor in political legitimacy: “It would be a grave mistake to equate
legitimacy with the ‘sovereign will’”.163 Like the Rapporteurs, the Court downplayed the
significance of a vote in favour of secession: it expressed a popular will, but did not in itself have
a binding legal effect.164
Burke’s second response was that in the long period of state-building other values necessary
for a nation become intertwined with the institutions of the state: “where…  [institutions] have
cast their roots wide and deep, and where, by long habit, things more valuable than themselves
are so adapted to them, and in a manner interwoven with them…  one cannot be destroyed
without notably impairing the other”.165 The Court also developed the idea of four unwritten
principles interwoven with the constitution: democracy, the protection of minorities,
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and federalism.166 These principles provided a standard
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against which the legitimacy of a secession would be measured: “Refusal of a party to conduct
negotiations in a manner consistent with constitutional principles and values would seriously put
at risk the legitimacy of that party’s assertion of its rights”.167 The popular will could not be the
single decisive factor. “[L]inguistic and cultural minorities, including aboriginal peoples”, the
Court noted, and Quebec contained both, “look to the Constitution of Canada for the protection
of their rights.”168 As the Court later pointed out, groups which could be characterised as
“peoples” existed not only in Canada but also in Quebec.169 Moreover, in the federal system,
“there may be different and equally legitimate majorities in different provinces and territories
and at the federal level. No one majority is more or less ‘legitimate’ that the others”.170 Indeed,
federalism, “would be defeated if one of those democratically elected levels of government could
usurp the powers of the other simply by exercising its legislative power to allocate additional
power to itself unilaterally.”171
The Constitution, the Court found, neither expressly authorised nor prohibited secession,172
but a referendum could be no more than a bargaining chip. It considered that: “the clear
repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue
secession by the population of a province would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties
to Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire.”173 The result of
those negotiations, though, would not be predetermined:
“The Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people of Canada. It lies
within the power of the people of Canada, acting through their various governments duly
elected and recognized under the Constitution, to effect whatever constitutional
arrangements are desired within Canadian territory, including, should it so be desired, the
secession of Quebec from Canada.”174
However:
“We hold that Quebec could not purport to invoke a right of self-determination such as to
dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties: that would not be a
negotiation at all…  The democracy principle, as we have emphasized, cannot be invoked
to trump the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and
minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a
whole.”175
Thus, Re. Secession of Quebec, like the Rapporteurs’ decision in the Åland Islands, fits into a
conservative nationalist tradition stretching back to Edmund Burke’s original repudiation of the
French Revolution. This conservative counter-argument emphasises historical political
development within established entities and limits the significance of any particular expression
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of the will of the people. The judgment’s use of history has been criticised as a means to,
“obscure or presumptively legitimate what judges are doing when they dip outside the text of the
constitution for legal and binding rules.”176 But, that is precisely the point. Re. Secession of
Quebec, like the Åland Islands decisions, underlines that legal principles are far from monolithic,
rather they are closely connected with political considerations and legitimising national ideas.
7. The Tatarstan and Chechnya Cases: The Basic Counter-Argument
If the Rapporteurs and Re. Secession of Quebec represent the conservative counter-argument,
the decisions by the First and Second Russian Constitutional Courts in the Tatarstan and
Chechnya cases,177 represent a more conventional nationalist counter-argument. Both cases
involved a balance between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity in which
the latter prevailed. In both the court also supported this balance by using the basic nationalist
counter-argument of drawing a distinction between a nation and its aspirations as such, and
political and legal demands made in its name.
The decision of the (First) Russian Constitutional Court in the Tatarstan case on the 13 March
1992 concerned the constitutionality of a Declaration of State Sovereignty by the Republic of
Tatarstan’s Supreme Soviet on 31 August 1990; amendments to the Tatar Constitution; and, in
particular, a referendum on the status of the republic, which was held a week later on 21 March
1992. This asked the question:
“Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international
law that constructs its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states
on the basis of treaties between equal parties? ‘Yes’ or ‘No’”.178
The referendum was intended to lend popular legitimacy to the earlier Declaration of State
Sovereignty: “to attribute to it the quality of a norm of the highest level – confirmed by the
People.”179 Sovereignty declarations had been made by other republics in the Russian Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and concept of “sovereignty” in the Soviet Union had been
somewhat open. However, what distinguished the Tatar declaration, and concerned the Court,
was that it made “no mention whatsoever” of Tatarstan being part of Russia.180 Was the
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referendum, then, a vote on secession?
Tatarstan’s right to raise the issue of its legal status, the Court held, was “derivative from the
right of the People to self-determination.”181 This right, it noted, could be found in both Russian
and international law. Article 3 of the Decree of the Congress of People’s Deputies, “On the
Fundamental Principles of the National-State Structure of the RSFSR”, established that the right
of self-determination was to be guaranteed in the Russian Federation. This, however, could be
“exercised in various national-state and national-cultural forms.”182 On the international level the
Court cited article 1 of the Covenants (ratified by the USSR in 1973) and the Friendly Relations
Declaration. The right of self-determination was, “one of the basic principles of international
law”.183
However, the Court balanced this right with the principles of respect for territorial integrity
and human rights. Citing article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and GA Res.
41/117, it argued that the exercise of rights required respect for the rights and freedoms of others.
“Otherwise”, it considered, “the exercise of any right, including that to self-determination…
would be the abuse of the right and not the exercise of the right.”184
Additionally, international documents emphasised, “the impermissibility of making reference
to the principle of self-determination in order to jeopardize state and national unity.”185 These
documents included, in particular, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration.
“Analogous principles” could also be found in CSCE instruments. “Thus”, the Court concluded,
“without negating the right of a People to self-determination exercised by means of the lawful
expression of will, it is appropriate to proceed from the premise that international law restricts it
by the observance of the requirements of the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of
the observance of human rights.”186
A similar balance was applied on the level of Russian constitutional law. The Russian
Constitution did not envisage the right of its constituent republics to secede. On the contrary,
under the Constitution, any changes to the Russian national-state structure fell under the
jurisdiction of the RSFSR. The unilateral secession of Tatarstan would not only be a violation of
the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and the national unity of its peoples, it would harm
the constitutional order to the detriment of human rights and the rights of peoples. The “only
lawful and equitable” solution to the question of the status of the republics was a “negotiation
process based on the law”, involving, “all of the interested subjects of the RSFSR”.187
However, this balance was not to negate, “the right of a People to self-determination
exercised by means of the lawful expression of will [emphasis added]”. The Court, therefore,
supported its balance containing self-determination by arguing that the case did not involve a
lawful expression of will, distinguishing the referendum conducted by Tatar authorities from the
Tatarstan people themselves and their rights. On the one hand, the Court claimed that it viewed,
“with understanding the aspirations of the multinational People (narod) of Tatarstan to develop
and reinforce the statehood of the republic”.188 On the other, it argued that the forthcoming
referendum could not express those aspirations.
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The referendum question, the Court argued, was confusing: a violation of, “the requirement of
clarity and unambiguousness”. Its precise purpose was undefined, and in substance it amounted
to several questions to which only one answer could be given. It, therefore, deprived citizens of
not only “the right to the free expression of their will”, but also the, “right to participate in the
discussion and adoption of laws and decisions of national importance” contained in the Tatar and
RSFSR constitutions.189 Judge Ametistov, in a separate opinion, went even further and argued
that it violated article 25 of the Civil and Political Covenant.190
Nonetheless, the Court did find that most of the question was clear enough in its intent to
violate the constitution. The part which stated that, “Tatarstan is a subject of international law
and constructs its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the
basis of treaties between equal parties”, the Court found, “shall be recognized as not in accord
with the Constitution”. This was because the formulation was, “associated with a unilateral
change of the national-state structure of the RSFSR and signifies that the republic of Tatarstan is
not part of the RSFSR.”191 This, of course, aside from the reference to Tatarstan as sovereign,
which in Soviet usage had always been ambiguous, was basically the question.
A similar formula was followed by the (Second) Russian Constitutional Court in the 1995
Chechnya case. This case concerned the constitutionality of four presidential edicts issued during
the First Chechen War. These edicts provided for the use of force in order to protect the security
and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. As a result, the relationship between territorial
integrity and self-determination became an issue in the case.
The balance between self-determination and territorial integrity was again based on paragraph
seven of the Friendly Relations Declaration. Self-determination was recognised as an accepted
international norm. However, in accordance with the paragraph, exercise of the right: “must not
be interpreted as sanctioning or encouraging any actions that would lead to the division or
complete violation of the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
states acting in observance of the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of
nations.”192 The principle of territorial integrity was again supported by human rights: “The
integrity of the state is an important condition of the equal legal status of all citizens, irrespective
of the place of their residence, and one of the guarantees of their constitutional rights and
freedoms.”193 Thus, the 1993 Russian Constitution, which did not recognise a right of secession
and provided in article 66(5) that a subject of the Federation could only change its status by
mutual agreement, was, “in accord with generally accepted international norms on the right of a
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nation to self-determination.”194
Paragraph seven again was raised on the assumption that the Russian government was, in fact,
representative and acting in conformity with the principles of equal rights and self-determination.
The Court cited in consideration of this that “the federal powers (the President, the Government,
and the Federal Assembly) repeatedly undertook attempts to overcome the crisis that had arisen
in the Chechen Republic.” “However”, it continued, “they did not lead to a peaceful political
resolution.”195 The Court did not examine whether the presidential edicts restricting
constitutional rights and freedoms, effected the representiveness of Russia’s government.
This balance was supported again by separating the Chechen nation (narod) and their
legitimate aspirations from the nationalist politicians who claimed to represent them. On one
hand, the situation in Chechnya was considered to be the product of historic injustices: the
nation’s mass deportation under Stalin and the “insufficiently effective” rectification of the
consequences of this. “The state power, first of the USSR and then of Russia, was not able to
assess correctly the justified resentment of the Chechens”, and the Russian Federation,
“exhibited passivity in the resolution of the problems of mutual relations with this republic”.196
Nonetheless, it was emphasised that in autumn 1991 the lawfully elected Supreme Soviet of
the republic had been dispersed and free elections had not taken place since then. The Court cited
statements by the Congress of People’s Deputies, the Duma and the European Parliament that,
“free elections or a referendum had not been held and lawful bodies of power had not been
formed”197 The Court characterised the Chechen rebels simply as “illegal armed formations”,
and described the secessionist conflict as nothing more than “a civil war” between “mutually
hostile groupings”.198 Thus, the Court separated the Chechen nation and its possible grievances
from the secessionists themselves. The Chechen movements, as presented, were neither united
nor represented the people. This again supported the containment of self-determination within
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
8. Western Sahara: Painting in a Colour between Blue and Green
a. Introduction
Nations and peoples are usually defined as groups sharing certain common characteristics,
such as language, culture and a sense of identity. But, they are not the only groups with such
features. Similar ties may be found in a tribe, even though tribes are not generally considered to
be nations. How, then, is a nation distinguished from a tribe? Generally tribes are smaller than
nations, but there are large tribes and small nations, so where does one begin and the other end?
Hugh Seton-Watson put the dilemma rather well:
“The word ‘tribe’ has usually been applied to comparatively small groups of people, with a
rather low level of culture…  Most of these communities, scattered across the globe and the
centuries, shared a fierce loyalty both to their chiefs and to fellow-members of the
194 Ibid. p. 52.
195 Ibid. p. 52.
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community. The difficulty is to decide at what point ‘tribal consciousness’ becomes
‘national consciousness’…  one has to be very cautious in the use of the words ‘nation’ and
‘tribe’; yet the difference exists, just as the difference in the spectrum between blue and
green exists, though the colours merge in the human eye which beholds the rainbow.”199
If tribal and national identities can merge into one another like blue into green, how should
one consider a country made up of tribes? Does one see one people, a people with a tribal
structure, a group of tribes, a group of peoples or a group of peoples who have become a single
people? There are a number of possibilities, and the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of
1975200 presented not one, but three such countries: Western Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania.
The opinion was in many ways a display of legal gymnastics. The Court managed to contort
itself into finding both that there were ties between Western Sahara and Morocco and
Mauritania, and that they were not the sort of ties that effected the application of self-
determination. In each of its twists it found support in the very particular nature of the peoples of
the region, which were painted in ambiguous shades of turquoise.
The opinion concerned the legal position of Western (or Spanish) Sahara, which at the time
was a Spanish colony on the north-west African coast claimed by two of its neighbours,
Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco’s claim dated from 1956 and was part of originally far
greater ambitions which extended down the west African coastline past Western Sahara and into
Mauritania. Mauritanian claims were much more recent, dating only from 1970. Interest in the
territory was also spurred with the discovery of substantial phosphate deposits there.
The General Assembly had also taken an interest in Western Sahara and in 1966 called on
Spain in consultation with Morocco and Mauritania and other interested parties to devise
procedures for a referendum there.201 Spain, which earlier claimed that Western Sahara was an
overseas province, accepted the principle of self-determination, but in practice dragged its feet
over implementation emphasising difficulties created by the nature of the territory and its
population. However, in 1973 this policy changed and the next year a referendum was scheduled
for the first half of 1975.
Morocco and Mauritania’s ambitions now took on a sense of urgency. In September 1974
King Hassan of Morocco challenged Spain to submit Western Sahara to arbitration by the
International Court of Justice.202 If Spain refused, he argued, the United Nations could ask for an
199 H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism
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advisory opinion. And this was what happened. Morocco and Mauritania were able to gather
enough support in the General Assembly to pass a resolution in December 1974, GA Res.
3292(XXIX) requesting an advisory opinion on Western Sahara.203 The resolution also urged
Spain to postpone its referendum until after the opinion, which Spain duly did. This bought time
for Morocco and Mauritania whose attitude to the proceedings could not ultimately be said to be
that of good faith.204
In GA Res. 3292(XXIX), the General Assembly requested the Court’s opinion on two
questions:
“I. Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by
Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the
Mauritanian entity?”205
As noted by several judges, these questions were loaded.206 If the Court answered Question I
by finding that Western Sahara was not terra nullius (land belonging to no one), which it did,207
then it must belong to someone, and Question II was orientated to finding that someone to be
Morocco and Mauritania. The Court, therefore, essentially reframed the questions. They were to
be, “considered in the whole context of the decolonization process”,208 in which the, “applicable
principles of decolonization”, would form, “an essential part of the framework”.209 Thus,
Question II was reinterpreted as one of the existence of, “such ‘legal ties’ as may affect the
policy to be followed in the decolonization of Western Sahara.”210 The relevant date for the
existence of such ties was set at 1884, when a Spanish protectorate was proclaimed over Río de
Oro.211 In broad terms, the issue was one of the balance between the principles of territorial
integrity and self-determination. In order to consider the question in this way, the Court argued
that “legal ties” could not only be understood as ties to territory, since legal ties were normally
established in relation to people.212
b. The Moroccan, Mauritanian and Spanish Claims
At the centre of Morocco’s claim was a balance between the principles of self-determination
and territorial integrity, as set out in principles 2 and 6 of GA Res. 1514(XV). Morocco
considered that the principles and techniques of decolonisation were not yet settled and there
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203 GA Res. 3292(XXIX), 29 GAOR (1974) Supplement No. 31, (A/9631) pp. 103-4.
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remained a wide range of possible solutions in light of these two principles. One method of
decolonisation was the reintegration of a province with the “mother country” from which it had
been detached by colonialism.213 As the only historical state in the region, Morocco claimed
Western Sahara on the basis of ties of state sovereignty supported by common political,
geographical, religious, ethnic, cultural and historical ties.214
Mauritanian claims were also based on the balance between self-determination and territorial
integrity. The balance between the two, it was argued, varied and in some cases territorial
integrity might predominate, especially where a territory had been created by colonialism to the
detriment of the “State or country” to which it belonged.215 The word “country” was significant,
because at the time of Spanish colonisation, Mauritania was not yet a state. This was a claim
made solely on behalf of a nation. Mauritania claimed to have been united as a national “entity”
known as the Bilad Shinguitti, which would later form the basis of the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania. The Bilad Shinguitti was vast: ranging from the Senegal River in the south to Wad
Sakiet El Hamra in northern Western Sahara. Its people were united by language, culture,
religion, history, habits, social structure and law. Moreover, they saw themselves, and were
known in the Arab world, as a distinct community famous for its scholarship, literature and
poetry. Although not a state, the emirates and tribes of the Shinguitti nation exercised co-
sovereignty as equals, and, while they sometimes fought each other, they united against
foreigners.216
A third view on the Western Saharan population was offered by Spain. Spain argued that at
the time of colonisation the territory was inhabited by a distinct people, the Sahrawis, whose
common organisation and way of life created a sense of collective self-awareness and mutual
solidarity. These people, organised as autonomous tribes independent of outside authority, made
a clear distinction in their literature between themselves, “the country of the nomads” and the
settled peoples to the north and south, in Morocco and Mauritania.217
Obviously not all three of these claims could be correct. The Moroccan idea was attacked by
Spain and to a lesser extent by Mauritania. Spain noted, “a striking absence of any documentary
evidence or other traces of a display of political authority by Morocco with respect to Western
Sahara.”218 Allegiance to the Sultan was limited to settled populations in southern Morocco, not
to the independent nomads of Western Sahara, and even in settled areas this authority was weak.
Those populations paid no taxes and were never completely subjugated.219 Mauritania, for its
part, did not dispute the Sultan’s authority over the tribes of northern Western Sahara, but the
other tribes were part of the Bilad Shinguitti.220
Spain also attacked the Mauritanian national idea. The Bilad Shinguitti, it argued, was only a
zone of Islamic culture around the town of Shinguit, whose influence, in any case, had declined
by the sixteenth century. Adrar, one of Mauritania’s emirates, which included the town within its
borders, emerged only in the eighteenth century and could not be considered to be its successor.
The emirates and tribes of the region, far from acting as co-sovereigns, fought each other and
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signed separate treaties with France.221  Indeed, not only were the emirates and tribes of
Mauritania divided, but there was also no evidence for ties of allegiance to the independent tribes
of Western Sahara.222 Moreover, the alleged historical Mauritanian nation was not the basis of
the present state. “Mauritania” as an idea dated only to 1904, by which time the Spanish colony
in Western Sahara was well established in fact and law.223
The rejection of the Spanish idea of a Sahrawi people was implicit in both the Moroccan and
Mauritanian claims. Both states argued that Western Sahara was an artificial creation of Spanish
colonialism which separated its inhabitants from their homeland.224
c. A Tribal Solution to Western Sahara
Incredibly enough, the Court managed, to some extent, to accommodate all three of these
positions. Its conclusion was that there were legal ties between Western Sahara and Morocco and
Mauritania. But, these ties did not amount to “territorial sovereignty”. Thus, they might not,
“affect the application of resolution 1514(XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in
particular, the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will
of the peoples of the Territory”.225 Commentators noted that the opinion felt like a diplomatic
compromise.226 Morocco and Mauritania could save face but the referendum would go ahead.
However, notably each stage of the compromise was supported by the tribal nature of the
countries involved. The tribal structure of Western Sahara allowed the Court to find legal ties to
Morocco, but not ties that effected the general population. The tribal nature of Mauritania
created the opportunity to find ties to Western Sahara, but not ties that limited the application of
self-determination. Finally, the tribes of Western Sahara left the maximum room for negotiation
in a future settlement based on a referendum.
Integral to all these findings was the principle of self-determination and the Court approached
it in a way that left all the options open. It refrained from identifying a Western Saharan people,
instead referring to an undisclosed number of unidentified “peoples” in the territory. Its
definition of the principle, “the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples”,227
emphasised the process of self-determination, rather than its direction towards any particular
end. Moreover, even this process was loose. As was pointed out in the introduction, the
definition fell short of an “obligation” to “respect” the freely expressed will of peoples, and left
substantial room for future, “consultations between the interested States”,228 which the Court
specifically envisaged. On top of this, the Court emphasised its disclaimer on the legal
consequences of an opinion: “the right of the population of Western Sahara to self-determination
is not prejudiced or affected by the present request for an advisory opinion”.229 The Court, thus,
fashioned self-determination in Western Sahara into an empty concept, leaving its subject,
procedure and ends open for other parties to fill in later. Nonetheless, whatever form it took, the
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Court did orientate future policy towards, “a free and genuine expression of the will of the
people.”230
This basic orientation was reflected in its approach to the principles of decolonisation. The
basic balance of principles behind the Western Sahara dispute was between self-determination
and territorial integrity. However, despite finding that territorial sovereignty might affect its
application, the Court’s examination of self-determination’s relationship with other principles
was, in fact, quite muted. Surveying the international instruments on decolonisation, the Court
cherry-picked the provisions that supported its own particular interpretation of self-
determination. In GA Res. 1514(XV) it cited principles 2, 5 and 6, finding that, “in particular
paragraph 2” confirmed and emphasised, “that the application of the right of self-determination
requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.”231 In GA Res.
1541(XV) it found that “certain of its provisions” (those on free association and integration)
provided that they should be the result of, “a free and voluntary choice by the peoples”, and, “the
freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples”, respectively.232 The requirements for
independence in the resolution, or the lack of them, were passed over. In GA Res. 2625(XXV),
the Court focussed on the part of the resolution that provided that a political status was to be,
“freely determined by a people [the Court’s own emphasis]”.233
The General Assembly, however, had not itself always followed this policy in decolonisation.
The Court concluded with the observation that the validity of self-determination was not affected
by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly had dispensed with the requirement of
consulting the inhabitants of a territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration
that a certain population did not constitute a “people” entitled to self-determination or on the
conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances.234 This
finding was question-begging. Was a people only a people when the General Assembly
considered it to be one? Where did it acquire such sweeping powers, and what were the “special
circumstances” that made consultation unnecessary? The Court did not address these questions.
Its statement was basically a defence of its own interpretation of self-determination: the General
Assembly’s practice did not affect the validity of the principle as the need to pay regard to the
freely expressed will of peoples.
Integral to this process based approach to self-determination was the ambiguity surrounding
the peoples of Western Sahara, which itself was based on the tribal composition of the territory.
The Court emphasised this tribal structure. Western Sahara had, “very special characteristics
which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined the way of life and social
organization of the peoples inhabiting it.” Low and spasmodic rainfall created an environment
inhabited mostly by nomadic tribes. These tribes, the Court noted, had a number of common
features: their Islamic faith, their general political structure of a sheikh and a Juma’a (tribal
assembly), rights and customs relating to pasture and water, and the role of burial grounds. “Not
infrequently”, these tribes had ties of dependence or alliance, “which were essentially tribal” in
nature. However, despite these common features, it was also noted that, “inter-tribal conflict was
not infrequent.”235 It was in this context of an undisclosed number of tribal peoples that the Court
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considered the ties to Morocco and Mauritania and the application of self-determination to
Western Sahara.
d. The Court’s Examination of Morocco’s Claims
Morocco’s claim was based on the balance of self-determination and territorial integrity in
GA Res. 1514(XV), and this, in turn, depended on the concepts of “country” and “people”.
Morocco had established its legal ties by building up its “country” with national ties: history,
geography, religion, culture and politics. The Court examined all of them in turn and found none
to be ties of territorial sovereignty.
The first of these were historical ties. The Court, however, dismissed Morocco’s claim for a
long-standing historical relationship with Western Sahara dating back to the Arab conquest of
the seventh century. The historical events referred to by Morocco were found to be of a “far
flung, spasmodic and often transitory character”, and, “somewhat equivocal as evidence of
possession of the territory now in question.”236
Morocco also claimed a common geography with Western Sahara. Indeed there is no natural
boundary between the two.237 However, the Court dismissed this geographical unity or
contiguity as “somewhat debatable”. This might have been a reference to the Atlas mountain
range of southern Morocco (which itself does not delimit the border with Western Sahara),
although this was never spelled out. Instead, the Court turned the geographical argument against
Morocco. Geographical contiguity, in its opinion, only made the lack of authority shown by
Morocco over Western Sahara harder to reconcile with immemorial possession.238
Political ties lay at the centre of the Moroccan claims: expressed either as displays of
Moroccan authority or ties of allegiance between the tribes and the Sultan. The Court first
examined political ties based on a continuous display of authority in the territory. It recalled the
test in the Permanent Court’s judgment in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland. The Eastern
Greenland test had two elements: “the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual
exercise or display of such authority”239 The Court considered that it might be true that in,
“thinly populated or unsettled countries, ‘very little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign
rights’ might be sufficient in the absence of a competing claim.” Western Sahara, though, “if
somewhat sparsely populated, was a territory across which socially and politically organized
tribes were in constant movement and where armed incidents between these tribes were
frequent.”240 Therefore, “the paucity of evidence of actual display of authority unambiguously
relating to Morocco renders it difficult to consider the Moroccan claim as on all fours with that
of Denmark [which was found to exercise sovereignty] in the Eastern Greenland case.”241
Having rejected political ties based on a display of Moroccan authority, the Court turned to
ties of political and religious allegiance to the Sultan. It was noted that the Moroccan Sherifian
State of the time was based on a common bond of Islam, as well as the allegiance of tribes
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through their caids or sheikhs to the Sultan. The first of these ties, religious ties, were readily
dismissed: “Common religious links have, of course, existed in many parts of the world without
signifying a legal tie of sovereignty or subordination to a ruler. Even the Dar al-Islam…  knows
and knew separate States within the common religious bond of Islam.”242 This easy rejection of
religion was, however, criticised by Judge Ammoun: “Religious feeling does not preclude ethnic
or national solidarity between Sahrawi and Moroccans. It tends rather to consolidate it…  there is
no doubt that the religious tie is one of the constituent elements in legal ties and in those of
nationality, being additional to ethnic, social, cultural and economic ties and national aspirations,
and making them more binding: the more so in that the Sultan possessed both temporal and
spiritual powers, and appointed the caids who applied Muslim law. Modern examples of the
strength of religious ties abound: Ireland, Pakistan, Bangladesh… ”243
The Court then turned to Morocco’s claim of ties of political allegiance supported by common
bonds of religion and culture. It noted that the Moroccan state was divided into two areas: Bled
Makhzen, areas actually subject to the Sultan; and Bled Siba, areas where tribes were de facto not
submissive to the Sultan. Morocco claimed that this political disunity was counteracted by
common cultural and religious ties.
However, the Court saw the tribes of the Bled Siba as evidence of the limits of Moroccan
authority, calling them “de facto independent powers”. These tribes, it was noted, paid no taxes,
did not contribute to the army, did not govern themselves under the Sultan’s authority and were
“in a state of permanent insubordination”.244 Moreover, it was pointed out that the Bled Siba,
which seemed to mark the limits of the Sultan’s authority, inhabited the areas, “immediately to
the north of Western Sahara”.245 These tribal areas appeared to form a political buffer between
Morocco and Western Sahara.
Nonetheless, despite concluding that each one of Morocco’s ties to Western Sahara did not
amount to “territorial sovereignty”,246 the Court still found other ties of allegiance: “between the
Sultan and some, but only some, of the nomadic peoples of the territory.”247 The Court drew
attention to the Tekna, a tribe in the north of Western Sahara whose migration route extended
into Morocco. It controversially and ambiguously found that “some authority” was exercised by
the Sultan through settled Tekna over the Tekna nomads of Western Sahara.248
This finding was met with bemusement by several judges who pointed out that the tribes in
question were never identified and evidence for these ties was, to say the least, questionable.
Judge de Castro claimed that he had, “not found any firm evidence for the existence of such ties”
between “certain unclearly defined tribes” and the Sultan.249 Judge Dillard questioned whether
this connection was, “sufficiently supported by the evidence”.250 Judge Petrén supported by
Judge Ignacio-Pinto argued that the finding depended, “on an analysis of the real significance of
the allegiance mentioned, and on an exact identification of the tribes acknowledging it and of the
parts of Western Sahara inhabited by them. No such analysis or identification…  [were] to be
242 Ibid. p. 44, para. 95.
243 Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, ibid. p. 98; see also Judge Boni, Separate Opinion, ibid. p. 173.
244 Ibid. pp. 44-5, para. 96.
245 Ibid. p. 45, para. 97.
246 Ibid. p. 48, para. 105
247 Ibid. p. 49, para. 107; also p. 57, para. 129.
248 Ibid. p. 49, para. 106.
249 Judge De Castro, Separate Opinion, ibid. p. 172.
250 Judge Dillard, Separate Opinion, ibid. p. 119.
236
found in the Advisory Opinion.”251 Judge Gros called the Court’s observations “injudicious”,
and the tribes, “mere a posteriori constructions of a little known epoch.”252 Nonetheless, the
tribal structure of Western Sahara allowed the Court to find ties to Morocco, but limit their effect
to “some, but only some” of its peoples, leaving no implications for rest of the population.
Moreover, as these ties were not of territorial sovereignty, they did not even effect the
application of self-determination to the Tekna either, assuming that the Court had a clear idea of
who those tribes really were.
e. The Mauritanian “Entity”
In the claims brought by Morocco, national ideas were used to support a claim that centred on
state sovereignty. As such, they could be examined by the Court using traditional tests for
sovereignty. Mauritania’s claims, though, were more of a problem because, as Mauritania
accepted itself, there was no Mauritanian state at the time of Spanish colonisation. It was also
clear that Mauritanian statehood was not retroactive. Thus, at the beginning of its examination of
Mauritanian claims the Court could confidently state that, “no legal ties of State sovereignty”
were involved.253 Considering that its own standard for legal ties was “territorial sovereignty”,
and that it was questionable whether any bodies other than states could be sovereign in
international law circa 1884,254 the Court could have dismissed Mauritania’s claim right there
and then.
However, it did not. Instead, the Court investigated whether “other legal ties” existed between
the Mauritanian “entity” and Western Sahara.255 The basis for this was a legal test outlined in the
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion. The
Reparation test posed the question of whether an entity was in: “such a position that it possesses,
in regard to its Members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect.256 This test, the Court
conceded, “was applied in a somewhat special context”. The Reparation opinion concerned the
question of whether the United Nations had a capacity to bring legal claims. Nonetheless, it was,
“the essential test where a group, whether composed of States, of tribes or of individuals, is
claimed to be a legal entity distinct from its members.”257 On the basis of this test the Court
found that:
“[T]he information before the Court discloses that, at the time of Spanish colonization,
there existed many ties of a racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic nature
between various tribes and emirates whose peoples dwelt in the Saharan region which
today is comprised of the Territory of Western Sahara and the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania. It also discloses, however, the independence of the emirates and many of the
tribes in relation to one another and, despite some forms of common activity, the absence
251 Judge Petrén, Separate Opinion, ibid. p. 114; see also Judge Ignacio-Pinto, Declaration, ibid. p. 78.
252 Judge Gros, Separate Opinion, ibid. p. 76.
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among them of any common institutions or organs of even a quite minimal character.
Accordingly, the Court is unable to find that the information before it provides any basis
for considering the emirates and tribes, which existed in the region to have constituted…
‘an entity capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its Members’.
Whether the Mauritanian entity is described as the Bilad Shinguitti, or as the Shinguitti
‘nation’ as Mauritania suggests, or as some form of league or association, the difficulty
remains that it did not have the character of a personality or corporate entity distinct from
the several emirates and tribes which composed it. The proposition, therefore, that the
Bilad Shinguitti should be considered as having been a Mauritanian ‘entity’ enjoying some
form of sovereignty in Western Sahara is not one that can be sustained.”258
To sum up, there were racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic ties between the
emirates and tribes, which today form Western Sahara and Mauritania. However, these emirates
and tribes were independent of each other, and despite some common activity, lacked even
minimal institutions or organs between them. Therefore, they did not form an entity, which
imposed obligations on its members. Consequently, Mauritania did not form a corporate entity
distinct from its emirates and tribes, which could enjoy some form of sovereignty over Western
Sahara.
However, the use of this test raised some questions. The Reparation test may have been an
“essential test”, but it was also a general test. If the test was that an entity possessed rights, which
entailed obligations, then the next logical step would be to ask which rights, which obligations?
What were they in theory and in practice? In the Reparation Opinion the Court applied its
general test by examining the organs and the functions of the UN, both as outlined in the Charter
and in practice. This application was not laid out in great detail, but it was there. From that
investigation it found that, “the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact
exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the
possession of a large measure of international personality”.259 However, in Western Sahara this
necessary step seemed to be missing. The Court applied a general test and obtained a specific
result, but provided little to connect the two. The possible rights and obligations of the
Mauritanian entity were never specified let alone examined.
What were the possible rights of the Mauritanian entity? They were unlikely to be state’s
rights because it was already acknowledged that Mauritania was not a state. They might be the
rights of an international organisation, like the UN, and the Court’s reference to, “some form of
league or association” suggests that this possibility was considered. However, this was not the
Mauritanian claim. As the Court itself stated, “the Shinguitti ‘nation’ as Mauritania suggests”.
Mauritania claimed that the Bilad Shinguitti was a nation.
To properly apply the Reparation test the Court needed to ask what rights a nation could
possess? This in turn required investigating whether the Mauritanian entity was a nation. If the
Reparation test is looked at from this perspective, the Court seems to address these rights only by
implication. It found, “many ties of a racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic nature
between various tribes and emirates”. This was a fairly clear reference to national ties. However,
it also noted, “the independence of the emirates and many of the tribes in relation to one another
and, despite some forms of common activity, the absence among them of any common
institutions or organs of even a quite minimal character.” The obvious implication was that if the
258 Ibid. p. 63, para. 149.
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Bilad Shinguitti was supposed to be a nation in 1884, it did not act much like one. And that was
it. On the basis of these two sentences the Court determined that the Mauritanian entity failed the
Reparation test and was not a corporate personality.
This did not mean that the Court had determined that Mauritania was not a nation. To do so
would have been both unnecessary and unwise, and it listed of a number of national ties which
could point to the contrary. But what it did manage to do was to put the Shinguitti “nation”
figuratively as well as literally into quotation marks. By highlighting its fragmented tribal nature,
the Court was able to redefine the country from a corporate into a non-corporate entity. The
Mauritanian “nation” was no more than the sum of its clannish parts: “the various tribes living in
the territories of the Bilad Shinguitti, which are now comprised within the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania.”260
Once Mauritania had been redefined on these terms, the Court seemed to turn quite easily to
the question of its ties to Western Sahara. It found that the migration routes of almost all Western
Saharan tribes passed through what was now Mauritania. Rights over grazing pasture, cultivated
lands, and wells and water-holes along those routes, as well as the settlement of disputes, were
subject to inter-tribal custom derived from Koranic law or tribal usage. The Court again found, to
the criticism of many judges, that these ties, including rights over land, constituted legal ties
between Western Sahara and the “Mauritanian entity”, as defined by the Court.261
f. Self-Determination of…  The Regheibat?
The tribes of north-west Africa proved very useful to the Court. The tribal nature of Western
Sahara allowed the Court to find ties to Morocco, but not ones that effected the general Western
Saharan population. The tribal composition of Mauritania meant that it could have ties to
Western Sahara without them being ties of sovereignty. The “peoples” of Western Sahara
allowed a broad range of options for a political settlement based on the application of self-
determination.
However, this emphasis on tribes did create a bit of a vacuum. Self-determination is a right of
peoples and if it is to be applied to a territory, it ultimately looks a bit empty if there is no people
there to exercise it. The principle of territorial integrity as presented by Morocco and Mauritania
was supported with various national ties. The principle of self-determination applied to a
territory of an undisclosed number of unidentified peoples looked rather hollow in comparison.
What Western Sahara really needed was a people and it was precisely in the context of the
territory being seen as a void that one was produced.
Just before the Court made its final legal conclusions it turned to the issue of whether
Moroccan and Mauritanian claims overlapped leaving nothing in between. The Court noted that
both Morocco and Mauritania had asserted that there was “no geographical void” or “no-man’s
land” between their respective claims.262  Bits of Western Sahara were either Moroccan or
Mauritanian. The Court, though, dismissed these claims: “overlapping arose simply from…  the
migration routes of the nomadic tribes…  To speak of a ‘north’ and a ‘south’ and an overlapping
with no void in between does not, therefore, reflect the true complexity of that situation.”263
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Finding a possible void between Morocco and Mauritania, the Court then appeared to find a
people to fill it. Judge Gros noted that there was undisputed evidence before the Court that at the
time of the opinion there were one hundred and seventy-three tribes in the territory. As to the
situation in 1884, he considered that there was not enough information to make an accurate
determination of the tribes and their ties.264 Nonetheless, prior to its conclusions, the Court
noted, “the independence of some of the nomads”, and highlighted a single tribe, the Regheibat,
which it described as, “a tribe prominent in Western Sahara”. It continued: “The Regheibat,
although they may have had links with the tribes of the Bilad Shinguitti, were essentially an
autonomous and independent people in the region with which these proceedings are
concerned.”265
One would assume that reference to “the region with which these proceedings are concerned”
was a reference to Western Sahara. However, what the Court did not mention was that the
Regheibat were also prominent over large areas of Mauritania.266 Mauritania had not claimed
that the Regheibat had links with the tribes of the Bilad Shinguitti, but that they were part of it.267
Moreover, the description the Regheibat as “an autonomous and independent people” also
overlooked important divisions within the population, such as the distinction between the Coastal
(Sahel) Regheibat and the Eastern (Sharg) Regheibat.268 The impression left, though, was that
the Regheibat, a “prominent” and “independent people” in between Morocco and Mauritania,
was essentially the Western Saharan people or at least the nucleus for one.
In conclusion, Western Sahara can be seen to be based on a legal balance between the
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, or, at least, self-determination and
territorial sovereignty. These principles, however, were also based on the fundamentally political
concepts of “people” and “country”, and each part of the balance was supported by highlighting
certain characteristics of the peoples of the region. The region’s tribal nature and the ambiguous
line between tribe and nation allowed plenty of room for the interpretation of peoples. This can
be seen in the issue of ties between Morocco and Western Sahara, the Court’s handling of the
Mauritanian “entity” and its alternate emphasis on the “peoples” of Western Sahara and the
prominence of the Regheibat.
9. Judge Ammoun’s Separate Opinion in Namibia: An African Nationalist
History
This chapter has been concerned with the coupling of nationalist rhetoric and legal principles.
But, how far can this rhetoric go? The final example, Judge Ammoun’s separate opinion in
Namibia provides some indication. Not only does it involve an elaborate nationalist argument,
but its basic reasoning ultimately only makes sense within the context of a particular
nationalism: Pan-Africanism.
Lebanese Judge Faoud Ammoun was perhaps self-determination’s most enthusiastic supporter
at the International Court of Justice. In 1970 he found the right to be an imperative rule of law,
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and that was in a case about a Canadian-based light and power company.269 The next year,
though, gave the Vice President of the Court the chance to grapple with one of the most
notorious cases of colonial domination, as once again the Court turned to the question of
Namibia (South West Africa).
However, for Ammoun, the Namibia opinion appeared to be something of a missed
opportunity. While the Court recognised the general applicability of self-determination to
colonial territories, the next logical step of applying it to Namibia was much more obscure.270
The Court did find that South Africa, “remains accountable for any violations of its international
obligations, or of the rights of the people of Namibia.”271 It also reminded all states to, “bear in
mind that the injured entity is a people which must look to the international community for
assistance in its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted.”272 These
are presumably references to self-determination. But, that is the point. It has to be assumed. The
Court seemed to apply self-determination to Namibia in winks and hints.
The Court was, in fairness, not specifically mandated to deal with Namibian self-
determination. The opinion followed a request by the Security Council on the legal consequences
for states of South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia despite SC Res. 276 of 1970, which
declared this presence illegal. However, SC Res. 276 was only an enforcement measure for a
previous decision by the General Assembly, GA Res. 2145 (XXI) of 1966, which terminated
South Africa’s mandate over the territory.273 The legality of this termination was, therefore, an
important element in assessing the legality of the South African presence in Namibia. The Court
found that the General Assembly had, within its competence, determined a material breach of the
mandate based on South Africa’s obligations under the Mandate Agreement and the UN
Charter.274 It also described the South African administration as, “a flagrant violation of the
purposes and principles of the Charter.” However, this was on the basis of, “distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or
national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights”,275 presumably
contrary to article 1(3), and not self-determination. Despite finding that self-determination was
the ultimate objective of the sacred trust, the principle was not specifically cited as an obligation
that South Africa had breached leading to the termination of its mandate.
This recognition of the principle of self-determination, but a failure to explicitly apply it was
criticised by Ammoun:
“[T]he Court has been called upon to pronounce, for the first time in regard to certain
fundamental principles of international law…  These are, in particular…  the right of
peoples to self-determination and decolonization…  The Court, in its Advisory Opinion,
has not overlooked them. In my view, however, it has not always gone far enough to spell
269 Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company
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out the legal conclusions to which they point.”276
Clearly dissatisfied with this state of affairs, the judge set about making the case for Namibian
self-determination.
South Africa had justified its policy of apartheid in Namibia on the basis that the natives had
never formed a people and thus their ethnic and social differences were best served by a policy
of separate development.277 Judge Ammoun countered this argument by presenting Namibia as a
single national entity. Moreover, he argued that Namibia was not simply a product of European
colonialism. It had a character that had both preceded and survived German and South African
domination:
“Namibia, even at the periods when it had been reduced to the status of a German colony
or was the subject to the South African Mandate, possessed a legal personality which was
denied to it only by the law now obsolete. It was considered by the Powers of the day as
merely a geographical concept taking its name from its location in the South West of the
African Continent. It nevertheless constituted a subject of law that was distinct from the
German State, possessing national sovereignty but lacking the exercise thereof.”278
Judge Ammoun thus met South African claims head on with his own assertion that there was
indeed a historical Namibian personality. However, as an objective interpretation of history, this
was open to question. Although the labelling of Namibians as South West Africans by ignorant
European colonisers might sound all too likely, in fact the reverse was true. “South West Africa”
was coined in the 1840s by the Swedish explorer C. J. Andersson. However, “Namibia”, was
derived in the 1950s from the Namib Desert,279 in the same way that Zambia is named after the
Zambezi River, and part of a movement to give African colonies suitably indigenous names. The
fact that these names were “African”, though, did not mean that they had been traditionally used.
Ghana and Benin, as we saw in Chapter 1, were named after medieval empires that were not
actually found within their borders.
Judge Ammoun was not analysing historical facts, but rearranging them to fit a nationalist
theory of Namibian history. As has been seen earlier, history is used by nationalists to add depth
to national claims. “Nationalist historiography”, wrote Hans Kohn, “desires not only to describe
a people’s life but to help form it and to make its history appear as the fulfilment of a supposed
national destiny. Such a historiography is less important for the knowledge of history itself than
for the understanding of the image which a nation forms of itself and of its own nationalism.”280
Nationalist histories often follow a formula with three elements: a national golden age; a period
of decline and humiliation, usually at the hands of foreigners; and a period of national
regeneration.281 The basic idea is to support a nationalist programme by presenting it as merely
the restoration of a natural state of affairs. As Greek nationalist Adamantios Koraes argued in his
Report on the Present State of Civilization in Greece, which is something of a classic among
such works: “If the state of a nation is to be fruitfully observed, it is mainly in the period when
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this nation degenerates from the virtues of its ancestors, as well as in the period when it is in the
process of regeneration.”282 Judge Ammoun’s opinion closely followed this three-fold structure.
Perhaps the defining statement of his argument was that: “the Namibian people, ultimate heir of
an ancient civilization which in its heyday rivalled anything in Europe, had, before the days of
the colonial régime, taken part in the making of great empires”.283
However, before he could turn to his nationalist history, Judge Ammoun had first to demolish
the foundations for South Africa’s claim that the Namibians were not a people. South Africa
supported its assertion that the natives of Namibia had never formed a people by highlighting
their ethnic and sociological differences, but Judge Ammoun repudiated this emphasis on
ethnicity in nationality. “How many of the peoples”, he asked, “that have come into being,
throughout history and in our times, have not in fact been made up of a variety of human
elements?” Citing the states of Ghana, Mali, Bornu, Axum, Kivu, Benin, the Bantus and the
Congo State, he continued that: “Multiplicity of ethnic entities has been no obstacle to the
formation of peoples and States in Africa.” Not only in Africa: in Asia there was India, China
and Pakistan; in Europe, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom.
Some of these examples were in retrospect unwise, but the point is clear enough, and Ammoun
rather elegantly drove into the heart of the South African argument: “is not even the South Africa
of today governed by a White minority formed by the union of immigrants of different national
origins – Germans, English, Dutch and several others?”284
South African pretensions thus countered, Judge Ammoun could turn to his nationalist
history. In its first phase, the golden age, Africa, “had seen the rise and development of
flourishing States and empires.” Ghana, he recalled was an empire, “the power and wealth of
which was unequalled in Western Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire.” The Empire of
Mali, “covered territories more vast than Europe at a time when a considerable part of the latter
was a feudal and often feuding patchwork”. At its centre, “shone a university more ancient than
any of Europe, the University of Timbuktu, of which it is said, in illustration of its splendour,
that the profit there obtained from the sale of manuscripts exceeded that derived from any
economic activity.” The state of Bornu was so prosperous that a nineteenth century English
traveller claimed that, “even the most humble citizen appeared…  happy and comfortable.” The
remains of the Great Lake civilisations revealed traces of roads, irrigation canals, dykes and
aqueducts which were constructed with “a remarkable level of technical skill.”285
Turning to southern Africa, he recalled that the Portuguese had found on the banks of the
Zambezi, “richer trade than in any other part of the world”. This was, he considered, “a flattering
comparison, for it was made when the Italian republics were at their splendid apogee.” In
Zimbabwe there were, “gigantic ruins, which call to mind the bastions of Nuragus or Mycenae”.
This empire extended over large areas, including what is now Pretoria and Johannesburg.
Africans had not only flourished politically and economically. Ammoun recalled Father
Placide Tempels, (a popular figure for African nationalists)286 whose study of the Bantus
revealed: “the ontological nature of their thinking, based upon awareness of self – on the ‘know
thyself’…  of Thales, the Phoenician philosopher who was adopted by the Greeks and ranked
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among the Seven Sages of their land. ‘To the intense spiritual doctrine which quickens and
nourishes souls within the Catholic Church,’ writes Placide Tempels, ‘a striking analogy may be
found in the ontological thinking of the Bantus.’”
To sum up Ammoun quoted Raimondo Luraghi: “Thus, at the time of the arrival of the
Portuguese, a chequered history had unrolled for centuries and millennia between the Sahara
desert and South Africa – a history of civilized peoples, comparable to that of the great empires
of Latin America or of Europe in the most brilliant days of Antiquity and the Middle Ages.”287
This golden age of African civilisation ended with the arrival of foreigners: Europeans. At the
1885 Conference of Berlin, European powers, in “a monstrous blunder and a flagrant injustice”
and “one of fate’s ironies” declared Africa south of the Sahara terrae nullius and divided it
amongst themselves. With them they brought, “the two greatest plagues in the recorded history
of mankind: the slave-trade, which ravaged Africa for centuries on an unprecedented scale; and
colonialism, which exploited humanity and natural wealth to a relentless extreme…  Only
Abyssinia [Ethiopia], by its savage resistance, escaped the slave-trade and repelled
colonialism”.288
This dark age of foreign exploitation had now been succeeded by a period of national
awakening and the struggle for independence: “the people of Namibia, which always used to be
the master of the country, is nowadays united by common aspirations, the legal foundation of
nationhood, towards a life of independence and freedom, whatever may be the political régime
which it will select after obtaining independence.”289
While Ammoun’s interpretation of Africa’s past and future may have its attractions, it is,
however, open to question as an objective reading of history. The simple denunciation of
European colonialism as a great plague obscures the profound changes that it brought to African
society. The modern states of Zimbabwe and Ghana are very much the political successors to the
colonies of Southern Rhodesia and the Gold Coast, rather than their ancient namesakes. There is
also a certain inconsistency in the denunciation of European empire-building as a plague, while
glorifying “great” African empires and celebrating the Namibian role in creating them.290 One
might seriously doubt whether the Empire of Ghana, which literally means “war-leader”,291 had
its foundations in “common aspirations”. Nor does Ammoun mention that the state of Bornu,
whose wealth he pointedly celebrated, grew rich along a trade route where one of the principal
commodities exchanged were human beings.292 However, there is an even greater problem with
Ammoun’s history. Although he produced evidence for great African civilisations, he showed
nothing to substantiate his claim that the Namibians played any role in making them.
What “great empires” could the Namibians have been involved with? The state of Zimbabwe,
which emerged after 1100, certainly covered a significant area of southern Africa in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries before its fall around 1500.293 It is not clear to what extent
Zimbabwe was a political unit rather than a zone of cultural and economic influence.
Nonetheless, it grew along an eastward trade route between the goldfields of the Zimbabwean
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plateau and the Indian Ocean, not west over the Kalahari Desert into Namibia. Similarly, the
vibrant trade on the Zambezi River found by the Portuguese may point to the industriousness of
the ancestors of Mozambiquans, but it says nothing about commerce in Namibia. Judge
Ammoun, on the face of it, seems to have produced no evidence at all that the Namibians
themselves had participated in the making of great empires or were heirs to a civilisation which
rivalled anything in Europe. So what was he saying?
To understand Judge Ammoun’s opinion one has to look at African nationalism. Nationalism
in Africa emerged on a number of levels. On one hand, there were the nationalist movements,
which developed within individual colonies and sought to gain control of the colonial state in the
name of a people: Nigeria, Angola, Namibia etc. On the other hand, there was also Pan-African
nationalism. Pan-Africanism294 is a nationalism (another notable example is Pan-
Europeanism)295 whose national idea embraces the population of an entire continent. The
doctrine itself is a mix of ideas ranging from Black pride to the political unification of Africa in a
single state. The Constitutive Act of the African Union 1999 specifically claims inspiration from
Pan-Africanism in its preamble, although in its objectives and principles it refers several times to
the “peoples” of Africa.296 The African people has also been ambiguous, being alternatively
defined by geography (the people of the African continent) and race (the Black people).
Nevertheless, at least, two levels of people have been available for African nationalists.297
Pan-Africanism has a particular significance in African nationalism. The movement did not,
in fact, first develop in Africa, but among members of a Black diaspora in Europe and the
Americas. However, what these individuals shared was a common experience of racial
discrimination and an African identity allowed them to turn this shared exclusion on its head. As
Colin Legum noted: “Deep at its quivering sensitive centre, Pan-Africanism rests on colour
consciousness. Recognition of the unique historical position of black peoples as universal
bottom-dog led to a revolt against passive submission to this situation…  Pan-Africanism became
a vehicle for the struggle of black people to regain their pride, their strength and their
independence.”298
History was an integral part of this process. As Basil Davidson argued: “African self-assertion
could never hold its own, intellectually, unless it could stand on its own history.”299 And  history
in this period was a political battlefield. European colonists who first saw the Zimbabwe ruins in
the late nineteenth century could not believe that Africans were capable of such a civilisation. At
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1992) at p. 53.
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the time of the opinion, the white minority regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were
still denying that they were.300 Against this, Judge Ammoun armed with Pan-Africanism could
draw on the greatness of Ghana, the learning of Timbuktu and the prosperity of Bornu to provide
Namibians, as Africans, with a glorious heritage. They may not have literally taken part in the
making of those empires, but they could still draw on their legacy as their own. “[I]t is these very
populations,” Ammoun reflected, “which the South African Government claims are…  incapable
of uniting, and which do not deserve the title of a people which the United Nations has attributed
to them.”301 The key word here is “deserve” and it is central to the politics of self-determination.
It may be one thing to talk in the abstract about the equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, as the UN Charter does. It is another to show it: to demonstrate that Africans who were
claimed to be incapable of self-government had actually built states that equalled or surpassed
those of the Europeans who ruled them. It can be noted that a very similar fleshing out of African
history was seen in the debate on the Colonial Independence Declaration.302 Ammoun’s message
was clear. Africans had prospered in the past and left to their own devices would do so again.
Thus, his opinion fulfilled the standard function of a nationalist history: to support a political and
in this case also a legal claim by making it appear the logical fulfilment of a historical process.
Concluding Remarks
In 1920, in the heady early days of the doctrine of self-determination, Sarah Wambaugh
concluded her A Monograph on Plebiscites with the proposal that: “No group, however small,
should be without its day in Court.”303 Today that suggestion would seem over-optimistic. Courts
and tribunals have accepted the applicability of self-determination as a legal principle. Indeed,
the International Court of Justice has recognised a line of jurisprudence, albeit a short one,
around the principle.304 However, application remains far from easy.
The standard legal approach of courts and other bodies to self-determination has been to
balance the right with principles, such as territorial integrity, state sovereignty and uti possidetis.
This has been used in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, the Badinter Opinions, the Åland
Islands decisions, the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute, Re. Secession of Quebec, Tatarstan
and Chechnya. These balances have also been supported by general political considerations, such
as peace, stability and development. However, as the Badinter Opinion No. 2 demonstrates, this
approach by itself does not deal with problems of nationalist legitimacy. Courts and tribunals,
therefore, have typically used nationalist practices of constructing and shaping ideas of peoples
to support their legal balances.
This represents a departure from the idea of justice as the impartial examination of factual
evidence. These ideas involve subjective interpretations based on a selective examination of the
300 E. Alpers, “The Mutupa and Malawi Political Systems to the Time of the Ngoni Invasions” in T. O. Ranger
ed., Aspects of Central African History (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968) pp. 1-28 at p. 5.
301 Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) p. 87, para. 10.
302 Liberia, 15 GAOR (1960) Plenary Meetings, 931st mtg., (A/PV.931) paras. 71-2; Guinea, ibid. 932nd mtg.,
(A/PV.932) para. 90; Togo, ibid. 936th mtg., (A/PV.936) paras. 58-60.
303 S. Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites with a Collection of Official Documents (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, New York, 1920) at p. 33.
304 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), (2004), www.icj-cij.org
(12/07/04) para. 88.
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facts. Thus, in the Åland Islands, the Jurists and the Rapporteurs alternatively interpreted the
islanders’ desire for union with Sweden as a deeply felt historical wrong or the reaction of
isolated yokels to political change. In both cases, neither commission produced much supporting
evidence. In Western Sahara the Court with evidence for 173 tribes in the territory, nonetheless,
highlighted a single “autonomous and independent people”. Judge Ammoun produced a
historical argument for Namibian self-determination, which said virtually nothing about
Namibian history, instead concentrating on idealised descriptions of the empires of Ghana, Mali
and other great African civilisations. All these cases point to the pervasive influence of
nationalism in the law of self-determination.
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5
The Law of Self-Determination: A Contradiction in
Terms?
Outline
The last two chapters examined the effect of legitimacy on the drafting of international
instruments and the decisions of courts and tribunals. This final chapter will extend this to
international legal obligations. The theme throughout this work is that the law of self-
determination is defined by the relationship, and indeed the tension between the doctrines of
nationalism and international law. In this “law”, self-determination is appealed to as an
alternative source of legitimacy to international law and it can be appealed to for two reasons:
either to support legal principles and obligations or to challenge them. The various aspects and
categories of the law of self-determination can, therefore, either be seen as a support or a
challenge to existing legal principles and rules. Does this mean, then, that the law of self-
determination is a contradiction in terms?
If self-determination is a doctrine about the legitimacy of legal rules, this also raises the
question of to what extent the law of self-determination is actually concerned with creating legal
obligations? Does the law of self-determination, at the end of the day, basically amount to a
critique of international law, or does it actually establish rules of its own? Is it about legal status
or political legitimacy, or are the two inseparably interconnected? Ten aspects of self-
determination will be looked at: (1) colonial peoples, (2) the peoples of states, (3) minorities, (4)
peoples under foreign or alien domination, (5) economic self-determination or permanent
sovereignty, (6) democratic government, (7) the use of force, (8) the issue of principle and right,
(9) jus cogens or peremptory norms and (10) erga omnes obligations.
1. Colonial Self-Determination
By all accounts the self-determination of the peoples of trust, non-self-governing and mandate
territories appears to be the doctrine’s most successful legal application. There seems to be a
general consensus that colonial self-determination is now part of international law.1 This
1 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1995) at p. 71; J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) at p. 101;
A. Rigo-Sureda, Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination (A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1973) at p. 226; M. A. Shukri,
The Concept of Self-Determination in the United Nations (Al Jadidah Press, Damascus, 1965) at pp. 338-50; K.
Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at p.
51; F. L. Kirgis Jr., “Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era” 88 American Journal of International
Law (1994) pp. 304-310 at p. 307; H. Quane, “The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination” 47
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1998) pp. 537-72 at p. 558; R. C. A. White, “Self-Determination:
Time for a Re-Assessment?” 28 Netherlands International Law Review (1981) pp. 147-70 at p. 150; S. P. Sindha, “Is
Self-Determination Passé?” 12 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1973) pp. 260-73 at p. 270; T. D.
Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) at p. 178; A. Anghie, “‘The
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consensus perhaps found its notable expression by the ICJ in Namibia:
“[T]he subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing
territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them. The concept of the sacred trust was confirmed and
expanded to all ‘territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government’ (Art. 73). Thus it clearly embraced territories under a colonial régime…
… the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of
the peoples concerned.”2
Colonial self-determination was undoubtedly a challenge to the legitimacy of both colonial
government and the concept of trusteeship in the Trust and Non-Self-Governing systems, and as
such it has been very successful. States with non-self-governing territories have all accepted the
applicability of the principle of self-determination.3 An indication of its success also is the fact
that one colonial category, the trust territory, no longer exists. The last territory of this type, Palau
exercised self-determination by free association with the United States in 1994 and the UN
Trusteeship Council now only exists as a “‘virtual’ body”.4 The ranks of non-self-governing
territories have also been dramatically slashed, with only a handful remaining. However, beyond
the fact that self-determination applies to non-self-governing territories, and that states with such
territories must justify their governance by reference to the principle, what specific obligations
does it impose? On this point, the consensus appears less substantial. General agreement on the
self-determination of colonial peoples was achieved by allowing disagreement on two key
variables: namely self-determination and peoples.
The obligations imposed by self-determination, as opposed to those under articles 73 and 76 of
the Charter, vary considerably depending on whether implementation of the right is seen as
immediate or progressive. Immediate self-determination was undoubtedly a radical break from
the commitments of the Charter, which envisioned the progressive achievement of self-
government under the doctrine of trusteeship. Progressive self-determination, on the other hand,
was more a reframing than a repudiation of Charter obligations. Peoples under this right obtained
self-government by self-determination rather than the paternalistic concept of trusteeship.
Nonetheless, like trusteeship, it was to be achieved according to the circumstances of the territory
and the people, and their capacity for self-government. This was not really a substantial change in
obligations, only in how they were seen. Indeed, it was even argued that articles 73 and 76
provided a standard by which this exercise of self-determination could be measured.5
Heart of My Home’: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case” 34 Harvard International Law
Journal (1993) pp. 445-506 at p. 466; R. T. de George, “The Myth of the Right of Collective Self-Determination” in
W. Twining ed., Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1991) pp. 1-7 at p. 2; A.
Michalska, “Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination in International Law” in ibid. pp. 71-90 at p. 78; R. S. Bhalla,
“The Right of Self-Determination in International Law” in ibid. pp. 91-101 at p. 91; G. Alfredsson, “Different Forms
of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination” in D. Clark and R. Williamson ed., Self-Determination:
International Perspectives (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996) pp. 58-84 at p. 61.
2 Namibia (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1971) p. 31, paras. 52-3.
3 UK, (CCPR/C/1/Add.37) 6-10 YHRC (1979-80) II, pp. 130-1; Netherlands, (CCPR/C/10/Add.5) 11-6 YHRC
(1981-2) II, pp. 174-5; Australia, (CCPR/C/14/Add.1) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, p. 35; New Zealand,
(CCPR/C/10/Add.6) ibid. pp. 269-70; France, (CCPR/C/46/Add.2) 31-3 HRCOR (1987-8) II, pp. 104-5; US,
CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994) pp. 5-8.
4 Trusteeship Council, 61st Session, (1994) 1705th mtg., (T/PV.1705) at p. 5.
5 UK, A/AC.125/SR.57 (1967) p. 6; US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 6; Australia, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) pp. 6-
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This division in the implementation of self-determination can be seen throughout the drafting
of the major instruments on the right, and neither of the two approaches entirely prevailed. The
Colonial Independence and Friendly Relations declarations, although more oriented towards the
immediate exercise of the right, nonetheless, accommodated a progressive interpretation through
the phrases “immediate steps” and “speedy”. The Covenants, in article 1, which had been drafted
earlier, appear to support a more progressive interpretation of self-determination, and this
approach was still maintained by some states later before the Human Rights Committee. If
neither prevailed, then, at a minimum, obligations would appear to be those of progressive self-
determination, if only by default. If self-determination has not been established to be exercised
immediately, then it must be to some extent progressive.
The other variable is the “people”. Here the International Court’s claim in Namibia that self-
determination was applicable to all non-self-governing territories appears misleading. Not all
such territories have been considered to be entitled to exercise or have been able to exercise the
right.6 Indeed, the Court in Western Sahara later qualified this statement with the defensive view
that the validity of the principle of self-determination was not affected by the General Assembly
dispensing with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of given territories.7
In fact, in the drafting of all the major international instruments on decolonisation, states have
sought to limit the application of self-determination in certain situations. This limitation is
usually expressed as a balance of legal principles, and in Western Sahara the Court found that the
principle of territorial sovereignty might effect the application of self-determination.8 The most
common principle, though, has been territorial integrity, which, it has been argued, prevails over
self-determination in certain colonial situations. The most frequently cited authority for this has
been principle 6 of the Colonial Independence Declaration which upholds the national unity and
territorial integrity of a “country”.9 However, a “country” can be as ambiguous as a “people”, and
just as nationally loaded. What is presented as a balance of principles often boils down to
competing national ideas. Which principle ultimately prevails depends on how “people” and
“country” are interpreted.
The concept of a “non-self-governing territory” itself has also proved subjective. Despite a
supposedly objective test in GA Res. 1541(XV), and the fact that UN keeps a list of such
territories (currently 16),10 practice has also shown that the title can be assigned or withdrawn on
an apparently arbitrary basis. For example, Hong Kong and Macau, at the request of the People’s
Republic of China, were removed from the list in 1972, on the grounds that they were not non-
self-governing territories after all, but “Chinese territory occupied by British and Portuguese
authorities.”11
8; Canada, A/AC.125/SR.93 (1968) p. 145; New Zealand, (CCPR/C/10/Add.6) 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) II, pp. 269-
70.
6 See H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1990) at p. 37.
7 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 33, para. 59.
8 ICJ Reports (1975) p. 68, para. 162.
9 See Morocco and Mauritania in Western Sahara, ICJ Reports (1975) pp. 29-30, paras. 49-50; Argentina,
A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 16; Spain, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th Cmttee., 1002nd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1002) para. 49;
Guatamala, ibid. 1003rd mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1003) para. 33.
10 Western Sahara, Anguilla (UK), Bermuda (UK), British Virgin Islands (UK), Cayman Islands (UK), Falkland
Islands (Malvinas) (UK), Montserrat (UK), St. Helena (UK), Turks and Caicos Islands (UK), United States Virgin
Islands (US), Gibraltar (UK), American Samoa (US), Guam (US), New Caledonia (France), Pitcairn (UK), Tokelau
(New Zealand). www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/ trust3.htm (visited 07/10/04).
11 Letter Dated 8 March 1972 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Addressed to
250
Practice by the General Assembly on designated non-self-governing territories has been
mixed. On one hand, there is Belize, a former British colony in Central America claimed by
Guatemala.12 General Assembly resolutions from 1975 supported Belize’s right to self-
determination, despite Guatemala’s claims,13 and Belize acceded to independence on 21
September 1981.14
On the other hand, there is the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), a British non-self-governing
territory in the South Atlantic 350 miles off the coast of Argentina, which claims it.15 In this case
General Assembly resolution not only did not accord the inhabitants a right of self-determination,
but pointedly called them a “population” rather than a “people”.16 On 2 April 1982 the islands
were invaded by Argentina, an intervention which was determined by the Security Council as a
breach of the peace,17 and defeated militarily by Britain. Nonetheless, the General Assembly’s
line remained unchanged, calling for negotiations on the islands without reference to self-
determination and taking only, “due account of the interests of the population”.18
There is also Gibraltar, a British non-self-governing territory off the southern tip of Spain,
which was originally ceded by Spain in the Treaty of Utrecht 1713, although article X gave it a
right of pre-emption if Britain relinquished sovereignty.19 The General Assembly again did not
support Gibraltar’s self-determination.20 A referendum on 10 September 1967, in which the
the Chairman of the Special Committee, 27 GAOR (1972) Supplement No. 23, (A/8723/Rev.1) vol. I, p. 70; GA Res.
2908(XXVII), 27 GAOR (1972) Supplement No. 30, (A/8730) pp. 2-3.
12 See R. J. Maguire, “The Decolonization of Belize: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity” 22 Virginia
Journal of International Law (1982) pp. 849-79 at pp. 852-3; Y. Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965) at p. 105; P. K. Menon, “The Anglo-Guatemalan Territorial Dispute over
Belize”Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations (1977) pp. 115-45 at pp. 118-33; T. M. Franck and P.
Hoffman, “The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places” 8 New York University Journal of International
Law and Politics (1975) pp. 331-86 at pp. 359-60.
13 GA Res. 3432(XXX), 30 GAOR (1975) Supplement No. 30, (A/8730) pp. 114-5; 30 GAOR (1975) 4th Cmttee.,
2173rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.2173) para. 57. GA Res. 31/50, 31 GAOR (1976) Supplement No. 39, (A/31/39) pp. 122-3;
GA Res. 32/32, 32 GAOR (1977) Supplement No. 45, (A/32/45) pp. 168-9; GA Res. 33/36, 33 GAOR (1978)
Supplement No. 45, (A/33/45) pp. 177-8; GA Res. 34/38, 34 GAOR (1979) Supplement No. 46, (A/34/46) pp. 204-
5; GA Res. 35/20, 35 GAOR (1980) Supplement No. 48, (A/35/48) pp. 214-5.
14 GA Res. 36/3, 36 GAOR (1981) Supplement No. 51, (A/36/51) p. 12.
15 See M. A. Sánchez, “Self-Determination and the Falkland Islands Dispute” 21 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (1982-3) pp. 557-584; Musgrave op. cit. no. 1 at p. 250; Franck and Hoffman loc. cit. no. 12 at
pp. 381-2; Blum op. cit. no. 12 at pp. 109-10.
16 GA Res. 2065, 20 GAOR (1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) p. 57; GA Res. 31/49, 31 GAOR (1976)
Supplement No. 39, (A/31/39) p. 122.
17 “Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), 1.
Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities; 2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from
the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) 3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” SC Res. 502 (1982).
18 GA Res. 37/9, 37 GAOR (1982) Supplement No. 51, (A/37/51) pp. 18-9; GA Res. 39/6, 39 GAOR (1984)
Supplement No. 51, (A/39/51) p. 17.
19 Article X: “And in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the crown of Great Britain, to grant, fell, or by any
means to alienate therefrom the propriety of said town of Gibraltar, it is hereby agreed, and concluded, that the
preference of having the same, shall always be given to the crown of Spain before any others.” Treaty of Utrecht
1713, 28 Parry’s TS (1713-4) pp. 324-46 at pp. 330-1. See J. E. S. Fawcett, “Gibraltar: The Legal Issues” 43
International Affairs (1967) pp. 236-51; R. Smith, “Solid as the ‘Rock’?”New Law Journal (31 May 2002) at p. 812;
Franck and Hoffman loc. cit. no. 12 at pp. 371-9; H. S. Levie, The Status of Gibraltar (Westview Press, Boulder,
1983).
20 GA Res 2070(XX), 20 GAOR (1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) p. 59.
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population voted for British sovereignty 99.6% on a 95.9% turnout,21 was condemned,22 and the
next year the Assembly called on Britain to terminate the colony by 1 October 1969 without
reference to the wishes of its inhabitants.23 A second referendum was held on 7 November 2002,
following attempts by the British and Spanish governments to negotiate an agreement on joint
sovereignty. This vote, in which 98.97% opted for sole British sovereignty on an 88% turnout,24
was recognised by neither government and ignored by the General Assembly, which called for a
continuation of the negotiations which lead to the poll in the first place.25
In support of this limitation it has been argued that the Falkland Islanders and the Gibraltarians
are settler populations without a connection to their territories and, in any case, are too small to
exercise self-determination. However, these arguments also reveal inconsistencies in practice.
Aside from the question of how long a population must inhabit a territory to have a connection to
it: the Falkland Islanders and Gibraltarians have lived in their respective territories for 170 and
290 years: the General Assembly has accorded self-determination to settler populations, for
example, Indians in Fiji.26 It has also granted the right to extremely small populations. Even
Pitcairn Island, with less than a hundred inhabitants, has been considered to have a right not only
to self-determination but also to independence.27 Some commentators have suggested that the
crucial difference between these cases is the attitude of the Non-Aligned group which dominates
the General Assembly. The Falkland Islanders and Gibraltarians, white populations wanting to
keep their ties to the colonial country, unlike Belize, may have simply not fitted into this group’s
idea of self-determination.28
There is also Hong Kong and Macau. Hong Kong was a British enclave in southern China
composed of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsular, ceded by China to Britain in 1842
and 1860, and the New Territories, leased from China for 99 years in 1898.29 Macau was another
enclave in which Portugal had been conceded the right to perpetual occupation on condition that
it would not alienate the territory to another state without China’s consent.30 In 1946 in GA Res.
66(I) Britain put Hong Kong on the list of non-self-governing territories,31 which the Republic of
China did not dispute. In 1960 in GA Res. 1542(XV) Macau was designated by the General
Assembly as a non-self-governing territory, with reservations by the Republic of China.
However, when the People’s Republic took the Chinese seat in 1971, Hong Kong and Macau
were both removed from the non-self-governing territories list.32 In 1984, with the impending
21 Levie op. cit. no. 19 at p. 112.
22 GA Res. 2353, 22 GAOR (1967) Supplement No. 16, (A/6716) p. 53.
23 GA Res. 2429(XXIII), 23 GAOR (1968) Supplement No. 18, (A/7218) p. 64.
24 Keesing’s (November 2002) at p. 45114; A. Sparrow, “Straw Rethinks Sovereignty Plan after Gibraltar Poll”
Daily Telegraph (9 November 2002).
25 GA Dec. 57/526, 57 GAOR (2002) Supplement No. 49, (A/57/49), vol. II, p. 17; See also Gibraltar: Working
Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/AC.109/2003/3, pp. 11-3, 15-6, paras. 36, 39-40, 46, 51.
26 GA Res. 2068(XX), 20 GAOR (1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) p. 58.
27 See e.g. GA Res. 2430(XXIII), 23 GAOR (1968) Supplement No. 18, (A/7218) pp. 64-5.
28 T. M. Franck, “Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War” 77
American Journal of International Law (1983) pp. 109-24 at pp. 121-2; M, Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law
and Practice: The New Doctrine of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982) at pp. 21-2.
29 R. W. McGee and D. K. K. Lam, “Hong Kong’s Option to Secede” 33 Harvard International Law Journal
(1992) pp. 427-40 at p. 428; Hannum op. cit. no. 6 at pp. 129-50.
30 See Y. Ghai, “The Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau: Some Reflections” 49
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000) pp. 183-98; H. S. Yee and S. S. H. Lo, “Macau in Transition:
The Politics of Decolonization” 31 Asia Survey (1991) pp. 905-19.
31 GA Res. 66(I), 1 GAOR (1946) (A/64/Add.1) p. 125.
32 J. F. Engers, “From Sacred Trust to Self-Determination” 24 Netherlands International Law Review (1977) pp.
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expiry of the lease on the New Territories, Britain and China concluded the Sino-British Joint
Declaration on Hong Kong, which provided for the whole territory to be transferred to China as a
Special Autonomous Region.33 No reference was made to the wishes of the population and the
transfer took place on 1 July 1997.34 In 1979 Portugal and China agreed a secret treaty, which
paved the way for the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration 1987. On 19 December 1999 the
Portuguese administration was terminated and Macau was also established as a Special
Administrative Region of China, again without any consultation of the local population.35
The use of force has also been a common method for settling the relationship between the self-
determination and territorial integrity and this again shows different practice. The majority in the
General Assembly was broadly sympathetic to the Indian invasion of the Portuguese enclaves of
Goa, Daman and Diu in western India, while the Security Council was blocked by the Soviet
veto.36 Indian sovereignty over the territories was acknowledged by Portugal in 1974.37
The Security Council and General Assembly, on the other hand, did condemn the 1975
Indonesian invasion of the Portuguese non-self-governing territory of East Timor.38 SC Res. 384
and 389 recognised the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and called upon states to
respect their territorial integrity. However, they did not invoke chapter VII of the Charter and did
not specify measures to compel Indonesian compliance.39 General Assembly resolutions on East
Timorese self-determination were also passed, but with declining majorities and after 1982 failed
to gain sufficient support.40 East Timor was, though, still recognised as a non-self-governing
85-91 at pp. 89-90; A. Eide, “The National Society, Peoples and Ethno-Nations: Semantic Confusions and Legal
Consequences” 64 Nordic Journal of International Law (1995) pp. 353-67 at p. 362; N. Jayawickrama, “Hong Kong:
The Gathering Storm” 22 Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1991) pp. 157-74 at pp. 164-5; R. McCorquodale,
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British Yearbook of International Law (1995) pp. 283-331 at pp. 290-4; E. Chadwick, Self-Determination, Terrorism
and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1996) at pp. 57-9.
33 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 23 ILM (1984) pp. 1366-87.
34 Keesing’s (July 1997) at p. 41732.
35 Keesing’s (December 1999) at p. 43314.
36 Q. Wright, “The Goa Incident” 56 American Journal of International Law (1962) pp. 617-32; F. de Quadros,
“Decolonization: Portugese Territories” in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 1992) vol. I, pp. 990-3 at pp. 991-2; Shukri op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 214-9.
37 Treaty between India and Portugal on Recognition of India’s Sovereignty over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli and Related Matters, 982 UNTS, pp. 159-61
38 P. D. Elliott, “The East Timor Dispute“ 27 International and Compatative Law Quarterly (1978) pp. 238-49;
R. S. Clark, “The ‘Decolonization’ of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and
Aggression” 7 Yale Journal of World Public Order (1980-1) pp. 2-44 at pp. 5-9; Franck and Hoffman loc. cit. no. 12
at pp. 342-50.
39 SC Res. 384 (1975) and SC Res. 389 (1976). R. S. Clark, “Some International Law Aspects of the East Timor
Affair” 5 Leiden Journal of International Law (1992) pp. 265-71 at p. 265; Franck and Hoffman loc. cit. no. 12 at p.
349.
40 GA Res. 3485(XXX), 30 GAOR (1975) Supplement No. 34, (A/10034) pp. 118-9 (adopted by 72 votes to 10,
with 43 abstentions); GA Res. 31/53, 31 GAOR (1976) Supplement No. 39, (A/31/39) p. 125 (adopted by 68 to 20,
with 49 abstentions); GA Res. 32/34, 32 GAOR (1977) Supplement No. 45, (A/32/45) pp. 169-70 (adopted by 67 to
26, with 47 abstentions); GA Res. 33/39, 33 GAOR (1978) Supplement No. 45, (A/33/45) pp. 181-2 (adopted by 59
to 31, with 44 abstentions); GA Res. 34/40, 34 GAOR (1979) Supplement No. 46, (A/34/46) p. 206 (adopted by 62
to 31, with 45 abstentions); GA Res. 35/27, 35 GAOR (1980) Supplement No. 48, (A/35/48) pp. 219-20 (adopted by
58 to 35, with 46 abstentions); GA Res. 36/50, 36 GAOR (1981) Supplement No. 51, (A/36/51) p. 200 (adopted by
54 to 42, with 46 abstentions); GA Res. 37/30, 37 GAOR (1982) Supplement No. 51, (A/37/51) pp. 227-8 (adopted
by 50 votes to 46, with 50 abstentions).
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territory.41 Political changes in Indonesia in 1998, however, lead the government to propose a
referendum on autonomy in East Timor with the possibility that it might secede if this was
rejected. In May 1999 an agreement was reached for the UN to organise a referendum in the
territory,42 and in this poll in August the East Timorese rejected autonomy by 78.5% on a 98.6%
turnout.43 This vote lead to devastating retribution by pro-Jakarta militias, with the result of the
dispatch of an international force to the territory to restore security,44 and the establishment of the
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor.45 UNTAET administered the territory until
East Timor acceded to independence on 20 May 2002.46
The Moroccan invasion of the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara in November
1975, following the Western Sahara Opinion, was also met with a weak response from the
Security Council. SC Res. 380 of 6 November 1975 called on Morocco to immediately to
withdraw from the territory, but made no mention of enforcement measures or self-
determination.47 Nonetheless, subsequent Security Council resolutions have upheld a right of
self-determination48 and Western Sahara remains a designated non-self-governing territory.
General Assembly resolutions were initially non-committal49 or divided (with two parts and parts
A and B taking different positions).50 However, since 1979 they have consistently recognised
Western Sahara’s right to self-determination.51 On 14 November 1975 Morocco, Mauritania and
Spain reached an agreement to partition the territory between Morocco and Mauritania with
Spain receiving fishing rights and mining interests.52 This occupation was resisted by the Sahrawi
liberation movement, POLISARIO, which declared the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) on 27 February 1976. In 1980 a slim majority of states in the OAU (26 out of 50)
recognised the SADR as the government of Western Sahara and in 1983 it took its seat as the
OAU’s 51st member, prompting a walk out by Morocco and eighteen other states. In 1979
Mauritania pulled its troops out, leaving Morocco to fight on alone.53 The continuing conflict
drew in the UN and in August 1988 Morocco and POLISARO, through the good offices of the
OAU and UN Secretary-General, reached an agreement in principle for a referendum in Western
Sahara.54 In April 1991 the Security Council created MINURSO, the United Nations Mission for
the Referendum in Western Sahara, to organise and oversee a vote in the territory.55 However,
this referendum has so far been hampered by fundamental disagreement between the parties over
41 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 103, para. 31.
42 United Nations, The United Nations and East Timor: Self-Determination through Popular Consultation
(United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 2000) pp. 6-10. See SC Res. 1236 (1999) and SC
Res. 1246 (1999).
43 Ibid. pp. 38-40.
44 SC Res. 1264 (1999).
45 SC Res. 1272 (1999).
46 Keesing’s (May 2002) p. 44781.
47 SC Res. 380 (1975).
48 E.g. SC Res. 621 (1988).
49 GA Res. 32/22, 32 GAOR (1977) Supplement No. 45, (A/32/45) pp. 161-2.
50 GA Res. 3458(XXX) A and B, 30 GAOR (1975) Supplement No. 34, (A/10034) pp. 116-7.
51 GA Res. 34/37, 34 GAOR (1979) Supplement No. 46 (A/34/46) at pp. 203-4.
52 T. M. Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara” 70 American Journal of International Law (1976) pp. 694-721 at
pp. 711-5; J. Mercer, The Sahrawis of Western Sahara (Minority Rights Group Report No. 40, London. 1979) at pp.
9-10.
53 T. Hodges, The Western Saharans (Minority Rights Group Report No. 40, London, 1984) at pp. 11-5.
54 SC Res. 621 (1988).
55 SC Res. 690 (1991).
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the identification of voters and the basic goals of the vote.56
These disputes over non-self-governing territories may, of course, be expressed legally by
principles such as self-determination and territorial integrity. However, these principles, in turn,
hinge on the fundamentally political concepts of “people” and “country”. State practice in the UN
has shown notable inconsistencies and tends to demonstrate that whether the inhabitants of a non-
self-governing territory are a “people” or merely a “population” depends on a variety of political
considerations.
To sum up, a consensus has emerged around colonial self-determination, but this was only
achieved by allowing ambiguity in two key areas. The first variable was the process of self-
determination and whether the right was immediate or progressive. Progressive self-
determination did not really differ from existing obligations under the Charter, merely how they
were seen. The second variable was the “people”, a designation which has not been extended to
all inhabitants of non-self-governing territories. The differential treatment of colonial populations
may be explained in terms of a balance of legal principles, like self-determination and territorial
integrity, but these balances themselves only seem to reflect political considerations.
Self-determination has certainly posed a successful challenge to the legitimacy of colonial rule
and there is little dispute today that broadly speaking it applies to colonial territories. However,
once this general principle is looked at in terms of specific obligations, it fragments and appears
rather less substantial. The acknowledgement that self-determination is legally applicable to
colonial territories is a powerful statement on the legitimacy of that form of government, but the
specific legal consequences that flow from it are much more ambiguous. Only a few non-self-
governing territories now remain, and, although these include a significant number of disputed
cases, there appear to be limited prospects for the further development of this area of self-
determination.
2. The Peoples of States
In this area self-determination generally plays a supporting role, lending legitimacy to the
principles of the sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.
Those two principles, the International Court noted in Nicaragua, are fundamentally connected
and part of international law.57 Nonetheless, self-determination gives them an extra dimension,
putting the perspective of peoples into two fundamentally state-orientated principles. As Liberia
argued in the debate on the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention: “Intervention
was…  more than a violation of the rules governing the relations of States; what it amounted to
was the domination of one people by another”.58
There is considerable evidence for a connection between the two principles and self-
determination. In the Covenants, states linked the three, both in the drafting and before the
56 See T. M. Franck and G. Nolte, “The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General” in A. Roberts and
B. Kingsbury eds., United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1993) pp. 143-182 at pp. 167-6; M. Huband, “Mirage in the Desert”Financial Times (4 December 1998).
57 “The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without
outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it
is part and parcel of customary international law. As the Court has observed: ‘Between independent States, respect
for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations’”. Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1986) p. 106, para. 202. See also paras. 203-9.
58 Liberia, 20 GAOR (1965) 1st Cmttee., 1401st mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1401) para. 42.
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Human Rights Committee. The Committee itself in General Comment No. 12 (21) called on
states to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states and thereby adversely
affecting the exercise of the right to self-determination.59
In the Friendly Relations Declaration self-determination, in principle 5, sits alongside non-
intervention and sovereign equality, in principles 3 and 6, respectively. Not only does the text of
the Declaration assume that the three principles are complementary, but states in the drafting also
explicitly connected them. The same is also true for the Helsinki Final Act, which, in principle
VIII, proclaimed respect for self-determination, and in principles VI and I, respect for non-
intervention and sovereign equality. States again linked the three in the drafting. Moreover,
principle 5 of the Friendly Relations Declaration connected realisation of self-determination with
the promotion of friendly relations between states. This followed the UN Charter, which in
articles 1(2) and 55 based friendly relations between nations on respect for self-determination.
Finally, a connection between self-determination and non-intervention can be seen in the
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131(XX) of 1965. This resolution
was passed almost unanimously, by 109 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (United Kingdom), and has
been considered by the International Court in assessing opinio juris regarding non-intervention.60
In addition to respect for non-intervention, the Declaration provides that: “All States shall respect
the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised
without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”61 A connection between the two principles was also clearly evident in the drafting.62
In the words of the United Arab Republic: “The principle of equal rights and self-determination
and the principle of non-intervention were inseparable.”63
There is, therefore, considerable evidence for an interpretation of self-determination, which
encompasses the principles of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states. In treaty law
59 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 143, para. 6.
60 Nicaragua, ICJ Reports (1986) p. 107, para. 203.
61 GA Res. 2131(XX), 20 GAOR (1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) pp. 11-2.
62 Honduras: “[F]or Latin America, non-intervention represented not merely a principle but also an indispensable
basis for ensuring independence and territorial integrity and for guaranteeing the legitimate and permanent self-
determination of peoples.” 20 GAOR (1965) 1st Cmttee., 1400th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1400) para. 27; Sweden: “[T]he
principle of non-intervention was supplemented and supported by other principles of the Charter which gave it
meaning and substance – for example, those relating to the prohibition of the threat or use of force, the right to self-
determination, and the obligation to abide by international treaties.” Ibid., 1401st mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1401), para. 25;
Chile: “[I]ntervention destroyed the very foundations of international coexistence, such as the principles of sovereign
equality of States and the right of peoples to self-determination”. Ibid. 1402nd mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1402) para. 44;
Cyprus: “[T]he United Nations Charter was based fundamentally on the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, which included the principle of the sovereign equality of States, and on the principle that
States should refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State.” Ibid. 1404th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1404) para. 28; Columbia, ibid. 1st Cmttee., 1395th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1395) para.
36; Cuba, ibid. 1396th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1396) para. 25; Mexico, ibid. 1397th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1397) para. 24;
Argentina, ibid. 1398th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1398) para. 43; Ukrainian SSR, ibid. 1399th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1399) para. 23;
Dominican Republic, ibid. para. 44; Uruguay, ibid. 1401st mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1401) para. 25; Liberia, ibid. para. 42;
Tunisia, ibid. 1402nd mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1402) para. 1; Poland, ibid. paras. 6-7; El Salvador, ibid. 1403rd mtg.,
(A/C.1/SR.1403) para. 19; Burma, ibid. para. 29; Philippines, ibid. para. 40; Iraq, ibid. 1404th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1404)
paras. 51-3; Jordan, ibid. 1405th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1405) paras. 2-3; Mongolia, ibid. para. 26; Jamaica, ibid. 1406th
mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1406) para. 31; Pakistan, 20 GAOR (1965) Plenary Meetings, 1408 th mtg., (A/PV.1408) para. 63;
USSR, ibid. paras. 106 and 110; Brazil, ibid. para. 120; Guatamala, ibid. para. 128; Cameroon, ibid. paras. 136 and
138.
63 UAR, 20 GAOR (1965) 1st Cmttee., 1403rd mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1403) para. 3.
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this may be reasonably inferred from the drafting and implementation of article 1 of the
Covenants. In customary law, the comments of states in the drafting of, in particular, the Friendly
Relations Declaration, the Helsinki Final Act and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention provide a great deal of evidence for opinio juris.
However, the relationship between self-determination and the two principles may not always
be complementary. Self-determination is based on peoples, while sovereign equality and non-
intervention are based on states, and a basic principle of nationalism is that the two do not
necessarily correspond. In cases where a state is seen not to represent a people, such as apartheid
South Africa, self-determination may actually be used as a challenge to non-intervention. This is
evident in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, which, on the basis of self-
determination, also called on states to, “contribute to the complete elimination of racial
discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.” Comments by states in the
drafting suggest that in such situations self-determination may be an exception to non-
intervention.64 Similar interpretations were also made in drafting of the Friendly Relations
Declaration and the Definition of Aggression. This aspect of self-determination will be examined
in more detail in the sections on peoples under foreign and alien domination and the use of force,
but it highlights that the principles may not always be compatible.
3. Minorities and Other Non-State Populations
a. Minority Self-Determination
The question of whether minorities within states have a right to self-determination should be
relatively straightforward, and yet it is not. What has been fairly clear is the general lack of a
positive intention in the drafting of international instruments to extend self-determination, at least
in a form that includes secession, to minorities.65 But, what also stands out is how hard it can be
64 Afghanistan, 20 GAOR (1965) 1st Cmttee., 1396th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1396) para. 16; Ukrainian SSR, ibid. 1399th
mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1399) para. 30; Democratic Republic of Congo, ibid. 1400th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1400), para. 40;
Tanzania, ibid. 1401st mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1401) para. 5; Byelorussian SSR, ibid. para. 12; Algeria, ibid. para. 19;
Yugoslavia, ibid. para. 37; Tunisia, ibid. 1402nd mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1402) para. 3; Kenya, ibid. para. 20; Jordan, ibid.
1405th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1405) para. 4; Nigeria, ibid. para. 48; USSR, 20 GAOR (1965) Plenary Meetings, 1408th
mtg., (A/PV.1408) para. 107. But see France: “Europeans would remember only too well how the pretext of
‘assistance to oppressed minorities’ had been used between 1933 and 1940; and representatives of countries in other
continents would no doubt have more recent experiences to remind them of the dangers of that particular argument.”
Ibid. 1st Cmttee., 1405th mtg., (A/C.1/SR.1405) para. 43.
65 On the general antipathy towards secession in international law see J. Crawford, “State Practice and
International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession” in A. F. Bayefsky ed., Self-Determination in International
Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer, The Hague, 2000) pp. 31-61 at pp. 42-3, 57; A. Buchanan, “Democracy
and Secession” in M. Moore ed., National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1998) pp. 14-33 at p. 15; D. Philpott, “Self-Determination in Practice” in ibid. pp. 79-102 at p. 86; D. F. Orentlicher,
“International Responses to Separatist Claims: Are Democratic Principles Relevant?” in S. Macedo and A. Buchanan
eds., Secession and Self-Determination (New York University Press, New York, 2003) pp. 19-49 at p. 19; D. L.
Horowitz, “A Right to Secede?” in ibid. pp. 50-76 at p. 59; L. Hannikainen, “Self-Determination and Autonomy in
International Law” in M. Suksi ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) pp. 79-95
at p. 83; D. Murswiek, “The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of
Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 21-39 at pp. 23-4, 37; R. Higgins, The Development of
International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford University Press, London, 1963) at p.
105; Quane loc. cit. no. 1 at p. 546; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 123; Eide loc. cit. no. 32 at p. 363; Knop op. cit. no. 1
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to draw a line between the self-determination of peoples and the rights of minorities. Can it
definitely be said that the “peoples” referred to in the Covenants, or the Friendly Relations
Declaration always exclude minorities?
State practice tends to confirm both a lack of support for, but also considerable ambiguity
over, the self-determination of minorities. The international community has been notably hostile
to secession. This was underlined in the 1960s with the failure of two African secessions.
Katanga, which declared independence from Congo (Zaïre) in 1960-63, was not recognised by
single state,66 and Biafra, which seceded from Nigeria in 1967-70,67 was only recognised by five
countries: Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Zambia and Haiti.68 These secessions were defeated
militarily. But, a number of secessionist movements which do effectively control all or part of
their territory, including Southern Sudan,69 Northern Cyprus,70 Somaliland,71 Abkhazia,72 Trans-
Dniestr, Nagorno-Karabakh,73 Chechnya74 and Anjounan in the Comoros archipelago,75 have also
at p. 53; Michalska op. cit. no. 1 at p. 81; Bhalla op. cit. no. 1 at p. 92; M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to
International Law (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982) at p. 253; S. J. Anaya, “The Capacity of International
Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims” 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1993) pp. 403-11 at p. 404; S.
Trifunovska, “One Theme in Two Variations – Self-Determination for Minorities and Indigenous Peoples” 5
International Journal of Minority and Group Rights (1997) pp. 175-97 at p. 188; L. Wildhaber, “Territorial
Modifications and Breakups in Federal States” 33 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1995) pp. 41-74 at p.
42;  J. E. Stromseth, “Self-Determination, Secession and Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations” 86
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1992) pp. 370-4 at pp. 370, 374; H. Hannum, “Self-
Determination in the Post-Colonial Era” in D. Clark and R. Williamson eds., Self-Determination: International
Perspectives (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996) pp. 12-44 at p. 38; P. Sieghart, The International Law of Human
Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) at p. 367; O. S. Kamanu, “Secession and the Right of Self-Determination:
An O.A.U. Dilemma” 12 Journal of Modern African Studies (1974) pp. 355-376 at p. 360.
66 A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (Frank Cass, London, 1991) at pp.
58-79; L. C. Buccheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978)
at pp. 141-53; E. Suzuki, “Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial
Separatism” 16 Virginia Journal of International Law (1975-6) pp. 779-862 at pp. 821-5.
67 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, “The Peoples of Nigeria: The Cultural Background to the Crisis” 66 African Affairs
(1967) pp. 3-11; Hercalides op. cit. no. 66 at pp. 80-106; M. G. K. Nayar, “Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial
Context: Biafra in Retrospect” 10 Texas International Law Journal (1975) pp. 321-45 at pp. 321-45; Buccheit op.
cit. no. 66 at pp. 162-76; Suzuki loc. cit. no. 66 at pp. 798-805; C. R. Nixon, “Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra
Case” 24 World Politics (1972) pp. 473-497.
68 D. A. Ijalaye, “Was ‘Biafra’ at any Time a State in International Law” 65 American Journal of International
Law (1971) pp. 551-9 at pp. 553-4.
69 See SC Res. 1547 (2004); SC Res. 1556 (2004).
70 “Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ is invalid, and will
contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus…  1. Deplores the declaration of the purported secession of part
of the Republic of Cyprus; 2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its
withdrawal…  6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-
alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; 7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the
Republic of Cyprus”. SC Res. 541 (1983).
71 A. J. Carroll and B. Rajagopal, “The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland” 8 American
University Journal of International Law and Policy (1993) pp. 653-81.
72 SC Res. 876 (1993); SC Res. 906 (1994); SC Res. 937 (1994); SC Res. 896 (1994); SC Res. 971 (1995); SC
Res. 993 (1995); SC Res. 1036 (1996); SC Res. 1065 (1996); SC Res. 1077 (1996); SC Res. 1096 (1997); SC Res.
1124 (1997); SC Res. 1187 (1998); SC Res. 1225 (1999); SC Res. 1287 (2000); SC Res. 1311 (2000); SC Res. 1339
(2001); SC Res. 1364 (2001); SC Res. 1393 (2002); SC Res. 1427 (2002); SC Res. 1462 (2003); SC Res. 1524
(2004); SC Res. 1554 (2004).
73 SC Res. 822 (1993); SC Res. 853 (1993); SC Res. 874 (1993); SC Res. 884 (1993).
74 See 6 US Department of State Dispatch (1995) at pp. 120-1; 66 British Yearbook of International Law (1995)
at p. 621.
75 G. J. Naldi, “Separatism in the Comoros: Some Legal Aspects” 11 Leiden Journal of International Law (1998)
258
not received international recognition.
However, other state practice has blurred the distinction. States before the Human Rights
Committee have reported on constitutional arrangements involving minorities under self-
determination. The line between peoples and minorities has also been eroded with the
development of the rights of indigenous peoples. A number of constitutions also recognise either
peoples or a right of self-determination within the respective states. The Russian Constitution
1993 in its preamble and article 5(3) recognises peoples with a right to self-determination within
the federation, although this is balanced with territorial integrity in article 4(3).76 Article 39 of the
Ethiopian Constitution 1995 recognises not only the self-determination of nations, nationalities
and peoples within the country, but also their right to secession.77 The Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1995 recognises at least three constituent peoples.78 Article 235 of the South
African Constitution 1996, although recognising the, “right of the South African people as a
whole to self-determination”, does not preclude, “the notion of self-determination”, for
communities within the country.79 Moreover, in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia this constitutional right to self-determination was invoked to support the
dissolution of those states.
In addition, while secessionist movements have not generally received international
recognition, there have been exceptions. The first was the secession of Bangladesh in 1971.
pp. 247-56.
76 Preamble: “… Guided by universally recognized principles of equality and self-determination of peoples… ”
Article 5(3): “The federative make-up of the Russian Federation shall be based upon its state integrity, a uniform
system of state authority, the separation of jurisdiction and powers between the bodies of state authority the Russian
Federation and bodies of state authority of the members of the Russian Federation, and the equality and self-
determination of the peoples within the Russian Federation.” Article 4(3): “The Russian Federation shall ensure the
integrity and inviolability of its territory.” V. V. Belyakov and W. J. Raymond ed., The Constitution of the Russian
Federation (Brunswick Publishing, Lawrenceville, 1994) pp. 15-7.
77 Article 39: “Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples 1. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia
has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession. 2. Every nation, nationality and
people in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express and to promote its
culture; and to preserve its history. 3. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure
of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and
to equitable representation in regional and national governments. 4. The exercise of self-determination, including
secession of every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia is governed by the following procedures: (a) When a
demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of legislative council of any
nation, nationality or people; (b) When the Federal Government has organised a referendum which must take place
within three years from the time it received the concerned Council’s decision for secession; (c) When the demand for
secession is supported by a majority vote in the referendum; (d) When the Federal Government will have transferred
to the people or to their Council its powers; and (e) When the division of assets is effected on the basis of a law
enacted for that purpose. 5. A nation, nationality or people for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people
who have or share a large measure of common culture, or similar customs, mutual intellegibility of language, belief
in a common or related identities, and who predominantly inhabit an identifiable, contiguous territory.” G. H. Flanz,
“Ethiopia” in G. H. Flanz ed., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Oceana Publications, New York, 1995) at
pp. 18-9.
78 Preamble: “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows… ” 35 ILM (1996) pp.
118-27 at p. 118.
79 Article 235: “The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this
Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of self-determination of
any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any
other way, determined by national legislation.” M. Rwelamira, “South Africa” in G. H. Flanz ed., Constitutions of
the Countries of the World (Oceania, New York, 1997) at p. 118.
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Bangladesh was originally East Pakistan, carved out of the eastern, mostly Muslim part of Bengal
province in the 1947 partition of India, and one of the two “wings” of Pakistan that straddled
either side of the subcontinent. East and West Pakistan were not only geographically separate, but
also culturally distinct and never acted as a single political unit, with different parties dominating
in each “wing” in elections. Moreover, despite the fact that East Pakistan contained the majority
of the Pakistani population, it found itself subordinated to the West. Pakistan’s national
institutions were located in the West and controlled by Westerners, who also filled administrative
positions in the East. The East also suffered economically in the union. On partition per capita
income in East Pakistan was 10% less than the West, but by the end of the 1960s it was 60%
less.80
The political crisis that lead to the 1971 secession began in December 1970 with the success of
the autonomist Awami League in national elections. The League stood on a platform of
restructuring Pakistan as a loose federation and its victory was so comprehensive in the East that
it held a majority in the Pakistani parliament. West Pakistani politicians, in turn, rejected
domination by the East and argued that federal structure would leave Pakistan fatally weakened
against India. Political gridlock ensued, which was broken by the Pakistani army on 25 March
1971 with a massive attack on the East, causing enormous civilian casualties.81 On the 26 March
Bangladeshi independence was declared over the radio and reaffirmed on 10 April as, “due
fulfilment of the legitimate right of self-determination of the people of Bangla Desh.”82
The critical factor in the fate of the secession was the role of India. Pakistani military action in
the East created an immense refugee crisis for the country, with  9.7 million refugees on Indian
territory by November. This humanitarian crisis, as well as the opportunity to dismember
Pakistan and discredit the idea of a Muslim nation, lead India to intervene in the East. An ill-fated
Pakistani air strike on 3 December provided the cue for the invasion and on the 6 December India
recognised Bangladesh. India’s intervention was raised in the Security Council, which found
itself blocked by disagreement between the Soviet Union, America and China. The matter was,
therefore, taken up by the General Assembly, which by a large majority passed GA Res.
2793(XXVI), calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal. If implemented this would have left
Pakistan in control of the East. Nevertheless, Indian action was swift and decisive and on 16
December, twelve days after the war began, Pakistani forces surrendered. After the war
Bangladesh quickly gained recognition, although it was not admitted to the United Nations until
1974 due to the Chinese veto.83
Other states established by outside intervention have not been recognised, but there may be a
number of features that set Bangladesh apart from other secessions. First, with its geographical
separation, Bangladesh was effectively much closer politically to the decolonisation of an
overseas territory than a standard secession.84 With an ocean and a hostile India between the two,
80 R. Sisson and L. E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1990) at pp. 8-16; L. Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide (Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1985) at pp. 44-7.
81 International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan: A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, 1972) at pp. 11-45; Buccheit op. cit. no. 66 at pp. 202-7; Heraclides
op. cit. no. 66 at pp. 147-52.
82 Proclamation of Independence Order People’s Republic of Bangla Desh April 10, 1971, 4 New York University
Journal of International Law and Politics (1971) at p. 557.
83 Heraclides op. cit. no. 66 at pp. 159-62; Buccheit op. cit. no. 66 at pp. 207-11; V. P. Nanda, “Self-
Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East
Pakistan)” 66 American Journal of International Law (1972) pp. 321-36 at p. 325.
84 Ibid. p. 336; Buchheit op. cit. no. 66 at pp. 211-2.
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it was clear that once Pakistan had been defeated it would be unable to reassert its control.
Second, Bangladesh was not a corner of an island or a dot on a map, that could be ignored on a
point of principle, but a substantial entity with 73 million people. Commentators have pointed out
that the secession did not involve the self-determination of a minority, but the majority of the
Pakistani population.85 Third, Pakistan had tarnished its authority by the brutality of its
crackdown in Bengal, although, as will be seen shortly, this should certainly not be overplayed.86
The second example was Eritrea in 1993.87 Eritrea was a former Italian colony on the north-
east African coast, which in 1950 was recommended by the UN to be federated with Ethiopia
under the Ethiopian crown.88 However, Eritrea’s autonomy within this union was steadily eroded
by Ethiopia until on 14 November 1962 the Eritrean Assembly under duress voted to abolish the
federation. This attack on Eritrean autonomy was resisted, first by the Eritrean Liberation Front
(ELF) in 1961, which drew from traditionally pro-independence coastal Muslims, and later by the
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which, including Christians from the interior, was
more representative of the population.89
A crucial factor in Eritrean independence was the alliance in the 1990s between the EPLF and
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Ethiopia, itself an alliance
of Tigray, Amhara and Oromo liberation movements. In May 1991 the EPLF captured the
Eritrean capital Asmara, while its Ethiopian allies overthrew the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia.90
One of the first acts of the new EPRDF government was to recognise Eritrea’s right to self-
determination and the organisation of a referendum in the territory.91 In June 1992 the EPLF set
up an interim administration in Eritrea followed by a transitional government. A referendum in
April 1993 produced a 99.8% vote for independence on a 98.2% turnout,92 and independence was
declared on 24 May 1993.93 The recognition of the Ethiopian government meant that, despite
decades of secessionist struggle, Eritrean independence was ultimately achieved by mutual
agreement.94 Eritrea was also fortunate that as a former colony the principle of uti possidetis,
which had been endorsed by most OAU members to frustrate African secessionist movements,
actually supported its separation from Ethiopia.95
Self-determination has also been involved in the dissolution of states, in particular, the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is closest to the model of the dissolution
of a multinational federation. Leaders of the Czech and Slovak republics agreed their separation
85 Nanda loc. cit. no. 83 at p. 336.
86 Heraclides op. cit. no. 66 at p. 156; Crawford op. cit. no. 65 at p. 45.
87 See generally Eyassu Gayim, The Eritrean Question: The Conflict between the Right of Self-Determination and
the Interests of States (Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, 1993).
88 GA Res. 390(V), 5 GAOR (1950) Supplement No. 20, (A/1775) pp. 20-2.
89 A. Bariagaber, “The Politics of Cultural Pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trajectories of Ethnicity and
Constitutional Experiments” 21 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1998) pp. 1056-73 at pp. 1065-6; Heraclides op. cit. no.
66 at pp. 177-95; K. Tronvall, “Borders of Violence – Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation-
State” 22 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1999) pp. 1037-1060.
90 C. Clapham, “The Foreign Policies of Ethiopia and Eritrea” in S. Wright ed., African Foreign Policies
(Westview, Boulder, 1999) pp. 84-99 at pp. 90-2.
91 D. Connell, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution (Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1993) at p. 247;
Crawford op. cit. no. 65 at pp. 51-2.
92 Keesing’s (April 1993) p. 39403.
93 Keesing’s (May 1993) p. 39450.
94 See Alfredsson op. cit. no. 1 at p. 62.
95 See J. Klabbers and R. Lefeber, “Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis” in C. Brölmann,
R. Lefeber and M. Zieck eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp.
37-76 at pp. 70-4.
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within their existing frontiers on 1 January 1993 and Czechoslovak representatives argued that
this was an exercise of the right to self-determination.
The Soviet Union was a union of fifteen sovereign Union Republics and with its dissolution
those political units became independent states. In the Minsk Declaration of 8 December 1991,
the leaders of Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine, which were the original signatories to the Union
Treaty of 1922 establishing the USSR, dissolved the union.96 In its place they established the
Commonwealth of Independent States and in the Alma Alta Declaration of 21 December 1991
CIS membership was extended to other Union Republics of the former Soviet Union: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.97
Georgia also later joined in October 1993 under some coercion.98
A distinction, however, can be made over the position of the Baltic Republics of Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. These Union Republics had originally been independent states and members
of the League of Nations, which were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. On 11 and 30
March and 5 May, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, respectively, reaffirmed that they were de jure
independent states, based on the illegality of their original annexation as well as the right to self-
determination. Lithuania went further and also declared its de facto independence, although this
lead to a Soviet blockade, and a moratorium on the implementation of this independence in
June.99 After the coup of 19 August 1991, Estonia and Latvia also declared their de facto
independence on 20 and 21 August and were quickly recognised internationally and by Soviet
authorities on 6 September.100 Thus, the Baltic States effectively seceded from the Soviet Union
before its final dissolution, although their position was that they were merely restoring their
existing independence.101
The break up of Yugoslavia was also treated as following the dissolution model, in particular,
by the Badinter Commission and the UN Security Council,102 even though there was no
agreement to dissolve the federation and Slovene and Croatian independence was resisted by
federal authorities. This meant that recognition was only potentially extended to the six sovereign
Yugoslav republics. The basic principles of recognition, as set out in the EC Declaration on
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States of 16 December 1991 and applied by the Badinter
Commission, were self-determination and the inviolability of frontiers,103 which was interpreted
to mean the boundaries of the republics.
On this basis recognition was extended to Slovenia by the EC on 15 January 1992, following
the advice of Badinter,104 and to Croatia, against the advice of the Commission,105 which had
96 The Minsk Declaration, 8 December 1991, 31 ILM (1992) pp. 142-6. See A. Wilson, “Post-Soviet States and
the Nationalities Question” in G. Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (Longman, London,
1996) pp. 23-43 at pp. 24-5.
97 The Alma Alta Declaration, 21 December 1991, 31 ILM (1992) p. 147.
98 S. Jones and R. Parsons, “Georgia and the Georgians” in G. Smith ed., The Nationalities Question in the Post-
Soviet States (Longman, London, 1996) pp. 291-313 at p. 307
99 A. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1993) at pp. 229-43.
100 R. Pullat, “The Restoration of the Independence of Estonia 1991” 2 Finnish Yearbook of International Law
(1991) pp. 512-32 at pp. 529-30.
101 R. Mullerson, “The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia”
42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1993) pp. 473-93 at pp. 480-2.
102 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 31 ILM (1992) at p. 1497. SC Res. 757
(1992) and SC Res. 777 (1992).
103 EC Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union”, 31 ILM (1992) pp. 1486-7.
104 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 7, 31 ILM (1992) at pp. 1512-7.
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required constitutional provisions on autonomy.106 Macedonia was more difficult because of a
dispute with Greece. Despite Badinter’s finding that Macedonia’s title did not imply a claim on
the Greek region of the same name,107 EC recognition was not forthcoming, and the republic did
not take a seat at the UN until 8 April 1993, and only then under the mouthful of, “the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, with controversy still over its name.108 Bosnia-Herzegovina
was not recommended by Badinter for recognition because it was considered that the will of its
peoples to form an independent state had not been established.109 Bosnian authorities
subsequently held a referendum on 29 February-1 March 1992, which endorsed independence by
99.4% on a 63% turnout,110 and Bosnia was recognised by the EC on 6 April despite continued
fighting in the territory.
Nonetheless, although recognition was only extended to the former republics, the international
community also recognised ethnic partition, as long as it was done within the formalities of
statehood. Thus, the Dayton Agreement of 19 November 1994 recognised the division of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into two ethnically based “entities”, the Muslim (Bosniac)-Croat Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republika Srpska.111 Bosnia was left as a shell of a state
with only, “those functions which enable it to function as the government of the internationally
recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”112
However, there remains an outstanding issue from the collapse of Yugoslavia, in the shape of
Kosovo. Kosovo, with a current population of 1.8 million, 90% of which is ethnic Albanian, was
not a republic but an autonomous province of Serbia.113 It was never upgraded to a full republic
for the theoretical reason that Albanians were not a “nation” but a “nationality” and the practical
reason that Serbs would not tolerate a further carve up of their territory.114 Kosovo’s autonomy
was abolished in March 1989 by the Serbian government and its Albanian leaders responded by
declaring it a republic, and in a referendum in September 1990 independence was endorsed by
99% on an 87% turnout.115 The current situation in Kosovo stems from the failure of the
Milošovi? regime in March 1999 to sign the Rambouillet peace accords with the Albanian
guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army. This lead to NATO air strikes and an
agreement to establish a UN administration in Kosovo. The UN Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK was
created by SC Res. 1244 of 10 June 1999 with the mandate to administer the province and to
promote substantial autonomy and self-government pending a final settlement. This was to be
conducted within the nominal framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
105 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 5, 31 ILM (1992) at pp. 1503-5.
106 M. Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” 86
American Journal of International Law (1992) pp. 568-607 at pp. 586, 593.
107 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 6, 31 ILM (1992) at pp. 1507-12.
108 GA Res. 47/225, 47 GAOR (1992) Supplement No. 49, (A/47/49) at p. 6
109 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 4, 31 ILM (1992) at pp. 1501-3. See also S.
D. Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments” 48 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (1999) pp. 545-81 at pp. 562-3; R. Rich, “Recognition of States: The Collapse of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union” 4 European Journal of International Law (1993) pp. 36-65 at pp. 49-50.
110 Keesing’s (March 1992) p. 38832.
111 Article 1(3), Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 ILM (1996) pp. 118-25 at p. 118.
112 Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995, 35
ILM (1996) pp. 172-83 at p. 173.
113 N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (Papermac, London, 1998) at p. 331.
114 Ibid. pp. 327-8; V. Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (S. P. Ramet trans.), (Routledge, London,
1999) at p. 9; C. Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (Hurst and Co.,
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Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro), although the exercise of this sovereignty was
suspended.
The UN administration in Kosovo has inevitably drawn analogies to trusteeship.116 Kosovo is
not literally a trust territory, but SC Res. 1244 certainly follows trusteeship’s basic rationale of
setting aside questions of self-determination to focus on building the institutions of self-
government. While there have been successes in this field, with elections of moderate Albanian
nationalists to the province’s assembly in November 2001117 and its presidency in March 2002,118
there has also been serious violence between ethnic Albanians and the Serb minority.119 The
province’s economy also remains stagnant, which has been blamed on its current political
limbo.120 Like trusteeship before it, it is questioned how long UNMIK can exclude questions of
national government, and attention has turned to talks on the province’s final status.
There are three possibilities for this final status, all of which may be objectionable to one of
the various parties. The first is that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia and Montenegro in
accordance with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, a return to Serb
rule would be likely to be resisted by the province’s ethnic Albanian population. The second
might be some sort of partition. The creation of Serb cantons in Kosovo has been proposed by the
Serbian government, but rejected by Albanian leaders.121 The international community might be
expected to object to an outright partition of Kosovo, but might accept some form of devolved
government for the Serb minority. The third is an independent Kosovo in accordance with the
principle of self-determination. International law does not seem to grant Kosovo a right of self-
determination,122 but neither does it comprehensively exclude it. This would appear to satisfy the
wishes of the most of Kosovo’s population, but could be expected to be resisted by Serbia, and
would also challenge the basis for the territorial settlement in Yugoslavia, which limited
independence to the republics.
State practice, then, seems to suggest that while there is little positive support for a right of
self-determination for groups within states, especially one that includes secession, neither is this
comprehensively repudiated. Peoples within states have been recognised in certain states’
constitutions and in some state practice. Self-determination has also successfully been used to
support secession from or the dissolution of a number of states. This does not negate a general
antipathy to secession, but it does show how hard it is to draw a line between peoples and
minorities both in terms of legitimacy and practice.
116 M. Ruffert, “The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the International Community” 50 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly (2001) pp. 613-31 at p. 629; M. Bothe and T. Marauhn, “UN Administration of
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Hague, 2002) pp. 217-42; C. Stahn, “International Territorial Administration in Former Yugoslavia: Origins,
Developments and Challenges Ahead” 61 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2001)
pp. 107-72 at pp. 134-5.
117 Keesing’s (November 2001) p. 44463.
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b. Remedial Secession
Another possibility worth investigating is that, even if minorities do not have a right to self-
determination and secession in international law, they may acquire such a right if states exclude
or persecute them. This idea of remedial secession harks back to the enlightenment and the liberal
notion of the state as a rational institution constructed to serve the governed. The American
Declaration of Independence of 1776 is perhaps the best single expression of the doctrine. These
ideas have, of course, been extremely important for the modern concept of the state,123 and this is
a source of legitimacy which has arguably been appealed to in international law. Paragraph 7 of
the Friendly Relations Declaration supported its balance of principles by allowing or at least not
excluding this possibility. The Rapporteurs in the Åland Islands, the Canadian Supreme Court in
Re. Secession of Quebec and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in
Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire also raised it to strengthen their balances. Nonetheless, the
Court in Re. Secession of Quebec noted that, “it remains unclear whether this…  actually reflects
an established international law standard”.124
This is the question. Is remedial secession actually an international legal standard, or does it
only relate to the legitimacy of statehood, and by extension international law? It is notable that in
the drafting of paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration states showed little support for
secession. The provision appeared to be more intended to improve the limitation of self-
determination by making the balance with territorial integrity seem less arbitrary and limiting the
right by satisfaction. This is supported by the fact that in the cases where the balance has been
applied, Re. Secession of Quebec, Tatarstan and Chechnya, the Courts have proceeded on the
assumption that the governments in question were representative.
The use of the balance in paragraph 7 to aid territorial integrity rather than support secession
can also be seen in the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s General
Recommendation XXI (48) of 1996.125 This recommendation struck a familiar balance. On one
hand, in accordance with the Friendly Relations Declaration, states had a duty to promote the
right of peoples to self-determination.126 On the other, none of the Committee’s actions were to
be construed as, “authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
and possessing a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory, without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.”127
The Committee fleshed out this balance with the internal and external aspects of self-
determination.128 Internal self-determination appeared to encompass the content of representative
government and consist of a variety of rights: the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct
of public affairs, as per article 5(c) of the Convention; the protection of individual rights without
discrimination, according to article 2; and rights contained in the Declaration on Minority Rights,
123 On remedial secession as legitimacy see A. Buchanan, “The Quebec Secession Issue: Democracy, Minority
Rights, and the Rule of Law” in S. Macedo and A. Buchanan eds., Secession and Self-Determination (New York
University Press, New York, 2003) pp. 238-71 at p. 242.
124 161 DLR (1998) 4th Series, p. 441, para. 135.
125 General Recommendation XXI (48), CERD/C/365/Rev.1, (2000) pp. 16-7.
126 CERD/C/365/Rev.1, (2000) para. 3.
127 CERD/C/365/Rev.1, (2000) para. 6.
128 Mr. Rechetov, however, questioned whether such a distinction could be made. CERD/C/SR.1147, (1996) para.
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GA Res. 47/135. On the other hand, the Committee also supported territorial integrity with
considerations of stability: “a fragmentation of States may be detrimental to the protection of
human rights, as well as to the preservation of peace and security.”129
However, despite the intricacy of this balance, comments by Committee members suggest that
the intention of the recommendation was simply to prevent appeals for secession.130 “It should be
made quite clear”, Mr. Valencia Rodriguez stated, “that the Committee was not in the business of
encouraging secession”.131 Indeed, Mr. Wolfrum introduced the draft recommendation to the
Committee with the comment that, “the Committee should make plain its opposition to
secession”.132 This again supports the idea that paragraph 7 was a provision for legitimising
territorial integrity rather than supporting remedial secession.
Remedial secession also suffers from a notable lack of state practice. Superficially, the most
promising candidate is Bangladesh. Two elements are certainly there. The secession was
successful and it was achieved in the face of exceptional brutality by the Pakistani army. It is
estimated that the actions of Pakistani forces in East Bengal (Bangladesh) between March and
December 1971 lead to three million deaths and created almost ten million refugees.133 The
crucial factor, however, was the international response and here the theory runs into problems.
Indian intervention was critical to the success of the secession. India sheltered and trained East
Bengalis in their guerrilla campaign against Pakistan. But, the guerrillas themselves lacked the
capacity to prevail militarily and it was Indian intervention on 4 December which secured
independence.134 However, the United Nations’ response to India’s intervention, aside from a
divided Security Council, was GA Res. 2793(XXVI),135 passed on 7 December 1971 by 104
votes to 10, with 11 abstentions.136 This called on India and Pakistan to declare a cease-fire and
withdraw to their own sides of the India-Pakistan border, while vaguely recognising the need “to
deal appropriately at a subsequent stage” with the issues behind the hostilities. In other words, if
it had been implemented, it would have left Pakistan in effective control of the East.
Strictly speaking, GA Res. 2793(XXVI) concerned hostilities between India and Pakistan
rather than the secession as such, and its call for a cease-fire and withdrawal was based on solid
Charter principles. However, it was also more than just a resolution on India’s intervention.
129 CERD/C/365/Rev.1, (2000) para. 6.
130 Mr. Rechetov, CERD/C/SR.1147, (1996) para. 24; Mr. van Boven, ibid. para. 27; Mr. Garvalov, ibid. para. 29;
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States were clearly aware of the implications of their vote for the secession,137 and a considerable
number took the opportunity to express their hostility to Bangladeshi independence. “If we are to
speak of self-determination in our respective States, we might not be surprised to see some States
multiplied by 4 or by 10 because of their varied internal problems, and our Organization, which
has 131 members today, might have more than 600 members tomorrow as a result of this splitting
up of States”, warned the Togolese delegate. “Togo, which bravely said ‘No’ to the secession of
Katanga and ‘No’ to the secession of Biafra, reaffirms that position today.”138 Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
raised the danger of setting a “deadly precedent”: “Most countries in this Assembly have
substantial minorities – my country has – and must bear in mind the implications of treating the
East Pakistan Awami League as a liberation movement.”139 The Bangladeshi movement was
variously denounced as “a puppet government”140 and a “fifth column”.141
Bangladeshi self-determination found support from India and the Soviet Bloc.142 However,
this was a clear minority. Moreover, aside from India, Bangladesh did not receive international
recognition until Pakistan had been defeated and it was clear that it was incapable of reasserting
control. Bangladesh does not, in fact, appear to be a particularly good example of remedial
secession.
With such a lack of positive evidence, it is not surprising that lawyers have often fallen back
on the opinions of other lawyers, such as, the Canadian Supreme Court’s “[a] number of
commentators… ”,143 or Judge Wildhaber’s, “a consensus has seemed to emerge… ”144 However,
this literature is also often highly equivocal. James Crawford introduced remedial secession with,
“(Possibly)… ”.145 Lauri Hannikainen similarly called it, “not a rule or right but only a
possibility”.146 Heather A. Wilson described it as “possible” but also “highly controversial”.147
Erica-Irene A. Daes considered that there “may perhaps” be such a right for excluded minorities,
with the disclaimer that, “in such a state of affairs legal arguments cease to have any real
significance”.148 Antonio Cassese also added a disclaimer. On one hand, he suggested that: “the
contention could be made that the Declaration on Friendly Relations links external self-
determination to internal self-determination in exceptional circumstances. A racial or religious
137 Yugoslavia, 26 GAOR (1971) Plenary Meetings, 2003rd mtg., (A/PV.2003) para. 123; Madagascar, ibid. para.
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asked of Pakistan, namely the disintegration of the territorial and national unity of that country.” Ibid. para. 295. See
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group may attempt secession, a form of external self-determination, when it is apparent that
internal self-determination is absolutely beyond reach.”149 On the other, he added a qualifier, “the
possibility of racial groups to secede under the extreme circumstances set out above has not
become customary law.”150 But, if it is not part of international law, why raise it in the first place?
Why is it that international lawyers, time after time, seem go out on a limb for remedial
secession? Why should writers prefix this right with “possibly” or “perhaps”, or even make
plaintive appeals to morality, “[t]here must, at least, be… ”,151 rather than exclude it from
international law altogether? The answer, it may be argued, lies in the liberal idea of statehood, a
notion which fundamentally informs how states are seen today. As Judge Luchin observed in the
Chechnya case: “A constitutional order mixed in blood and human grief and misfortune, like the
road not leading to the temple, loses its principal purpose – to serve Man.”152 Or as Christian
Tomuschat put it: “States…  have a specific raison d’être. If they fundamentally fail to live up to
their essential commitments they begin to lose their legitimacy”.153 Remedial secession, thus,
occupies an interesting position in international law, and one very much in keeping with self-
determination. There is very little evidence, both in the drafting of instruments and in practice to
support such a principle. But, at the same time, it is so central to the idea of statehood that to
exclude it from international law would seem fundamentally unjust. It seems better to leave open
such a possibility than to dismiss it completely. Nonetheless, the position of remedial secession is
arguably more related to the legitimacy than the substance of positive international law.
4. Peoples under Foreign or Alien Domination
Peoples under foreign or alien domination154 goes to the heart of the conflict between
nationalism and international law in the law of self-determination. The category is problematic as
a legal concept, and it is a problem precisely because the idea that peoples under foreign
domination have a right to self-determination is so central to nationalism. As a result the concept
is both extremely broad, arguably encompassing all other categories of self-determination (except
perhaps democratic government), and apparently open-ended. If a people doesn’t fall into a
particular category, such as a non-self-governing territory or a state, then it can be a people under
foreign or alien domination, although the term could encompass those categories as well. This
149 Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 120.
150 Ibid. p. 121.
151 Murswiek op. cit. no. 65 at p. 27.
152 Judge Luchin, Separate Opinion, Chechnya Case, 31:5 Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and its
Successor States (1995) at p. 67.
153 C. Tomuschat, “Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-
Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 1-20 at p. 9.
154 See Re. Secession of Quebec, 161 DLR (1998) 4th Series, p. 440, para. 133; Draft Code on Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission, YILC (1988) vol. II, part 2, pp. 63-4,
paras. 262-7; Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory (2004), icj-cij.org (12/07/04), paras. 29-30; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 90-9; Pomerance op.
cit. no. 28 at pp. 14-5; E. Gayim, The Principle of Self-Determination: A Study of Its Contemporary Legal Evolution
(Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Publication No. 5, Oslo, 1990) at p. 57; D. L. Horowitz, “Self-Determination:
Politics, Philosophy, and Law” in M. Moore ed., National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1998) pp. 181-214 at p. 201; R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use
It (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) at pp. 115-6; Michalska op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 79-80; Knop op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 64-5;
Hannum op. cit. no. 65 at p. 25; R. Ranjeva, “Peoples and National Liberation Movements” in Mohammed Bedjaoui
ed., International Law: Achievements and Prospects (UNESCO, Paris, 1991) pp. 101-112 at p. 106.
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tension is also underlined by attempts to define the category. UN Special Rapporteur Héctor Gros
Espiell stated in his report that: “‘colonial and alien domination’ means any kind of domination,
whatever form it may take, which the people concerned freely regards as such.”155 This may
satisfy the nationalist perspective, but it renders the concept as a legal category entirely
dependent on subjective criteria. Peoples under foreign or alien domination, thus, remains
ambiguous both in terms of its scope and obligations.
Peoples under foreign or alien domination has never been particularly well defined in
international instruments. Both the Friendly Relations and Colonial Independence declarations
reject the subjection of peoples to “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”. This phrase
was a careful formula which implicitly condemned colonialism, without explicitly criticising
states with non-self-governing or trust territories, and also allowing that alien domination could
apply to other situations.
Article 1(1) of the Covenants referred to “all peoples”, and article 1(3) created an obligation
for states to promote the realisation of self-determination. This applied in particular to states with
non-self-governing and trust territories, but was not exclusive to those situations. General
Comment No. 12 (21) reflected this, considering that article 1(3) imposed specific obligations on
states parties not only to their own peoples but, “vis-à-vis all peoples which have not been able to
exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right to self-
determination.”156
Perhaps the clearest reference was in the Definition of Aggression, which referred to, “peoples
under colonial and racist régimes or other forms of alien domination”. The concepts of “colonial
and racist régimes” and “alien domination” were not defined, but the phrase, “or other forms of
alien domination”, suggests that alien domination might include colonial and racist regimes but
not be limited to them. The drafting of the Definition, together with the Friendly Relations
Declaration on which it was based, indicates that those peoples were, in particular, the
populations of South Africa, South African occupied Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese
colonies and Palestine.157
A similar formula, “peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign
occupation”, was used in the Vienna Declaration of 1993 and the UN Fiftieth Anniversary
Declaration of 1995. Although states in the drafting of those instruments did not specify who
those peoples were, it is suggestive that the issue of peoples under “foreign occupation” was
raised by Arab states and Pakistan.158
Finally, article 1(4) of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
referred to: “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
155 H. Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions (United
Nations, New York, 1980) E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, at p. 6.
156 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 142, para. 6.
157 In the Definition of Aggression: UAR, A/AC.134/SR.58 (1970) p. 60; Iraq, A/AC.134/SR.59 (1970) p. 80;
Guyana, A/AC.134/SR.65 (1970) pp. 149, 155; Syria, A/AC.134/SR.73 (1970) p. 102; Tanzania, 23 GAOR (1968)
6th Cmttee., 1080th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1080) para. 55; Zambia, ibid. para. 58; Yemen, ibid. para. 80; Indonesia, 27
GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1349th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1349) para. 69.
In the Friendly Relations Declaration: India, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 10; Poland, ibid. p. 13; Czechoslovakia,
A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 7; Kenya, ibid. p. 23; Cameroon, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 13; Syria, ibid. p. 18; USSR,
A/AC.125/SR.89 (1968) p. 93; Madagascar, A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 123; Tanzania, 22 GAOR (1967) 6th
Cmttee., 999th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.999) para. 65; Zambia, 23 GAOR (1968) 6th Cmttee., 1096th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1096)
para. 22; Algeria, ibid. para. 30; Ghana, 24 GAOR (1969) 6th Cmttee., 1160th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1160) para. 43.
158 Lebanon, Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
A/AC.240/1995/L.13/Rev.1 at p. 8; Libya, ibid.; Cuba, ibid. p. 8; Pakistan, ibid. p. 11; Syria, ibid.
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occupation and racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on…  [Friendly Relations]”.159 The
concepts of “colonial domination”, “alien occupation” and “racist régimes” were again not
defined,160 although some states drew a distinction between peoples under “alien” rule and the
position of minorities.161 However, these concepts, which seemed to be quite fluid, again
appeared to be primarily focussed on South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, Portuguese
colonies and Palestine.162 There may be five categories that might be peoples under foreign
domination: colonial peoples, peoples under racist regimes, states’ peoples, Palestine and
minorities.
The first category may be the peoples colonial territories. This could include peoples in non-
self-governing and trust territories (though this was denied by states administering such
territories)163 and Namibia when it was governed by South Africa in violation of its mandate. It
might also logically apply to non-self-governing territories whose right of self-determination was
frustrated by the intervention of a third state, such as East Timor164 or Western Sahara.165
159 Additional Protocol I 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 16 ILM (1977) pp. 1391-1441 at p.
1397.
160 Federal Republic of Germany: “The terms ‘colonial domination’, ‘alien occupation’, ‘racist régimes’ are not
objective criteria but lend themselves to arbitrary, subjective and politically motivated interpretation and
application.” CDDH/SR.36, p. 61; New Zealand: “a great deal is left to subjective appreciation, in deciding whether
or not a situation falls within the ambit of Article 1, paragraph 4.” CDDH/SR.36, p. 63; US: “Concepts such as ‘alien
domination’ and ‘racist régimes’ had yet to be defined.” CDDH/I/SR.2, p. 14; Australia, CDDH/I/SR.3, p. 12; Brazil,
CDDH/III/SR.34.
161 Nigeria: “He understood the right to self-determination not as encouraging secessional and divisive subversion
in multi-ethnic nations, but as a applying to a struggle against colonial and alien domination, foreign occupation and
racist régimes.” CDDH/I/SR.2, p. 13; Pakistan: “There was a clear distinction between freedom fighters struggling in
the exercise of their right to self-determination against alien occupation and racist régimes, and minority movements
rebelling against a lawful authority and threatening the territorial integrity of a State.” CDDH/III/SR.33, p. 226.
162 Nigeria, CDDH/SR.36, p. 48; Syria, ibid. p. 51; Qatar, ibid. p. 54; Uganda, CDDH/SR.40, p. 129; Sudan, ibid.
p. 139; Iran, CDDH/SR.41, p. 152; Mozambique, ibid. p. 154; Madagascar, ibid. pp. 189-90; USSR, ibid. p. 203;
Norway, CDDH/I/SR.3, p. 22; Tanzania, CDDH/I/SR.6, p. 43.
163 US, A/AC.125/SR.68 (1967) p. 5; Australia, A/AC.125/SR.70 (1967) p. 7; UK, A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970) pp.
73-4.
164 Mozambique: “The right of peoples to self-determination was also being denied in East Timor. He demanded
the withdrawal of the Jakarta clique, so that the people of East Timor could decide its own future.” 37 GAOR (1982)
3rd Cmttee., 9th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.9) para. 67; Zimbabwe: “The United Nations had refused to accept the fait
accompli in East Timor and demanded that Indonesia should withdraw its forces and desist from further violation of
the territorial integrity of East Timor…  His delegation urged Indonesia to respect the rights of the East Timorese
people and to intiate a process of dialogue aimed at allowing them self-determination.” Ibid. 13th mtg.,
(A/C.3/37/SR.13) para. 2.
165 Algeria: “[T]he people of Western Sahara had been suffering since 1975 the tragic consequences of a new
foreign domination.” 37 GAOR (1982), 3rd Cmttee., 6th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.5), para. 46; Zimbabwe: “Morocco had
attempted to justify its illegal occupation of Western Sahara by citing unsubstantiated ties of allegiance between the
two States. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter had stated that historic links
between the two territories did not support claims of territorial sovereignty or preclude the application of the
principle of self-determination for inhabitants in the area. Thus, illegal invasion could never be legitimized by
subsequent developments.” Ibid. 13th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.13) para. 1; Afghanistan: “[T]he people of Western Sahara
was also seeking to exercise its right of self-determination, and his delegation once again expressed its firm support
for the struggle of the Democratic Arab Republic of Sahara for independence.” Ibid. para. 47; East Timor: “Timor-
Leste shares with our Sahrawi brothers a remarkable amount of history. The inalienable right of the Sahrawi people
to self-determination was recognized by the United Nations eight years before that of Timor-Leste. Yet, while the
case of Timor-Leste is now seen as a United Nations success story, that of Western Sahara continues to be stalled by
successive obstacles.” 57 GAOR (2002) Plenary Meetings, 20th mtg., (A/57/PV.20) p. 10.
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The second category may be peoples under racist regimes.166 The concept of a “racist regime”
has never been defined, although it was applied, above all, to the white minority regimes of South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and in this sense can be seen as essentially an overspill from
colonial self-determination. The designation has also been extended to Israel, especially in GA
Res. 3379(XXX), which equated Zionism with racism,167 although this resolution was notably
repealed in 1991.168 In recent written submissions to the ICJ in the Wall Opinion, for example,
Arab, African and Asian states complained of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory in
racist terms. Israel’s security barrier, which formed the focus of the opinion, was frequently
described with words like “apartheid” and “bantustanisation”, after the policies the South African
white minority regime.169
In general the category of peoples under racist regimes can probably be best understood, not
with legal principles, but in the context of the Afro-Asian anticolonial nationalism behind
colonial self-determination. Anticolonial nationalism developed, it can be recalled, in reaction
against the monopolisation of power and social status by a white elite. In most cases these elites
could be removed by independence. Hence the equation of self-determination with independence
in instruments like the Colonial Independence and Friendly Relations declarations. Various
discriminatory measures also entrenched the positions of these elites, and in reaction to this,
anticolonial nationalism was closely associated with the elimination of racial discrimination. This
connection can again be seen in the two declarations.
However, in two cases, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the formula of self-
determination and independence did not work. Power was held by sizeable population of white
settlers and respect for independence only cemented their rule. Nonetheless, following the basic
logic of anticolonial nationalism there was no reason not to extend self-determination to those
regimes. This was despite the fact that South Africa was an independent state and Southern
Rhodesia claimed to be one. Southern Rhodesia, in fact, stands out as the only colony where a
166 Syria: “[M]illions of human beings in South Africa, Palestine, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia remained
under alien subjugation”. 30 GAOR (1975) 3rd Cmttee., 2126th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.2126) para. 24; Oman: “Millions of
people still lived under foreign domination. In South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe the white minority régimes
continued to humilate and discriminate against the indigenous peoples.” Ibid. 2128th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.2128) paras.
20-1; Senegal: “The racist theories advanced by the minority régimes in southern Africa as a pretext for colonial rule
and foreign domination… ” 31 GAOR (1976) 3rd Cmttee., 14th mtg., (A/C.3/31/SR.14) para. 7; Peru: “Peru, faithful
to its humanist principles and its independent foreign policy, reaffirmed its recognition of the right of all peoples to
freedom, equality and self-determination and the legitimacy of the struggle to attain those rights. His delegation, for
its part, would support any measure designed to eradicate colonialism, racism, apartheid and other forms of foreign
domination.” Ibid. 15th mtg., (A/C.3/31/SR.15) para. 57; Nigeria: “Instances of aggression, occupation by foreign
forces, colonial domination and mercenary subversion and intervention were some of the most serious factors
impeding the exercise of the right of self-determination. South Africa and Palestine, among others, were areas where
the international community must act resolutely to permit the exercise of the right to self-determination.” 45 GAOR
(1990) 3rd Cmttee., 3rd mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.3) para. 59.
167 See GA Res. 3379(XXX), 30 GAOR (1975) Supplement No. 34, (A/10034) pp. 83-4.
168 GA Res. 46/86, 46 GAOR (1991) Supplement No. 49, (A/46/49) p. 39.
169 Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, 30 January 2004, p. 254, para. 567; Letter to the President of the
Court from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guinea to the United Nations, 15 January 2004;
Statement from the Republic of Yemen, p. 3; Statement of the Kingdom of Morocco, p. 10; Legal Memorandum
Submitted by the Arab Republic of Egypt, 28 January 2004, p. 4; Written Statement of Lebanon, 30 January 2004, p.
8, para. 38; Written Statement Submitted by the Republic of Indonesia, 29 January 2004, p. 4; A Memorandum
Presented by the Syrian Arab Republic, 30 January 2004, p. 9; Written Statement of the League of Arab States, 28
January 2004, p. 7, para. 1.4, p. 63, para. 8.4; Written Statement of the Republic of Cuba, 30 January 2004, p. 3.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www. icj-cij.org (12/07/04).
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unilateral declaration of independence was rejected by the General Assembly.170
The balance of principles in the Colonial Independence Declaration, it can be recalled, limited
self-determination with territorial integrity. The two could, of course, be compatible if self-
determination was understood as a right to democratic or representative government for the
peoples of states. However, the racist regimes category does not seem to be part of a general
movement for representative, non-discriminatory government. Many of its most forceful
proponents were often dictatorships with dubious records in human rights and ethnic relations,
and this has lead to the charge of double standards.171 The category is, in truth, better understood
as a tidying up of some loose ends in colonial self-determination and its underlying nationalism,
rather than any systematic attempt to end discriminatory government. The continued application
of the designation against Israel reflects the perception that the occupied Palestinian territories
constitute a European-style colonial situation.
A third category may be the peoples of states. Self-determination has been considered a
corollary of the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention. A logical extension of this
would be that intervention, or acts of aggression contrary to article 2(4) of the UN Charter would
also constitute foreign domination. States’ peoples considered to have been denied self-
determination or to be peoples under occupation or domination have included Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia,172 Korea,173 Vietnam,174 Hungary,175 Czechoslovakia,176 Cambodia (Kampuchea),177
170 GA Res. 2024(XX), 20 GAOR (1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) pp. 55-6.
171 R. Emerson, “The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World” 27 World Politics (1974-5) pp. 201-226 at pp.
223-4; Pomerance op. cit. no. 28 at pp. 41-2.
172 US: “The United States did not recognize the forcible incorporation by the Soviet Union of the three Baltic
States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into its territory in 1940. His government supported the efforts of those three
states to attain self-determination peacefully.” 45 GAOR (1990) 3rd Cmttee., 7th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.7) para. 40;
Lithuania (for Estonia and Latvia): “[T]he peaceful struggle of the Baltic States for independence was proof positive
of their commitment to…  the right of peoples to self-determination. Even though they had been denied the right to
self-determination for fifty years and the issue had been largely ignored by the United Nations, it was to be hoped
that the world would learn from that experience and change for the better.” 47 GAOR (1992) 3rd Cmttee., 6th mtg.,
(A/C.3/47/SR.6) para. 29.
173 Byelorussian SSR: “The provisions of the Charter were being flagrantly violated by the colonial Powers, and
especially the United States of America, which was trying to stifle movements for national independence by all
possible methods, including the use of armed force. The world was witnessing a striking example of that policy in
Korea, where American aggressors were trying to prevent a peaceful people from enjoying the fundamental right of
all peoples and nations.” 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 444th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.444) para. 4; Venezuala: “One of the
objects of affirming the right of self-determination of peoples and establishing safeguards for the exercise of that
right, was to prevent such changes of sovereignty from being effected by force or corruption…  One great problem
facing the United Nations, the problem of Korea, had sprung from an act of secession made possible by the influence
of a great Power, working through a political party which was ostensibly Korean. The United Nations had taken a
stand in opposition to that movement of secession, and its efforts had been directed towards restoring to the Koreans
the natural unity of their country.” Ibid. 451st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.451) para. 31.
174 USSR: “It was clear that the right of self-determination of peoples was the right of peoples to determine their
political and economic systems freely, and not under the threat of foreign bayonets. It was in the name of those
principles that the peoples of the whole world condemned the United States, and that the United States would yet
have to end its bombings, withdraw its troops and permit the Viet-Namese people to determine their own future.” 21
GAOR (1966) 6th Cmttee., 931st mtg., (A/C.6/SR.931) para. 20. US: “[I]t was important to secure for the people of
Viet-Nam their right to self-determination. It was precisely because the people in Viet-Nam were being denied that
right that the tragic situation in Viet-Nam now existed. Aggression in Viet-Nam was from the North, and the purpose
of all United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam was to enable its people to resist that aggression so that
they could live in peace and freedom.” A/AC.125/SR.64 (1967) p. 16.
175 GA Res. 1131(XI): “Considering that recent events have clearly demonstrated the will of the Hungarian
people to recover their liberty and independence,
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Afghanistan,178 Cyprus,179 Lebanon,180 Syria (over the Golan Heights),181 Nicaragua,182
Noting the overwhelming demand of the Hungarian people for the cessation of intervention of foreign armed forces
and the withdrawal of foreign troops…
Condemns the violation of the Charter of the United Nations by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in depriving Hungary of its liberty and independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their
fundamental rights”. 11 GAOR (1956), Supplement No. 17, (A/3572) p. 64.
176 US: “[T]he principle of self-determination had been flagrantly disregarded by the invasion, continued
occupation and attempted political control of Czechoslovakia…  it was the clearest case of violation of the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in a non-colonial context.” A/AC.125/SR.92 (1968) p. 129.
177 E.g. GA Res. 39/5: “[T]here is an urgent need for the international community to find a comprehensive
political solution to the Kampuchean problem that will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure
respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as
well as the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination free from outside interference”. 39 GAOR (1984)
Supplement No. 51, (A/39/51) p. 16. GA Res. 46/18: “The General Assembly… Calls upon all parties concerned to
ensure respect for and full observance of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Cambodian people and
to assist them to exercise their right to self-determination through free and fair elections, as provided for in the Paris
Agreements”. 46 GAOR (1991) Supplement No. 49, (A/46/49) p. 19; Japan: “The Vietnamese military intervention
in Kampuchea still continued. Japan had always been in favour of a comprehensive political settlement based on the
withdrawal of all foreign military forces and the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of
Kampuchea.” 41 GAOR (1986) 3rd Cmttee., 4th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.4) para. 40; Turkey: “An overall political
settlement of the situation in Kampuchea would require the withdrawal of foreign forces and the exercise of the right
to self-determination of the Kampuchean people.” Ibid. 9th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.9) para. 23; Fiji: “[V]ery little, if any,
progress had been made to free Kampuchea and Afghanistan from occupation by foreign troops…  Fiji therefore
called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from those two countries in order to allow the people to determine their
own destiny through the process of free and fair elections.” Ibid. 12th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.12) para. 33; China (PRC),
37 GAOR (1982) 3rd Cmttee., 5th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.5) para. 28; UK, ibid. 6th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.6) para. 70;
Canada, ibid. 9th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.9) para. 35; Portugal, ibid. 10th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.10) para. 36; Spain, ibid.
para. 64; Thailand, ibid. para. 86; Australia, 38 GAOR (1983) 3 rd Cmttee., 5th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.5) para. 21;
Malaysia, ibid. 14th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.14) para. 34; Singapore, ibid. 15th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.15) para. 19; Pakistan,
41 GAOR (1986) 3rd Cmttee., 9th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.9) paras. 33, 36; Ireland, ibid. 10th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.10)
para. 31; Philippines, ibid. 12th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.12) para. 62;
178 E.g. GA Res. 36/34: “The General Assembly… Reaffirms the right of the Afghan people to determine their
own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention,
subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever”. 36 GAOR (1981) Supplement No. 51, (A/36/51) pp. 17-
8. Pakistan: “Afghanistan and Kampuchea were two more regrettable examples of the way in which foreign military
intervention and occupation had deprived a people of its inalienable right to self-determination.” 41 GAOR (1986)
3rd Cmttee., 9th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.9) para. 33; China (PRC): “With the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, the
Afghan people has taken an important step towards the realization of their right to national self-determination.” 44
GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee., 7th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.7) para. 26; Ireland: “The withdrawal of foreign troops had
removed an important obstacle to self-determination in Afghanistan”. Ibid. 9 th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.9) para. 50; China
(PRC), 37 GAOR (1982) 3rd Cmttee., 5th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.5) para. 28; UK, ibid. 6th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.6) para.
70; Canada, ibid. 9th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.9) para. 35; Portugal, ibid. 10th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.10) para. 36; Spain, ibid.
para. 64; Thailand, ibid. para. 85; Australia, 38 GAOR (1983) 3 rd Cmttee., 5th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.5) para. 21;
Malaysia, ibid. 14th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.14) para. 33; Singapore, ibid. 15th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.15) para. 20; Turkey,
39 GAOR (1984) 3rd Cmttee., 11th mtg., (A/C.3/39/SR.11) para. 39; Japan, 41 GAOR (1986) 3rd Cmttee., 4th mtg.,
(A/C.3/41/SR.4) para. 41; Philippines, ibid. 12th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.12) para. 62; US, 44 GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee.,
9th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.9) para. 21; Italy (for the EC), 45 GAOR (1990) 3rd Cmttee., 3rd mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.3) para.
43; Bangladesh, ibid. 9th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.9) para. 37;
179 Cyprus: “The present forced separation of our people carried out by Turkish bayonets is not a reality; it is
artificial. But even if one assumes that the Turkish Cypriot community of 120,000 persons, which was forced by the
occupier to reside in the north, is a separate people and that it can exercise separately that right to self-determination
– which is not the case – this community is as much under occupation and foreign domination as the rest of our
people.” 38 SCOR (1983), Plenary Meetings, 2503rd mtg., (S/PV.2504), para. 29.
180 Angola: “[P]eoples under illegal foreign military occupation, namely…  the people of…  parts of Lebanon now
occupied by the Israeli armed forces.” 38 GAOR (1983) 3rd Cmttee., 10th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.10) para. 57;
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Grenada,183 Chad,184 Kuwait,185 Croatia186 and Iraq.187
Singapore: “The principle of self-determination was also being undermined in the Middle East…  It called for the
withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon and for respect for the right of the Lebanese to self-determination.” Ibid. 15th
mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.15) para. 22; Chile, ibid. 22nd mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.22) para. 39; Ukrainian SSR, 41 GAOR (1986)
3rd Cmttee., (A/C.3/41/SR.7) para. 54; Ireland, 44 GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee., 9th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.9) para. 48;
181 Cyprus: “The annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights was another violation of the Charter and of the principle
of self-determination.” 37 GAOR (1982) 3rd Cmttee., 10th mtg., (A/C.3/37/SR.10) para. 86; Angola: “[P]eoples under
illegal foreign military occupation, namely…  the people of…  the Syrian Golan Heights” 38 GAOR (1983) 3rd
Cmttee., 10th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.10) para. 57;
182 Nicaragua: “[Nicaragua] stressed the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights
and impeding the exercise of the right of people to self-determination…  The International Court of Justice, in its
judgment of 27 June 1986, had indicated that outside assistance to the counter-revolution had been essential to its
survival and continuity. The Court had thus agreed with Nicaragua’s contention that those forces were not a national
liberation movement”. 44 GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee., 9th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.9) para. 26; Bulgaria, 38 GAOR (1983)
3rd Cmttee., 16th mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.16) para. 27; Tanzania, 41 GAOR (1986) 3rd Cmttee., 7th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.7)
para. 7; Vietnam, ibid. para. 21; Czechoslovakia, ibid. 10th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.10) para. 37; Mongolia, ibid. para. 42;
Byelorussian SSR, ibid. para. 83; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ibid. 15th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.15) para. 56.
183 USSR: “The right to self-determination was currently being violated in Grenada as well. The armed
occupation of Grenada was form of miltary reprisal against any young countries which exercised their right to
determine their own social structure.” 39 GAOR (1984) 3rd Cmttee., 11th mtg., (A/C.3/39/SR.11) para. 33; Cuba:
“The United States continued to occupy Grenada, and the population was still being deprived of its right to self-
determination.” Ibid. para. 35; German Democratic Republic, 38 GAOR (1983) 3rd Cmttee., 21st mtg.,
(A/C.3/38/SR.21) paras. 44 and 47; Bulgaria, ibid. 22nd mtg., (A/C.3/38/SR.22) para. 22; Vietnam, ibid. para. 25;
Nicaragua, ibid. para. 37; Laos, ibid. para. 47.
184 US: “A further example of the denial of the right to self-determination was provided by the military
occupation of almost one third of Chad by Libya, the Government of which sponsored terrorism on a world-wide
scale.” 41 GAOR (1986) 3rd Cmttee., 15th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.15) para. 25.
185 Bahrain: “The international community must step up its efforts to enable all peoples under colonial
domination or foreign occupation to exercise their legitimate rights, in accordance with the principles of the Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In that context, Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait
constituted, as recognized in successive Security Council resolutions, a breach of international peace and security
and a blatent violation of international law.” 45 GAOR (1990) 3rd Cmttee., 8th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.8) para. 21; Chile:
“The right of peoples to self-determination was one of the cornerstones of the United Nations. All countries were
indissolubly bound by that guiding principle. The recent invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces constituted a
serious violation of that right, which was embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” Ibid. 4th mtg.,
(A/C.3/45/SR.4) para. 9; Australia: “The right to self-determination, had always been a basic preoccupation of the
United Nations and Iraq’s brutal actions in Kuwait represented a violation of it through foreign invasion and
occupation, which his government unreservedly condemned.” Ibid. 6th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.6) para. 20; Bulgaria:
“Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait…  constituted an outrageous violation of the principle of self-determination.” Ibid.
7th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.7) para. 3; US: “The United Nations stood unanimous in its demand that Kuwait’s right of
self-determination should be restored.” Ibid. para. 43; Italy (for the EC), ibid. 3rd mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.3) para. 42;
Nigeria, ibid. para. 60; Morocco, ibid. 4th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.4) para. 22; Japan, ibid. para. 36; New Zealand, ibid.
5th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.5) para. 6; Austria, ibid. 6th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.6) para. 29; Saudi Arabia, ibid. para. 33;
Poland, ibid. 7th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.7) para. 10; Hungary, ibid. para. 29; Madagascar, ibid. para. 32; Uganda, ibid.
para. 84; Ethiopia, ibid. 8th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.8) para. 16; Ireland, ibid. para. 41; Kenya, ibid. para. 53; UK, ibid. 9th
mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.9) para. 3; Tanzania, ibid. para. 9.
186 Croatia: “[T]he Serbs had sought to dissect Croatian territory into various non-contiguous parts which would
have been economically isolated, the goal being to create a situation whereby the Croatian people would not have
been able effectively to exercise their right to self-determination. Serbian aggression had resulted in the occupation
of over a quarter of Croatian territory.” 49 GAOR (1994) 3rd Cmttee., 7th mtg., (A/C.3/49/SR.7) para. 64.
187 SC Res. 1511 (2003): “… Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq,
Reaffirming also the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own
natural resources…  2. Welcomes that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional
Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty; 3. Reaffirms the right of the Iraqi people
freely to determine their own political future and to exercise full authority and control over their financial and natural
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A fourth possible category, Palestine, does not really fit into either the category of the people
of a state,188 nor, despite being a former mandate territory, the people of a colonial territory.189
Nonetheless, there appears to be a general consensus that the Palestinian people have a right of
self-determination. Like colonial self-determination, this consensus has been summed up by the
International Court of Justice. In the Wall Opinion the Court considered that, “the existence of
the ‘Palestinian people’ is no longer in issue”, and further that, “the Palestinian people and its
‘legitimate rights’…  include the right to self-determination”.190 Moreover, this was a right that
not only Israel,191 but all states had an obligation to respect.192 Even the one dissenting justice,
Judge Buergenthal did not dispute the existence of such a right.193 Support for Palestinian self-
determination was also evident in written statements submitted to the Court by a number of
interested states.194
There are a number of possible sources for a Palestinian right to self-determination. The
Palestinians have been contemplated, mainly by Arab states, in the drafting of the main
instruments on self-determination, such as the Colonial Independence and Friendly Relations
declarations, the Definition of Aggression and the Human Rights Covenants. With regard to the
last if these, statements and reports to the Human Rights Committee also show broad recognition
of a Palestinian right of self-determination.195 The ICJ also emphasised the role of General
resources… ” SC Res. 1483 (2003): “Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political
future and control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the
creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when
the Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly… ” Qatar: “We have consistently affirmed our commitment to the
territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty of Iraq and to the right of Iraqis to self-determination, to the
restoration of their independence and sovereignty and to the reconstruction of their homeland, as well as their right to
live in dignity and freedom in their own land. In that context, we look forward to the success of the international
efforts to strengthen security and stability in Iraq. We call upon the coalition forces to achieve that essential objective
and to intensify coordination with the competent international bodies and institutions in order to pave the way for the
country’s return to normalcy.” 59 GAOR (2003), Plenary Meetings, 14th mtg., (A/58/PV.14) pp. 9-10; Vietnam:
“Peace, security and reconstruction are now the most urgent tasks in Iraq. Viet Nam reaffirms its support for Iraq’s
independence and sovereignty. We hope that stability will soon be restored and that a Government chosen by the
Iraqi people will be established at an early date so that they can focus on national reconstruction and development in
keeping with their self-determination.” Ibid. p. 23.
188 J. Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?” 1 European Journal of
International Law (1990) pp. 307-13.
189 Syria: “Since the Palestinians were not suffering from colonial domination, they could not invoke General
Assembly resolution 1514(XV), and since they were not a State, they could not exercise their right of self-defence
either.” A/AC.134/SR.73 (1970) p. 102.
190 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www. icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 118.
191 Ibid. paras. 122, 149.
192 Ibid. para. 159.
193 Judge Buergenthal, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 4.
194 Legal Memorandum Submitted by the Arab Republic of Egypt, pp. 37-8; Written Statement of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, 30 January 2004, pp. 3, 15-6, 18; Statement Made by the State of Kuwait, p. 1; Written Statement of
Lebanon, 30 January 2004, p. 8, para. 36; Written Statement Submitted by the Government of the Reupblic of
Indonesia, pp. 4-5; Written Statement Submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 30 January 2004, p. 55, para.
5.50; A Memorandum Presented by the Syrian Arab Republic, p. 4; Written Statement of the League of Arab States,
January 2004, pp. 62-5, paras. 8.1-7, pp. 67-79, paras. 8.13-39.
195 Jordan, (CCPR/C/1/Add.55) 11-6 YHRC (1981-82) II, p. 198; Italy, 11-6 YHRC (1981-82) I, SR.261, para.
38; Japan, 11-6 YHRC (1981-82) I, SR.324, para. 15; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, (CCPR/C/22/Add.5)
17-22 YHRC (1983-84) II, p. 369; German Democratic Republic, (CCPR/C/28/Add.2) 17-22 YHRC (1983-84) II, p.
406; Mexico, 17-22 YHRC (1983-84) I, SR.404, para. 16; France, 17-22 YHRC (1983-84) I, SR.445, para. 16;
Lebanon, 17-22 YHRC (1983-84) I, SR.446, para. 5; New Zealand, 17-22 YHRC (1983-84) I, SR.482, para. 50;
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Assembly resolutions and the body’s recognition of the right “on a number of occasions”.196 In
fact, the General Assembly has since 1970 issued a string of resolutions proclaiming a right of
Palestinian self-determination. Initially controversial, these resolutions have since become routine
and have been supported by the overwhelming majority of states, with consistent opposition only
from Israel and the United States. Nonetheless, some Western states, like Germany and Britain,
have abstained and it may be questioned whether these resolutions reflect legal intent or simply
political concern.197
Panama, 17-22 YHRC (1983-84) I, SR.526, para. 28; Chile, 17-22 YHRC (1983-4) I, SR.528, para. 41; Mongolia,
(CCPR/C/37/Add.2) 23-8 YHRC (1985-86) II, p. 244; Trinidad and Tobago, 23-8 YHRC (1985-86) I, SR.555, para.
24; Venezuala, 23-8 YHRC (1985-86) I, SR.557, para. 19; Dominican Republic, 23-8 YHRC (1985-86) I, SR.581,
para. 4; Finland, 23-8 YHRC (1985-86) I, SR.643, para. 30; Federal Republic of Germany, 23-8 YHRC (1985-86) I,
SR.663, paras. 43-5; Tunisia, (CCPR/C/28/Add.5/Rev.1) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 41; Senegal,
(CCPR/C/37/Add.4) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 83; Romania, (CCPR/C/32/Add.10) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 171;
Iraq, (CCPR/C/37/Add.3) 29-30 YHRC (1987) II, p. 191; Denmark, 31-3 HRCOR (1987-88) I, SR.779, paras. 57-8;
Australia, 31-3 HRCOR (1987-88) I, SR.807, para. 18; Columbia, 31-3 HRCOR (1987-88) I, SR.818, para. 35;
Netherlands, (CCPR/C/42/Add.6), 34-6 HRCOR (1988-89) II, p. 141; Philipinnes, (CCPR/C/50/Add.1/Rev.1) 34-6
HRCOR (1988-89) II, p. 201; Norway, 34-6 HRCOR (1988-89) I, SR.844, para. 52; Mauritius, 34-6 HRCOR (1988-
89) I, SR.904, para. 34; Vietnam, (CCPR/C/26/Add.3) 37-9 HRCOR (1989-90) II, p. 230; Portugal, 37-9 HRCOR
(1989-90) I, SR.936, para. 21; Ecuador, (CCPR/C/58/Add.9) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-92) II, p. 56; Algeria,
(CCPR/C/62/Add.1) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-92) II, p. 78; Tanzania, (CCPR/C/42/Add.12) 46-8 HRCOR (1992-93) II,
p. 56; Egypt, (CCPR/C/51/Add.7) 46-8 HRCOR (1992-93) II, p. 173; Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/114/Add.1 (1998)
p. 6.
196 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 118.
197 GA Res. 2649(XXV), 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 28, (A/8028) pp. 73-4. (71 to 12, with 28
abstentions); GA Res. 2672C(XXV), 25 GAOR (1970) Supplement No. 28, (A/8028) p. 36. (47 to 22, with 50
abstentions); GA Res. 2792D(XXVI), 26 GAOR (1971) Supplement No. 29, (A/8429) p. 47. (53 to 23, with 43
abstentions); GA Res. 2963E(XXVII), 27 GAOR (1972) Supplement No. 30, (A/8730) p. 29. (67 to 21, with 37
abstentions); GA Res. 3089D(XXVIII), 28 GAOR (1973) Supplement No. 30, (A/9030) p. 27. (87-6, with 33
abstentions); GA Res. 3236(XXIX), 29 GAOR (1974) Supplement No. 31, (A/9631) p. 4. (89 to 8, with 37
abstentions); GA Res. 3375(XXX), 30 GAOR (1975) Supplement No. 34, (A/10034) p. 3. (101 to 8, with 25
abstentions); GA Res. 35/169A, 35 GAOR (1980) Supplement No. 48, (A/35/48) p. 26. (98 to 16, with 32
abstentions); GA Res. 36/120D, 36 GAOR (1981) Supplement No. 51, (A/36/51) pp. 27-8. (111 to 13, with 20
abstentions); GA Res. 37/86E, 37 GAOR (1982) Supplement No. 51, (A/37/51) p. 36. (123 to 2, with 19
abstentions); GA Res. 38/58C, 38 GAOR (1983) Supplement No. 47, (A/38/47) p. 47. (124 to 4, with 15
abstentions); GA Res. 39/49C, 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 51, (A/39/51) pp. 27-8. (131 to 3, with 15
abstentions); GA Res. 40/96C, 40 GAOR (1985) Supplement No. 53, (A/40/53) p. 43. (131 to 3, with 18
abstentions); GA Res. 41/43C, 41 GAOR (1986) Supplement No. 53, (A/41/53) pp. 52-3. (124 to 3, with 19
abstentions); GA Res. 42/66C, 42 GAOR (1987) Supplement No. 49, (A/42/49) pp. 48-9. (133 to 3, with 18
abstentions); GA Res. 43/175C, 43 GAOR (1988) Supplement No. 49, (A/43/49) pp. 61-2. (127 to 2, with 17
abstentions); GA Res. 44/41C, 44 GAOR (1989) Supplement No. 49, (A/49/49) pp. 45-6. (136 to 3, with 17
abstentions); GA Res. 44/42, 44 GAOR (1989) Supplement No. 49, (A/49/49) p. 45. (151 to 3, with 1 abstention);
GA Res. 45/67C, 45 GAOR (1990) Supplement No. 49A, (A/45/49) p. 31. (124 to 2, with 20 abstentions); GA Res.
46/74C, 46 GAOR (1991) Supplement No. 49, (A/46/49) p. 28. (125 to 2, with 23 abstentions); GA Res. 47/64D, 47
GAOR (1992) Supplement No. 49, (A/47/49) p. 28. (93 to 4, with 60 abstentions); GA Res. 48/158D, 48 GAOR
(1993) Supplement No. 49, (A/48/49) p. 44. (92 to 5, with 51 abstentions); GA Res. 49/62D, 49 GAOR (1994)
Supplement No. 49, (A/49/49) p. 38. (136 to 2, with 7 abstentions); GA Res. 50/84D, 50 GAOR (1995) Supplement
No. 49, (A/50/49) p. 60. (143 to 3, with 3 abstentions); GA Res. 51/26, 51 GAOR (1996) Supplement No. 49,
(A/51/49) p. 21. (152 to 2, with 4 abstentions); GA Res. 52/52, 52 GAOR (1997) Supplement No. 49, (A/52/49) p.
43. (155 to 2, with 3 abstentions); GA Res. 53/43, 53 GAOR (1998) Supplement No. 49, (A/53/49) p. 52. (154 to 2,
with 3 abstentions); GA Res. 54/42, 54 GAOR (1999) Supplement No. 49, (A/54/49) pp. 34-5. (149 to 3, with 2
abstentions); GA Res. 55/55, 55 GAOR (2000) Supplement No. 49, (A/55/49) pp. 88-90. (149 to 2, with 3
abstentions); GA Res. 56/36, 56 GAOR (2001) Supplement No. 49, (A/56/49) pp. 31-2. (131 to 6, with 20
abstentions); GA Res. 57/110, 57 GAOR (2002) Supplement No. 49, (A/57/49) pp. 55-6. (160 to 4, with 20
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Another source apparently used by the Court was the principle of the “sacred trust”. In
individual opinions there seemed to be differences as to which type of self-determination the
Palestinian case fell into. Judge Higgins considered that the opinion represented a case of “self-
determination beyond colonialism”.198 However, Judges Koroma, Al-Khasawneh and Elaraby all
referred to the continuing role of the sacred trust in defining the rights of the Palestinian
people.199 The opinion itself seemed to suggest that, like the colonial variant, Palestinian self-
determination evolved from the principle of the sacred trust. The Court recalled that Palestine
was established as a class A mandate under article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. It also
recalled that in its International Status of South West Africa opinion it identified two principles
“of paramount importance” in the mandate: non-annexation and the sacred trust. Citing the
Namibia opinion the Court considered that, “‘… the ultimate objective of the sacred trust’ referred
to in Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of the League of Nations ‘was the self-
determination…  of the peoples concerned’”.200 The Court seems to suggest that, although Britain
abandoned its mandate over Palestine in 1948 and the General Assembly provided for its
termination in GA Res. 181(III) of 1947,201 Palestinian self-determination developed along the
same trajectory as the colonial right.
The Court also referred to an exchange of letters on 9 September 1993 between Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO President Yasser Arafat in which Israel recognised the PLO as,
“‘… the representative of the Palestinian people’” It also cited the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 which referred, “a number of
times to the Palestinian people and its ‘legitimate rights’”. The Court inferred that these rights
included self-determination.202
Israel itself has considered that Palestinian rights may include self-determination in statements
to the Human Rights Committee in 1998. The Israeli representative recognised that: “One of the
main aims of the Middle East peace process was the achievement of self-determination for all the
peoples of the region, including the Palestinians.” Emphasis was placed on self-determination as
a process, rather than any specific end, which was interconnected with the peace process as a
whole. The representative divided Palestinian self-determination into internal and external
aspects. Internally, he argued, self-determination was already being exercised by the Palestinians
in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem by democratic elections under international supervision
and a freely elected administration governing all spheres of civil life. Externally, “self-
determination was taking place through a political process”, based on the “mutual consent of both
parties”.203
The Palestinian view has been more directed to the ends of self-determination, in particular,
abstentions); GA Res. 57/198, 57 GAOR (2002) Supplement No. 49, (A/57/49) p. 381. (172 to 4, with 3 abstentions).
The legal status of these resolutions has, however, been questioned. See T. Becker, “Self-Determination in
Perspective: Palestinian Claims to Statehood and the Relativity of the Right to Self-Determination” 32 Israel Law
Review (1998) pp. 301-54 at p. 342; K. R. Radley, “The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International
Law” 72 American Journal of International Law (1978) pp. 586-614 at pp. 606-8.
198 Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), (2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) paras. 29-30.
199 Judge Koroma, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 7; Judge Al-Khasawneh, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 8; Judge
Elaraby, Separate Opinion, ibid. paras. 2.1-3
200 Ibid. para. 88. See also J. Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development
and Future” in P. Alston ed., Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 7-67 at p. 14.
201 GA Res. 181(III), 2 GAOR (1947), (A/519) at p. 132.
202 Ibid. para. 118.
203 Israel, CCPR/C/SR.1675 (1998) paras. 18-20 and CCPR/C/SR.1676, para. 14.
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statehood. In pleadings in the Wall opinion, Palestinian representatives argued that the exercise of
the right of self-determination required the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine.204 Written
statements and pleadings by Palestine have also connected this right with the territorial integrity
of the occupied territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the demographic
composition and economic viability of the Palestinian people, and permanent sovereignty over
resources, including land, work and water.205
Internationally Palestinian self-determination has been able to gain broad support through a
notable ambiguity in its means and ends. As to the means, some states have explicitly balanced
the exercise of Palestinian self-determination with the security of Israel,206 while others have
simply focussed on a right to struggle against that country.207 The Court seemed to reflect this
ambiguity. It called on all states, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, “to see
to it” that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination be brought to an end.208 As has been seen
earlier (and will be explored more fully in section 7) states have different interpretations on what
assistance to a people, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, entails. One
possible interpretation might be military support for the Palestinian intifadah. 209 Another
204 Mr. Al-Kidwa: “[T]he General Assembly…  in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, dealt with
mandated Palestine, deciding on 29 November 1947, in resolution 181(II), to partition Palestine into two States, one
Jewish and one Arab. The Arab State has, of course, not yet been realized; and thus the Palestinian people have been
unable to exercise their right to self-determination.” Legal consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), Verbatim Record, 23 February 2004, p. 19, para. 6 at
www.icj.cij.org  (visited 07/04/04).
205 Mr. Salmon, ibid. pp. 56, 60-1, paras. 3, 9; Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, 30 January 2004, pp.
239-40, para.  548; p. 258, para. 573.
206 Nepal: “Nepal…  fully supported the need for self-determination for the Palestinian people and security for
Israel.” 44 GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee., 6th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.6) para. 15; Bahamas: “[H]er country reaffirmed its
position that the State of Israel must exist within  secure boundaries but that the aspirations of the Palestinian people
for its own State must be respected.” Ibid. para. 51; Philippines: “In the Middle East. The conflict could be resolved
by recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to establish an
independent State, and the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to live in peace with secure and recognized
boundaries.” Ibid. 7th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.7) para. 5; FRG, 41 GAOR (1986) 3rd Cmttee., 9th mtg., (A/C.3/41/SR.9)
para. 3; Argentina, 44 GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee., 7th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.7) para. 12; Poland, ibid. 8th mtg.,
(A/C.3/44/SR.8) para. 28; Australia, ibid. 9 th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.9) para. 6; Hungary, 46 GAOR (1991) 3rd Cmttee.,
8th mtg., (A/C.3/46/SR.8) para. 70;
207 Laos: “The people of Palestine, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, had been
waging its struggle against foreign occupation for a number of decades. The intifadah, which was a clear expression
of the courage of the Palestinian people, would achieve its objectives – the full exercise of the right to self-
determination and national independence.” 44 GAOR (1989) 3rd Cmttee., 8th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.8) para. 20;
Zambia: “Zambia believed that, through their heroic intifadah, the Palestinian people had demonstrated to the world
their determination to attain freedom, dignity and their right to a homeland. Peace would not come to the Middle East
until the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people were seriously addressed.” Ibid. 9th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.9) para.
74; Cyprus, ibid. 10th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.10) para. 31; Jordan, ibid. para. 25; Somalia, ibid. para. 35; Libya, ibid.
para. 14; Yugoslavia, ibid. 11th mtg., (A/C.3/44/SR.11) para. 19; Bahrain, ibid. para. 32; Yemen, 45 GAOR (1990)
3rd Cmttee., 7th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.7) para. 50; Syria, ibid. 8th mtg., (A/C.3/45/SR.8) para. 24.
208 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 159.
209 See submissions to the Court by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: “Reduced by their sufferings to a
state of despair, the Palestinian people have twice risen up against the occupier in a struggle known as the Intifada.
That action simply represented enforcement of a right recognized by contemporary international law. Thus General
Assembly resolution 2625 of 24 October 1970 recommends that States should: ‘(B)ring a speedy end to colonialism,
having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial
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interpretation might be respect for self-determination balanced with concern for the security of
Israel. But, this too was ambiguous. The Court did conclude by emphasising that, “both Israel
and Palestine are under an obligation scrupulously to observe the rules of international
humanitarian law, one of the paramount purposes of which is to protect civilian life”,210 and the
need for negotiations to ensure, “peace and security for all in the region.”211 Nonetheless, some
judges argued that the opinion did not sufficiently stress the protection of civilians.212
As to the ends of self-determination, it can be noted first of all that the main instruments on
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute make no reference to the right.213 SC Res. 242 (1967) and 338
(1973),214 which are considered to form the basis for a peaceful solution to the conflict, make no
mention of it. Moreover, although the call in SC Res. 242 for the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from occupied territories as a basis for a peace settlement, might seem consistent with self-
determination, it has been noted that the resolution left open what those “territories” were.215
Similarly, SC Res. 1397 (2002) and SC Res. 1515 (2003), which affirm, a “vision of a region
where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders”,
do not specify what those borders would be.216 The Oslo Accords of 1993 also did not
specifically mention self-determination, only, “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”,217
which were intended to be fulfilled through elections and negotiations.218 The “Roadmap” Plan of
30 April 2003 outlined many of the goals of Middle East self-determination, “an independent,
democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and
its other neighbours.”219 Nonetheless, the process it proposed to achieve those goals made no
reference to the right.
The International Court also maintained some ambiguity in the ends of Palestinian self-
of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter…  In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible
actions in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.” Written Statement of the Organisation of the
Islamic Conference, January 2004, ibid. p. 7, para. 25.
210 Ibid. para. 162.
211 Ibid. para. 162.
212 Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 19; Judge Owada, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 31.
213 See C. Chinkin, “The Potential and Pitfalls of the Right to Self-Determination for Women” in S. Bowen ed.,
Human Rights, Self-determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1997) pp. 93-117 at pp. 96-7.
214 SC Res. 242 (1967); SC Res. 338 (1973).
215 G. R. Watson, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2000) at p. 31; R. Falk, “Some International Law Implications of the Oslo/Cairo
Framework for the PLO/Israeli Process” in S. Bowen ed., Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1997) pp. 1-23 at p. 17.
216 SC Res. 1397 (2002); SC Res. 1515 (2003).
217 Article III(3) in A. Cassese, “The Israeli-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination” 4 European Journal of
International Law (1993) pp. 564-81 at pp. 568-71.
218 Article III: “1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves
according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under
agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.… 3. These
elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people and their just requirements.” Article V: “… 2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as
soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of
Israel and the Palestinian people representatives. 3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining
issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with
other neighbours, and other issues of common interest… ” Ibid.
219 A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
usinfo.state.gov (visited 07/07/03).
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determination. Although it concluded with an appeal for negotiations based on the provisions of
the Roadmap and SC Res. 1515 for a Palestinian state, the Court did not specifically connect self-
determination with a right to independence.220 Indeed, when it quoted a provision from GA Res.
2625(XXV) that every state had the duty to refrain from forcible action to deprive peoples of
self-determination, it cut the Declaration’s original formula of “self-determination and freedom
and independence” to just “self-determination”.221 Moreover, while proceeding from the principle
of the non-annexation of occupied territory, the Court did not explicitly connect self-
determination to the principle of territorial integrity as Palestine and the Arab League had done in
their submissions.222
A final point to note about the Wall Opinion was its context, and this may say a great deal
about position of Palestinian self-determination. Part of the background to the opinion were
statements submitted by a large number of states, including the US, Russia and the countries of
the EU, which together with the UN form the “Quartet” sponsoring the Roadmap. These states
wrote to inform the Court that they believed that the opinion was inappropriate and unhelpful in
resolving the dispute.223 These countries did not object because they believed that Israeli actions
were lawful, they often stressed the contrary. Nonetheless, they argued that a legal opinion would
hinder a political solution. It may be argued that the rights of the Palestinian people are sui
generis, an area of law still in development.224 But, perhaps the defining statement on Palestinian
self-determination does not come from the ICJ, but the UN Committee responsible for the
original partition plan for Palestine in 1947: “The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two
220 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 162
221 Ibid. para. 88.
222 “… [T]he Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem has been recognized by the United Nations
and the international community as a territory with an international status – a self-determination unit – with borders
based on the Armistice Line of 1949…  The wall is…  in direct violation of the territorial integrity of the self-
determination unit which it amputates and of the legal right to self-determination and statehood of the Palestinian
people.” Written Statement of the League of Arab States, January 2004, pp. 62, paras. 8.1 and 8.4.
223 Italy (for the EU), 58 GAOR (2003), Plenary Meetings, 23rd mtg., (A/ES-10/PV.23) at pp. 14-5; Uganda, ibid.
p. 18; US, ibid. p. 19; UK, ibid. p. 21; Canada, ibid. p. 22; Switzerland, ibid.; Singapore, ibid.
Written Statement of the United States of America, 30 January 2004, p. 2, para. 1.4, 16, para. 3.1, pp. 24-5, para.
4.6; Written Statement of the Russian Federation, 29 January 2004, p. 5; Ireland (for the EU), p. 1; Italy (for the EU),
Illegal Israeli Action in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, at p. 2; Written
Statement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, January 2004, p. 2, para. 1.6, pp. 18-9, para.
3.23; Written Statement of the French Republic, 30 January 2004, pp. 1-2, paras. 3-5; Statement of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany, January 2004, p. 4; Written Statement of Italy, pp. 1-2; Statement by the Czech
Republic; Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic; Statement of Malta, 30 January
2004; Statement of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 30 January 2004, p. 2; Statement of the
Kingdom of Spain, 30 January 2004, p. 2; Written Statement of the Kingdom of Belgium, pp. 1-2. (However, there
appeared to be some deviations from this position. See Statement of Sweden, 30 January 2004, para. 2; Statement of
the Government of Ireland, January 2004). Norway, Letter Dated 30 January 2004, p. 2; Written Statement of the
Government of Japan, 30 January 2004, p. 1; Written Statement of the Government of Canada, pp. 1-2; Written
Statement of the Government of Australia, 29 January 2004, p. 4, para. 3; Note Verbale from the Ministry of
External Relations, Republic of Cameroon, 28 January 2004; Memorial of the Federated States of Micronesia, 29
January 2004, p. 1; Memorial of the Republic of Palau, 28 January 2004, p. 1; Memorial of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, 29 January 2004, p. 1; Switzerland changed position once it had been decided to submit the matter
to the Court for an opinion. See Written Statement addressed to the International Court of Justice by the Swiss
Confederation, p. 2, paras. 7-9.
224 C. J. Drew, “Self-Determination, Population Transfer and the Middle East Peace Accords” in S. Bowen ed.,
Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1997) pp. 119-68 at p. 125; Becker loc. cit. no. 224 at p. 346.
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intense nationalisms.”225 It seems to be that it is the political pressures created by these
nationalisms that shape the conflict and its potential solutions, and caught between these tectonic
forces, a legal right of self-determination may look very frail indeed.
Fifth, despite some assertions to the contrary there is no logical reason why the concept of
peoples under alien domination might not be applicable to populations within states. The General
Assembly has called the inhabitants of Tibet, which is a part of People’s Republic of China, a
“people” and recognised that they have been deprived of their fundamental human rights and
right to self-determination.226 There is also the case of Kashmir, which has been claimed by
Pakistan to be one of the peoples under “colonial and alien rule”,227 while India has maintained
that the territory is an integral part of the Indian state.228 This underlines that there is no category
of self-determination to which “peoples under foreign or alien occupation” cannot be potentially
applied.
Peoples under foreign or alien domination, undoubtedly captures much of the essence of
national self-determination. This may make it useful as a political concept, but it is also
extremely slippery as a legal one. The category may be used alternatively to support or challenge
legal principles. It may encompass a variety of obligations: respect for the right of the peoples of
non-self-governing and trust territories to self-determination; the prohibition of the use of force to
frustrate such a right; non-discrimination and the elimination of racial discrimination; respect for
the principles of the sovereign equality of states, non-intervention in the internal affairs of states
and the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of states. However,
it may also in some circumstances challenge many of those obligations. It is, therefore,
questionable whether the category imposes any distinct obligations in itself.
225 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, 2 GAOR (1947)
Supplement No. 11, (A/364) p. 47, para. 3.
226 GA Res. 1723(XVI): “Solemnly renews its call for the cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people
of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination… ” 16 GAOR (1961)
Supplement No. 17, (A/5100) p. 66. See also GA Res. 1353(XIV), 14 GAOR (1959) Supplement No. 16, (A/4354)
p. 61.
227 Pakistan: “Pakistan, having come into being as the result of the exercise of the right of self-determination by
the Moslems of the subcontinent, naturally supported the exercise of that right by all people under colonial or alien
rule that were recognized as being entitled to that right. The exercise of that right by the people of Jammu and
Kashmir was intimately bound up with the realization of independence by the people of Pakistan. A lasting solution
to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute could only be found on the basis of the right of self-determination. During the 29
years that had elapsed since the achievement of its independence, Pakistan had supported the struggles of many
peoples of the third world for self-determination and liberation from colonial rule, including the peoples of Africa, of
the Arab Maghreb and of Jammu and Kashmir.” 31 GAOR (1976) 3rd Cmttee, 17th mtg., (A/C.3/31/SR.17) para. 42.
228 India (in reply): “The representative of Pakistan had referred to the so-called Jammu and Kashmir dispute,
which, according to that representative, should be solved on the basis of the right of the people of that area to self-
determination. India could not accept the position of Pakistan, for the following reasons. Jammu and Kashmir
constituted an integral part of the territory of independent India. It had become part of India when it had acceded
legally, finally and unconditionally to India on 27 October 1947 and its people had become citizens of India. Like
other citizens of India, the people of Jammu and Kashmir had been periodically exercising their right to self-
determination within India’s constitutional framework by participating in the five nation-wide general elections that
had been held in the 29 years since India’s independence. There could be no question of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir exercising the right of self-determination separately from India. That would be a violation of the Indian
Constitution and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and an unwarranted interference in its internal
affairs, all of which would constitute a violation of the United Nations Charter.” 31 GAOR (1976) 3 rd Cmttee., 17th
mtg., (A/C.3/31/SR.17) para. 57.
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5. Economic Self-Determination or Permanent Sovereignty
Economic self-determination, or permanent sovereignty over natural resources represents an
attempt to challenge existing international economic law and to formulate new rules on the basis
of the right. The rights of peoples, often equated with the rights of states, were used to enhance
states’ sovereign rights in relation to international legal obligations.
Obligations under economic self-determination or permanent sovereignty fall into two
categories. First, there are treaty obligations under article 1(2) of the Covenants. Second, there
may be customary obligations shaped by instruments such as the Declaration of Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803(XVII) and the Charter of the Economic
Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281(XXIX).
Article 1(2) of the Covenants may represent the most clearly legally binding provision on
economic self-determination, but it is far from clear itself. It can be recalled that it constituted a
balance of five interconnected elements: (1) the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources, (2) obligations arising from international economic co-operation, (3)
mutual benefit, (4) international law, and (5) that no people may be deprived of its means of
subsistence. The problem, though, was that none of these elements, nor the way they related to
each other was ever defined. This meant that a wide range of interpretations, from an extremely
contingent right to an almost absolute right, could be extrapolated from the paragraph. Comments
by states before the Human Rights Committee, and the Committee’s own comments, including
General Comment No. 12 (21), have done little to clarify the issue. Additionally, there is article
25/47, which does not impose positive obligations, but seems to have been intended to prevent
restrictions on a right to natural resources. The conclusion must be that obligations under article
1(2) are unclear and open to considerable interpretation.
This leaves customary international law. A principal instrument in this regard is the
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803(XVII),229 which
was adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions.230 The Declaration, in its preamble, described
permanent sovereignty as a basic constituent of the right to self-determination and this was
reflected in the comments of many states.231 The Declaration was intended to express a consensus
229 GA Res. 1803(XVII), 17 GAOR (1962) Supplement No. 17, (A/5217) pp. 15-6.
230 In favour: Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UAR, UK, US, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuala, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China (ROC), Columbia, Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Malaya, Finland, Greece, Guatemala,
Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan.
Against: South Africa, France. Abstaining: Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Bulgaria, Burma,
Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Hungary. 17 GAOR (1962) Plenary Meetings, 1194th mtg.,
(A/PV.1194), para. 8.
231 Chile, Comm.PSNR (1959) 2nd mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.2) p. 3; UAR, ibid. 4th mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.4) p. 5; Peru,
Comm.PSNR (1960) 10th mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.10) p. 7; Sweden, Comm.PSNR (1961) 22nd mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.22) p.
6; Afghanistan, 32 ESCOR (1961) 1177th mtg., (E/SR.1178) paras. 36-7; USSR, 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 834th
mtg., (A/C.2/SR.834) para. 27; Netherlands, ibid. para. 35; Algeria, ibid. 846 th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.846) para. 8; Bolivia,
ibid. 848th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.848) para. 37; Indonesia, ibid. 852nd mtg., (A/C.2/SR.852) para. 17. See also Judge
Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion, East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) at p. 197; P. Peters, N.
Schrijver and P. de Waart, “Responsibility of States in Respect of the Exercise of Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources: An Analysis of Some Principles of the Seoul Declaration (1986) by the International Law
282
in an area of considerable disagreement, and consequently it was composed of ambiguous
formulations capable of accommodating various interpretations on certain key points.
The Declaration, in particular, set the standard of compensation for the nationalisation and
expropriation of foreign property as “appropriate”.232 This formula was intentionally vague. “The
word”, the American delegate observed, “had no technical or limited meaning but was merely
descriptive.”233 It encompassed a wide range of interpretations over the level and timing of
compensation, from the United States’ “prompt, adequate and effective” to appeals by Sri Lanka
for compensation to be linked to the state’s ability to pay.234 Socialist states, who abstained on the
Declaration, on the other hand, rejected any international standard for compensation arguing that
was purely an internal matter.235
In disputes over compensation, the Declaration provided that the national jurisdiction of the
nationalising state should first be exhausted.236 Many states stressed the primary role of national
Association” 36 Netherlands International Law Review (1989) pp. 285-313 at p. 292.
232 “4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on ground or reasons of public utility,
security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both
domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules
in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international
law… ”
233 US, Comm.PSNR (1961) 30th mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.30) p. 10.
234 Chile: “appropriate”, Comm.PSNR (1959) 2nd mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.2) p. 4; Sweden: “equitable”, ibid. p. 7;
Netherlands: “fair and equitable”, Comm.PSNR (1960) 9th mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.9) p. 9; UAR: “equitable”,
Comm.PSNR (1961) 20th mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.20) p. 5; Afghanistan: “adequate”, ibid. 27th mtg., (A/AC.87/SR.27) p.
5; Philippines: “just”, ibid. 30th mtg., (A/AC.97/SR.30) p. 13; Afghanistan: “compensation would be paid ‘when and
where appropriate’”, 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 834th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.834) para. 20; Chile: “Compensation was
to be paid in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty
and in accordance with international law.” ibid. para. 42; US: “prompt, adequate and effective”, ibid. 835th mtg.,
(A/C.2/SR.835) para. 10; India: “adequate”, ibid. para. 17; UAR: “full”, ibid. 842nd mtg., (A/C.2/SR.842) para. 11;
France: “just and effective”, ibid. para. 15; Uruguay: “fair”, ibid. para. 20; Nigeria: “adequate”, ibid. 845 th mtg.,
(A/C.2/SR.845) para. 31; Peru: “due”, ibid. para. 38; Madagascar: “compensation could not but be adequate; as to
the promptness of compensation, the very idea of international co-operation demanded that the financial situation of
the State concerned should be borne in mind”, ibid. 846th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.846) para. 4; Ireland: “full and fair”, ibid.
848th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.848) para. 27; Central African Republic: “effective”, ibid. 850th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.850) para.
34; Greece: “suitable”, ibid. 851st mtg., (A/C.2/SR.851) para. 10; Ceylon: “it might happen that a country was unable
freely to release the foreign exchange that would enable it to fulfil its obligations within the time specified: its failure
should not be considered a hostile act”, ibid. 853rd mtg., (A/C.2/SR.853) para. 13; Nepal: “fair”, ibid. 860th mtg.,
(A/C.2/SR.860) para. 6. Mexico: “prompt…  appropriate compensation”, 17 GAOR (1962) Plenary Meetings, 1194th
mtg., (A/PV.1194) para. 35. See also K. N. Gess, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An Analytical
Review of the United Nations Declaration and its Genesis” 13 International Comparative Law Quarterly (1964) pp.
398-449 at pp. 427-9; N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1997) at pp. 66-7; U. O. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law
(Archond Books, Hamden, Connicticut, 1972) at p. 209; R. A. Falk, The Status of Law in International Society
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970) at p. 182 R. Dolzer, “New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of
Alien Property” 75 American Journal of International Law (1981) pp. 553-589 at p. 562.
235 USSR: “compensation could not be paid ‘in accordance with international law’, since international law
provided for no compulsory payment of compensation. Experience showed that each country tackled that problem as
its own interests dictated.” 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 834th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.834) para. 31; Hungary: “The basis
of any right to compensation was not some rule of international law but the relevant legislation of the State
concerned.” Ibid. 846th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.846) para. 2; Byelorussian SSR: “the need for compensation in cases of
nationalization…  depended on the decision of the country concerned.” Ibid. 848th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.848) para. 35;
Czechoslovakia: “payments should…  be fixed by the sovereign State”, ibid. 852nd mtg., (A/C.2/SR.852) para. 23;
236 “[4]…  In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to controversy, the national jurisdiction of
the State taking such measure shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.”
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jurisdiction for settling disputes and that this role should not be prejudiced.237 However, the
Declaration also provided that if sovereign states agreed, disputes could be settled through
arbitration or international adjudication.238 It was significant that this agreement was “by”
sovereign states, rather than “between” them, as this covered not just agreements between states,
but also between states and companies.239
The Permanent Sovereignty Declaration was not formally binding, but its importance lay in
the fact that it represented some sort of consensus.240 Later General Assembly resolutions relied
on the voting muscle of the Third World as it pushed for a more absolute interpretation of the
right to permanent sovereignty. The culmination of this was the 1974 Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281(XXIX).241 Under article 2(2)(c) of the Declaration
states had a right to nationalise and expropriate in accordance with their own laws and regulations
or any circumstances considered pertinent, without regard to obligations under international law.
The standard of compensation was again “appropriate”, but what was appropriate was to be
determined under the domestic law and in the tribunals of the nationalising state. International
jurisdiction was only to be resorted to if all the parties to a dispute agreed.242
237 Afghanistan, 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 834th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.834) para. 20; Peru, ibid. 845th mtg.,
(A/C.2/SR.845) para. 39; Madagascar, ibid. 846th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.846) para. 3; Iraq, ibid. 851st mtg.,
(A/C.2/SR.851) para. 29; Malaya, ibid. 856th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.856) para. 6; Ethiopia, ibid. para. 9; Argentina, ibid.
859th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.859) para. 32.
238 Based on a UK-US Amendment (A/C.2/L686/Rev.3). 17 GAOR (1962) Annexes, Agenda Items 12, 34-7, 39
and 84, p. 44, para. 88. Adopted by 52 votes to 28, with 13 abstentions. 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 858th mtg.,
(A/C.2/SR.858) para. 44.
239 UK, 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 858th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.858) para. 8. Lebanon and Syria unsuccessfully
attempted to restrict the provision to disputes between states. Lebanon-Syria Sub-Amendment (A/C.2/L.697). 17
GAOR (1962) Annexes, Agenda Items 12, 34-7, 39 and 84, p. 44, para. 89. Rejected by 38 votes to 30, with 24
abstentions. 17 GAOR (1962) 2nd Cmttee., 858th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.858) para. 42.
240 S. M. Schwebel, “The Story of the U.N.’s Declaration Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” 49
American Bar Association Journal (1963) pp. 463-9 at p. 469; S. K. Banerjee, “The Concept of Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources - An Analysis” 8 Indian Journal of International Law (1968) pp. 515-46 at p.
533; P. J. O’Keefe, “The United Nations and Permanent Soveriegnty over Natural Resources” 8 Journal of World
Trade Law (1974) pp. 239-82 at p. 250; R. Dolzer, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic
Decolonization” 6 Human Rights Law Journal (1986) pp. 217-230 at p. 219.
241 GA Res. 3281(XXIX), 29 GAOR (1974) Supplement No. 31, (A/9631) pp. 51-5. Adopted by 120 votes to 6,
with 10 abstentions. In favour: Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, UAE, Cameroon, Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China (PRC), Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia.
Against: Denmark, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, US, Belgium. Abstaining: France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Austria, Canada. 29 GAOR (1974) Plenary Meetings, 2315 th mtg., (A/PV.2315) para.
99.
242 Article 2: “1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use
and disposal, over its wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 2. Each State has the right…  (c) To
nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be
paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall
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These resolutions highlight the problem of permanent sovereignty as the basis for legal rules.
The concept of permanent sovereignty, like self-determination, can play a co-ordinating role
between states, but at the cost of clarity. As a relative right, permanent sovereignty allowed states
to unite behind it, while retaining their own understanding of the balance of rights and obligations
it entailed. GA Res. 1803(XVII) was, therefore, able to build a consensus by creating a balance of
rights and obligations in which different views could be contained by ambiguity on certain
points. Later resolutions, especially GA Res. 3281(XXIX), shifted this balance towards a more
absolute right, but at the cost of breaking the coalition and alienating states. This division of the
international community was between a majority and a minority. But, the polarisation was
between the capital importing and exporting countries, and as the aim of these instruments was to
govern relations between the two, the opposition of the capital exporting minority was
significant.
Subsequent practice by tribunals tends to support this. Considerable value has been given to
GA Res. 1803(XVII), despite its ambiguities, because as a consensus instrument it may reflect
custom.243 On the other hand, the divisive impact of GA Res. 3281(XXIX) was seen to
undermine its legal status. It is also significant, considering the attempt to use permanent
sovereignty to review issues such as compensation, that tribunals have continued to support a
standard of “full” compensation.244
Economic self-determination, like its colonial counterpart, represented an attempt to challenge
existing legal rules and replace them with new ones based on self-determination or related
concepts. However, the problem again has been that, while the coalition-building role of the right
ensures that states can support these principles in general, the resultant obligations remain
ambiguous and their legal impact consequently limited.
6. Democratic Government
There has always appeared to be a natural connection between self-determination and
democracy. Both are sources of political legitimacy, both are considered to be important for the
enjoyment of individual rights and both hold that power derives from the people. It has been
considered that there may be a legal right to democratic government245 and this right may be
be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually
agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States
and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.” Article 2(2)(c) was adopted by 104 votes to 16, with 6
abstentions. 29 GAOR (1974) 2nd Cmttee., 1648th mtg., (A/C.2/SR.1648) para. 20.
243 Award on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Company
and the Governmernt of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 ILM (1978) pp. 1-37 at pp. 24, 27-30; Interlocutory Awars in
Case Concerning SEDCO, Inc. and National Iranian Oil Company and Iran, 25 ILM (1986) pp. 629-48 at pp. 633-4;
Award in the Matter of an Arbitration between the Government of the State of Kuwait and the American
Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), 21 ILM (1982) pp. 976-1053 at pp. 1021-2; Sociedad Minera el Teniente
S.A. v. Aktiengesellschaft Norddeutsche Affinerie, 12 ILM (1973) pp. 251-89 at p. 276.
244 Interlocutory Award in Case concerning SEDCO, Inc. and National Iranian Oil Company and Iran, 25 ILM
(1986) pp. 629-48 at pp. 632, 634-5; Case concerning the American International Group, Inc./American Life
Insurance Company and the Islamic Republic of Iran/Central Insurance of Iran, 23 ILM (1984) pp. 1-13 at p. 9;
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Dispute between Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) and the
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic Relating to Petroleum Concessions 16, 17 and 20, 20 ILM (1981) pp. 1-87
at p. 79. M. Pellonpää and M. Fitzmaurice, “Taking of Property in the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal” 19 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1988) pp. 53-178 at p. 175.
245 See T. M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” 86 American Journal of International
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supported by self-determination.
In the drafting of international instruments there has been widespread, although not universal,
support for a connection between self-determination and democratic government. The two have
been connected by states, in particular, in the drafting of the Helsinki Final Act and the Friendly
Relations Declaration, the latter including a specific reference to representative government. A
connection has also been made between self-determination and article 21(3) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. All these examples provide evidence for opinio juris. But, it is in
the Civil and Political Covenant, where self-determination, in article 1, sits alongside article 25,
on the right to take part in public affairs and vote and be elected, that the connection seems most
developed.246
There has been considerable evidence to support an interpretation of article 1 of the Covenants
which includes a right to democratic government, both in the comments of states in the drafting
and before the Human Rights Committee. This interpretation has not been universal. Some states
have argued that self-determination is satisfied in a one party state, although the collapse of
communism and the general growth of democracy has reduced their numbers.
In General Comments No. 12 (21) and 25 (57) the Human Rights Committee appeared to
support such a connection, while not completely endorsing it. In General Comment No. 12 (21) it
called on states to describe the constitutional and political processes which in practice allowed for
the exercise of the right.247 General Comment No. 25 (57) was more forthright. It stated that
article 25 was related to, but distinct from the right of peoples to self-determination in article 1,
on account that article 25 was individually framed. Nonetheless, by virtue of self-determination
in article 1, peoples had the right to freely determine their political status and to enjoy the right to
choose the form of their constitution or government.248
There appears, therefore, to be a connection between the exercise of the right of self-
determination and the enjoyment of the rights in article 25. It may be reasonably said that respect
for the individual rights under article 25 allows the exercise of self-determination of peoples
under article 1. This again represents self-determination lending an extra dimension to other legal
obligations. What is less clear, though, is whether article 1 has developed into a distinct peoples’
right to democratic government. It should also be noted that, even if such a right existed, in terms
of enforcement, article 25 is a more effective formulation of rights connected with democratic
government. As General Comment No. 25 (57) noted, rights under article 25, unlike article 1, can
be claimed under the Optional Protocol.
Law (1992) pp. 46-91; G. H. Fox, “The Right to Political Participation in International Law” in G. H. Fox and B. R.
Roth eds., Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) pp. 48-
90; J. Crawford, “Democracy and the Body of International Law” and “Democracy in International Law – Reprise”
in ibid. pp. 91-120.
246 See A. Kiss, “The Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination” 7 Human Rights Law Journal (1986) pp. 165-75 at p.
171; A. Rosas, “Article 21” in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide eds., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A
Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1999) pp. 431-51 at p. 442; M. Scheinin, “The
Right to Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin eds.,
Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous People to Self-Determination (Åbo Akademi University, Turku, 2000) pp.
179-99 at pp. 187, 189; Higgins op. cit. no. 153 at pp. 120-1.
247 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 142, para. 4. See also A.
Rosas, “Internal Self-Determination” in C. Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 225-52 at p. 244.
248 General Comment No. 25 (57), 51 GAOR (1996) Supplement No. 40, (A/51/40) p. 98, para. 2.
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7. The Use of Force
The relationship between the right of peoples to self-determination and the use of force can be
conveniently divided into four possible obligations:
1. The prohibition on the use of force by states to deny peoples their right to self-determination.
2. The prohibition on assistance to states which are forcibly denying peoples their right to self-
determination.
3. The right of peoples to use forcible means to exercise their right of self-determination.
4. The right of states to provide military assistance to peoples struggling for their right of self-
determination.
Of these possible obligations, the first two are the least controversial and the most widely
accepted.249 The duty of states to refrain from the use of force to deny self-determination can be
found in principles 1 and 5 of the Friendly Relations Declaration, principle 4 of the Colonial
Independence Declaration and the preamble of the Definition of Aggression.250 This restriction
would also appear to be implicit in any provision on respect for the self-determination of peoples.
It would be hard to see, for example, how the duty to promote the realisation of self-
determination in article 1(3) of the Covenants and principle 5 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration could be compatible with such a use of force.251 The obligation also appears to be
supported by the International Court in Nicaragua, in which it considered that this duty, outlined
in principle 1 (not principle 5 on equal rights and self-determination) of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, was an indication of opinio juris.252 This was reinforced by the Court in the Wall
Opinion, which again citing GA Res. 2625(XXV), found that: “Every State has the duty to refrain
from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to (in that resolution)…  of their right to
self-determination.”253 The Court did not specify that Israel’s construction of the West Bank
barrier in itself constituted such “forcible action”. Judge Higgins in her separate opinion argued
that it was not.254 However, proceeding from the principle of the illegality of territorial
acquisition resulting from the use of force, the barrier was found to give “expression in loco” to
such acquisitions, in the shape Jewish settlements and changes to the status Jerusalem. Together
with changes to the demographics of the Arab population, these were found to “severely impede”
249 See N. Ronzitti, “Resort to Force in Wars of National Liberation” in A. Cassese ed., Current Problems of
International Law: Essays on UN Law and the Law of Armed Conflict (Giuffrè, Milan, 1975) pp. 319-53 at pp. 320-
2, 330-5; G. Abi-Saab, “Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War” 3 Annale d’Etudes Internationales
(1972) pp. 93-117 at pp. 100, 102; Crawford op. cit. no. 1 at p. 117; L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus
Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing
Company, Helsinki, 1988) at pp. 359, 367; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 154; Akehurst op. cit. no. 65 at p. 257; E.
Jiménez de Arechaga, “International Law in the Past Third of a Century” 159 Recueil des Cours (1978) I pp. 1-343
at pp. 99-100.
250 “Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination,
freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial integrity”. 29 GAOR (1974) Supplement No. 31, (A/9631) p. 143.
251 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) paras. 88, 156.
252 “Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the
elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of that right to self-determination and freedom and
independence.” Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986) p. 101, para. 191.
253 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 88.
254 Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 35.
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Palestinian self-determination.255 This was found to be a breach of Israel’s obligation to respect
the right,256 and, in turn, established an obligation for other states not to recognise, or aid or assist
that illegal situation.257
The third rule on the use of force by a people in exercise of the right of self-determination has
been more controversial. The Friendly Relations Declaration referred to the right of peoples
deprived of exercise of the right to self-determination by forcible action to take actions against
and resist such forcible action. The Definition of Aggression referred to the right of peoples
forcibly deprived of the right of self-determination to struggle to that end. Subsequent
instruments, such as the Vienna Declaration 1993 and the UN Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration
1995 have spoken more ambiguously about, “the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to realize their inalienable right to self-
determination.” The drafting, in particular, of the 1995 Declaration revealed conflicting
interpretations of what this meant.258
Both the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Definition of Aggression, of course,
represented consensus agreements in an area of sharp disagreement between states. Neither
endorsed an inherent right of peoples to use forcible action in self-determination, referring only to
peoples who had been forcibly deprived and action against that forcible deprivation. The nature
of the “resistance” and “struggle” of those peoples was never specified, although by implication it
would appear to involve forcible action. A right to resist in those circumstances, though, would
appear to be no more than an exercise of the right to self-determination. This, in itself, does not
impose any new obligations on states, which already have a duty to refrain from forcible action
that deprives peoples of self-determination.
The fourth rule on assistance by states is the most controversial. This appears to represent self-
determination being used to legitimise a challenge to a number of basic international legal
principles: the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of states,
non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty. Like other challenges, such as colonial self-
determination and permanent sovereignty, it shows that it is one thing to challenge legal
principles and another to replace them.
The basic statements on state assistance can be found in the Friendly Relations Declaration
and the Definition of Aggression. Both refer to peoples struggling against the forcible denial of
self-determination being entitled to seek and receive “support” in accordance with the “purposes
and principles” and the “principles”, respectively, of the Charter. The formula in both resolutions
was not to specify what “support” included, but to refer to the principles of the Charter. This, in
turn, depended what that support was. If it involved humanitarian assistance it was unlikely to
clash with the principles of Charter. The real issue was whether military assistance, arms and
personnel, which under normal circumstances would be a violation of article 2(4) of the
Charter,259 could be compatible with it in the context of self-determination.
From the original drafting of the Charter there was little reason to believe that it was. The
Charter was the product of a devastating war and sought to unambiguously restrict the use of
force in the relations of states, except in the limited situations of self-defence and authorisation
255 Ibid. para. 122.
256 Ibid. paras. 122, 149.
257 Ibid. para. 159.
258 See Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
A/AC.249/1995/L.13/Rev.1 at p. 7, para. 18. See also comments by Lebanon, ibid. p. 8; Libya, ibid.; Ireland, ibid. p.
9; Cuba, ibid.; UK, ibid.; Pakistan, ibid. p. 11; Syria, ibid.
259 ICJ Reports (1986) p. 104, para. 195.
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by the Security Council. The Second World War may have been presented as a struggle for self-
determination, and the principle seen as a basis for peace, but its use as a pretext for intervention,
as in the case of Austria, was only cited as an abuse.
Times, though, change and in the late 1960s and 1970s this position was challenged in the
Declaration and the Definition using self-determination. This challenge took the normal two
stages: first, self-determination was used to attack the legitimacy of existing rules; and, second,
new rules were formulated based on the right. The results, however, were mixed.
Coalition-building can again be seen in this mixed picture. The Friendly Relations Declaration
did build coalitions around self-determination in some areas, such as the use of “speedy”, which
nodded to both immediate and progressive interpretations of the right. However, the question of
whether self-determination could encompass military assistance proved much more divisive,
splitting states into sharply contrasting positions. The compromise was to move this controversy
into the purposes and principles of the Charter. From a legal perspective, considering that the
purpose of these resolutions was to develop Charter principles, this might seem like the drafters
shooting were themselves in the foot. The result of the resolutions was to make the principles, if
anything, even more ambiguous. However, from the nationalist perspective, it was a success.
Self-determination had been used to inject a margin of uncertainty into the Charter principles on
force. It can be noted that legal writers are now divided on the issue260 and that the ICJ passed
over the issue without comment in Nicaragua.261 The Court in the Wall opinion also failed to
clarify what action in accordance with the “United Nations Charter” and “international law”
actually entailed.262
 From a legal perspective, it is obvious what an unsatisfactory situation moving the ambiguity
into the principles of the Charter has created. However, this ambiguity seems also to have
mitigated against the second stage in the challenge. Any new rules on state support have to be
derived from ambiguous formulations, reflecting deep divisions in the international community.
It is questionable whether the provisions in the Friendly Relations Declaration or the Definition
of Aggression provide any coherent opinio juris, much less sufficient legal intent to effectively
amend article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
8. Principle or Right?
The next three categories deal with how self-determination is viewed as a norm. The first
concerns the question of whether it is properly expressed in international law as a principle or a
260 See G. Abi-Saab, “The Third World and the Future of the International Legal Order” 29 Revue Egyptienne de
Droit International (1973) pp. 27-66 at pp. 47-8; Rigo-Sureda op. cit. no. 1 at p. 348; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 152;
A. Tanca, “The Prohibition of Force in the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970” in A. Cassese ed., The
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986) pp. 397-412 at p. 407; S. M.
Schwebel, “Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern International Law” 136 Recueil des Cours (1972)
vol. II, pp. 411-97 at p. 486; T. M. Franck and N. S. Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force” 67 American Journal of International Law (1973) pp. 275-305 at p. 302; Wilson op.
cit. no. 147 at pp. 94-9; Akehurst op. cit. no. 65 at p. 258; Jiménez de Arechaga loc. cit. no. 249 at p. 111; M.
Halberstam, “The Evolution of the United Nations Position on Terrorism: From Exempting National Liberation
Movements to Criminalizing Terrorism Wherever and by Whomever Committed” 41 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law (2003) pp. 573-84.
261 ICJ Reports (1986) p. 108, para. 206.
262 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004), www.icj-
cij.org (12/07/04) para. 159.
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right. This, in turn, begs two further questions: what is the difference between self-determination
as a principle and a right; and what is the significance of it being one or the other? There are
various arguments about the legal status of self-determination. One school of thought holds that
self-determination is best expressed as a principle in international law. However, another
particularly popular one proposes that self-determination has been transformed from a principle
into a right and it is this claim on which this section will focus.
The idea that self-determination is either a principle or a right suggests that a clear distinction
can be drawn between the two. However, this tends to be undercut by practice. Principle and right
have frequently been used interchangeably or combined when describing self-determination and
this can be seen throughout the legal process.
Instruments like the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Helsinki Final Act refer to self-
determination both as a principle and a right. The UN Charter proclaims the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples. This language suggests not only that self-determination
is a principle, but that in principle peoples have an equal right to self-determination. And
comments by the Rapporteur for the subcommittee responsible for the provision support both
interpretations: “what is intended…  is to proclaim the equal rights of peoples as such,
consequently their right to self-determination. Equality of rights, therefore, extends in the Charter
to states, nations and peoples.” He also stated that: “the principles of equal rights of people and
that of self-determination are two component elements or one norm.”263 This fluidity between
principle and right was also reflected in states’ opinions.264 The Human Rights Covenants,
though, do only refer to a right of self-determination. Moreover, they were also an attempt to
specifically frame self-determination as a right, which succeeded in the face of some considerable
opposition. Nonetheless, given this background, one might expect states in the drafting to be
highly conscious of the difference between a principle and a right. But, instead, they used the
terms interchangeably265 or combined them as “the principle of the right”,266 and this has
continued in reports to the Human Rights Committee.267
263 Report of Rapporteur, SubCmttee. I/1/A, (Doc. 723, I/1/A/19) UNCIO, vol. VI, at pp. 703-4.
264 Belgium: “[R]espect for the essential rights and equality of the states and of the rights of the peoples’ to self-
determination.” (Doc. 374, I/1/17) UNCIO, vol. VI; Yugoslavia: “[T]his principle of the right of self-determination”,
Comm.I/1, 15 May, p. 18; Columbia, ibid. p. 20.
265 See e.g. Belgium: “[I]n proclaiming the right of peoples to self-determination, the Charter has established a
principle which was of benefit to all peoples and binding on all States without exception.” 8 Comm.HR (1952) 252nd
mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.252) p. 7; Guatemala: “Guatemala regarded the right of peoples to self-determination as an
unquestionable principle which all civilized nations should accept and respect.” 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) para. 32; China (Republic of): “[T]he effect of the ammendment was to reaffirm a principle –
the right of peoples to self-determination.” 5 GAOR (1950) 3rd Cmttee., 312th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.312) para. 10; France:
“The right of self-determination, however, was a general principle… ” 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmtee., 445th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.445) para. 32; Czechoslovakia: “[W]ith regard to the principle of self-determination. Czechoslovakia
considered it to be an essential right… ” 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 449th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.449) para. 17; Brazil:
“[T]he statement of a principle implied recognition of an unquestionable right… ” 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 402nd
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.402) para. 6; Bolivia: “[S]tressed the importance which his country attached to the right of self-
determination; respect for the principle of self-determination was one of the foundations of his Government’s
domestic and international policy… ” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR. 651) para. 14.
266 Belgium, 8 Comm.HR (1952) 252nd mtg., (E/CN.4/SR.252) p. 9; US, 6 GAOR (1951) 3rd Cmttee., 364th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.364) para. 20; Israel, ibid. 403rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.403) para. 77; Turkey, ibid. para. 80; Columbia, ibid.
para. 82; Lebanon, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 454th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.454) para. 11; Norway, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd
Cmttee., 569th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.569) para. 3.
267 Portugal, (CCPR/C/6/Add.6) 11-16 YHRC (1981-2) II, p. 97; Jordan, (CCPR/C/1/Add.55) ibid. p. 198;
Barbados, (CCPR/C/42/Add.3) 31-3 HRCOR (1987-8) II, p. 298; Austria, (CCPR/C/51/Add.2) 43-5 HRCOR (1991-
2) II, p. 14; Tanzania, (CCPR/C/42/Add.12) 46-8 HRCOR (1992-3) II, p. 56.
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International bodies have also used the terms interchangeably. The International Court of
Justice used both principle and right to describe self-determination in Western Sahara268 and East
Timor.269 In Western Sahara it also considered that GA Res. 1514(XV) enunciated, “the principle
of self-determination as a right of peoples”, suggesting that a principle could be simultaneously
framed as a right.270 In the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute case, the Court appeared to
equate principle and right,271 and in the Wall Opinion combined them: “the principle of the
right”.272 In Namibia it did just call self-determination a principle (in one of two references),273
but later on referred to the “rights of the people of Namibia.”274 Principle and right were also
equated by the Canadian and Russian courts in Re. Secession of Quebec,275 Tatarstan276 and
Chechnya,277 the Badinter Commission in Opinion No. 2278 and the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in General Recommendation XXI (48).279 The fact that this
interchangeable use has been so widespread throughout the law of self-determination by people
who are trained to be careful with words suggests that there is more to it than simple linguistic
carelessness.
Descriptions of principle and right also tend to point to the difference between them being one
of emphasis and perspective. India, for example, in the drafting of the Covenants, argued that
principle and right, “were two aspects of the same reality: what was a principle and an obligation
for the governors was a right for the governed.”280 The principle of self-determination on the
268 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) pp. 31-2, paras. 55 and 57, p. 33, para. 59, p. 36,
paras. 70-1, p. 67, para. 161, p. 68, para. 162.
269 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29.
270 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports (1975) p. 31, para. 55.
271 Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute Case: “At first sight this principle conflicts outright with another one, the
right of peoples to self-determination”. ICJ Reports (1986) p. 567, para. 25.
272 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (2004), www.icj-
cij.org (12/07/04) at para. 118.
273 Namibia (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1971) p. 31, paras. 52-3.
274 ICJ Reports (1971) p. 54, para. 118.
275 Re. Secession of Quebec: “The existence of the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely
recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention’ and is
considered a general principle of international law”. 161 DLR (1998) 4th Series, pp. 434-5, para. 114. See also p.
438, para. 127.
276 The Tatarstan Case: “[T]he right to self-determination is one of the basic principles of international law.” 30:3
Statutes and Decisions of the USSR and Its Successor States (1994) p. 40.
277 The Chechnya Case: “[T]he right to self-determination ‘must not be interpreted as sanctioning or encouraging
any actions that would lead to the division or the complete violation of the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent states acting in accordance with the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of
nations.’” 31:5 Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States (1995) p. 52.
278 Opinion No. 2: “Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on human rights establishes that the
principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard human rights.” 31 ILM (1992) pp.1497-9 at p. 1498,
para. 3.
279 General Recommendation XXI (48): “The right to self-determination of peoples is a fundamental principle of
international law.” CERD/C/365/Rev.1 (2000) p. 16, para. 2.
280 India, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 651st mtg. (A/C.3/SR.651) para. 3. See also Iraq: “He could not agree
with the representative who tried to differentiate between the principle and the right of self-determination; that
seemed to be a mere play on words.” Ibid. 643rd mtg. (A/C.3/SR.643) para. 5; Mexico: “It was particularly difficult,
in view of the evolution of legal thought, to draw a precise boundary line between what was a principle and what was
a right.” Ibid. 646th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.646) para. 25; Greece, ibid. 635th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.635) para. 3; Indonesia, ibid.
644th mtg. (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 26; USSR, ibid. 646 mtg., (A/C.3/SR.646) para. 19; Byelorussian SSR, ibid. 644th
mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 19; Saudi Arabia, ibid. 641st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.641) para. 27; India, 9 GAOR (1954) 3rd
Cmttee., 569th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.569) para. 24; Syria, ibid. 572nd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.572) para. 6.
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whole seems to be seen to be more general. It is neutrally framed, being applied to a subject
rather than being held by a subject or against an object. It is also visibly relative. Principles are
weighed against each other to determine how they are to be applied. A right of self-
determination, on the other hand, is held by a subject, a “people”, against an object, states, which
have obligations towards that subject. It is seen as more active, being claimed by a people rather
than being applied to them, and the word itself is emotionally and politically charged.281
Nonetheless, this reflects more a difference in approach. It would not be unreasonable to say that
recognition of the principle of self-determination potentially implies a right for peoples and
obligations for states, each one being a different aspect of the other. This would certainly account
for the interchangeable use of the terms.
However, is it possible to draw a more substantial line between the two which might justify
self-determination being one or the other, or changing from one into the other? The main line
between a principle and a right tends to be drawn around the issue of the people.282 Both the
principle and the right of self-determination are ultimately centred and dependent on the
identification of a people. However, as a right is actually held by a people, it puts much more
emphasis on the subject than a principle, which only applies to a people. Whereas a group cannot
exercise a right unless it is a people, and thus identification as a people is a prerequisite to enjoy a
right, a principle could possibly exist for a long time in a general form, with peoples only being
identified on its application. Thus, Britain, in particular, has argued that self-determination in
international law is best expressed as a principle, “primarily because of the almost insuperable
difficulty of defining or identifying the category of persons possessing the right.”283
Certainly in terms of the exercise of the right of self-determination this is important. The most
important attempt to create a legal framework for the exercise of the right has been the Optional
Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant. This might have potentially allowed persons
claiming to represent peoples to bring complaints over the violation of self-determination.
However, such petitions have been excluded and it is fairly clear from the Human Rights
Committee in Lubicon Lake Band and South Tirol that an important factor in this exclusion has
been the problem of identifying peoples.284
However, this relates to the exercise of the right of self-determination within a legal
framework, not necessarily the existence of a right itself. An argument can and has been made
that rights do not in themselves depend on their enjoyment.285 As a matter of principle I can still
have a right even if I am prevented from exercising it. Indeed, rights are usually most valuable
where they are least respected. The fact that a dictatorship prevents people from exercising
281 Netherlands, 7 GAOR (1952) 3rd Cmttee., 447th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.447) para. 9; Venezuala, ibid. 458th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.458) para. 60; Greece, 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 635th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.635) para. 3; Byelorussian
SSR, ibid. 644th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.644) para. 19; India, ibid. 651st mtg., (A/C.3/SR.651) para. 3; Belarus, 43-5
HRCOR (1991-2) I, SR.1151, para. 51. More generally see Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1984) pp. 46-7, para. 79; R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977) at pp. 25-7, 35, 37, 90-2; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at pp.
127-33; Knop op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 32-5, Crawford op. cit. no. 1 at p. 88; O. Schachter, “The Relation of Law, Politics
and Action in the United Nations” 109 Recueil des Cours (1963) II, pp. 163-256 at pp. 191-4.
282 “[T]he notion of a right has no meaning unless, first of all, we can determine the bearers of the right and the
persons who are obliged to respect it”. Crawford op. cit. no. 200 at p. 8;
283 UK, A/AC.125/SR.69 (1967) p. 18.
284 Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, 45 GAOR
(1990) Supplement No. 40, (A/45/40) vol. II, p. 27, para. 32.1; A. B. et al. v. Italy, Communication No. 413/1990, 46
GAOR (1991) Supplement No. 40, (A/46/40) p. 321, para. 3.2.
285 J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989) at p. 11.
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human rights makes those rights more rather than less relevant. Similarly the right of self-
determination is invoked much more for peoples under foreign domination than for peoples
without it.
Once this connection between the exercise and the existence of a right is broken, then the line
between principle and right also crumbles. With no requirement for a legal framework for its
implementation, a right of self-determination has no need for peoples to be defined in order to
exist. This seems to be born out in practice. The Human Rights Covenants and the Colonial
Independence Declaration were able to declare self-determination as a “right” without ever
defining the peoples who exercised it. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
appeared to have no problem in proclaiming that, “[a]ll peoples have a right to self-
determination”, and continuing, “[t]here may however be controversy as to the definition of
peoples and the content of the right.”286 Similarly, the Canadian Court in Re. Secession of Quebec
could recognise both that, “[i]nternational law grants the right to self-determination to ‘peoples’”,
and that, “the precise meaning of the term ‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain.”287 The
Badinter Commission also seemed to find no contradiction in its statement that international law
as it currently stands does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination.288
The identification of peoples, then, does not seem to separate a right from a principle. Ambiguous
principles far from preventing the formation of rights, simply lead to ambiguous ones.
If there is, then, no fundamental difference between self-determination as a principle and a
right in international law, what is the significance of the claim that it has been transformed from
one into the other? Behind this assertion is the idea that self-determination in the UN Charter was
originally a mere principle, which through state practice and instruments like the Covenants and
the Colonial Independence Declaration was changed into a right, at least in the colonial context.
It is a claim very much focussed on colonial self-determination. The clear implication of this
theory is that peoples and their rights, and conversely states and their obligations, have become
increasingly defined in the colonial context.289
There are two basic objections to this claim. First, it can be questioned whether self-
determination was really just a principle in the UN Charter. The language of articles 1(2) and 55
and the drafting suggests a more fluid interpretation. It was true that the Covenants and the
Colonial Independence Declaration did frame self-determination as a right. However, later
instruments, like the Friendly Relations Declaration referred to both a principle and a right. Thus,
in the twenty-five year period between the Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration there
was arguably no change in the status of self-determination as both a principle and a right. One
could argue for a change in emphasis between principle and right, but to argue that self-
determination was transformed from one into the other seems to ignore a more fluid reality. This
is also equally true of the argument that self-determination at the time of UN Charter was a mere
286 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire in R. Murray and M. Evans eds., Documents of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) at p. 389.
287 Re. Secession of Quebec, 161 DLR (1998), 4th Series, p. 324, para. 123.
288 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 31 ILM (1992) pp. 1497-9 at p. 1498.
289 See H. Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination” 34 Virginia Journal of International Law (1994) pp. 1-69 at
p. 12; K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights
and the Right to Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000) at p. 284; G. Binder, “The Case for Self-
Determination” 29 Stanford Journal of International Law (1993) pp. 223-70 at pp. 235-6; P. Alston, “Peoples’
Rights: Their Rise and Fall” in P. Alston ed., Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 259-93 at
pp. 262-3; Orentlicher op. cit. no. 65 at p. 22; Higgins op. cit. no. 65 at pp. 101-2; Trifunovska loc. cit. no. 65 at pp.
180-1; D. Wippman, “Introduction: Ethnic Claims and International Law” in D. Wippman ed., International Law
and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998) pp. 1-21 at pp. 10-1.
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principle because it had not yet been incorporated into customary law. However, if self-
determination was generally a political principle, why could it not also be a political right? When
the Commission of Jurists found in 1921 that self-determination was not part of positive
international law, it was expressed as the, “principle that nations must have the right of self-
determination”.290 Thus, in the periods when it was essentially political, primarily a treaty-based
law and finally part of customary law, self-determination has been expressed both as a principle
and a right.
Second, it may be questioned how much the concept of a right can be connected to the
clarification of peoples and obligations in the decolonisation process. The right of self-
determination promoted in instruments like the Covenants and the Colonial Independence
Declaration was always simultaneously broader and narrower than the populations of all non-
self-governing and trust territories. On one hand, the right was extended to the extremely
ambiguous category of peoples under foreign or alien domination. On the other, the right did not
automatically extend to all colonial populations. As the ICJ underlined in Western Sahara,
colonial self-determination is still determined by balances of principles and the “consideration”
that a population is a “people”.291 This seems much closer to the idea of a principle than a right. It
may be that various instruments and the practice of decolonisation have worked to expand and
develop the content of self-determination in the colonial context, but, as Namibia demonstrates,
this can be expressed by a principle as much as a right.
Nonetheless, even if self-determination’s supposed transformation from a principle into a right
may be legally questionable, it had other implications. Rights generally appear more active and
politically charged, and on their flip side they emphasise obligations. These features were
particularly important for self-determination when it was being used to challenge the legitimacy
of colonial rule. One problem in this challenge was that self-determination, expressed mainly as a
principle, sat in the UN Charter alongside the Trust and Non-Self-Governing systems, which
regulated, and thus legitimised, colonial government. Such a formulation hardly looked like the
stick with which to beat colonialism. Therefore, if self-determination was to challenge colonial
rule, it needed to appear more active and political, to emphasise obligations, and above all to be
seen to be in the hands of the people. A right fulfilled all these functions. Thus, self-
determination was seen to have, in the words of Sudan, “graduated from the level of principle to
that of right.”292 It was a change that more than anything reflected a new attitude to self-
determination. It can be noted that states’ views293 and the literature on this change are often
290 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 3, (October 1920) pp. 5-6.
291 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) p. 33, para. 59.
292 Sudan, 28 GAOR (1973) 6th Cmttee., 1145th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1145) para. 29.
293 See Saudi Arabia: “The right of peoples to self-determination was…  not only a recognized principle, but a
well-established right. If its implementation required a spirit of compromise, it should be asked of the peoples who
were fighting to gain the right when the time came for them to negotiate the conditions of their freedom, rather than
the delegations which upheld the right.” 10 GAOR (1955) 3rd Cmttee., 633rd mtg., (A/C.3/SR.633) para. 24;
Philippines: “He could not agree with those representatives who held that self-determination, as contemplated in the
Charter of the United Nations, should be regarded as a guiding principle and not as a right. Such a contention ignored
the fact that the Charter, like the constitution of any country, required constant adjustment to new needs and
consequently had to be flexible…  The [General] Assembly, alive to the increasing assertiveness of the peoples’
aspirations towards independence, had indicated unambiguously in its resolution 637(VII) that it regarded self-
determination as a right. During the ten years in which it had been in existence, the United Nations had never
slavishly adhered to the actual words of the Charter, the letter and spirit of which the General Assembly had often
had occasion to interpret. Accordingly, so far as the right of peoples to self-determination was concerned, the
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focussed on political aspects,294 or the changing nature of legal obligations.295 Thus, in terms of
the legitimacy, the transformation from a principle into a right was an integral part of the
development of colonial self-determination, even if its legal significance is more questionable.
9. Jus Cogens and Peremptory Norms
It is argued throughout this work that self-determination is a doctrine of political and legal
legitimacy. When applied to international law, it enhances the status of some legal principles, but
may attack the legitimacy of others. International law also has a legal mechanism for ranking
legal rules and determining their validity: peremptory or jus cogens norms. A peremptory norm is
defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 as “a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.”296 The Vienna Convention also provided that a
treaty would become void if at the time of its conclusion it conflicted with a peremptory norm
(article 53), or if after its conclusion a new and contradictory jus cogens norm emerged (article
64).
Commentators seem divided over whether self-determination actually amounts to such a norm,
although there is substantial support for the idea.297 The right has also been mooted for a long
General Assembly had already taken a decision which it could hardly reverse. Nationalism was on the march and the
United Nations could not ignore that historic fact, if the Organization was to continue to exist.” Ibid. 646 th mtg.,
(A/C.3/SR.646) para. 39; Venezuela: “[R]egarded self-determination not merely as a political principle but as a right,
for which his country, like so many others, had had to struggle before achieving independence.” Ibid. para. 42;
Ecuador: “[T]he peoples who had thrown off the colonial yoke wished the principle of self-determination to be
applied to all the remaining colonies, but, being anxious to observe the rule of law, wanted to formulate the principle
as a right and to include it in a legal text which would be universally recognized.” Ibid. 650th mtg., (A/C.3/SR.650)
para. 13;
294 “Under the moral and political imperatives of decolonization, however, the vague ‘principle’ of self-
determination soon evolved into the ‘right’ to self-determination.” Hannum op. cit. no. 289 at p. 12; “The vague
principle of self-determination developed through the decolonization process into a full-blown right and this because
of the moral and political imperatives of the process.” Henrard op. cit. no. 289 at p. 284; “During the postwar period,
self-determination gradually made the transition from a political principle to a legal right. The impetus behind the
transformation was the evolution of human rights norms in general and the need to create a legal vehicle for
decolonization in particular.” Wippman op. cit. no. 289 at p. 10; “[S]elf-determination was no longer a mere guiding
principle but a right that could be invoked by the peoples concerned to assert their entitlement to sovereign
independence.” Alston op. cit. no. 289 at p. 263.
295 “[I]t seems academic to argue that as Assembly resolutions are not binding nothing has changed, and that
‘self-determination’ remains a mere ‘principle’, and Article 2(7) is an effective defence against its implementation.”
Higgins op. cit. no. 65 at pp. 101-2.
296 Article 53, 8 ILM (1969) pp. 679-713 at pp 698-9.
297 In support see Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, Barcelona Traction, Second Phase (Merits), ICJ Reports
(1970) p. 304; Hannikainen op. cit. no. 249 at p. 421; Casssese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 140; I. Brownlie, Principles of
Public International Law (Fourth Edition), (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) at p. 513; H. Gros Espiell, “Self-
Determination and Jus Cogens” in A. Cassese ed., UN Law/Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen Aan Den Rijn, 1979) pp. 167-173; F. Ermacora, “Protection of Minorities before the
United Nations” 182 Recueil des Cours (1983) IV, pp. 255-370 at p. 325; H. J. Richardson III, “Constitutive
Questions in the Negotiations for Namibian Independence” 78 American Journal of International Law (1984) pp. 76-
120 at p. 79; K. Doehring, “Self-Determination” in B. Simma ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) pp. 56-72 at p. 70; S. J. Anaya, “Self-Determination as a Collective Right
under Contemporary International Law” in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin eds., Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous
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time by the International Law Commission as a “possible” example of jus cogens.298 ILC
Rapporteur Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz in his own report on state responsibility suggested in a rather
offhand way that it was.299 The 2001 commentary on the draft articles on state responsibility
tentatively and non-committedly noted that in regard to jus cogens, “the obligation to respect the
right of self-determination deserves to be mentioned.”300 However, this was rather less than a
ringing endorsement that the right did actually have this status.
The definition of jus cogens in the 1969 Vienna Convention, in fact, provides three possible
tests for assessing whether self-determination is peremptory. First, would be evidence of a
consensus around self-determination as jus cogens, which might be consistent with recognition
by the international community of states as whole. However, while there have been statements of
support by some states in the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,301 the
Friendly Relations Declaration302 and in submissions to the ICJ in the Wall Opinion,303 this
would seem to fall short of acceptance by the community of states “as a whole”.
The second is the status of treaties. If self-determination were jus cogens there may be
examples of treaties which were found to be void when concluded because they conflicted with
it. If no such treaties were concluded at all, that might, at least, point in the same direction.304
Peoples to Self-Determination (Åbo Akademi University, Turku, 2000) pp. 3-18 at p. 3; S. Blay, “Self-
Determination: A Reassessment in the Post-Communist Era” 22 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy
(1993-94) pp. 275-315 at p. 275; D. Rai?, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer, The Hague, 2002)
at p. 444; R. T. Vance Jr., “Recognition as an Affirmative Step in the Decolonization Process: The Case of Western
Sahara” 7 Yale Journal of World Public Order (1980-1) pp. 45-87 at p. 46; M. Bedjaoui, “The Right to
Development” in M. Bedjaoui ed., International Law: Achievements and Prospects (UNESCO, Paris, 1991) pp.
1177-1203 at p. 1184.
In opposition see Pomerance: “[I]f ‘self-determination’ is not really jus – or only very questionably so – it is
difficult to see how it could be presumed to be jus cogens.” Pomerance op. cit. no. 28 at p. 70; Hannum, loc. cit. no.
289 at p. 31; G. J. Naldi, “The Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali: Uti Possidetis
in an African Perspective” 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1987) pp. 893-903 at p. 902; A.
Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, at p. 80; J. Crawford, “Book Review
of Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal” 90 American Journal of International Law
(1996) pp. 331-3 at p. 332.
298 Article 37: Commentary, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly (A/5509) YILC (1963) II, p.
199, para. 3; Article 50: Commentary, Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly (A/6309/Rev.1) YILC
(1966) II, p. 248, para. 3.
299 “[T]he jus cogens limitation already covers subject-matters not included in the specific limitations mentioned
(for example, the prohibition of countermeasures deriving from the peremptory rule on self-determination of
peoples).” G. Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, (A/CN.4/444 and Add.1-3), YILC (1992), II, pt.
1, p. 34, para. 91.
300 Article 40: Commentary, Report of the International Law Commission, 56 GAOR (2001) Supplement No. 10,
(A/56/10) p. 284.
301 USSR, 1 UNCLT (1968), (A/CONF.39/11), Plenary Meetings, 52nd mtg., para. 3; Sierra Leone, ibid. 53rd
mtg., para. 9; Ghana, ibid. para. 16; Cyprus, ibid. para. 66; Czechoslovakia, ibid. 55th mtg., para. 25; Ecuador, 2
UNCLT (1969), (A/CONF.39/11/Add.1), Plenary Meetings, 19th mtg., para. 35; Cuba, ibid. para. 42; Poland, ibid.
para. 71; Byelorussian SSR, ibid. 20th mtg., para. 48;
302 Iraq, 25 GAOR (1970) 6th Cmttee., 1180th mtg., (A/C.6/SR.1180) para. 6; Ethiopia, ibid., 1182nd mtg.,
(A/C.6/SR.1182) para. 49; Trinidad and Tobago, ibid., 1183rd mtg., para. 5.
303 Written Statement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 30 January 2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), (2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) at p. 3;
Written Statement Submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 30 January 2004, at p. 52, para. 5.39, pp. 54-5,
paras. 5.45-49; Written Statement of the League of Arab States, January 2004, at p. 62, para. 8.2; Written Statement
Submitted by the Government of the Republic of South Africa, 30 January 2004, at p. 11, para. 25.
304 B. Simma and P. Alston, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles”
12 Australian Yearbook of International Law (1991), pp. 82-108 at pp. 103-4; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 173.
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There might also be examples of treaties concluded in earlier times which have subsequently
been treated as void because they clashed with self-determination.
However, there are a number of treaties which seem to conflict with self-determination.305 The
Timor Gap Treaty 1989 between Australia and Indonesia, which provided for the exploitation of
East Timor’s natural resources after its forcible annexation by Indonesia, scarcely seemed in
conformity with self-determination.306 Yet practice with this instrument does not suggest that
violated a jus cogens norm. The treaty, of course, lay at the centre of the 1995 East Timor case,
although the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction. Nonetheless, with East Timor’s transition to
independence, the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) did
provisionally uphold the treaty in 2000.307 Indeed, its ultimate fate was not decided by jus cogens
but by lex posterior. In 2001 UNTAET and Australia signed a new accord, the Timor Sea
Arrangement, which maintained many of the Timor Gap Treaty’s provisions, but gave a greater
share of oil revenues to East Timor.308 None of this would seem to be compatible with a treaty
that was void.
The Treaty of Utrecht 1713, which in article X provides for a Spanish right of pre-emption if
Britain relinquishes its title over the non-self-governing territory of Gibraltar,309 might be seen as
a treaty which conflicts with the subsequent the emergence of self-determination. The article,
which also prohibits Jews and Moors from residing in the territory, would, at least, seem
inconsistent with subsequent standards on non-discrimination and minority rights.310
Nonetheless, both Britain, the administering state, and Spain have argued that the treaty restricts
the exercise of self-determination in Gibraltar.311
Both types of treaty may be seen in Hong Kong, which was also originally designated as a
non-self-governing territory. In 1997 the territory was transferred by Britain to China on the basis
of a treaty, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984,312 without regard to the wishes of the
population, on the basis of previous commitments under the Treaty of Peking of 1898.
It may, of course, be argued that populations like Gibraltar and Hong Kong were simply not
“peoples” with a right to self-determination. This might be harder for East Timor, which is now
305 See also J. A. Frowein, “Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations under International Law” in C.
Tomuschat ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) pp. 211-23 at at p. 219.
306 Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, 29 ILM (1990) pp. 475-537.
307 D. M. Ong, “The Legal Status of the 1989 Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Treaty Following the End of
Indonesian Rule in East Timor” 31 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2000) pp. 67-129 at p. 120.
308 Ibid. pp. 123-8.
309 Article X: “And in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the crown of Great Britain, to grant, fell, or by any
means to alienate therefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar, it is hereby agreed, and concluded, that the
preference of having the same, shall always be given to the crown of Spain before any others.” Treaty of Utrecht
1713, 28 CTS (1713-4) pp. 325-347 at p. 331.
310 Article X: “And her Britannic Majesty, at the request of the Catholic King, does consent and agree, that no
leave shall be given, under any pretence whatsoever, either to Jews or Moors, to reside or have their dwellings, in the
said town of Gibraltar”. Ibid. at p. 330.
311 See statement by the British Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: “Under the treaty of Utrecht
independence is not an option, unless Spain is prepared to agree.” 61 British Yearbook of International Law (1990)
p. 510; also the Spanish representative to the United Nations Special Political and Decolonisation Committee:
“Gibraltar could continue to be a British colony or revert to Spain. No other solution was possible. Spain would
continue to oppose any initiative that would lead to the question of Gibraltar being settled other than in accordance
with the retrocession clause of the Treaty of Utrecht… ” 6 Spanish Yearbook of International Law (1998) at p. 140.
312 Joint Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, 26 September 1984, 23 ILM (1984) pp.
1366-1387.
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an independent state and was recognised as a people in Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions. However, at the same time, this ambiguity over non-self-governing territories
undermines the idea that self-determination is a well-established legal principle with a status of
jus cogens.
The third test is evidence of self-determination’s relationship with other legal principles. If
self-determination were jus cogens it should prevail over other norms unless they were
peremptory too. The law of self-determination is normally structured as a balance between the
right and other principles, so one would expect to see the right normally override those principles
unless they could also be shown to be jus cogens. However, generally in its relations with
principles like state sovereignty, territorial integrity, uti possidetis and the inviolability of
frontiers, self-determination seems to take a subordinate role.
Its peremptory status might still be tenable if those principles were likewise jus cogens, but for
some of these principles this is questionable. Uti possidetis, for example, is a pragmatic rather
than a fundamental principle,313 derived from a Latin defence of the status quo: uti possidetis, ita
possideatis (as you may possess, so you may possess).314 If it were a peremptory norm then
colonial borders could not be overturned even by mutual agreement. Such borders, though, have
been changed, for example, in British Togoland, British Somaliland, the British Cameroons, the
division of Rwanda and Burundi, and the union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika.315 It would also
mean that border disputes in Africa or Latin America could not be settled by adjudication or even
by agreement between the parties if the result deviated from uti possidetis. This again would
seem inconsistent with practice.316
The same argument can be made for the inviolability of frontiers, which balanced self-
determination in both the Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter. States in the drafting of those
instruments specifically recognised that “inviolability” did not mean “immutability” and allowed
that frontiers might be changed by mutual agreement.
Thus, although self-determination proposes that legal obligations which run counter to it are
invalid, the idea that this can be explained by jus cogens is contradicted by the available
evidence. A better explanation might be that self-determination is doctrine of legitimacy, which
underpins international law, but is not necessarily integral to it. From such a position it can
challenge the validity of legal obligations, while not necessarily needing legal mechanisms to do
so. If the law of self-determination glows with legitimacy and appears more important than other
principles (and it may be that much of the support for its peremptory status simply reflects this
perception)317 it may be from reflected light whose source lies elsewhere.
313 For a sceptical view on uti possidetis as jus cogens see S. R. Ratner, “Ethnic Conflict and Territorial Claims:
Where Do We Draw the Line” in D. Wippman ed., International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, 1998) pp. 112-27 at pp. 115-6; Higgins op. cit. no. 154 at pp. 123-4.
314 S. R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States” 90 American Journal of
International Law (1996) pp. 590-624 at p. 593.
315 See Judge Luchaire, Separate Opinion, Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute, ICJ Reports (1986) pp. 652-3.
316 Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), 52 ILR at p. 133; Case Concerning the Arbitral Award
Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), ICJ Reports (1960) at pp. 199-200, 215;
The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) Case (India v. Pakistan), 50 ILR at p. 470.
317 “The studies on the notion of jus cogens and on the identification of rules having that character have often
been influenced by ideological conceptions and by political attitudes.”Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31
July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 83 ILR at p. 25.
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10. Erga Omnes
This leads on to self-determination as an erga omnes principle.318 Erga omnes, like jus cogens,
presumes a mechanism for ranking the importance of legal rules. As defined by the ICJ in
Barcelona Traction in 1970, erga omnes obligations were held by states, “towards the
international community as a whole”, and in view of their “importance”, “all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection”.319 In East Timor in 1995 the Court found the idea that
self-determination had an erga omnes character was “irreproachable”,320 and this was reaffirmed
in the Wall Opinion in 2004.321 But what did this actually mean? Did the label of erga omnes
simply reflect the perception that self-determination was important, or did it give the right a new
legal significance?
There are a number of reasons why self-determination might be considered to be erga omnes.
First, the right has been widely presented as a cornerstone of the international community.
Friendly relations between nations, in articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter, were based on
respect for the principle, and it was seen to promote friendly relations and co-operation among
states in the Friendly Relations Declaration. In the drafting of the Covenants it was frequently
argued that self-determination was the prerequisite for human rights and this was explicitly
affirmed in GA Res. 637(VII). With such apparently fundamental roles self-determination would
seem to be necessarily the concern of all states.
Second, self-determination is framed universally as a right of all peoples. If states assume the
obligation to respect the right of self-determination, they necessarily have the duty to respect its
exercise by all peoples. The Friendly Relations Declaration spells out the duty of every State to
promote realisation of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples and this was cited by the
International Court in the Wall Opinion.322 Article 1(3) of the Covenants also imposes the duty on
states parties to promote the realisation of self-determination and in the Wall Opinion the Court
considered that this applied for “all peoples”.323 The Human Rights Committee in General
Comment No. 12 (21) affirmed that the provision extended to all peoples unable to exercise the
right.324 The Russian Constitutional Court in Tatarstan also recognised that article 1 imposed
318 See Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) pp. 142,
172-3; Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), (2004), www. icj-cij.org (12/07/04) paras. 37-9; Judge Kooijmans,
Separate Opinion, ibid. paras. 40-4; Judge Al-Khasawneh, Separate Opinion, ibid. para. 13; Judge Elaraby, Separate
Opinion, ibid. para. 3.4; M. Lachs, “The Law in and of the United Nations (Some Reflections on the Principle of
Self-Determination)” 1 Indian Journal of International Law (1960-1) pp. 429-42 at pp. 429, 433; Frowein op. cit. no.
305 at p. 215; Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 134, 152-3, 177-8; B. Kingsbury, “Restructuring Self-Determination: A
Relational Approach” in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin eds., Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
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319 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), (Second
Phase), ICJ Reports (1970) p. 32, para. 33.
320 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29.
321 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) paras. 88, 156.
322 Ibid. para. 156.
323 Ibid. para. 88.
324 General Comment No. 12 (21), 39 GAOR (1984) Supplement No. 40, (A/39/40) p. 142, para. 6. See also Mr.
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obligations on “all states” for “all peoples”.325
Third, self-determination is closely connected with a number of principles which by their
nature would seem to be the concern of all states. The principle of sovereign equality must by
definition equally apply to all states. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of states or the
prohibition of the threat or use of force would be meaningless if they did not apply to all states in
their relations with all other states.
The proposition that every state has a legal interest in the right of self-determination may then
reflect its fundamental character, its political importance, its universal application and the
generality of the obligations it imposes. However, a legal interest for all states in the self-
determination of all peoples does not need to be expressed through the language of erga omnes. It
can be quite simply accommodated in the statement that the right of peoples to self-determination
is part of customary international law. This proposition, which is widely accepted, would
establish a general obligation on states to respect, and even promote, the self-determination of all
peoples. The question is, what would erga omnes add to such an obligation? The International
Court has now had two opportunities to spell out what the “irreproachable”erga omnes character
of self-determination means. On both counts the results have been question-begging.
The Court in East Timor did not elaborate on why it considered the erga omnes character of
self-determination to be irreproachable, although it did subsequently describe it as “one of the
essential principles of contemporary international law”.326 The Court has used similar language in
other cases, like Corfu Channel,327 Reservations to the Genocide Convention,328 Barcelona
Traction,329 Tehran Hostages,330 Nicaragua331 and the Nuclear Weapons Opinion,332 when
accepting principles of a clear moral or humanitarian character without enquiring as to their
formal source.333 The legal consequences of this finding were also obscure.
One possible consequence of every state having a legal interest in the right of self-
determination of any people might be actio popularis, a right of any interested state to bring
actions before the ICJ.334 Controversially, this concept was rejected by the Court in the South
325 Tatarstan Case, 30:3 Statutes and Decisions of the USSR and its Successor States (1994) p. 40.
326 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29.
327 “Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of
war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity”. Corfu
Channel Case (Merits), ICJ Reports (1949) p. 22; Also cited in Nicaragua, ICJ Reports (1986) p. 114 para. 218 and
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1996) p. 257, para. 79.
328 “[P]rinciples which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation.”Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
Opinion) ICJ Reports (1951) p. 23.
329 “[P]rinciples and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person”. Case Concerning the Barcelona
Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase) (Merits), ICJ Reports (1970) p. 32,
paras. 33-4.
330 “[F]undamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) (Judgement), ICJ Reports (1980) p.
42, para. 91.
331 “[F]undamental general principles of humanitarian law”. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986) pp. 113,
para. 218.
332 “[U]niversally recognized humanitarian principles”. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
(Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1996) p. 258, para. 82; see also the Court’s application of the Martens Clause p.
260, para. 87.
333 See Simma and Alston loc. cit. no. 304 at pp. 105-6.
334 See J. Klabbers, “The Scope of International Law: Erga Omnes Obligations and the Turn to Morality” in M.
Tupamäki ed., Liber Amicorum Bengt Broms: Celebrating his 70th Birthday 16 October 1999 (Finnish Branch of the
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West Africa Cases in 1966. In this case Liberia and Ethiopia as members of the former League of
Nations attempted to bring an action against South Africa over the violation of its mandate over
South West Africa (Namibia), including the denial of self-determination.335 Nonetheless, despite
its erga omnes rhetoric, the Court in East Timor did not appear to make this connection. On the
contrary, it stated that: “the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction
are two different things.”336 It is by no means clear whether erga omnes would allow states to
bring actions in the ICJ over violations of self-determination to which they are not directly
parties.
Erga omnes was also developed in the Wall Opinion, but this also underlined the uncertainty
in the concept. The Court confidently stated that, “self-determination is today a right erga
omnes”,337 but its later application appeared less sure. In considering the obligations for states as
a result of the illegality of the Israeli construction of the wall, the Court recalled the “erga omnes
character” of self-determination. But, it appealed equally to customary international law, and the
provision in the Friendly Relations Declaration that every state had a duty to promote the
realisation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.338 Its other finding
that certain obligations under international humanitarian law also had an erga omnes character
was similarly backed by custom.339 In neither case did the Court extend erga omnes where it
could not demonstrate existing general obligations for states under international custom. As
Judge Higgins noted in her separate opinion, the obligations covered by erga omnes flowed either
from the “self-evident” principle that, “an illegal situation is not to be recognized or assisted by
third parties”, or from, “customary international law, no more and no less.”340
The obligations which the Court attributed to other states, in part, on the basis of erga omnes
were non-recognition, non-assistance and, while respecting the UN Charter and international law,
to see to it that any impediment to Palestinian self-determination resulting from the construction
of the wall was brought to an end. The relationship between the latter obligation and the use of
force has already been looked at, but the statement also suggests the possibility that states might
deploy countermeasures in support of self-determination. It is recognised that states with a legal
interest in certain legal obligations may be entitled to use proportionate, non-forcible
countermeasures to ensure compliance with those obligations.341 This entitlement does not extend
to “a third State”.342 States must have a direct legal interest. The Court’s statement may suggest
International Law Association, Helsinki, 1999) pp. 149-79 at p. 169; J. Dugard, “1966 and All That: The South West
Africa Judgment Revisited in the East Timor Case” 8 African Journal of International and Comparative Law (1996)
pp. 549-63 at p. 561.
335 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), (Second Phase), ICJ Reports
(1966) p. 47, para. 88.
336 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29.
337 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 88.
338 Ibid. para. 156.
339 “[A] great many rules of humanitarian law…  are ‘to be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law’. In the Court’s view, these rules incorporate obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes
character.” Ibid. para. 157.
340 Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion, ibid. paras. 38-9.
341 See Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1986) p. 127, para. 249;
Naulilaa Arbitration (Portugal v. Germany), 4 ILR (1927-8) p. 527; US/France Air Services Agreement Arbitration
(1978), RIAA, Vol. XVIII, pp. 443-5, paras. 81-94.
342 Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)  (Judgment), ICJ Reports (1986) p. 127, para. 249. But see
Judge Schwebel, Dissenting Opinion, Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Request of Indication of
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that states might have that interest, although this could be based as much on customary law as
erga omnes. In the past, sanctions in the UN framework have been called for on Portugal,343
Southern Rhodesia344 and South Africa345 for their failure to respect the self-determination of
peoples.346
Thus, it remains questionable from the practice of the ICJ whether self-determination as erga
omnes actually involves distinct legal obligations, rather, to the extent that it might be seen to
produce obligations, it seems to shadow the general nature of obligations under customary
international law. However, if the legal consequences of erga omnes remain open, it appears to
have significance in terms of legitimacy. The designation of, “a right erga omnes”,347 suggests
that self-determination is somehow something more than a mere “right”. The Court’s discussion
of erga omnes in Barcelona Traction, East Timor and the Wall Opinion are punctuated with
words like “importance”, “essential” and “character”.348 Erga omnes, whatever its ambiguous
legal significance, may also function as a ribbon, which can be attached to the right of self-
determination to highlight its importance and the legitimacy of its obligations.
Final Remarks
a. Legitimacy and Obligations
This survey of obligations under self-determination again underlines that the law of self-
determination is the product of the interaction between nationalism and international law. Self-
determination may be referred to as a legal principle, but the doctrine is fundamentally not a legal
one. It does, however, occupy a strategic position from which it can both underpin international
law and remain outside it. This means that it can be appealed to both to support or challenge other
legal principles and this framework provides an effective model for examining self-determination
in international law.
Indeed, many aspects of self-determination, such as its supposed transformation from a
principle into a right, and assertions of its jus cogens and erga omnes status appear to be best
explained in terms of legitimacy. Other aspects, such as the right of colonial peoples to self-
determination or permanent sovereignty, appear as powerful statements on the legitimacy of
certain areas of international law, but when looked at in terms of specific obligations appear less
substantial. Other supposed obligations, notably remedial secession, seem to owe their position
almost entirely to perceptions of legitimacy. It was considered in Chapters 3 and 4 how the
Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports (1984) pp. 196-8.
343 GA Res. 2107(XX), 20 GAOR (1965) Supplement No. 14, (A/6014) pp. 62-3; SC Res. 218 (1965).
344 SC Res. 217 (1965); SC Res. 253 (1968); SC Res. 277 (1970); SC Res. 409 (1977).
345 GA Res. 1899(XVIII) 18 GAOR (1963), Supplement No. 15, (A/5515) pp. 46-7; SC Res. 566 (1985).
346 See Cassese op. cit. no. 1 at p. 158; Shukri op. cit. no. 1 at pp. 220-33; A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, The
New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, Cambridge:
Mass., 1998) at pp. 43-7.
347 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
(2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 88.
348 “Given the character and the importance of the right and obligations involved… ”Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestian Territory, (2004), www.icj-cij.org (12/07/04) para. 159; “As the
Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, such obligations are by their very nature ‘the concern of all States’
and, ‘In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection.’” Ibid. para. 155; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) p. 102, para. 29.
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development of the law of self-determination in drafting committees and judicial bodies has been
extensively shaped by the issue of legitimacy. It may be concluded here that legitimacy occupies
a primary position in defining the content of the law of self-determination. It might further be
argued that specific legal obligations under self-determination, frequently limited and ill defined
in terms of their scope and content, almost seem to take a secondary position.
In its supporting role self-determination may lend additional legitimacy to principles such as
non-intervention, sovereign equality, the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity of states and rights associated with democratic governance. Self-determination
gives these state or individually framed rights an extra dimension, namely the dimension of
peoples’ rights. However, while there is considerable support for a connection between self-
determination and these principles and rights, it is also undermined by the fact that the right may
alternatively in other circumstances be used to challenge them.
On the other hand, self-determination may be used to challenge international law. Its main
application in this context has been colonial self-determination, permanent sovereignty and
assistance to peoples struggling for self-determination. However, these examples also show that it
is one thing to challenge the legitimacy of a legal rule: and self-determination provides an
effective means of doing this: but another to produce coherent rules as a replacement. Here, in
fact, self-determination as a doctrine of legitimacy works against such rules. One function of its
legitimacy is coalition-building, which means that states can unite behind the right in general,
while retaining their own interpretations on the particulars of its application. The rights of
colonial self-determination and permanent sovereignty were established in this way, in broad
coalitions. Differences among states as to what those concepts meant were contained by
ambiguous formulations, like “immediate steps” and “appropriate” compensation, which allowed
different, perhaps even contradictory interpretations. As a result there was broad support for those
rights in general, and this was certainly important for establishing their legal status. Much has
been made, in particular, of the fact that instruments like GA Res. 2625(XXV) and 1803(XVII)
reflected a consensus and that GA Res. 1514(XV) was adopted by 89 votes to 0, with only 9
abstentions. However, this coalition shattered when the right was looked at in terms of specific
legal obligations. The superficially impressive rights broke down into a range of deeply contested
obligations. This, in turn, ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the challenge. In the case of
military assistance, a coalition was constructed around the “purposes” and “principles” of the UN
Charter, but states views differed so sharply that its impact on existing obligations is
questionable.
b. Nationalism in the Legal Process
This conclusion that self-determination in international may perhaps be more a doctrine about
the legitimacy of legal rules than a source for them affirms the view that the structure of the law
is defined by the interaction of nationalism and international law. This interaction can be charted
throughout the legal process. Any position in the law of self-determination is constantly held up
to the two competing standards of nationalism and positive international law. Positive
international law is based on sovereign states and looks to establish defined categories of
obligations and rights (like self-determination) and rights-holders (like peoples), which allow for
consistent application. Nationalism and national self-determination, while undoubtedly related to
the politics of states and international law, are based on nations and peoples, and demand that the
law should conform to the rights of authentic peoples without any arbitrary restrictions. These are
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clearly very different demands and they do not allow for a stable middle ground between them.
However, this conflict does effectively define the law of self-determination.
The general method of navigating between these two rocks in the drafting of international
instruments has been balancing. Balancing is a technique by which self-determination is balanced
with other principles which effectively limit its application. This allows an instrument to
proclaim self-determination as a right of all peoples (satisfying nationalist demands), while
restricting it to certain situations (satisfying positive law). Mostly this is done in different
provisions (e.g. articles 1(2) and 2(7) of the Charter or principles 2 and 6 of GA Res. 1514(XV)),
or sometimes it is implicit (e.g. the Covenants). Only in the CSCE instruments does the
proclamation and the restriction of self-determination occur in the same article.
Unfortunately, the flaw in the technique is that it does not fully satisfy either position. From
the legal perspective, the balancing of self-determination is never free from ambiguity. For
example, the balance between self-determination and territorial integrity in principles 2 and 6 of
the Colonial Independence Declaration boiled down to how a “people” and a “country” were
interpreted, and this was fertile nationalist territory. On the other hand, the balancing principles
were obviously inserted with the intention of restricting self-determination and protecting states’
interests, and from a nationalist perspective this made any declaration that all peoples had the
right somewhat hollow.
One solution has been to create a more sophisticated balance, and the present formula first
appeared in paragraph 7 of principle 5 in the Friendly Relations Declaration, although a similar
balance had been used fifty years earlier in the Åland Islands cases. This made the balance
between self-determination and territorial integrity less arbitrary by linking territorial integrity to
a government representing the whole people belonging to a territory without distinctions and thus
conducting themselves in compliance with self-determination. Its advantage was that, by
connecting self-determination to representative government, it restricted the right by satisfaction
rather than arbitrary limitation. However, the drafting and subsequent practice in Re. Quebec,
Tatarstan, Chechnya and General Recommendation XXI(48) suggest that paragraph 7 and its
successors in the Vienna and Fiftieth Anniversary declarations were really only more
sophisticated devices for protecting the integrity of states. The formula, thus, still suffers from the
problem of arbitrariness.
Balancing, therefore, shows two problems. The first is that the balances of principles remain
closely connected to nationalist ideas. As we saw in Chapter 1, national ideas and the ties that are
used to create them, can be readily accommodated by legal principles. A nationalist argument can
equally be made with national ties or legal principles. The second is that balancing appears as an
arbitrary and state-centred limitation on peoples’ rights. These problems have, in turn, effected
the approach of courts and tribunals to the issue of self-determination.
These problems were highlighted in Chapter 4. Balancing by itself suffered from a problem
of legitimacy with the result that a decision might appear as a defence of states’ rights (Katangese
People’s Congress v. Zaire) or become incoherent (Badinter Opinions). It was argued, therefore,
that courts and tribunals often supplement balancing with nationalist ideas. That they should do
this is quite understandable. As has been said, a balance between, for example, self-determination
and territorial integrity may boil down to how a “people” and a “country” are interpreted. To that
extent, building up or knocking down national ideas is only fleshing out this interpretation. If
legal principles and national ties are interconnected, why should they be separated? But, there is
also more to it. Self-determination argues that the legitimate basis for legal institutions and
principles lies in nations and peoples. Correspondingly, nations and peoples may be elaborated
specifically to legitimise those principles. Balancing with nationalist construction, in fact, seems
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to be the normal method when judicial bodies engage with self-determination. It can, at least, be
found in a majority of such cases: the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute, the Åland Islands
cases, Re. Quebec, Tatarstan, Chechnya and Western Sahara.  It can also be seen in individual
opinions, most notably Judge Ammoun’s Separate Opinion in Namibia. The national ideas
presented in these cases appear as political ideas intended to legitimise certain positions, rather
than simply stating the facts or filling in the background, and many follow familiar nationalist
themes. The basic nationalist counter-argument can be seen in Tatarstan and Chechnya, while the
counter-arguments in the Rapporteurs’ decision in the Åland Islands and Re. Quebec are from a
conservative school with affinities to Burke. Burkina Faso/Mali hugs the contours of African
nation-building and Judge Ammoun’s opinion fits snugly into Pan-Africanist thought.
What emerges from this study is a single thread running through the law of self-
determination, which consists of a doctrine of legitimacy that shapes the drafting of instruments,
the decisions of judicial bodies and the nature of obligations. It was said in the introduction that
considering that the law of self-determination is logically the product of the interaction between
nationalism and international law, focussing solely on positive law is only to tell half the story.
The problem with telling one side of a story is not only that important details are missing, but that
the narrative itself may be lost. The narrative of the law of self-determination is that it is
continuously shaped by perceptions of legitimacy resulting from the interaction of nationalism
and international law. The only way to really understand the law in this area is to look outside it.
c. Nationalism, Liberalism and the Structure of International Law
It was claimed in the introduction that international law is institutionally orientated towards
the nationalist argument. This statement may run counter to the preferred self-image of
international lawyers, but it follows logically from the law’s basic structure. Sovereign states,
which form the basis for international law, have, in turn, a national basis. Correspondingly, one
would expect relations between states to be expressed in national and nationalist terms. This is
borne out in instruments like the UN Charter and the Covenants, among others, and self-
determination’s prominent position in these instruments was justified on the grounds that it was a
“basis for friendly relations” and a “prerequisite for human rights”.
Despite the status of these conventions, these claims must be treated with some caution. The
phrases “basis for friendly relations” or “prerequisite for human rights” are simplistic slogans that
do little justice to the complex relationship between individuals, nations, states and international
law. As Hans Morgenthau noted:
“It has been its moral virtue and its besetting political sin to look at nationalism as though
it were a self-sufficient political principle and could bring freedom, justice, order, and
peace simply by being consistently applied. In truth, no political principle carries within
itself such a force for good. What good and evil it will work depends not only upon its
own nature, but also upon the configurations of interest and power in which and for the
sake of which it is called upon to act.”349
A similar point can be made about the “internal” and “external” aspects of self-determination.
This is the most explicit expression of the liberal nationalist matrix which underpins much of the
349 H. J. Morgenthau, “The Paradoxes of Nationalism” 46 Yale Review (1957) pp. 481-96 at p. 496.
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law of self-determination, the UN Charter system and international law more generally. The
doctrine of liberal nationalism has taken quite a knocking since the nineteenth century and many
of its suppositions cannot be accepted uncritically. The question is whether this is what internal
and external self-determination actually does? On the face of it, this does appear to be the case.
The language of the division certainly implies that national government (external self-
determination) is an extension of liberal government (internal self-determination). This may have
been plausible in John Stuart Mill’s day, but it was looking shaky by Woodrow Wilson’s time
and must be treated with considerable scepticism today.
But, there is another way of looking at internal and external self-determination. This is,
proceeding from the fact that the two aspects may not always be complementary, and that rights
may be most valuable where they are least established, there is a need for an internal, or liberal
counterpart to national self-determination. Self-determination as a pure slab of nationalism can be
pretty unappealing, and thus splitting the right in two, at least, provides a means to emphasise the
liberal as well as the national potential of the right. There may be support for this in the
Covenants and the Helsinki Final Act, where the division was introduced in the context of
promoting liberal government. It also may be seen in the criticism by Antonio Cassese, the
commentator who has been most prominent in promoting the division, that: “The work of the
United Nations has…  been one-sided [note the emphasis] in that it has concentrated on ‘external’
self-determination and neglected ‘internal’ self-determination.”350 Nonetheless, the formula is
undoubtedly problematic. The best defence for presenting the internal and external aspects of
self-determination as extensions of each other is the fact that the two can work against each other,
and the aim is to prevent this antagonistic relationship under the rhetoric that they are
complementary.
If this is the case, perhaps it might be more useful to talk directly about the “national” and
“liberal” aspects of self-determination. This would, at least, have the advantage of clarity.
However, this might also be its biggest drawback. Self-determination does not always want to be
clear. The substitution of liberal for national government in the Friendly Relations Declaration or
in Re. Secession of Quebec, might appear less convincing if it was actually spelt out in terms of
liberal and national aspects of self-determination. The actual argument that the right of peoples to
self-determination is satisfied by liberal government and does not have a nationalist aspect is
actually quite a hard one to make. Nonetheless, it does remain true that much of the
contemporary analysis of self-determination revolves around the relationship between its liberal
and national aspects, even if lawyers often seem to prefer to mince their words.
Liberal nationalism for all its faults does occupy an important position in international law,
both in the UN Charter and the law of self-determination. This relationship also has historical
depth and can be traced back to Bentham and Bluntschli and even to Montesquieu and Vattel.
There are institutional reasons why liberal nationalism should have this position. As was seen in
Chapter 2, liberalism, nationalism and international law have similar origins in the modern state
and in their own ways fill in the internal and external aspects of sovereignty. However, just as the
internal and external aspects of sovereignty are clearly related, so there is also a need for a
doctrine which can encompass all three.
On the external aspects of sovereignty, although international law contains rules and
principles governing the relations between states, it does not explain why those states should
350 A. Cassese, “Political Self-Determination - Old Concepts and New Developments” in A. Cassese ed., UN
Law/Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979) pp.
137-65 at pp. 147-8.
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exist in the first place. Liberalism also, while providing a rationale for the state, does so in a very
generic way. It does not address why the state system should take the particular form that it has.
Nationalism fills this void by providing each state with its own identity based on a supposed
“natural” foundation for the state and correspondingly the inter-state system. Equally
international law fills a void in nationalism. While the idea of a world of nations is implicit in any
nationalist doctrine (a nation is only a fragment of humanity), the idea that the nation is the basis
for the state provides little explanation, aside from the aforementioned slogans, on how states
should interact and co-operate.
On the internal aspects of sovereignty, liberals from Locke and Rousseau to Bentham and
Mill to Rawls351 and Dworkin352 have recognised the connection between a liberal order of
individual freedoms, representative government and the rule of law, and national identity and
institutions that reflect and even promote that identity. Individual human rights cannot be isolated
from political and legal institutions, and society at large, and nationalism provides a model for
both. However, while there may be a connection between liberal and national government, the
assertion that self-determination is the prerequisite for human rights is too simplistic. Nationalism
is focussed on peoples as collective entities and, it is argued, abstract ideas, rather than the
individuals that compose them. Indeed, it can be highly destructive of both individual rights and
individuals themselves. Liberalism and doctrines of individual human rights, thus, fill an
important blind spot in nationalism.
Liberal nationalism, which combines liberalism and nationalism with an idea of an
international community, therefore, provides a complete model that encompasses the individual,
the state and international society. Complete, though, is not the same as coherent. Liberal
nationalism, both conceptually and institutionally, is inherently unstable, combining actors and
interests which may be as much competitive as complementary. This probably accounts for both
how poorly the doctrine has stood the test of history, but also how often it is appealed to in spite
of this. The result is a familiar dilemma summed up well by former UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace:
“Globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to spur each
other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalization of contemporary life requires in
the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The Sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the
principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be
permitted to work against each other in the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles
at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the
community of States. Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while
finding a balanced design for all.”353
However, the strength of self-determination has always been that it seems to encompass
something good, while avoiding being pinned down on exactly how that good is to be achieved.
Its basic role is as a legitimising process which thrives in ambiguity. It might be argued, it has
been argued, that given this inherent ambiguity international law would be better off without it.
351 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Mass., 1999) at p. 23.
352 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana, London, 1986) at pp. 199-201.
353 Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN
Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 (1992) at para. 19.
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Realistically this is neither possible nor desirable. Self-determination underlines that international
law is not a stately edifice, but a dynamic process in which principles are negotiated and
renegotiated. After all, if the basis of international law is the sovereign state, it is only reasonable
that it should have its roots in the foundations of modern statehood.
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